Teves v. State

¹⁹⁶ Mason, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The appellant, William Edward Teves, was convicted by a jury in the Criminal Court of Baltimore of murder in the first degree, the use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence, and unlawfully wearing a handgun upon his person. He was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment for the murder conviction and consecutive terms totalling eighteen years for the handgun convictions. According to the evidence adduced at trial, on November 20," 1974, around 2:00 a.m., the appellant in the company of three other persons randomly fired a pistol into the air.

Officer Greiner of the Baltimore City Police Department, apparently in response to a complaint, approached this group and said, “Everybody stop and keep you hands still.” Whereupon the appellant fired three shots at the officer from a range of six to eight feet. Although seriously wounded, the officer was able to radio for help and to give a description of his assailant. Within minutes after the shooting, the appellant, who fit the description, was seen by the police. After a brief chase, the appellant was arrested.

Ten days later Officer Greiner died. At trial the appellant did not take the stand. Evidence, however, was introduced which indicated the appellant had been drinking prior to the incident, and that the alcoholic content of his blood was .18%. The appellant argues that the court’s instruction on intoxication unconstitutionally placed the burden of persuasion on him to prove he was so intoxicated he could not form the specific intent necessary to commit the offense. 1 The challenged portion of the jury instruction reads: To raise murder to first degree, as I have said the State must show that the killing was wilful, ¹⁹⁷ deliberate and premeditated.

So, the question of whether the accused was in such a condition of mind, by reason of drunkenness, to be capable of deliberation and premeditation, as I have defined it previously, is a matter for you to determine. While voluntary intoxication can be a defense to a specific intent crime, such as murder in the first degree, the degree of intoxication which must be demonstrated to exonerate a defendant from these charges is great. (Emphasis supplied). Significantly, this particular language which is now assailed was lifted verbatim from State v. Gover, 267 Md. 602 , 298 A. 2d 378 (1973), and is a correct statement of the law as to the level of intoxication necessary before the defense of intoxication can prevail in a specific intent crime.

Generally, voluntary drunkenness is no defense to a criminal charge. Breeding v. State, 220 Md. 193, 199 , 151 A. 2d 743 (1959). The only exception to this occurs when a defendant, charged with a crime requiring a specific intent, is so drunk that he is unable to formulate that mens rea. His intoxication then will excuse his actions and serve as a defense.

Avey v. State, 249 Md. 385 , 240 A. 2d 107 (1968). State v. Gover, 267 Md. at 606 . On authority of In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, 364 , 90 S. Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), and Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684 , this Court in Evans v. State, 28 Md. App. 640 , 349 A. 2d 300 (1975), aff'd, 278 Md. 197 , 362 A. 2d 629 (1976), held inter alia, that it is unconstitutional to impose upon a defendant a burden of proving by any standard his innocence as to any element of a crime or to relieve the State of its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt any element of the crime charged. In State v. Evans, supra, the Court of Appeals observed that the principles of Mullaney were applicable to any defense theory of justification, excuse, mitigation, including, among other things, intoxication.

In State v. Grady, 276 Md. 178 , 345 A. 2d 436 (1975), the ¹⁹⁸ following instruction was challenged as placing the burden upon the defendant to establish his alibi defense: With reference to alibi, a defendant may be entitled to acquittal if you believe the alibi testimony as his not being present at a time and place of the alleged offense, by taking into consideration this testimony with all the other evidence raising a reasonable doubt of guilt, but in order to prove an alibi conclusively, the testimony must cover the whole time in which the crime by any possibility might have been committed, and it should be subjected to rigid scrutiny. 276 Md. at 181 . The Court of Appeals in its analysis of that instruction said: ... we conclude that it was improper to explain alibi testimony as did the trial judge since, at the very least one rational interpretation of the words used would place an impermissible burden of proof upon the respondent.. . . 276 Md. at 185 . The appellant contends that the rationale undergirding Grady, supra, compels reversal here. We disagree.

Instructions must not be judged in artifical isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge in determining whether the principles of Mullaney were violated. State v. Garland, 278 Md. 212 , 362 A. 2d 638 , (1976). Even if we were to decide,