Thompson v. State

Wright, J. A jury in the Circuit Court for Kent County convicted Norvel B. Thompson, appellant, of second-degree assault, reckless endangerment, and possession of a shotgun by a prohibited person. The sentencing court imposed a prison term of ten years, with two years suspended, for second-degree assault and concurrent sentences of five years for reckless endangerment and three years for possession of a shotgun, to be followed by a five-year period of probation. Appellant noted this appeal and raises six issues for our review, which we have re-ordered for the sake of clarity: 1. Whether the trial court erred by failing to grant Mr. Thompson’s motion to dismiss based upon a Hicks violation? 2.

Whether the conviction for possession of a shotgun by a prohibited person violated the retroactive restrictions clause of the Maryland Declaration of Rights? 3. Whether the trial court erred by refusing to propound two voir dire questions requested by the defense? 4. Whether the evidence was sufficient- to sustain Mr. Thompson’s convictions for the crimes with which he was charged? ³⁹³ 5. Whether the trial judge erred in responding to a jury-note? 6.

Whether Mr. Thompson’s commitment record must be amended to reflect that he is not required to serve 50% of his sentence before he is eligible for parole inasmuch as he was not convicted of a crime of violence? For the reasons that follow, we answer the first two questions in the negative. As to the third question, we conclude that the circuit court abused its discretion in failing to ask one of the requested voir dire questions, and, therefore, we vacate appellant’s convictions and remand for a new trial. We shall address appellant’s fourth question, but appellant’s final two issues are moot.

BACKGROUND In the spring of 2014, Karen Somerville and appellant lived at Somerville’s residence in Worton, Maryland, as a married couple. On the afternoon of April 2, 2014, Somerville met appellant at a rental car facility to assist appellant in renting a vehicle. Somerville suspected that appellant had been drinking, and she drove to her home, while appellant drove to Philadelphia to pick up a friend. Later that evening, appellant called Somerville and informed her that he had been stopped by police for driving under the influence (“DUI”).

When appellant arrived home, he was “in a rage,” according to Somerville, and he wanted to drive Somerville’s vehicle. Som-erville refused, and appellant accused her of calling the police to get him in trouble. Appellant left the residence for approximately one hour. When he returned, he was complaining about the DUI charge and told Somerville that she did not care.

Somerville responded that appellant needed to take responsibility for his actions. Suddenly, appellant rushed at Somerville and shoved her against the wall while choking her. After appellant quickly let go of her, she ran into the bedroom to call the police. Maryland State Police Trooper First Class Mark Kendall responded and removed appellant, but no arrest was made. ³⁹⁴ Appellant returned to his house the next day.

Somerville urged appellant to seek counseling and treatment for his anger management and alcohol problems. Somerville also informed appellant that if he did not seek treatment, “as far as [she] was concerned ... the marriage was overt.]” 1 Approximately a month later, on May 3, 2014, Somerville drove to Dover, Delaware, to spend the day with her daughter — Nicole Smith — and grandchildren. Somerville thought appellant would accompany her, but on that morning, he refused to go. Somerville communicated with appellant throughout the day, however.

Around 9:00 p.m., Somerville left for home after calling appellant to let him know she was on her way. Somer-ville also called appellant when she stopped for gas. Sometime after Somerville departed Delaware, appellant called Smith to ask if Somerville had left. Smith thought this was strange, as appellant had spoken with Somerville just prior to her leaving.

Smith called Somerville to advise her about the call and also that appellant did “not sound like himself.” Smith was on the phone with Somerville when Som-erville pulled up to the house and observed appellant standing outside on the steps. Smith cautioned her mother that “[sjomething’s not right with” appellant and that “[h]e’s off.” As Somerville exited her vehicle, she asked appellant why he had called Smith and upset her. Appellant, without a word, turned around and went inside the house. Somerville told Smith that she would call back.

Approximately ten minutes later, Smith called and asked Somerville to send her some pictures from that day that Somerville had taken with her cell phone. Somerville testified that she had difficulty sending the pictures, and Smith was giving her instructions. Eventually, Somerville said she would hang up to send the pictures, and Smith should call her when she received them. As Somerville transmitted the pictures, appellant asked her why she was not talking to him.

Somerville informed appellant that his “atti ³⁹⁵ tude’s not right,” and she would speak with him when he was ready to have a reasonable conversation. A short time later, Smith called to say that she had received the pictures. Smith and Somerville continued to chat while Somerville sat on her bed. Then, appellant burst into the room holding a gun.

Somerville described the gun as a double-barrel shotgun that she had not seen before. 2 Appellant demanded that Somerville “[p]ut the goddamn phone down,” which she did. Smith could still hear the conversation, however. Appellant pointed the shotgun at Somerville and said “I’ll blow your fing brains out.” Somerville told appellant to “[g]et the fing gun out of my face.” Appellant told Somerville: “You once told me that you feared that a man would take your life. Then I’m gonna be the mf er that’s gonna do it, because I’m gonna blow your brains out.” Appellant then stepped closer to Somerville, and she heard the gun make a noise, which she described as a “chhh,” which she “perceived [ ] as a barrel engaging before you take a shot.” Somerville asked appellant why he was doing this and pleaded with him not to kill her.

Appellant accused her of cheating on him and ignoring him. Somerville stated that she continued to stare at the “two black eyes” of the shotgun as she prayed. When appellant stepped forward again, Somerville was no longer looking down the barrels of the shotgun because they were below her chin. Then, suddenly, appellant set the shotgun down and laughed.

He told Somerville, “[t]his is your word against mine,” and he turned and walked out of the bedroom. Somer-ville grabbed her phone, ran into the bathroom, and locked the door. Meanwhile, at some point during this event, Somerville’s phone dropped the call with Smith. Concerned, Smith called 911.

As Smith is a Delaware resident, however, she reached Delaware emergency dispatchers, who gave her the number for their Maryland counterparts. Smith called the Maryland ³⁹⁶ 911 dispatchers and told them about the conversation she overheard. She then called Somerville and told her to call 911; Somerville complied. 3 At a later point, while Somerville spoke with emergency responders, appellant knocked on the bathroom door and asked her to open it, saying he would not do anything to her. Somerville refused.

A short time later, Kent County Police Department Corporal Benjamin Hicks arrived at the residence. Corporal Hicks testified that appellant was surprised to see the officers, and Somerville was “hysterical” and crying. Corporal Hicks recovered Somerville’s single-barrel shotgun, but Somerville did not inform officers of the double-barrel shotgun. Appellant left vrith Corporal Hicks, and Somerville pressed charges the next day.

Somerville also filed for a protective order against appellant. The State charged appellant with second-degree assault for the April 2, 2014 shoving and choking incident, and first-degree assault, second-degree assault, reckless endangerment, and possession of a shotgun by a prohibited person for the May 3, 2014 event. The jury was unable to reach a verdict as to first-degree assault, and the circuit court declared a mistrial as to that count. The court then took a partial verdict as to the remaining charges, and the jury acquitted appellant of second-degree assault as to the April 2, 2014 incident but convicted him of the remaining offenses.

DISCUSSION I. Hicks Violation Prior to trial, appellant’s counsel moved for a competency evaluation, which the circuit court granted on August 18, 2014. At a pretrial hearing on September 2, 2014, the court rescheduled appellant’s trial for January 26 and 27, 2015, as the parties awaited the results of the evaluation. The evaluation was completed on September 23, 2014. At a subsequent proceeding on October 3, 2014, appellant’s counsel raised a ³⁹⁷ motion to dismiss for a Hicks violation. 4 The court effectively denied this motion.

Appellant contends that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to dismiss based on Hicks. Appellant argues that a competency evaluation is not, as a matter of law, a good cause to delay a trial, and the court was not required to wait five weeks for the results of the examination and/or mandate that the evaluation be completed by a psychiatrist. Appellant concedes, however, that once he raised the issue of his own competency, the court was required to determine whether he was competent to stand trial. The State argues that waiting for the results of a competency evaluation — especially one that appellant requested — constitutes good cause to delay a trial.

The State contends, moreover, that appellant ought not be allowed to benefit from a delay that he, himself, requested. In Maryland, a criminal defendant has a statutory right to have a trial within 180 days of the earlier of the appearance of counsel or the first appearance in the circuit court. Crim. Pro. § 6 — 103(a); Md. Rule 4 — 271(a)(1). “For good cause shown,” however, “the county administrative judge or a designee of the judge may grant a change of the trial date[.]” Crim.

Pro. § 6-103(b). See also Md. Rule 4-271(a)(1). The Court of Appeals has held that “the time limitation prescribed by the statute and the rule is ‘mandatory,’ and that ‘dismissal of the criminal charges is the appropriate sanction where the State fails to bring the case to trial’ within the 180-day period, absent ‘extraordinary cause justifying a trial postponement.’ ” State v. Huntley, 411 Md. 288, 290-91 , 983 A.2d 160 (2009) (quoting Hicks, 285 Md. at 318, 403 A.2d 356 ). ³⁹⁸ This Court has noted that “ ‘[t]he critical order by the administrative judge, for purposes of the dismissal sanction, is the order having the effect of extending the trial date beyond 180 days.’ ” State v. Barber, 119 Md.App. 654, 659 , 705 A.2d 345 (1998) (quoting State v. Parker, 347 Md. 533, 539 , 702 A.2d 217 (1995)). “ ‘The determination as to what constitutes a good cause, warranting an extension of the trial date beyond the [180-day] limit, is a discretionary one, which ... carries a presumption of validity.’ ” Id. (quoting Marks v. State, 84 Md.App. 269, 277 , 578 A.2d 828 (1990)).

Notably, the appellant has the burden to demonstrate “ ‘either a clear abuse of discretion or a lack of good cause as a matter of law.’ ” Moody v. State, 209 Md.App. 366, 374 , 59 A.3d 1047 (2013) (quoting State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 454 , 470 A.2d 1269 (1984)). In this case, the critical order occurred at the September 2, 2014 hearing. Neither party disputes that the rescheduling of the trial date to January 26, 2015, moved the trial date beyond the Hieks time limit, 5 The circuit court implicitly found good cause to move the trial date beyond the Hicks limit, stating: “So, given all the different issues, none of which is the State’s fault, I think we’re stuck with January.” 6 The court added at the October 3, 2014 hearing: “[GJiven the fact that the delay ³⁹⁹ we have is through no fault of the State, I’m going to say that’s still within Hicks.” The Court of Appeals has held that “[o]nce the issue of a defendant’s competency has been raised, the proceedings cannot continue until the trial judge determines that the defendant is competent to stand trial beyond a reasonable doubt.” Kennedy v. State, 436 Md. 686, 692 , 85 A.3d 106 (2014) (citing Peaks v. State, 419 Md. 239, 252 , 18 A.3d 917 (2011)). See also Crim.

Pro. § 3-104. Accordingly, then, once appellant’s counsel filed the motion for a competency evaluation, the case could not continue until the circuit court determined that appellant was competent to stand trial. We agree with the State that complying with Crim. Pro. § 3-104 constitutes good cause to delay the trial beyond the Hicks time limit.

Although appellant is correct that a determination of competency need not be based on a medical or psychiatric examination, see Sangster v. State, 70 Md.App. 456 , 464 n. 2, 521 A.2d 811 (1987), aff'd, 312 Md. 560 , 541 A.2d 637 (1988), a judge may certainly feel that a medical or psychiatric evaluation is helpful to that determination. See Crim. Pro. § 3-105(a)(1). Appellant contends that good cause was “lacking” because a competency evaluation was unnecessary.

This appears to us to be a baseless argument, given that appellant requested the competency evaluation. See also Lewis v. State, 79 Md.App. 1, 17 , 555 A.2d 509 (1989) (noting that delay in proceedings caused by competency evaluation charged to defendant). Appellant also contends that there was no good cause to wait five weeks for the completion of the evaluation. Appellant is correct that the circuit court “shall set and may change the conditions under which the examination” is conducted.

Crim. Pro. § 3405(a)(2). We find five weeks, however, to be a reasonable time period to wait for the results of a competency evaluation. Accordingly, dismissal of the charges for a Hicks violation would have been inappropriate in this case, and we perceive no error in the court’s effective denial of appellant’s motion. ⁴⁰⁰ II.

The Constitutional Argument As part of his motion for a judgment of acquittal, appellant argued that the possession of a shotgun charge was unconstitutional as applied to him because it violated the “retroactive restriction” clause of Article 17 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Specifically, appellant contends that the conviction that disqualified him from possessing a shotgun occurred prior to the enactment of Maryland Code (2003, 2011 Repl. Vol., 2014 Suppl.), Public Safety Article (“P.S.A§ 5-205(b), meaning that the enactment of that statute imposed a retroactive restriction on his previous criminal conduct. The State argued that appellant had failed to adequately present a claim in that he cites no authority for his argument that Article 17 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights differs in application from Article I of the United States Constitution.

Alternatively, the State contended that this Court and the Court of Appeals have construed Article 17 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights to have the same application as the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution, and there has been no ex post facto violation in this instance. In short, the State asserted that appellant was fairly convicted of possession of a shotgun after enactment of P.S.A. § 5-205 for post-enactment conduct. Preliminarily, we find that appellant had complied with Md. Rule 8-504, which required litigants to include argument in support of a position. The State is correct that “ ‘[arguments not presented in a brief or not presented with particularity will not be considered on appeal.’ ” Wallace v. State, 142 Md.App. 673 , 684 n. 5, 791 A.2d 968 (2002) (quoting Klauenberg v. State, 355 Md. 528, 552 , 735 A.2d 1061 (1999)), aff'd, 372 Md. 137 , 812 A.2d 291 (2002).

The State contended that appellant merely referred to the argument he made at trial, which is insufficient to present the argument to this Court. See Monumental Life Ins. Co. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 94 Md.App. 505, 544 , 617 A.2d 1163 (1993) (noting that issue is not sufficiently presented where party merely refers to argument made elsewhere, with one exception inapplicable to this ⁴⁰¹ case).

In his brief, appellant had done more than refer to the argument made at trial, however, and thus this issue had been adequately presented for our consideration. Turning to the merits, Article 17 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides: “That retrospective Laws, punishing acts committed before the existence of such Laws, and by them only declared criminal are oppressive, unjust and incompatible with liberty; wherefore, no ex post facto Law ought to be made; nor any retrospective oath or restriction be imposed, or required.” Notably, the Court of Appeals has construed Article 17 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights to be in pari materia with the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution: that is, they have the “same meaning.” See Khalifa v. State, 382 Md. 400, 425 , 855 A.2d 1175 (2004). Accordingly, then, to examine appellant’s constitutional claim, we look to the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. See U.S. Const, art.

I, § 9, el. 3. Justice Chase, writing for the United States Supreme Court in 1798, discussed the types of laws that would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause: “1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2nd. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3rd.

Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receive less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender.” Khalifa, 382 Md. at 425 , 855 A.2d 1175 (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 , 3 Dall. 386 , 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798)). The Court of Appeals has recognized that two elements must be present for a statute to violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution and Article 17 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights: “ ‘[I]t must be retrospective, that is, it must apply to events occurring before its enactment, and it must ⁴⁰² disadvantage the offender affected by it.’ ” Khalifa, 382 Md. at 426 , 855 A.2d 1175 (quoting Frost v. State, 336 Md. 125, 136 , 647 A.2d 106 (1994)). Appellant fails to demonstrate in any way that P.S.A. § 5-205 is retrospective in his case.

The statute was amended in 2013 to include the restriction prohibiting individuals who had previously been convicted of a disqualifying crime from possessing a shotgun. See P.S.A. § 5 — 205(b). Appellant was charged for violating this statute for his conduct that occurred in 2014. Accordingly, the statute is not retrospective in that appellant is not being punished for conduct that occurred prior to the enactment of the statute.

Appellant argues that he is being given additional punishment for his prior conviction, but P.S.A. § 5-205 is not an addition to his prior conviction; rather, it is punishment for a new criminal act. 7 III. The Voir Dire Questions Prior to trial, appellant requested the circuit court to propound the following questions during voir dire of the potential jurors: 9. Does any member of the panel hold strong feelings regarding the possession of firearms? * * * 12. In our legal system, a criminal defendant is presumed innocent unless the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that he or she is guilty.

Does any prospective juror have any ⁴⁰³ objection to or reservation about these principles or believe that the fact that a person has been charged is evidence that the person is guilty? The court declined to give Question 9, feeling it was not an “appropriate” question, and refused to ask Question 12 “because it’s really a jury instruction that I will cover with them at the appropriate time.” On appeal, appellant contended that the circuit court committed error in refusing to ask these questions. Appellant argued that a court must ask the potential jurors if they have any strong feelings about a charged crime when the defense so requests. Question 9, appellant contended, was such a question and would have permitted examination of whether potential jurors harbored any bias relative to firearms.

Furthermore, appellant argued that Question 12 was aimed at exposing jurors who would not or could not maintain the presumption of innocence, which is a form of bias. Appellant, however, appeared to concede that questions like Question 12 are disfavored in Maryland because he cited several out-of-state cases in support. Indeed, the State argued that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to ask Question 12 because it addressed an area of law that is better left to jury instructions. The State noted that several decisions of this Court and the Court of Appeals have rejected similar voir dire questions.

As to Question 9, the State contended that it is “virtually identical” to a question rejected in Curtin v. State, 393 Md. 593 , 903 A.2d 922 (2006). Moreover, the State argues that the court addressed the concerns raised by Question 9 in other voir dire questions, including a final “catch-all” question. The Court of Appeals has remarked: “ ‘Voir dire, the process by which prospective jurors are examined to determine whether cause for disqualification exists, is the mechanism whereby the right to a fair and impartial jury ... is given substance.’ ” Moore v. State, 412 Md. 635, 644 , 989 A.2d 1150 (2010) (quoting Dingle v. State, 361 Md. 1, 9 , 759 A.2d 819 (2000)) (internal citations omitted). “In the absence of ⁴⁰⁴ a statute or rule prescribing the questions to be asked of venirepersons during the examination, ‘the subject is left largely to the sound discretion of the court in each particular case.’ ” Id. (quoting Corens v. State, 185 Md. 561, 564 , 45 A.2d 340 (1946)).

The Court of Appeals noted that questions asked of the venire panel should “ ‘discover the state of mind of the juror in respect to the matter in hand or any collateral matter reasonably liable to unduly influence him.’ ” Id. at 645 , 989 A.2d 1150 (quoting Corens, 185 Md. at 564 , 45 A.2d 340 ). The questioning court should tailor the questions to the case, with “the ultimate goal, of course, being to obtain jurors who will be ‘impartial and unbiased.’ ” Id. (quoting Dingle, 361 Md. at 9 , 759 A.2d 819 ). A court abuses its discretion where the ruling under consideration is “ ‘well removed from any center mark imagined by the reviewing court and beyond the fringe of what that court deems minimally acceptable.’ ” Consol.

Waste Indus., Inc. v. Standard Equip. Co., 421 Md. 210, 219 , 26 A.3d 352 (2011) (quoting King v. State, 407 Md. 682, 711 , 967 A.2d 790 (2009)). Stated another way, a court abuses its discretion “ ‘where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the [trial] court[ ] ... or when the court acts without reference to any guiding principles.’ ” Aventis Pasteur, Inc. v. Skevofilax, 396 Md. 405, 418 , 914 A.2d 113 (2007) (quoting Wilson v. John Crane, Inc., 385 Md. 185, 198 , 867 A.2d 1077 (2005)). “ ‘An abuse of discretion may also be found where the ruling under consideration is clearly against the logic and effect of facts and inferences before the court[ ] ... or when the ruling is viola-tive of fact and logic.’ ” Id. (quoting Wilson, 385 Md. at 198 , 867 A.2d 1077 ).

We perceive no abuse of discretion as to the circuit court’s refusal to propound Question 12. Numerous appellate decisions of this Court and the Court of Appeals have held that propounding voiv dive questions concerning rules of law covered by jury instructions is inappropriate. See, e.g., Stewart v. State, 399 Md. 146, 162-63 , 923 A.2d 44 (2007) (noting that voiv dive questions concerning jury instructions are “disfavored” “and a court does not abuse its discretion in refusing to ⁴⁰⁵ ask them”); State v. Logan, 394 Md. 378, 398-99 , 906 A.2d 374 (2006); Marquardt v. State, 164 Md.App. 95, 144 , 882 A.2d 900 (2005) (“We begin by stating that this Court has not, nor could it, retreat from Twining [v. State, 234 Md. 97 , 198 A.2d 291 (1964) ]. We have consistently held that voir dire need not include matters that will be dealt with in the jury instructions.”); Baker v. State, 157 Md.App. 600, 616 , 853 A.2d 796 (2004) (“ ‘The rules of law stated in the proposed questions were fully and fairly covered in subsequent instructions to the jury.

It is generally recognized that it is inappropriate to instruct on the law at this stage of the case [voir dire], or to question the jury as to whether or not they would be disposed to follow or apply stated rules of law.’ ” (Quoting Twining, 234 Md. at 100 , 198 A.2d 291 )). As to Question 9, the Court of Appeals has stated “that, on request, a trial court must ask during voir dire whether any prospective juror has ‘strong feelings about’ the crime with which the defendant is charged.” Pearson v. State, 437 Md. 350, 360 , 86 A.3d 1232 (2014) (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Shim, 418 Md. 37, 54 , 12 A.3d 671 (2011), abrogated by Pearson, 437 Md. at 363-64 , 86 A.3d 1232 ). 8 Appellant clearly requested the circuit court to ask Question 9, which asked the potential jurors whether any juror held strong feelings regarding the possession of firearms. The State contended that Question 9 did not ask about the charged crime because appellant was charged with possession of a shotgun by a prohibited person. This appeared to be a semantic distinction that missed the point of the Court’s holdings in Shim and Pearson .

In Curtin, supra, the Court noted that certain crimes — narcotics crimes and child molestation — “in and of ⁴⁰⁶ themselves could evoke strong feelings that could unduly bias a venireman.” 393 Md. at 610 , 903 A.2d 922 . As to narcotics crimes, the Court recognized that there was an ongoing national debate regarding laws controlling marijuana and other drugs. See State v. Thomas, 369 Md. 202, 211-12 , 798 A.2d 566 (2002), abrogated on other grounds by Pearson, 437 Md. at 363-64 , 86 A.3d 1232 . 9 Indeed, this Court observed: “Laws regulating and prohibiting the use of controlled dangerous substances harbor an unusual position within our criminal code, such that jurors may be biased because of strong emotions relating to the dangers of narcotics and their negative effects upon our cities and neighborhoods, or, on the contrary, biases may exist because of passionate positions that advocate the decriminalization of narcotics.” Id. at 213, 798 A.2d 566 (quoting Thomas v. State, 139 Md.App. 188, 207 , 775 A.2d 406 (2001), aff'd, 369 Md. 202 , 798 A.2d 566 (2002)). The Court of Appeals also recognized that people may have strong emotions regarding child molestation, noting national and state efforts to address these types of crimes.

See Curtin, 393 Md. at 609 , 903 A.2d 922 . “ ‘[OJbserv-ing that most citizens have a bias against proscribed criminal conduct is not extraordinary. Yet, a bias that is so strong against a particular criminal act that it distorts a juror’s ability to render a fair and impartial verdict must be uncovered.’ ” Singfield v. State, 172 Md.App. 168, 173 , 913 A.2d 671 (2006) (quoting Thomas, 139 Md.App. at 203 , 775 A.2d 406 ). In a concurring opinion in Curtin , Judge Wilner stated: “It is obviously not reasonable to presume that those [narcotics and child molestation] are the only kinds of crimes about which public emotion may run high. Surely, there are others.” 393 Md. at 614 , 903 A.2d 922 (Wilner, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted).

The Court then recognized these other crimes in Shim: “[W]e recognize today that the potential for bias exists in most crimes, and thus we will require voir dire questions ⁴⁰⁷ which are targeted at uncovering these biases.” 418 Md. at 54 , 12 A.3d 671 . Regarding potential jurors’ emotions and firearms, in Uzzle v. State, 152 Md.App. 548, 552-63 , 832 A.2d 869 (2003), this Court determined that a trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to ask a series of voir dire questions as to those emotions. That case, however, concerned multiple questions posed by Uzzle’s counsel that did not focus on the charged crime of use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence. Id. at 551, 553 , 832 A.2d 869 .

For example, Uzzle’s counsel requested the court to ask not only whether any juror had any strong feelings about the possession of firearms (which, itself, was not focused on the charged crime), but also whether jurors believed it was a good idea to own a firearm for self-defense, whether any juror feared guns, and whether potential jurors were for or against gun control. Id. at 553 . Uzzle , therefore, did not present a focused question as to “strong feelings” regarded a charged offense and was also decided prior to Shim. This Court has previously recognized that the use of firearms in a murder may evoke strong feelings of potential jurors.

In Singfield , we held that the trial court erred in refusing to ask the venire if the nature of the case would make it difficult or impossible for potential jurors to render a verdict. 172 Md.App. at 170 , 913 A.2d 671 . Singfield was charged with murdering his victim with a handgun, and his defense at trial was self-defense. Id. at 169, 180 , 913 A.2d 671 . We held: “[T]he jurors might also have had to determine whether [Singfield] used the handgun in a reasonable or justifiable way, [and this] might have evoked strong feelings or biases concerning handguns.” Id. at 180 , 913 A.2d 671 .

We concluded that Singfield’s proposed question “was aimed ... directly at biases related to [Singfield]’s alleged criminal act and was reasonably likely to identify jurors with such strong feelings toward the use of handguns to commit murder that it would hinder their ability to render a fair and impartial verdict.” Id. at 180-81 , 913 A.2d 671 . ⁴⁰⁸ Building on Singfield, Shim, and Pearson , we are persuaded that possession of firearms is one of those offenses that may “in and of themselves” evoke strong feelings that could hinder a potential juror’s ability to render a fair and impartial verdict. Recognizing that people can hold strong feelings as to firearms, one Maryland trial judge remarked: “Some people believe that everybody ought to be able to carry a handgun and defend themselves. Other people believe that no one should have handguns.” Sanders v. State, 194 Md.App. 162, 168 , 4 A.3d 1 (2010), vacated on other grounds by, 418 Md. 368 , 14 A.3d 1163 (2011). Indeed, the intermediate Court of Appeals of Hawaii observed in 1982 that “[pjroposals for the licensing and registration of firearms have been the subject of national and local debate, and reported in the news media, for at least two decades.” State v. Emmsley, 3 Haw.App. 459 , 652 P.2d 1148, 1153 (1982).

That debate has only continued in the wake of several well-publicized mass shootings, the media’s coverage of gun violence, and governmental efforts to address firearms. We note that at least two federal courts and several of our sister state courts have also recognized that potential jurors may