Taylor v. Giant of Maryland, LLC

BATTAGLIA, J. We are asked to review a jury verdict in favor of the Petitioner, Julia M. Taylor, an African American female, in a suit in which she alleged both sexual discrimination and retaliatory termination against Giant of Maryland LLC, Respondent. 1 The focal point of our review of the discrimination ⁶³² verdict is the application of “comparator evidence” 2 in the context of Ms. Taylor’s claim of disparate treatment related to Giant’s requirement that she undergo an independent medical examination because of a gynecological condition. We also must determine whether Ms. Taylor adduced legally sufficient evidence to support the jury’s retaliatory discharge verdict, which was premised upon Ms. Taylor’s termination some twenty-five days after having filed a discrimination claim with the Prince George’s County Human Relations Commission. We seminally must also address whether it was appropriate for Ms. Taylor’s suit to proceed in state court or whether her claims had to be federally litigated. Ms. Taylor, a former tractor-trailer driver for Giant of Maryland, LLC, Respondent, filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County alleging not only breach of contract, but that Giant discriminated against her based on her race and gender under Section 42 of Article 49B, Maryland Code (1957, 2003 Repl.

Vol.), 3 and Section 2-222 of the Prince George’s County Code, 4 as a result of having required ⁶³³ her to undergo an independent medicai examination for “menorrhagia,” or heavy, prolonged menstrual hemorrhaging, 5 and uterine fibroids, when male truck drivers with health conditions of their own were not required to do so. Ms. Taylor also alleged that, within three weeks after she had filed her discrimination claim with the Prince George’s County Human Relations Office, Giant retaliatorily terminated her employment. She requested an award of $750,000 in compensatory damages and $750,000 in punitive damages as to each count, as well as a declaratory judgment that “the acts and practices” of Giant “violate the policies and laws of Prince George’s County and the state of Maryland,” to reinstate her employment with Giant with back pay, and to award her reasonable attorneys’ fees. After a seven-day jury trial, Ms. Taylor was the victor on the issues of sex discrimination and retaliatory termination, while Giant successfully defended on the issue of racial discrimination, culminating in an award of $644,751.00 in damages to Ms. Taylor. 6 Subsequently, Ms. Taylor was awarded attorneys’ fees in the amount $511,255.00 and costs in the amount of $33,670.00.

After Giant took appeals from the verdicts and the award of attorneys’ fees, the Court of Special Appeals reversed the judgments of the trial court, Giant v. Taylor, 188 Md.App. 1 , 981 A.2d 1 (2009), concluding that Ms. Taylor’s claims were preempted by Section 301 of the Labor-Management Rela ⁶³⁴ tions Act, 7 and even if they were not, Ms. Taylor failed to adduce legally sufficient evidence of discrimination and retaliatory termination. Moreover, although Ms. Taylor opposed review of her award of attorneys’ fees on grounds that Giant failed to note its appeal within the obligatory thirty days, the intermediate appellate court exercised its jurisdiction to review the award and vacated it, because Ms. Taylor was no longer the prevailing party. We granted certiorari, Taylor v. Giant, 412 Md. 495 , 988 A.2d 1008 (2010), to consider the following questions, which we have reordered: I. Does the Court of Special Appeals’ opinion announce an application of preemption law which is contrary to existing law? II; Has the Court of Special Appeals created a new, impossible standard for comparator evidence and “adverse employment action?” III.

Did Taylor present legally sufficient evidence that she was subjected to retaliatory treatment by Giant? We also granted certiorari to consider a related question, Taylor v. Giant, 412 Md. 495 , 988 A.2d 1008 (2010), as follows: Where the Respondent filed a notice of appeal 34 days after entry of a collateral order for attorney’s fees following judgment on the merits, did the Court of Special Appeals have jurisdiction to consider the second appeal? We shall hold that Ms. Taylor’s sex discrimination and retaliation claims were not preempted by Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (a). We ⁶³⁵ shall further hold that the trial court applied the correct standard for comparator evidence as it relates to adverse employment actions.

We shall also hold that Ms. Taylor adduced legally sufficient evidence to support the retaliation verdict, because a rational fact finder could have found that the decision-makers at Giant knew of her February 3, 2003 discrimination claim prior to the date of her termination, February 28, 2003. We address Ms. Taylor’s fourth question regarding the Court of Special Appeals’s jurisdiction to review the award of attorney’s fees and determine that the failure of Giant to appeal within 30 days was fatal to its claim about attorney’s fees but remand for the intermediate appellate court to consider other issues that were left unaddressed in Giant’s initial appeal. Background Ms. Taylor, an African American female, worked full-time as a tractor-trailer driver for Giant, making local deliveries of merchandise and groceries, from 1988 to 2003; she was a member of the Drivers, Chauffeurs and Helpers Local Union No. 639 Teamster’s Union at all times. At some point in 1995, Ms. Taylor was diagnosed with menorrhagia, or heavy, prolonged menstrual bleeding and fibroid tumors, by her gynecologist.

Ms. Taylor testified that she told her direct supervisor at the time, Pamela Sanford, of the diagnosis, and Ms. Taylor occasionally requested time off from work to facilitate her treatment. Ms. Taylor testified that, because of her condition, she would “start[] experiencing heavy bleeding sometimes prior to going to work, and it would interrupt the flow of preparing to get to work, getting dressed, getting showered,” which in turn delayed her arrival at work. At trial, it was established that Giant required its drivers to call in at least 1.5 hours ahead of a scheduled shift, if they were going to be tardy or absent. If a driver failed to abide by the call-in requirement twice within a one-month period, he/she could be subject to discipline.

Ms. Taylor testified that “on some days, if the bleeding was too heavy,” she would not have the ability to provide the required 1.5 hours advance ⁶³⁶ notice of her absence or lateness. Ms. Taylor began requesting Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) leave time in order to compensate for her gynecological-related lateness and absence, which Giant approved. Because of the call-in policy and Ms. Taylor’s inability to call in within the 1.5 hour time frame, however, Giant issued Ms. Taylor various disciplinary notices: A March 5, 2002 notice reflected that Ms. Taylor was late to her scheduled shift “twice within a 30 day period” and that her “[n]ext offense may result in more severe disciplinary action, up -to and including [germination”; a March 11, 2002 notice provided that “driver called 41 minutes prior to shift start at 07:15 am” and “[flailed to give required 1 1/2 hour notification.” A May 11, 2002 notice directed to Ms. Taylor similarly provided that Ms. Taylor “phoned in 1 hr. 2 min. prior to shift start time at 04:30 am” and “[n]ext offense may result in more severe disciplinary action up to and including termination.” Yet another notice, dated October 18, 2002, reflected that Ms. Taylor “called off sick” and “failed to provide medical documentation.” In response to the disciplinary notices, Ms. Taylor provided excuse slips penned by Dr. Jill Ladd, explaining that her violations of the call-in rule were due to a “gynecological problem.” Ms. Taylor also filed various grievances with Local 639, requesting that she have an opportunity to “present an explanation for [her] actions.” At the disciplinary hearing related to the notices, Ms. Taylor explained that she was unable to comply with Giant’s call-in rule because of her gynecological condition. At the November meeting, which was attended by several Giant officials, including Theodore Garrett, the Manager of Fair Employment at Giant, Ms. Sanford, Ms. Taylor’s supervisor, and Eric Weiss, Vice President of Labor Relations at Giant, Ms. Taylor was asked several questions about the effect her condition would have on her ability to abide by Giant’s call-in rule; various of those questions were included in a letter dated November 14, 2002, addressed to her and John Steger, a Local 639 official, as follows: ⁶³⁷ (1) Was Ms. Taylor physically incapable on March 4, 2002 and May 8, 2002 of providing Giant with 1.5 hours notice of her absences?

(2) If so, why? (3) Will there be occasions in the future where Ms. Taylor’s medical condition renders her physically incapable of providing Giant with 1.5 hours notice of her absence? (4) If so: (a) Why? (b) How frequently will Ms. Taylor be rendered physically incapable of providing the requisite amount of advance notice?

(c) What is the expected duration of Ms. Taylor’s physical inability to provide the requisite amount of advance notice? (d) Given the answer to 4(a), how much advance notice will Ms. Taylor be capable of providing during the period referenced in response to question number 4(c)? Ms. Taylor’s response was generated by Dr. Ladd in a letter dated December 11, 2002: As previously indicated on her FMLA forms, she has a problem with menorrhagia and uterine fibroids. On occasion she will suddenly start bleeding excessively.

This can occur suddenly, with no warning and when she hemorrhages she is required to get off her feet and rest to decrease the bleeding. This has required her to miss work, including 3/4/02 and 5/8/02. Unfortunately, these symptoms can occur quite suddenly, making it impossible for her to predict when she will need to stay home from work, and the sudden onset can prevent her from giving the required 1.5 hrs. notice to her job, as was the case on 3/4/02 and 5/8/02. There may be occasions in the future requiring Ms. Taylor to miss work without knowing 1.5 hrs. beforehand.

Some months the bleeding is manageable with routine activities, and some months it is not. She is currently trying different medical options to control this problem and if these fail, she will need to undergo surgery. To undergo major surgery is not a decision to be made lightly and is not unusual for my ⁶³⁸ patients to try other therapies for 6-12 months before finally scheduling a date. Mr. Weiss did not review the doctor’s response until some time in early January, because of vacation but, in the meantime, had advised Ms. Taylor by letter dated December 24, 2002 that he still had not received the- documentation 'he requested, and thus, “Giant ha[d] no choice but to seek a second medical opinion concerning Ms. Taylor’s ability to comply with the 1.5 hour call-in requirement.” Mr. Weiss directed Mr. Steger, the Local 639 official, to have Ms. Taylor set up an independent medical examination with the Kingstree Group, the relevant medical examiner, by December 31, 2002.

Mr. Weiss also stated that Ms. Taylor was required to take the examination by January 7, 2003, and that if she failed to do so, Giant would have “no choice but to deny her grievances” and perhaps to deny future requests for FMLA leave. After Mr. Weiss finally had an opportunity to review Dr. Ladd’s letter in January of 2003, however, he asked Josie Smith, Giant’s Human Resources Manager for Distribution, to explore whether Ms. Taylor’s gynecological condition presented a safety issue. Ms. Taylor did not attend the scheduled January 7, 2003 independent medical examination; another examination at the Kingstree Group was scheduled for January 23, 2003, but Ms. Taylor did not appear for that examination and requested to have the examination rescheduled for April 7, 2003. Ms. Taylor filed a discrimination claim on February 3, 2003 with the Prince George’s County Human Relations Commission, which provided, in pertinent part: On November 8, 2002, Management decided that the medical documentation used to initially approve my FMLA was now not adequate.

I was forced to provide additional medical documentation and they are now saying I have to undergo further testing with their doctors. Other employees (Male, White) are not similarly treated. The Prince George’s County Human Relations Commission mailed a notice of Ms. Taylor’s discrimination claim to Mr. ⁶³⁹ Garrett, the Manager of Fair Employment at Giant, with whom Ms. Taylor had met before, who testified that he received the claim on February 7, 2003. Ms. Taylor continued working for approximately three and a half weeks, until February 28, 2003.

That day, after Ms. Taylor’s shift, Ms. Smith called a meeting, which also was attended by Michael David, a shop steward, and Nick Galyean, the Fleet Safety Director at Giant. Ms. Taylor testified that she was told that the topic of the meeting was her safety and her “ability to drive the tractor-trailer” because of her gynecological conditions. During that meeting, all male personnel left the room while Ms. Smith and Ms. Taylor spoke alone about Ms. Taylor’s ailments. At trial, the parties’ versions of what was said in this private meeting differ.

Ms. Taylor testified that Ms. Smith told her she would have to submit to an independent medical examination and follow any and all recommendations made by Giant’s selected specialist, up to and including hysterectomy, which Ms. Smith denied. Further, Ms. Taylor testified that she was told she would be taken off the road and not “rehir[ed]” until she underwent an the independent medical examination and any recommended procedure, which she interpreted to mean she had been fired. Ms. Smith, on the other hand, testified that Ms. Taylor agreed to take the independent medical examination before the meeting adjourned. No independent medical examination occurred.

Rather, shortly after her meeting with Ms. Smith, Ms. Taylor applied for unemployment benefits and began looking for a new job. On March 6, 2003, she filed a claim of retaliation against Giant, in which she alleged she had been terminated as a result of her filing a discrimination claim on February 3, 2003: 8 I believe that the Respondent has retaliated against me for filing a Title VII based complained by terminating my employment because: On February 3, 2003,1 filed a discrimination complaint. On February 28, 2003, I was terminated from my employment. ⁶⁴⁰ I was told by the Human Resources Representative that I was terminated until I took a Physical. I explained to the Respondent that I just had a Physical in December 2002 (DOT).

The Representative stated that I was a safety risk and that is why I was being taken off the road. I believe that the Respondent has taken this action to further discriminate against me in retaliation for filing the previous Title VII complaint. Ms. Taylor also filed a grievance with Local 639 the same day, in which she set forth substantially the same allegations. 9 After a substantial procedural history and two removals to federal court and remands back to the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, the case proceeded before a jury for seven days on the issues of gender and race discrimination related to the required independent medical examination and the retaliatory discharge. At the close of a seven-day jury trial, both parties made the appropriate motions, which were denied.

After deliberating, the jury recorded its verdicts as follows: 1. Do you find by a preponderance of evidence that Giant of Maryland, LLC, discriminated against Plaintiff Julia M. Taylor on the basis of race prior to filing her February 3, 2003 charge of discrimination against Giant of Maryland, LLC, by requiring Plaintiff to submit to an independent medical exam (IME)? YES_ NO S 2. Do you find by a preponderance of evidence that Giant of Maryland, LLC discriminated against Plaintiff Julia M. Taylor on the basis of gender prior to filing her February 3, 2003 charge of discrimination against Giant of Maryland, LLC by requiring Plaintiff to submit to an independent medical exam (IME)? ⁶⁴¹ YES S NO_ 3.

Do you find by a preponderance of evidence that Giant of Maryland, LLC retaliated against Plaintiff Julia M. Taylor for filing a charge of discrimination on February 3, 2003, against Giant of Maryland, LLC by the actions taken by Giant of Maryland, LLC on February 28, 2003? YES / NO_ Thereafter, Giant filed a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, or in the Alternative, to Reduce the Award, in which it argued that Ms. Taylor’s gender discrimination and retaliation claims were preempted by Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act and that, in the alternative, Ms. Taylor failed to adduce legally sufficient evidence of discrimination and retaliation to support the jury verdict. The trial court denied the motion. Ms. Taylor filed a post-trial motion requesting attorneys’ fees and costs, which Giant opposed.

In a memorandum opinion and order, the trial court awarded attorneys’ fees in the amount $511,255.00 and costs in the amount of $33,670.00. The Court of Special Appeals reversed, in a reported opinion, 10 Giant v. Taylor, 188 Md.App. 1 , 981 A.2d 1 (2009), ⁶⁴² determining that Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (a) preempted Ms. Taylor’s discrimination and retaliation claims. Drawing upon the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef Inc., 486 U.S. 399 , 108 S.Ct. 1877 , 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988), the Court of Special Appeals reasoned that Ms. Taylor’s discrimination claim called for an “interpretation of the critical language of’ Article 22.7 of her collective bargaining agreement, which permitted Giant to request a re-examination of a D.O.T. approved driver if it had “reasonable cause to believe the employee has a physical or mental condition which necessitates that he be reexamined.” Giant, 188 Md. App. at 28 , 981 A.2d at 16 . Regarding Ms. Taylor’s sex discrimination claim, the Court of Special Appeals decided that the independent medical examination was not an adverse employment action and that Ms. Taylor’s male comparators were “not similarly situated to her, as a matter of law,” because they had different supervisors and their health conditions “could be followed and monitored” through the Department of Transportation’s mandatory physicals.

Id. at 37-38 , ⁶⁴³ 981 A.2d at 22-23 . In disposing of the related retaliatory discharge claim, the intermediate appellate court determined that Ms. Taylor failed to show “that the decision-makers in her termination ... knew before the termination that she had filed” a discrimination charge. Id. at 39-40 , 981 A.2d at 23-24 . Finally, in a separate, unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals reversed the award of attorneys’ fees to Ms. Taylor’s counsel, reasoning, in part, that Ms. Taylor was no longer “a prevailing party below,” and thus, that she was “not eligible for a statutory award of fees and costs under Article 49B, Section 42(c).” Discussion Initially, we must determine whether Ms. Taylor’s discrimination and retaliatory discharge claims must be decided in a federal forum rather than in a state court because of Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (a), involving violations of collective bargaining agreements, as Giant asserts.

Section 301 provides, in pertinent part: (a) Venue, amount, and citizenship. Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (a) (2006). Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, in providing federal courts jurisdiction to consider claims involving collective bargaining agreements, does not obviate state courts’ jurisdiction to entertain such cases. United Steelworkers of America v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362, 368 , 110 S.Ct. 1904, 1909 , 109 L.Ed.2d 362, 372-73 (1990), citing Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 , 82 S.Ct. 519 , 7 L.Ed.2d 483 (1962).

Rather, Section 301 does not permit the application of state law in the context of collective bargaining agreements. In effect, state-law causes of actions relating to violations of collective bargaining agreements are “displaced” by federal ⁶⁴⁴ law. United Steelworkers of America, 495 U.S. at 368 , 110 S.Ct. at 1909 , 109 L.Ed.2d at 372-73 . We observed in Batson v. Shiflett, 325 Md. 684, 717-18 , 602 A.2d 1191, 1208 (1992), that “[s]uits alleging a breach of a collective bargaining agreement are governed, not by state law, but by a special body of federal common law developed under § 301.” We also noted, nevertheless, that a state law claim which could be resolved without interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement could be brought in state court, even if the case required “addressing precisely the same set of facts.” Batson, 325 Md. at 720 , 602 A.2d at 1209 , quoting Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 410 , 108 S.Ct. 1877, 1883 , 100 L.Ed.2d 410, 421 (1988).

Thus, “mere parallelism between the facts and issues to be addressed under a state law claim and those to be addressed under § 301 does not render the state law analysis dependent on the labor contract.” Batson, 325 Md. at 720 , 602 A.2d at 1209 . When Giant initially was sued, it removed the case to federal court, asserting that Section 301 mandated federal preemption. Judge Deborah Chasanow of the United States District Court for the District of Maryland remanded the case to the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County and concluded that Ms. Taylor’s claims of discrimination and retaliatory discharge were not preempted by Section 301. See Taylor v. Giant, No. DKC 2004-0710, slip-op. at 21, 2004 WL 2191715 (D.Md. Sep. 13, 2004).

She put the question of the appropriateness of the federal forum in the context of whether the collective bargaining agreement between Local 639 and Giant was “central” to Ms. Taylor’s claims, which would require preemption, or whether interpretation of the agreement was only “tangential” to her claims, which would permit consideration in state court. Regarding the discrimination claim, Judge Chasanow determined that, whether white, male employees were treated differently than Ms. Taylor was a “purely factual question” that did not require an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. She also concluded that Ms. Taylor’s retaliation claim required no interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement and therefore Section 301 did ⁶⁴⁵ not apply. Rejecting Giant’s claim that Article 10 of the collective bargaining agreement, which permitted Giant to discharge an employee for “good cause,” was central to Ms. Taylor’s retaliation claim, Judge Chasanow reasoned that the issue was not “whether Defendant may discharge an employee for good cause, but whether Defendant’s alleged good cause was ‘manufactured! ] and orchestrated’ ... for the purpose in retaliation.” Taylor, No. DKC 2004-0710, slip op. at 14.

The Court of Special Appeals, however, reached the opposite conclusion regarding federal preemption, reasoning that Ms. Taylor’s theory of the case was “fluid and often elusive,” appearing at times to call into question Giant’s authority to require an independent medical examination in addition to a D.O.T. physical, under the collective bargaining agreement. Giant, 188 Md.App. at 28 , 981 A.2d at 16 . Our colleagues on the Court of Special Appeals concluded that Giant’s authority to require an independent medical examination was “not a matter of application of the words of that section of the CBA,” but a “matter of interpretation of the meaning of those words.” Id. at 29 , 981 A.2d at 17 . Before us, of course, Ms. Taylor disputes that her discrimination claim presents an interpretation of Article 22.7 of the collective bargaining agreement, but merely an inquiry into the application of that provision.

In so doing, Ms. Taylor relies upon Lingle, 486 U.S. 399 , 108 S.Ct. 1877 , 100 L.Ed.2d 410 , a case in which the Supreme Court held that a state law retaliatory discharge claim was not preempted by Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act. Giant responds that Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 213 , 105 S.Ct. 1904, 1912 , 85 L.Ed.2d 206, 216 (1985), a case in which the Supreme Court held that a state tort action for bad-faith handling of insurance claims was preempted by Section 301, is controlling. In Lingle , the issue involved whether a manufacturer terminated the employment of an individual for seeking worker’s compensation. The Supreme Court determined that Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act did not preempt ⁶⁴⁶ state law remedies, unless the resolution of the claim “depend[ed] upon the meaning of a collective-bargaining agreement.” Id. at 405-06 , 108 S.Ct. at 1881 , 100 L.Ed.2d at 418-19 .

The Court added that “not every dispute ... tangentially involving a provision of a collective bargaining agreement, is preempted by § 301,” such as provisions governing rate of pay and economic benefits relevant to the calculation of damages. Id. at 413 n. 12, 108 S.Ct. at 1884 n. 12, 100 L.Ed.2d at 423 n. 12, quoting Lueck, 471 U.S. at 211 , 105 S.Ct. at 1911 , 85 L.Ed.2d at 215 . The Court concluded that Ms. Lingle’s state law remedy was “ ‘independent’ of the collective bargaining agreement,” because the merits of her claim did not turn on an interpretation of the contract. Id. at 407, 108 S.Ct. at 1882 , 100 L.Ed.2d at 419 ; see also Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 124 , 114 S.Ct. 2068, 2078 , 129 L.Ed.2d 93, 110 (1994) (“when the meaning of contract terms is not the subject of dispute, the bare fact that a collective-bargaining agreement will be consulted in the course of state-law litigation plainly does not require the claim to be extinguished.... ”).

In Lueck , Roderick Lueck suffered a non-occupational back injury, submitted a disability claim with his health insurer, Aetna, and began receiving benefits that were subject to interception by his employer, Allis-Chalmers, which precipitated Mr. Lueck’s suit in state court in which he alleged that Allis-Chalmers had “‘intentionally, contemptuously, and repeatedly failed’ to make disability payments under the negotiated disability plan, without a reasonable basis for withholding the payments,” and thus, had “breached their duty ‘to act in good faith and deal fairly with [Lueck’s] disability claims.’ ” Lueck, 471 U.S. at 206 , 105 S.Ct. at 1908 , 85 L.Ed.2d at 212 . Addressing Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, the Court instructed that if “the state tort law purports to define the meaning of the contract relationship, that law is pre-empted.” Id. at 213 , 105 S.Ct. at 1912 , 85 L.Ed.2d at 216-17 . The Court observed that, in Wisconsin, the tort of bad faith handling of an insurance claim “intrinsically relate[d] to the nature and existence of the contract,” rendering the ⁶⁴⁷ “duties imposed and rights established through the state tort” wholly derivative from “the rights and obligations established by the contract.” Id. at 216-17 , 105 S.Ct. at 1914 , 85 L.Ed.2d at 218-19 . In so interpreting, the Court held that Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act preempted Mr. Lueck’s state tort claim.

In a case markedly similar to the case at bar, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit dealt with the same dichotomy. In Martin Marietta Corp. v. Maryland Commission on Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392 (4th Cir. 1994), Martin Marietta, a party to several collective bargaining agreements, sought to enjoin administrative proceedings undertaken by the Maryland Commission on Human Relations relative to a claim of discrimination filed by Franklin Price, pursuant to Article 49B of the Maryland Code. Martin Marietta petitioned the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, unavailingly, to enjoin the proceedings on grounds that Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act preempted Mr. Price’s claims. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of the injunction, observing that, while the collective bargaining agreements at issue contained provisions relating to “absence from work due to a work-related injury, as well as procedures for dispute resolution,” Article 49B provided both the “right to be free from handicap discrimination and a right to reasonable accommodation,” each of which were rights independent of the collective bargaining agreements.

Id. at 1399 . The Fourth Circuit concluded that it “seemed likely that Price’s handicap discrimination claim involve[d] no real issue of interpretation of the CBAs.” Id.; see also Owen v. Carpenters’ District Council, 161 F.3d 767, 776 (4th Cir.1998) (“In Dingle’s wake, we have held that state law claims of handicap discrimination, retaliation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress are not preempted by § 301 of the LMRA ... because the claims involved purely factual questions concerning the conduct of the employee and the conduct and motivation of the employer, and because no ⁶⁴⁸ interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement was required.”). We also have had occasion to address the Lingle-Lueck distinction in Batson, 325 Md. at 684 , 602 A.2d at 1191 . In Batson , A. Spencer Shiflett, a former president of Local of the Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America, brought suit against the national union as well as two of its representatives for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and conspiracy, arising from the union’s campaign to remove Mr. Shiflett from Office by alleging embezzlement and misappropriation of union funds.

After the jury returned a verdict in favor of Mr. Shiflett on all counts, the union representatives appealed, asserting, among other claims, that Mr. Shiflett’s state law claims were preempted by Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act. Specifically, the national union representatives asserted that Mr. Shiflett’s claims implicated a provision in the Union’s Constitution and Bylaws that “prohibit[ed] the Local from entering any collective bargaining agreement without the consent of the National Union.” Id. at 718 , 602 A.2d at 1208 . This Court, however, rejected the preemption claim, reasoning that Mr. Shiflett’s “claims of libel, slander, and intentional infliction of emotional distress [were] rights that exist[ed], under Maryland law, independent of any provision of the National Union’s Constitution or By-laws.” Batson, 325 Md. at 721 , 602 A.2d at 1210 . In the instant case, Giant alleges that it had the authority to request an independent medical examination under the terms of Article 22.7 of the collective bargaining agreement, which provides, in pertinent part: The Company shall not prohibit an employee with a current valid D.O.T. card from working unless the Company has reasonable cause to believe the employee has a physical or mental condition which necessitates that he be reexamined.

Whether Giant had the authority to order an independent examination of Ms. Taylor, or the requisite “reasonable cause” to require an independent medical examination, how ⁶⁴⁹ ever, are not in issue. 11 Rather, the issue, which was tested at trial, was whether Giant’s motivation in demanding the independent medical examination was in some way animated by Ms. Taylor’s race or gender. Nowhere in Ms. Taylor’s Second Amended Complaint does she allege that Giant somehow breached the terms of the collective bargaining agreement in requiring her, as opposed to her male counterparts, to undergo an independent medical examination. Rather, as the Second Amended Complaint lucidly states, Ms. Taylor ⁶⁵⁰ was alleging that Giant’s “request that Taylor take an IME was discriminatory, as it did not require its Caucasian or male drivers who were in the same or similar situation to take an IME.” It was clearly the application of the independent medical examination provision that was in issue, because Ms. Taylor’s allegations of race and sex discrimination turned, not upon the meaning of Article 22.7, but Giant’s design in invoking it. With respect to Ms. Taylor’s retaliation claim, we also disagree with Giant’s assertion that Article 10 of the collective bargaining agreement, which permits an employee to be discharged for “good cause,” required preemption.

Here, as with Ms. Taylor’s discrimination claim, the merits turned on Giant’s motivations for firing Ms. Taylor, not whether Giant breached Article 10 of the collective bargaining agreement by firing her, as illustrated by Ms. Taylor’s Second Amended Complaint: 113. Approximately, twenty-two (22) days after Plaintiff filed her first Charge of Discrimination with the PGHRC against Defendant, Giant on February 28, 2003 relieved Plaintiff of her duties as tractor-trailer driver unless she submitted to an IME under the guise that it was “concerned” about Plaintiffs safety. 115. Defendant’s actions associated with terminating Plaintiffs employment and the grievance proceedings were used to retaliate against plaintiff. Under these circumstances, Ms. Taylor’s retaliation claim was “independent of the collective-bargaining agreement,” and thus, not preempted.

Lingle, 486 U.S. at 407 , 108 S.Ct. at 1882 , 100 L.Ed.2d at 419 (instructing that a retaliatory discharge claim presents “purely factual questions pertaining] to the conduct of the employee and the conduct and motivation of the employer,” neither of which “requires a court to interpret any term of a collective bargaining agreement”). Our colleagues on the Court of Special Appeals, however, determined that the issue Ms. Taylor presented was whether Giant had the authority to order an independent medical ⁶⁵¹ examination, based on evidence adduced at trial. The issue of preemption, however, is not dependent upon evidence adduced at trial, but upon what is alleged as the focus in the discrimination claim. See Vera v. Saks & Co., 335 F.3d 109, 113-14 (2d Cir.2003).

As we have discussed, neither Ms. Taylor’s discrimination nor her retaliation claims alleged breaches of the collective bargaining agreement, so that federal preemption did not arise. In addressing Ms. Taylor’s sex discrimination claim, we must clarify the appropriate legal standard for comparator evidence as it relates to adverse employment actions, an issue of first impression in this Court. See Rosemann v. Salsbury, Clements, Bekman, Marder & Adkins, LLC, 412 Md. 308, 314 , 987 A.2d 48, 52 (2010) (“[O]ur review [of a purely legal question] is non-deferential to the judgments of the intermediate appellate court and the trial court.”). Ms. Taylor’s claim of disparate treatment emanated from Section 2-222 of the Prince George’s County Code, which stated: No employer in the County shall discharge or refuse to hire any person, or act against any person with respect to compensation or other terms and conditions of employment, or limit, segregate, classify, or assign employees because of discrimination.

Prince George’s County Code (2003), Section 2-222. The umbrella provision, of course, for her claim was Section 42 of Article 49B of the Maryland Code, which provided, in pertinent part: (a) Authorized.• — In Montgomery County, Prince George’s County, and Howard County, in accordance with this subtitle, a person who is subjected to an act of discrimination prohibited by the county code may bring and maintain a civil action against the person who committed the alleged discriminatory act for damages, injunctive relief, or other civil relief. Maryland Code (1957, 2003 Repl.Vol.), Section 42 of Article 49B. ⁶⁵² In proving her claim of disparate treatment, Ms. Taylor utilized evidence regarding four male truck drivers at Giant with significant health problems, none of whom was required to undergo an independent medical examination. Our colleagues on the Court of Special Appeals, however, determined that Ms. Taylor’s evidence was “not such as to allow any reasonable fact-finder to conclude that Taylor was treated differently — that is, required to undergo an IME by a Giant-specified doctor for a condition not covered by a DOT physical — than similarly situated male employees at all, let alone on the basis of gender.” Giant, 188 Md.App. at 38 , 981 A.2d at 23 .

In attempting to overcome the decision of the Court of Special Appeals regarding comparator evidence, Ms. Taylor asserts that the intermediate appellate court “created new evidentiary standards which are at odds with existing law and will be impossible to achieve.” Giant contends, however, that the male comparator evidence was inapposite, because an independent medical examination was unnecessary to monitor their condition. In addressing the issue of appropriate comparator evidence, we recognize the dearth of our own jurisprudence on this issue, as well as our history of consulting federal precedent in the equal employment area. Haas v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 396 Md. 469, 481 , 481 n. 8, 914 A.2d 735 (2007) (“Title VII is the federal