Teackle v. Crosby

Eccleston, 3., delivered the opinion of this court. The Act of 1854, ch. 193, sec. 1, authorises an insolvent to make application, as such, by a petition stating his insolvency, and offering to deliver up, for the benefit of his creditors, all his property, real and personal, and “exhibiting therewith a schedule of his property, and a list of the debts due from and owing to him, with the names of his debtors and creditors, all verified by affidavit,” &c., &c. Edward Higgins filed his application for the benefit of the insolvent law, on the 30th of March 1858, and on the same day, the commissioner of insolvents, for the city of Baltimore, appointed St. George W. Teackle trustee, who gave a bond as such, which was approved, and received from the insolvent a deed of all his property. The trustee also filed the usual certificate, that he had received from the insolvent all his property and evidences of debt mentioned in his schedule.

Subsequently, on the 2ist of April 1858, the appellees, as creditors of Higgins, filed their petition, charging, that he had filed his petition for the benefit of the insolvent law, but had not “exhibited therewith,” as required bylaw, “a schedule of his property, and a list of the debts due from and owing to him, with the names of his debtors and creditors, all verified by affidavit.” The appellees, in their petition, also objected ²¹ to the appointment, of Mr. Tcackle as trustee; and prayed that the proceedings of the commissioner, and the appointment of the trustee, might be annulled and revoked, and the petition of Higgins be dismissed. After the trustee had put in his answer, the court passed an order rescinding the appointment of the trustee, upon the ground of its having been prematurely made. By the same order, the application of Higgins was remanded to the commissioner, who was ordered and directed to appoint a trustee as if sufficient schedules and lists had been originally filed; provided Higgins should file full and sufficient schedules of his debts and credits, with full and sufficient lists of his debtors and creditors, under oath, and as far as he could ascertain the same, but not otherwise. Prom this order the trustee has appealed.

Higgins certainly failed to comply with the provisions of the Act, and his failure to do so ought to debar him from obtaining a release from his debts until he does comply with the requirements of the statute. Such, we think, was the design of the law, but we cannot suppose it ever was intended that such a failure on his part, should have the effect of rescinding the appointment of his trustee. It is, manifestly, one of the main objects of the insolvent system to have the property of the applicant placed, promptly and securely, in the hands of a trustee, to be converted into money and distributed amongst the creditors as speedily as practicable. IÍ be is to be removed, merely because of the insolvent’s non-compliance with the law, in the particulars mentioned, and no other trustee is to be appointed until the insolvent does comply, it will be allowing his misconduct to prejudice, delay and hinder the creditors, without any neglect or fault on their part, or that of the trustee.

An interpretation of the law producing such consequences could not have been intended by the Legislature, nor would it be calculated to insure a compliance with its provisions. But a more reasonable interpretation, and much more likely to have the requirements of the Act complied with, would be to retain the trustee, and at the same time deny to the applicant a final discharge until he does comply. ²² The appellees, in their petition, also urged, as a reason for removing the trustee, that he “did not represent any of the creditors, but was counsel for the applicant.” This, where, in other respects, the trustee is an unexceptionable person, cannot be a sufficient ground for rescinding the appointment, and ordering another trustee to be appointed only when the insolvent shall have “filed full and sufficient schedules of his debts and credits, with full and sufficient lists of his debtors and creditors, under oath.” From what has been said, it will be seen, that we concur with the judge below in regard to so much of the order appealed from, as remanded the case to the commissioner for the purpose of giving the insolvent an opportunity of complying with the provisions of the Act of 1854. But we