Taylor v. State

Anderson, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The issue before the Court in this appeal concerns the circumstances under which a criminal accused should be allowed to withdraw a plea of guilty. The appellant, James Joseph Taylor, was charged by criminal informations with having passed two worthless checks in violation of Md. Code, Art. 27, § 142 (1968 Cum. Supp.).

That Code section in pertinent part provides : “Every person who, with intent to cheat and defraud another, shall obtain money, credit, ⁵⁶⁰ goods, services .. . . or anything of value, five hundred dollars or more, by means of a check, draft or any other negotiable instrument of any kind drawn ■. . . upon any bank, person, firm, or- corporation not' indebted to drawer, or where the drawer or, drawers thereof shall not have provided for the payment or acceptance, . . . and the same be not paid upon presentation, shall be deemed to have obtained such money, credit, goods, services ... or things of value by means of a false pretense. . . . The giving of the aforesaid worthless check, draft or negotiable instrument . . . shall be prima facie evidence of intent to cheat or defraud . . .” The appellant allegedly violated that section when he gave two checks, one in the amount of $1813.75 and the other in the amount of $2500.00, to Standard Pontiac, Inc., in exchange for an automobile. The checks were dishonored upon presentment to the bank on which they were drawn. When the cases were called for trial in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, Judge Samuel W. H. Meloy presiding, the appellant’s then counsel stated to the court that the appellant desired to enter a plea of guilty to both charges.

Judge Meloy questioned the appellant personally; and upon the appellant stating that he did not think he was guilty the court refused to enter a plea of guilty. The court recessed for ten minutes after which appellant’s attorney said to the court: “If your Honor please, for the record, to kind of clarify what took place before your Honor took a recess, I have discussed the matter thoroughly before today with my client. I am very familiar with the facts with my own independent investigation and from what my client told me, and I have discussed the matter with him, I would say, no fewer than a dozen occasions, ⁵⁶¹ and I am thoroughly familiar with the facts in the case from what he has told me and my own independent investigation. “When your Honor asked him the question was he pleading guilty because he was guilty and for no other reason, your Honor, I explained to my client what that meant and his hesitating before. The facts would reveal, of course, when he gave the checks he knew that he did not have the money in the bank to cover the checks, which, of course, under the law is prima facie evidence of the intent.

He thought that he was going to get the money from a third person to cover the checks by the time they cleared. I explained to him this made him guilty under the law, and he, understanding that now, would like to enter a plea of guilty. This is my understanding.” The court then extensively questioned the appellant. The appellant acknowledged that he had received a copy of the informations, that he had read them and that he understood them; that he had ample opportunity to discuss with his attorney the allegations contained in the informations; that he understood that the minimum sentence was two years and the maximum sentence was ten years; that he understood that if he chose to plead not guilty he would be afforded a speedy and public trial by jury or by the court, the right to confront the witnesses against him, the right to use judicial process to compel the attendance of witnesses on his behalf, and the right to be represented by competent and able counsel throughout all stages of the proceedings; that no one had offered him any inducement or promise of leniency or probation if he pled guilty; that no one had applied any duress, force or intimidation to make him plead guilty; that he believed his attorney understood what he (appellant) had told him about the facts and circumstances concerning the allegations and that his attorney had done everything pos ⁵⁶² sible for him up to the present time.

The appellant then was asked by the court, “Are you pleading guilty because you are in fact guilty?,” to. which the appellant responded, “Yes, sir.” The court