Taylor v. State

Murphy, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Appellant was convicted at a court trial of unlawfully possessing and controlling marihuana and methadone and was sentenced to three years under the jurisdiction of the Department of Correctional Services. He contends on this appeal that the trial judge erred in overruling his objection to the admission of evidence which he claims was unconstitutionally seized. Robert Puepke, a Baltimore City police officer, testified that at 12:15 a.m. on February 27, 1969, he observed a car occupied by two young men parked in front of a bar in a high crime area of the city; that he requested appellant, who was sitting behind the wheel, to show him his license and vehicle registration because “it’s the younger generation generally observed stealing cars”; that he took these documents which bore appellant’s name (James Edward Taylor) and called police headquarters for “verification on a warrant check” and to determine if the vehicle was stolen; that he was told by headquarters personnel that there was an outstanding assault warrant for James Edward Taylor; and that as this was appellant’s name and he fit the given description of the wanted man, he arrested him as he stood outside of ⁴⁰⁵ his car.

Puepke testified that after arresting appellant he looked into the car and “observed laying on the front seat two brown envelopes, and, from my past experience, knowing that these envelopes are used for narcotic drugs, I examined the envelopes.” Puepke discovered a large number of capsules and a leafy substance inside the envelopes. Later examination revealed that the envelopes contained methadone and marihuana and this evidence was admitted at the trial over appellant’s vehement objection. Appellant contends that Officer Puepke had no right to check his driver’s license and vehicle registration because at the time, his car was parked and no violation of the law had been observed by the officer. He contends further that even if the officer had such a right, he could not detain him after the license and registration were exhibited.

Appellant urges, in effect, that he was under arrest prior to the moment that Officer Puepke observed the brown envelopes in the car, and that as such arrest was illegal, the subsequent seizure of the envelopes was likewise illegal. But even were the arrest found to be legal, as predicated on the outstanding assault warrant, 1 nevertheless it is appellant’s final contention that, under Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752 , the police could only make a protective search of his person for weapons, but not of his vehicle, since he was arrested outside of it for a crime of which there are no fruits properly subject to seizure. Maryland Code, Article 66⁴, Section 97, provides in relevant part that “Operating [drivers] licenses shall at all times be carried by the licensee when operating a motor vehicle upon the highways of this State, and shall be subject to examination upon demand by a uniformed officer of the law, * * Section 81 of the same Article provides that the vehicle “registration card shall be carried at all times in the vehicle to which it refers or shall be carried by the person driving or in control of such ve ⁴⁰⁶ hide who shall display the same upon demand of any uniformed officer of the law.” That these sections are applicable only to uniformed officers of the law is clear. See Cornish v. State, 215 Md. 64 .

The applicability of the statutes do not, however, depend upon whether the operator has committed some traffic or other violation of law, Burkett v. State, 5 Md. App. 211 , nor are they inapplicable simply because the vehicle is parked, rather than in actual operation, Shipley v. State, 243 Md. 262 . We think Officer Puepke — who the record discloses to have been a uniformed officer — had the right to ask appellant for his driver’s license and registration card. We hold that appellant was not placed in an arrest status solely because Officer Puepke sought to verify these documents in the stated manner. And upon learning of the outstanding assault warrant, and being given a description of the wanted person which corresponded to that of appellant, we think the officer had probable cause to make the arrest.

Lievers v. State, 3 Md. App. 597 ; St. Clair v. State, 1 Md. App. 605 . But even if the initial restraint were deemed to be illegal, this would not of itself vitiate the subsequent legal arrest based on the information