Teays v. Supreme Concrete Block, Inc.

Lowe, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. ¹⁶⁷ The appellant, Carl M. Teays, sued his former employer Supreme Concrete Block, Inc., (and its manager) for wrongfully discharging him from its employment. The defendants (appellees here) demurred on the ground: "That the Declaration fails to make out a cause of action cognizable in Maryland. Specifically, in Maryland an employment contract which is for an indefinite term may be terminated at will by either party, without regard to the reasons for such termination.” Finding the law of Maryland to be as alleged, Judge John P. Corderman sustained the demurrer in the Circuit Court for Washington County on June 23, 1981, without leave to amend. He was right.

Before the time expired during which that final judgment could be appealed, however, the Court of Appeals judicially enacted a comparable cause of action for Maryland, recognizing that it was adopting anew an extension of the common law theretofore unrecognized in Maryland. On July 16, 1981, the Court decided Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31 , holding that at least from that date on "Maryland does recognize a cause of action for abusive discharge by an employer of an at will employee when the motivation for the discharge contravenes some clear mandate of public policy. . . .” Id. at 47 . On July 17, 1981 Mr. Teays appealed, citing substantial authority to support his claim that despite the correctness of the judgment below at the time it was rendered, he is entitled to the application on appeal of the new law. In his usual careful and exhaustive manner, our former Chief Judge Orth examined that principle in Firstman v. Atlantic Constr. & Supply, 28 Md. App. 285 (1975).

Quoting from Yorkdale v. Powell, 237 Md. 121, 124 (1964), decided by ¹⁶⁸ the Court which he was destined to join, Judge Orth noted in Firstman that: "'Maryland consistently has followed the rule that 'an appellate court is bound to decide a case according to existing laws, even though a judgment rightful when rendered by the court below should be reversed as a consequence,’ as Judge Markell, for the Court, repeated in Woman’s Club v. State Tax Comm., 195 Md. 16, 19 (or, it may be noted, even when a judgment wrong when rendered is made right by the change in the law). See also for this proposition that a change in the law after a decision below and before final decision by the appellate Court will be applied by that Court unless vested or accrued substantive rights would be disturbed or unless the legislature shows a contrary intent, Keller v. State, 12 Md. 322 ; Day v. Day, 22 Md. 530 ; Gordy v. Prince, 175 Md. 688 ; Cockerham v. Children’s Society, 185 Md. 97 ; and Tudor Arms Apts. v. Shaffer, 191 Md. 342 .’ ” Id. at 296-297. Caught midstream, appellees were forced to change horses, despite President Lincoln’s admonition to the contrary. Compelled to acknowledge the Firstman concept, they orally, and unconvincingly, argued to us that the concept of entitlement to a change in the law should be restricted to statutory or rules changes.

Somehow, it seems, they find a difference when the Court of Appeals changes the common law. They contend that none of the cases referred to by appellant, or presumably in Firstman , apply when the common law is changed by the Court. But even that argument is not entirely correct. In Pope v. State, 284 Md. 309 (1979), the Court of Appeals acknowledged that we were correct