Tavakoli-Nouri v. State

ADKINS, Judge. Complaining that he was wrongfully arrested on suspicion of cutting the seat of a taxi cab in which he was riding, Kamran Tavakoli-Nouri, appellant, filed suit pro se in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County for false arrest, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, violations of his “Legal Rights and Civil Rights,” and national origin discrimination. He named as defendants (now appellees), Troopers Kevin Sinai and William Reaves of the Maryland State Police, the State of Maryland, the Maryland State Police, and the Motor Vehicle Administration (the “MVA”). Appellees moved to dismiss the complaint in its entirety, arguing that it failed to state a cause of action upon which relief could be granted and that the troopers were statutorily ⁷²³ immune from civil liability.

After a hearing, the circuit court granted appellees’ motion to dismiss. Appellant unsuccessfully moved to alter or modify judgment, and then noted this appeal. We have consolidated and rephrased the questions appellant presented for our review. I. Did the trial court err in concluding that appellant failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted against any of the appellees?

II

Did the trial court err in concluding that, alternatively, Troopers Sinai and Reaves had statutory immunity to all of appellant’s claims? Although we agree that appellant failed to state any claims arising from the decision to arrest and search appellant, we conclude that the complaint adequately alleges facts sufficient to assert a claim that the force used to make the arrest was so excessive that it violated his constitutional rights under Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Appellant should have been given an opportunity to amend his complaint to set forth a separate count regarding his improper manner of arrest allegations. We shall vacate the judgment of the circuit court, and remand so that appellant has an opportunity to do so.

FACTS According to appellant’s complaint, on August 25, 1998, he took a taxi cab to the MVA building in Beltsville, Maryland, planning to obtain a “Driver’s License or Non-Driver ID card.” While appellant was talking to an MVA supervisor, Trooper Kevin Sinai, who was a “security guard of that MVA office[,] approached [him] from behind and forcibly pulled [his] wrists behind his back and placed handcuffs on his wrists” without explanation. When appellant asked why he was being arrested, Sinai “refused to respond and failed to state a reason.... ” Along with Sinai, four more State police troopers “surrounded [appellant] at [the] MVA counter ... and K. Sinai dragged [appellant] while being handcuffed to a room at ⁷²⁴ the other end of the large hall of [the] MVA office.... ” Appellant alleged that the troopers improperly “us[ed] unreasonable and excessive force in brutally making [the] ... [a]rrest ... and dragging him across [the] MVA hall in handcuffs ... and conducting intrusive interrogations and unlawful searches in violation of ... all of [his] rights.” In the room, Trooper Reaves, “who was supervisor of the State Troopers present[,] conducted an unlawful and intrusive body search and search of [appellant’s] briefcase,” and emptied the contents of appellant’s shorts on a table. Trooper Reaves then handcuffed appellant to a chair in the room. He told appellant “that [the] taxi driver who had brought him to MVA had called police claiming that a cut on the seat of his taxi was allegedly caused by him.” “Although thorough searches of [appellant’s] briefcase and body ... proved that [appellant] did not have any sharp object with which he could have cut [the] seat,” the troopers “continued detaining [appellant]____” A second search of the briefcase confirmed that appellant was not carrying a sharp object.

Despite the lack of any sharp object, appellant was then questioned about his “life and his past and future plans and ... his address and his intention for residing at that address and ... why [he] needed [a] Driver’s License.” Appellant responded that he was living temporarily in the Econo Lodge Motel in College Park, Maryland until he could “find[ ] permanent housing.” The officers then called the manager of Econo Lodge to verify appellant’s address. After an hour, they released appellant without charging him. The taxi driver never filed charges against appellant. Appellant complained, unsuccessfully, to the trooper’s supervisor and to the Governor’s office.

The Maryland State Treasurer denied his claims under the Maryland Tort Claim Act in June 1999. He filed this suit on August 10, 1999. As a result of this incident, appellant claims, he was “obstructed ... from obtaining a[d]river’s [l]icense or State issued ID card that was most needed for [cashing checks] and [other] transaction^], and deprived ... [of] being able to ride his personal vehicle and [forced] to use public transporta ⁷²⁵ tion....” In addition, because the “State Troopers gave [her] ... the idea that [he] was in trouble with [the] law ..., the manager of the Econo Lodge evicted him and called a nearby [inn] to advise them not to rent to appellant.” Appellant had to move to another motel where the rate was more than $100 per week higher. Finally, appellant claims he “suffered emotional distress and anguish and lack of sleep.” DISCUSSION Appellant contends that the circuit court erred in granting appellees’ motion to dismiss his complaint. “In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Maryland Rule 2 — 322(b)(2), a court must assume the truth of all well-pleaded material facts and all inferences that can be drawn from them.” Rossaki v. NUS Corp., 116 Md.App. 11, 18 , 695 A.2d 203 (1997).

The material facts setting forth the cause of action “ ‘must be pleaded with sufficient specificity. Bald assertions and conclusory statements by the pleader will not suffice.’ ” Adamson v. Correctional Med. Svcs., Inc., 359 Md. 238, 246 , 753 A.2d 501 (2000) (quoting Bobo v. State, 346 Md. 706, 708-09 , 697 A.2d 1371 (1997)). On appeal, we view the well-pleaded facts of the complaint “in the light most favorable to the appellant,” Parker v. Kowalsky & Hirschhorn, P.A., 124 Md.App. 447, 458 , 722 A.2d 441 (1999), to determine whether the trial court was legally correct in dismissing the complaint.

Adamson, 359 Md. at 246 , 753 A.2d 501 . “The grant of a motion to dismiss is proper [only] if the complaint does not disclose, on its face, a legally sufficient cause of action.” Rossaki, 116 Md.App. at 18 , 695 A.2d 203 (citation omitted). I. Sufficiency Of Allegations Appellant’s complaint names five different causes of action — false arrest, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and violations of “Legal Rights and Civil Rights” — but does not set them forth in ⁷²⁶ separate counts. We shall consider whether appellant has alleged facts sufficient to state any of the causes of action he has attempted to plead. A. False Arrest And False Imprisonment Appellant claims that Troopers Sinai and Reaves falsely arrested and imprisoned him.

The torts of false arrest and false imprisonment “share the same elements.” Okwa v. Harper, 360 Md. 161, 189-90 , 757 A.2d 118 (2000). Both torts require that the plaintiff prove that he was deprived of his liberty “ ‘without [his] consent and without legal justification.’ ” Id. (citations omitted). Appellant alleged that he was arrested and detained, without a warrant, because the “taxi driver who had brought him to [the] MVA had called [the] police claiming that a cut on [the] seat of his taxi was allegedly caused by him.” Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol., 2000 Cum.Supp.), Article 27, Section 594B(e) provides that [a] police officer may arrest a person without a warrant if the officer has probable cause to believe: (1) That an offense listed in subsection (f) of this section has been committed; (2) That the person has committed the offense; and (3) That unless the person is immediately arrested: (i) The person may not be apprehended; (ii) The person may cause injury to the person or damage to the property of one or more other persons; or (iii) The person may tamper with, dispose of, or destroy evidence.

Offenses listed in subsection (f) include misdemeanor destruction of property. 1 See Art. 27, § 594B(f)(l)(iii). ⁷²⁷ We have held that to make a lawful warrantless arrest for destruction of property, section 594B(e) “requires that the officer must have probable cause to believe not only that the offense was committed, but also that it was committed by the arrestee. In addition, the officer must have probable cause with respect to at least one of the three disjunctive factors listed in § 594B(e)(3).” Howard v. State, 112 Md.App. 148, 159-60 , 684 A.2d 491 (1996), cert. denied, 344 Md. 718 , 690 A.2d 524 (1997). Probable cause is “ ‘a non-technical conception of a reasonable ground for belief of guilt, requiring less evidence for such belief than would justify conviction but more evidence than that which would arouse a mere suspicion.’ ” Id. at 160, 684 A.2d 491 (citations omitted). It “does not demand the certainty associated with formal trials; it is sufficient that a ‘fair probability’ existed .... based on the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable people act and is assessed by considering the totality of circumstances in a given situation.” Id. at 160-61 , 684 A.2d 491 .

In this case, appellant’s complaint reveals that the troopers had probable cause to believe that appellant had destroyed the personal property of another. Moreover, according to appellant’s complaint, the police had reason to believe that appellant was in possession of a sharp object which he had just used to cut the seat of a taxicab. They, therefore, had reason to fear that he might use the same instrument to harm the person or property of another or that he might quickly dispose of such an instrument, which was evidence of a crime under investigation. Given appellant’s presence in a public area, the concerns regarding possession and use of a sharp object, and the troopers’ immediate removal of him to a nonpublic area, the complaint also establishes that there was probable cause to believe that, unless appellant was immediately arrested, he might “cause injury to the person or damage to the property” of another, or might “dispose of, or destroy evidence.” See Art. 27, § 594B(e)(3)(ii) & (iii).

Because at least two of the three factors of § 594B(e)(3) were not satisfied, appellant failed to allege the elements of ⁷²⁸ false arrest and false imprisonment. Moreover, the facts set forth in his complaint actually support the conclusion that the police lawfully arrested him. Because appellant’s arrest was lawful, the search that followed that arrest was incident to it. See, e.g., Howard, 112 Md.App. at 162 , 684 A.2d 491 (valid search of person incident to warrantless arrest); Reimsnider v. State, 60 Md.App. 589, 597-98 , 483 A.2d 1324 , cert. denied, 302 Md. 681 , 490 A.2d 719 (1985) (valid search of briefcase incident to warrantless arrest).

B. Intentional Infliction Of Emotional Distress To support a prima facie claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must show: (1) the conduct is intentional or reckless; (2) the conduct is extreme and outrageous; (3) there is a causal connection between the wrongful conduct and the emotional distress; (4) the emotional distress is severe. In order for distress to be sufficiently severe to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, “the plaintiff [must] show that he suffered a severely disabling emotional response to the defendant’s conduct,” and that the distress was so severe that “no reasonable man could be expected to endure it.” Thacker v. City of Hyattsville, 135 Md.App. 268, 315 , 762 A.2d 172 (2000), cert. denied, 363 Md. 206 , 768 A.2d 55 (2001) (quoting Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560, 566, 570-71 , 380 A.2d 611 (1977)). Each element must be pled with specificity. See Foot v. Juvenile Svcs.

Admin., 78 Md.App. 151, 175 , 552 A.2d 947 , cert. denied, 316 Md. 364 , 558 A.2d 1206 (1989). Although appellant alleges that being dragged across the MVA hall in handcuffs caused him embarrassment and public humiliation, that the subsequent interrogation “caused him to feel inferior and ashamed about every answer he gave them,” and that “[a]s the result of this traumatic incident [he] suffered emotional distress and anguish,” he does not allege any facts that show that he had “a severely disabl ⁷²⁹ ing emotional response,” much less a distress so “severe that ‘no reasonable man could be expected to endure it.’ ” Thacker, 135 Md.App. at 315 , 762 A.2d 172 . Nor do the facts alleged rise to the level of intentionally “extreme and outrageous” conduct necessary to plead this cause of action. See, e.g., Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70 , 116 n. 22, 660 A.2d 447 (1995) (arrest, search, and interrogation were not extreme or outrageous).

C. Invasion Of Privacy The Court of Appeals has held that, “[e]ven if we assume, arguendo, that [appellant’s] arrest violated interests which the privacy tort is intended to protect,” the key to whether the arrestee has a claim of invasion of privacy is the “ ‘reasonableness under the facts