Thomas v. Higgins

Brent, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The questions arising upon this appeal, depend upon the construction of a deed executed by a certain Daniel Martin, wherein he conveyed on the 19th of March, 1841, the land in controversy as follows: “Unto James A. Waddell and Emmeline, his wife, for their joint and natural lives, and to the survivor of them during his or her natural life, * * * * remainder to the said Daniel James Waddell and William Waddell, as tenan'ts in common, during the natural life of each of them; remainder to the heirs of the body of the said Daniel James Waddell and William Waddell respectively, and in default of such issue living at the time of the death of the said‘Daniel James and William respectively, remainder to the heirs of the bodies of the said James A. Waddell and Emmeline, his wife, living at the death of the survivor .of them, and in default of such issue living at the death of the survivor as aforesaid, remainder to the heirs of the said Emmeline Waddell in fee-simple.” Upon the facts, as set forth in the agreed statement of counsel, the first and main question to be determined, is, what estate did Daniel and William take under the terms of this deed? That the rule in Shelley’s Case is of binding force in this State is well settled, and it is so recognized in the briefs filed by the respective counsel. This rule, is so fully set out in the decisions of this Court, and especially in the cases of Ware vs. Richardson, 3 Md., 544 , and Simpers’ Lessee vs. Simpers, 15 Md., 160 , that it is unnecessary to repeat it here.

So imperative are its requirements when it is applicable, that.it will control the operation of the grant and vest the whole estate in the ancestor, though the instrument declares he shall only have a life estate. It is claimed on the part of the appellee, that it controls the estate taken by Daniel and William Waddell under the deed in question. The appellants, while they concede ⁴⁵¹ that the terms, “remainder to the said Daniel and William as tenants in common, during the natural life of each of them, remainder to the heirs of the body of the said Daniel and William respectively,” standing alone would vest the whole estate in them, contend that the subsequent words ‘ in default of such issue living at the time of the death of the said Daniel and William respectively,” &c., so modify the meaning of the words “ to the heirs of the body of the said Daniel and William respectively,” as to make them a particular designation of certain persons as a root from whom the inheritance is to emanate. This narrows very much the question presented, and leaves us to consider whether the legal meaning of the word heirs is modified by the subsequent words “such issue living' at the time of the death,” &c.

The word issue is one of doubtful import. Its legal sense is one of very general signification and includes all persons having a common ancestry. Its true interpretation must be found from the connection in which it is used, noscitur a sociis. It may bo used in the sense of heirs, and if from its connection and association with words of reference it is plain that it is used in that sense, it must be so taken.

In the