Thompson v. State

Horney, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The defendant (Herbert A. Thompson) was convicted by a jury of rape and murder in the first degree without capital punishment and was sentenced to life imprisonment for each crime. He appealed. On a morning in the latter part of November of 1961, the body of a woman in her fifties was found on a vacant lot in Baltimore City.

She had been last seen on the preceding night leaving a tavern in the vicinity of the lot where her body was found. The autopsy, besides indicating acute alcoholism and recent intercourse, revealed that the woman had died as a result of injuries to her pelvis and vagina and exposure. She had also sustained injuries to her face which were of a type generally associated with suffocation. The defendant was arrested about two weeks later, and, after questioning by the police, admitted having had intercourse with the intoxicated woman after he had ripped off her panties and she had told him to stop and had scratched his face.

Immediately after the confession was signed, the defendant was photographed as a matter of routine, and shortly thereafter accompanied the police to the scene of the crime and pointed out the place where he had raped the victim. ¹¹⁵ On the Saturday before the Monday on which the cases had been assigned for trial, the defendant, pursuant to Maryland Rule 728 (Discovery and Inspection), filed a motion seeking, among other things, a list of all witnesses the State intended to use at the trial, but, because of the intervening Sunday,, the motion was not brought to the attention of the State’s Attorney until the morning of the trial. The State, with permission of the court, complied with the demand by orally listing the names of the witnesses that appeared on the back of the-indictments. At the same time, the defendant was further informed that photographs of the deceased had been taken in connection with the cases and that, if it became necessary, the State would expect to call certain named officers of the crime-laboratory as witnesses, but did not name the officer subsequently called as a rebuttal witness to identify photographs of the defendant. At the trial, the defendant, claiming that he had been severely beaten from time to time by the police while he was being questioned by them, objected to the admission of the confession into evidence on the ground that it had been induced by violence and fear and was therefore involuntary.

But, when the trial court had finished hearing evidence on behalf of the State as to the voluntary character of the confession and on behalf of the defendant to the contrary, the objection was. overruled, and the issue was ultimately allowed to go to the-jury. After the State had presented its case in chief, the defendant took the stand and testified that at the time the crimes were committed he was elsewhere than at the place they were perpetrated, and, having presented other evidence tending to corroborate the alibi, the defendant concluded his case. In rebuttal, the State called as a witness an officer of the crime laboratory (but not one of those it had previously indicated might be called as a witness to identify photographs of the victim), who had taken photographs of the defendant immediately after he had signed the confession. Over objection, the State was permitted to introduce the photographs in evidence for the purpose of showing that at the time they were ¹¹⁶ taken the body of the defendant bore no evidence of having received a beating.

No point was made on appeal with respect to the admission of the confession in evidence, and so far as the record discloses, no point was made of the fact that the rebuttal witness was not called at the preliminary inquiry concerning the voluntary character of the confession. The only contentions on appeal are: (i) that the trial court erred when over objection it admitted in evidence (through a rebuttal witness who had not been listed as a witness) the photographs showing the physical condition of the defendant at the time he made the confession; and (ii) that the evidence did