Tate v. BD. OF EDUC. OF KENT COUNTY

GILBERT, Chief Judge. Deborah E. Tate was dismissed by the Board of Education of Kent County (County Board) from her position as a tenured teacher. The State Board of Education (State Board) reversed the County Board’s decision. Subsequently, the Circuit Court for Kent County overturned the State Board’s ruling and, in effect, adopted the County Board’s dismissal of Tate.

According to the record, Tate was in the residence of a male friend, where she sometimes resided, when, by happenstance, the police executed a warrant to search the premises. During the search, two marijuana plants and various marijuana paraphernalia were discovered. Tate was arrested. She maintained that she did not use or own the illegal items, but that the controlled dangerous substance and paraphernalia were the property of her friend, the tenant of the apartment.

Nevertheless, she pleaded guilty because she believed that under the broad sweep of Md.Ann.Code art. 27, §§ 287 and 287A, and the appellate decisions thereon, she was “technically guilty” of possession of the controlled dangerous substance and paraphernalia. Her guilty pleas, notwithstanding, Tate maintained her innocence, see then Md.Rule 731, now Rule 4-242(c) and North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 , 91 S.Ct. 160 , 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970). The district court placed Tate on probation before judgment for a period of eighteen months. ¹⁴⁷ Md.Ann.Code art. 27, § 292. That section then provided in pertinent part: “(b) Whenever any person who has not previously been convicted of any offense under this subheading or under any prior law of this State or the laws of the United States or of any other state relating to controlled dangerous substances ... pleads guilty to or is found guilty of any of the offenses specified in this subheading, the court, if satisfied that the best interests of the person and the welfare of the people of this State would be served thereby may, with the consent of such person stay the entering of the judgment of guilt, defer further proceedings, and place such person on probation subject to such reasonable terms and conditions as may be appropriate ____ Upon fulfillment of the terms and conditions, the court shall discharge such person and dismiss the proceedings against him.

Discharge and dismissal ... shall not be deemed a conviction for purposes of disqualifications or disabilities imposed by the law upon conviction of a crime ____ Any expunged arrest and/or conviction shall not thereafter be regarded as an arrest or conviction for purposes of employment, civil rights, or any statute or regulation or license or questionnaire or any other public or private purpose, provided that any such conviction shall continue to constitute an offense for purposes of this subheading or any other criminal statute under which the existence of a prior conviction is relevant.” 1 The County Board dismissed Tate because of the guilty pleas and because of a threatening note that she wrote to a student. 2 The State Board found that the writing of the ¹⁴⁸ note was not misconduct. That issue was not decided by the circuit court and, therefore, it is not before us. Md. Rule 1085. The State Board, in ruling on the County Board’s action with respect to the guilty pleas, reasoned that the latter’s dismissal of Tate was premature in light of Md.Ann. Code art. 27, § 292(b).

The State Board concluded that Ms. Tate was “still serving her probationary period.” The State Board observed that there was some parental dissatisfaction with the idea of Ms. Tate’s being returned to the classroom. Based on the record before it, the State Board concluded “that many of ... [the] parents were misinformed,” and that the parents believed that Tate had been found guilty of using drugs, or guilty of possession of marijuana. There was, according to the State Board, “little indication that the community was aware that although ... [Tate] entered a technical plea of guilty ..., she had not admitted to guilt, was not convicted, and was placed on a probationary period which, if successfully served, would expunge her record of the plea of guilty altogether.” The circuit court said that it “disagree[d] with the opinion of the State Board when it says that ... [Ms. Tate] was not convicted of either possession or usage of marijuana or any other drugs.” The court declared that Tate’s “guilt was found when she entered the pleas of guilty which were accepted by the Court.” The court held that Tate had been convicted, that she had not fulfilled the terms of probation at the time the County Board considered the matter, and that her firing by the County Board was proper. The trial court’s interpretation of § 292(b) deprives the statute of effect during the probationary period.

The circuit court’s ruling, if allowed to stand, means