Tate v. State

Marbury, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The appellant, Henry C. Tate, was tried and convicted of assault with intent to murder, by Judge Harris, sitting without a jury. He was sentenced to imprisonment in the Maryland Penitentiary for a period of five years. From that judgment and sentence he appeals.

On the evening of October 20, 1961, approximately fourteen men were engaged in drinking and shooting “crap” in an alley in Baltimore City. After drinking whiskey and losing thirty-five dollars in the game, the appellant believed that the prosecuting witness, one Butler, was using “loaded” or “crooked” dice. When Tate reached for the dice, he says that Butler drew a knife and placed it at his throat ordering him out of the game and alley. The appellant left the game and the alley, walked down Laurens Street where he met his brother and asked to borrow the latter’s 22 caliber rifle.

His brother went home and got the rifle, which he delivered to Tate. Appellant then returned to the alley with the rifle loaded with seventeen shells, told Butler that he was going to shoot him, and fired one shot which struck Butler’s arm and lodged in his ³¹⁵ stomach. After firing this shot, defendant left the alley. The next day he surrendered to the police at about 3:45 p.m.

He was lodged in a cell, went to sleep until he was awakened, was interrogated and gave the police a statement, beginning at 5:45 p.m. On December 8, 1961, appellant was tried and convicted under an indictment on the charge of assault with intent to murder John Butler before Judge Carter, sitting without a jury. He was sentenced to imprisonment in the Maryland Penitentiary for a period of seven years. On July 15, 1963, Tate filed a petition under the Post Conviction Procedure Act.

After hearing, Judge Oppenheimer ruled that the original presentment and indictment by the grand jury were invalid. He found the determining issue to be whether the petitioner was entitled to relief since he was not represented by counsel at a preliminary hearing before the committing magistrate where his plea of “guilty” was taken. In the lower left corner of the form of the commitment to jail was the handwritten word “Plea” and beneath that the typewritten letter “G”, which clearly indicated that the plea had been “guilty”. This commitment paper was before the grand jury when Tate was indicted.

Thus, ruled Judge Oppenheimer, the defendant was deprived of his constitutional right to be represented by counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings against him because, if the grand jury had not had the petitioner’s plea of guilty before it, he might not have been indicted. Judge Oppenheimer found the original presentment and indictment to be invalid and granted the appellant his discharge and release from the Maryland Penitentiary. On the same day the appellant was reindicted by the grand jury and subsequently convicted on the charge of assault with intent to murder Butler by Judge Harris, sitting without a jury. He was sentenced to imprisonment for a period of five years in the Maryland Penitentiary.

It is from this last judgment and sentence that the appellant brings this appeal. He claims that he has been placed in double jeopardy since he was prosecuted a second time when he had already been subjected to the risk of life and limb in a prior trial on the same set of facts. This point of double jeopardy was not raised or passed upon below, and the State urges that the question is ³¹⁶ not before us under Maryland Rule 885. The appellant counters by saying that the defense goes to the jurisdiction of the trial court.

We see no need to decide the point, preferring to treat the question as properly before us on the assumption, for the purpose of decision only, that the matter is jurisdictional. Matters of jurisdiction are always before this Court, and are exceptions to the general rule that this Court only considers what has been first passed upon below. Webb v. Oxley, 226 Md. 339 , 173 A. 2d 358 ; Heath v. State, 198 Md. 455 , 85 A. 2d 43 ; Berlinsky v. Eisenberg, 190 Md. 636 , 59 A. 2d 327 . On this assumption, we find the appellant’s contention of former