Thomas v. State

CATHELL, Judge. Charles Leon Thomas, appellant, was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County of first degree ⁴⁴¹ murder. He was subsequently sentenced to life with all but 30 years suspended. Appellant presents a number of issues on appeal.

We address only the issue of whether the trial court judge failed to afford the appellant an adequate opportunity to elect between a jury trial and a bench trial. We hold that the trial court did not afford appellant an opportunity to waive his right to a jury trial and thus to assert his right to a court trial. This failure deprived appellant of his right to choose a court trial. We shall therefore reverse.

The Law There is, in Maryland, a long standing common law right to choose between a trial by jury and a trial by the court. See Martinez v. State, 309 Md. 124 , 522 A.2d 950 (1987); State v. Zimmerman, 261 Md. 11 , 273 A.2d 156 (1971); Rose v. State, 177 Md. 577 , 10 A.2d 617 (1940); Epps v. State, 52 Md.App. 308, 450 A.2d 913 , cert. denied, 294 Md. 633 (1982); Gilbert v. State, 36 Md.App. 196 , 373 A.2d 311 cert. denied, 281 Md. 737 (1977); Williamson v. State, 25 Md.App. 338, 333 A.2d 653 (1974). Judge Moylan stated in Gilbert, supra, that, “[i]n this State, however, we elect between equal trial modes. We do not waive a favored trial mode (trial by jury) in favor of an inferior or unfavored mode (trial by court).

We elect between equally attractive and equally venerable modes of trial.” Gilbert, 36 Md.App. at 210 , 373 A.2d 311 ; Zimmerman, 261 Md. 11 , 273 A.2d 156 . This Court stated in Epps, supra, that “there is no legal difference between jury trial and bench trial.” 52 Md.App. at 313 , 450 A.2d 913 . We further declared that the choice between a jury trial and a bench trial is a “choice of equals.” Id. at 313 n. 5, 450 A.2d 913 . Appellee argues, correctly, that the cases concerning choice have been based on the “choice of equals” language which “emanated” in Rose .

The Court of Appeals in Rose , based solely on long-established practices and history, opined that the choice of a jury or court trial was the election of “an equally normal method.” The Court in ⁴⁴² Grammer v. State, 203 Md. 200, 213 , 100 A.2d 257 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 938 , 74 S.Ct. 634 , 98 L.Ed. 1088 (1954), relied on Rose and its historical perspective in holding that the election was a choice of equals. The Court in Zimmerman, supra, while pointing out the differences in the language of the United States and the Maryland Constitutions, 1 relied again on the historical practices and, by inference, recognized a right to choose a court trial. In State v. Hutchinson, 260 Md. 227, 235-36 , 271 A.2d 641 (1970), the Court commented that “[t]he origins of the right of an accused to elect to be tried by the court in this State are somewhat misty” before noting it had previously emphasized antiquity as well as the importance of non-jury trials to stress the role they serve in the “administration of justice.” See also Byrd v. Warden of Maryland Penitentiary, 210 Md. 662, 663 , 124 A.2d 284 , cert. denied, sub nom. Byrd v. Pepersack, Warden, Maryland State Penitentiary, 357 U.S. 932 , 77 S.Ct. 236 , 1 L.Ed.2d 167 (1956), where the Court said: “[T]rial by the court ... including capital cases, is a normal and customary procedure ... and ... legal.” It would appear that the Maryland cases have, in the last half century, stressed the historical and customary practices in upholding the right to choose a court trial.

The appellee in the case at bar argues that the concept of an “election,” as discussed in Rose, 177 Md. at 581 , 10 A.2d 617 , and in Gilbert, 36 Md.App. at 210 , 373 A.2d 311 , as opposed to a “waiver” was undermined by the adoption of Maryland Rule 735 in 1977 (now Rule 4-246). Appellee asserts, and the cases support its position, that an election of a court trial may not be had unless a defendant first waives his right to a jury trial. We shall not address the degree to which the holdings of the cases mentioned may have been undermined by the rule. Because the defendant was denied the right implied by the rule to waive his ⁴⁴³ right to a jury trial and elect a court trial, we shall reverse.

We explain. The trial judge questioned the appellant and counsel as follows: THE COURT: ... Now, would we stick to the jury trial issue. You have recommended to your client that he waive his right to a jury trial?

MR. BOURS: I have. THE COURT: And proceed on a Bench trial? MR.

BOURS: I have. THE COURT: Has he indicated to you what his desire is with respect to that issue? MR. BOURS: He has told me to do whatever I think is best on every issue.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Thomas, would you stand up, please. What is your name? THE DEFENDANT: Charles Leon Thomas.

THE COURT: How old are you? THE DEFENDANT: I don’t know right off. THE COURT: All right. I will take a short recess and give you an opportunity or give you some time to talk to your lawyer about the kind of trial that you will have and then I will come back on the Bench and ask you some questions. ****** (Whereupon, a Bench Conference follows.) MR.

BOURS: I just wanted to put on the record that approximately a week ago, in fact on Thursday of last week, I did have a meeting with the Defendant at the detention center at which I discussed the status of his case and the issue of jury versus Court trial---- ****** MR. BOURS: Okay. Well, I just want to say that I wasn’t satisfied then that he truly understood the significance of a Judge versus jury trial, but I am reasonably ⁴⁴⁴ satisfied that he wants to leave decisions up to me. That is as far as I can go.

THE COURT: Then that resolves it. The rule says that in the Circuit Court, a Defendant having a right to a trial by jury shall be tried by jury unless the right is waived pursuant to section B. And given your experience, then perhaps — and given his response that he doesn't know his age right now, that you are not satisfied that he fully understands it — perhaps that should resolve the inquiry and in accordance with the rule, he shall be tried by a jury. MR. BOURS: Well, that may be — I recognize and I have recognized for some time that that may be the problem.

That creates another problem for me because I strongly feel he shouldn’t have a jury trial in this kind of case. I think it is strongly against his interests to have a jury trial in the type of case we are presented with here. # * # * * * MR. BOURS: ... But, I will say to the Court — I am not sure the Court wants to do a meaningful inquiry.

I think if you ask him questions about what is a jury or what is a Judge trial or open ended questions, it will be more likely to reveal his true abilities. THE COURT: Thank you, sir. MR. BOURS: I still strongly want him to have a Court trial as being in my view the fairest type of trial he could receive under the facts of this case.

THE COURT: Thank you, sir. % * # * * * (Whereupon, the Bench Conference was concluded.) THE COURT: Mr. Thomas, do you know what a jury trial is? THE DEFENDANT: Not right off. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, sir.

Have a seat. I indicated at the Bench Conference, Maryland rule procedure 4246A [sic] says in the Circuit Court a Defendant having a right to trial by jury shall be tried by a jury ⁴⁴⁵ unless the right is waived pursuant to Section B of this rule. If the waiver is accepted by the Court, the State may not elect a trial by jury. I don’t think that an inquiry by the Court would