Taylor v. Creswell

Robinson, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The will of Eliza A. Taylor, was admitted to probate on the 9th of December, 1872, and on the petition of the caveator, now appellant, issues, involving the execution of the will, knowledge of its contents by the testatrix, fraud and undue influence, were sent to the Circuit Court for trial. At the trial below, the caveator offered twelve prayers, the sixth, seventh, eighth and twelfth of which were refused, and the ninth was modified by the Court. We have carefully examined the record before us, and have not been able to find a particle of evidence to support either of these rejected prayers.

Proof was offered tending to show a want of testamentary capacity on the part of the testatrix, but this question was submitted to the jury, and all the instructions offered by the caveator, on this branch of the case, were granted by the Court. But there is no evidence from which the jury, in the exercise of a reasonable intelligence, could find either fraud or undue influence, or that the will was procured by persons standing in a confidential relation to the testatrix, or that the provisions of the will were the result of the suggestions or promptings of other persons, which the testatrix was un ⁴³⁰ able to resist. This case, like every other case, must be tried by tbe law and the evidence, and the Court very properly refused to grant instructions to the jury, upon an assumed statement of facts, in support of ■ which no evidence had been offered by the caveator. The twelfth prayer was also properly refused.

In this State, the presumption of law is in favor of sanity, and the burthen of proof is upon the party impeaching a will for want of testamentary capacity. Where permanent insanity is proven, the burthen is shifted, and in such a case the person setting up the will, must prove the competency of the testator at the time of its execution.' The twelfth prayer of the caveator however asserts, that if the testatrix was- of unsound mind at any time prior to the date of the will, or within a, few years after that date, the burden of proof is shifted to the caveatee. Evidence in regard to the condition of the mind, subsequent to the execution of a will, is admissible for the purpose of shedding light upon the inquiry, and thereby to assist the jury in determining the general question of testamentary capacity. But the bare proof of mental unsoundness a feto years after the execution of a will, without regard to the nature and character of such unsoundness, whether it be of a permanent or temporary character, will not be sufficient to rebut the presumption of law in favor of sanity, and thereby shift the burthen of proof.

So far then as concerns this case, if the will in question was properly executed, and the testatrix was of “sound and