Taylor v. Brown

Robinson, J., delivered the opinion .of the Court. The following issues were sent by the Orphans’ Court of Baltimore City to the Court of Common Pleas for trial; 1st. Whether the sum of $6588.07, which at the time of the death. of Sarah Ann Brown, was deposited in the Eutaw Savings Bank, or any part thereof belonged to her estate ? 2nd. Whether the sum of $2063.63, being the proceeds derived from the sale of certain property mortgaged by John Creagh and wife to Sarah Ann Brown, was part of her personal estate ?

At the trial of these issues, evidence was offered tending to prove that both ¡of these sums belonged to Sarah Ann Brown, that an account was kept in the Eutaw Savings Bank in the joint names of the said Sarah and her husband, William Broion, and the survivor, and subject to the order of either ; and that the sum of $6538.07, thus on deposit in the Bank, was paid on the order of the husband after the death of his wife. On the other hand, evidence was offered on the part of the appellees, tending to prove that the money in question belonged to.William Brown the husband; and further, that if the wife had any claim or title to the money, it was paid to the husband and used by him with her Icnoivledge and consent. During the- trial, the appellants offered to prove b j the witness Taylor, that a few days after the deposit of $5000’ in the Savings Bank, he had a conversation with Mrs. - Brown in the presence and hearing of her husband, in which conversation, she explained to witness why her husband’s name had been placed.upon the pass-book of the Bank, and to which explanation no objection whatever was made by the husband. The $5000 thus deposited was part of the sum of $6538.07 paid to the husband after the death ³⁷¹ of the wife ; and any explanation by her made in the presence and hearing of her husband, why it was deposited in their joint names, and payable to the survivor, was clearly admissible.

If no objection was made by him to such explanation, his silence might fairly be construed as an acquiescence in the truth of the statement made by the wife. And we do not see on what grounds the evidence was excluded. But the bill of exception does not set forth the explanation, to prove which the witness was offered, and for all that appears to the contrary, the exploration may have been wholly unimportant or immaterial. To justify us in reversing the judgment, it must appear that the evidence objected to and excluded worked an injury to the appellants.

As was said in Lawson vs. Price, 45 Md., 123 , “Before we can reverse the ruling excepted to, we must be able to see that the party really has ground for exception and may have been injured by what was done. Eor aught that appears, the answer of the witness may have been more favorable to the -appellant than to the appellee.” So here it is'impossible for us to say that the appellants were in any manner prejudiced by the ruling below, because the record does not set forth either the purport or effect of the explanation offered in evidence. Wo see no objection to the ruling in the second exception. The real issue before the jury, was whether the money in controversy