Thornton v. State

Panel: Nazarian, Arthur, Friedman, JJ. Arthur, J. ⁹⁵ Tamere Hassan Thornton 1 was charged in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City with offenses related to the possession of a handgun. After the circuit court denied his motion to suppress evidence, Thornton entered a plea of not guilty and allowed the case to proceed on an agreed statement of facts. On that basis, he was convicted of one count of possessing a regulated firearm after previously being convicted of a crime of violence.

The court sentenced him to four years of imprisonment and permitted him to remain on bail during this appeal to challenge the suppression ruling. For the reasons discussed in this opinion, we conclude that the circuit court did not err when it determined that the evidence of handgun possession was too attenuated from any unreasonable search to require the exclusion of that evidence. We affirm the judgment. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The basic facts are as follows: police officers detained Thornton for a parking infraction across the street from his home; after asking Thornton a few questions, the officers ordered him to step out of his car so that they could perform a pat-down search; as soon as the officer started to pat down Thornton's clothing, Thornton tried to run away, but he fell after a short distance; and the officers quickly restrained him and lifted him off the ground to discover a handgun underneath him.

The officers placed Thornton under arrest and transported him to a police station. They did not issue a parking citation. The weapon that they recovered was a .32 caliber semi-automatic handgun with a 2-1/8 inch barrel. It had one live round in the chamber and a magazine with five live rounds.

Testing showed that it was operable. ⁹⁶ Thornton was charged with five counts: (1) possessing a handgun after being convicted of a crime of violence; (2) possessing a handgun after being convicted of a disqualifying crime; (3) wearing, carrying, or transporting ⁷⁷⁴ a handgun on or about his person; (4) wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun in a vehicle travelling on a public road; and (5) possessing ammunition after having been prohibited from possessing a regulated firearm. He was released after posting bond. Counsel for Thornton filed an omnibus motion, which included a request to suppress evidence obtained at the time of his arrest. The circuit court held a suppression hearing on August 29, 2016.

Only two witnesses testified: Baltimore City police officers Kenneth Scott and Jeremy Zimmerman. As the circuit court recognized, the two officers gave "somewhat conflicting stories" about some events leading to the discovery of the handgun. The court described Officer Scott's testimony as "unconvincing" in many respects, and it appeared to rely on some of Officer Zimmerman's testimony. To provide context for analyzing the court's ruling, this summary includes testimony from both officers.

At around 2:00 p.m. on January 11, 2016, three officers assigned to an "Operations Drug Unit" were travelling in an unmarked police vehicle on Midwood Avenue. According to Officer Scott, who was a passenger in that vehicle, they were "patrolling" and "driving through to go through McCabe for CDS," or controlled dangerous substances. He asserted that "McCabe" is "a high drug area, traffic [sic]" located "right off of Midwood." 2 In the words of Officer Zimmerman, the driver of the vehicle, they were in the area looking for "[d]rugs, weapons, all kinds of things[.]" ⁹⁷ At the same time, Tamere Thornton was sitting in the driver's seat of a Cadillac sedan parked across from his home on Midwood Avenue. The sedan's lights were off, and its engine was not running.

On the same block, a tree-removal crew was occupying multiple parking spaces with two trucks and a set of cones. The sedan was parked nearby, facing against the flow of traffic, with its left wheels next to the curb. Maryland law requires that a vehicle parked on a two-way roadway must be "parked parallel to the right hand curb or edge of the roadway, with its right hand wheels within 12 inches of that curb or edge of the roadway." Md. Code (1977, 2012 Repl. Vol.), § 21-1004(a) of the Transportation Article ("TA").

Officer Scott noticed that the sedan was improperly parked on the wrong side of Midwood Avenue. Officer Zimmerman made a U-turn and stopped the unmarked police vehicle directly behind the sedan. The officers activated the emergency lights of the police vehicle, but did not activate its siren. Officer Zimmerman walked to the driver's side of the sedan, Officer Scott walked to the passenger side, and a third officer remained inside the police vehicle.

The officers were wearing tactical vests with the word "POLICE" displayed in bold letters across their chests. Thornton remained in the driver's seat of the sedan as the two officers approached. For a brief period of time, less than one minute, the officers proceeded to ask Thornton a few questions. Although Officer Scott claimed that the initial purpose of the encounter was to inform the driver that the sedan was "on the wrong side of the street," no testimony indicates that the officers actually told Thornton about the parking violation.

According to both officers, Thornton's demeanor was "laid back," and he did not say anything unusual during the exchange. Nevertheless, both officers testified that, because of ⁷⁷⁵ certain hand movements that Thornton made, they suspected that he might be carrying a weapon. As the circuit court noted, Officer Scott testified in "fairly vague terms" about these hand movements, while Officer Zimmerman's testimony "was less vague" on that matter. ⁹⁸ Officer Scott, a 10-year veteran of the police department, asserted that he had training and experience in identifying armed persons. Throughout his testimony, Officer Scott frequently stated his conclusion that Thornton displayed "characteristics of an armed individual" while seated in the sedan.

The only applicable "characteristic[ ]" that Officer Scott mentioned is that an armed person sometimes will perform "checks" by touching his or her "front waistband area," which, Officer Scott said, is a common place for a person to carry a firearm. Officer Scott testified that he could see Thornton "looking out his mirror" as the officers approached the sedan. Officer Scott claimed that, as he approached the passenger side of the sedan, he saw Thornton "numerous times like start making movements to his front area[.]" According to Officer Scott, Thornton kept his hands "down on the side" and "around his waistband area." When asked about any hand movements that he may have observed, Officer Scott gave various responses: [OFFICER SCOTT]: Like [Thornton] just kept like doing a check, like just trying to, I don't know, like push it down or just (indicating), I don't know, you know, just to make sure it's secured. I'm not sure what he was trying to do but, I mean, it just ... * * * [OFFICER SCOTT]: He was still like, the same thing, like a weapons check, just trying to, you know, like he had something he was trying to hide. * * * [OFFICER SCOTT]: It was more or less like his - yeah, I mean like, yeah, like I said, just trying to - I don't know if he was trying to push it down so like I guess we wouldn't be able to see it or I'm not sure, but I just know he just kept doing it ... * * * [OFFICER SCOTT]: But I mean, you know, it was just - something just didn't fit right with him keep checking his waist area. ⁹⁹ Officer Scott testified that he did not speak to Thornton at first, but instead focused on observing Thornton's conduct while Officer Zimmerman questioned Thornton from the opposite side.

At one point, Officer Scott heard Thornton say that he "lived across the street." 3 Officer Scott asked Thornton if he would permit the officers to search the sedan. Thornton declined, which he certainly had the right to do. See Longshore v. State , 399 Md. 486 , 537-38, 924 A.2d 1129 (2007) (explaining that a "person has a constitutional right to refuse to consent to a warrantless search of his or her automobile, and such refusal may not later be used to implicate guilt[,]" nor can it be used to justify a warrantless search). In response, Officer Scott told Thornton that they would need to wait for a "K-9 unit" to arrive with an odor-detecting dog. ⁷⁷⁶ In his testimony, however, Officer Scott admitted that he did not actually intend to call for a K-9 unit.

Officer Zimmerman later explained in his testimony that officers sometimes tell a detained driver that they intend to call a K-9 unit only "to gauge the reaction" of the driver. The circuit court described this tactic as "a bluff." There is no indication that Officer Scott's "bluff" provoked any particular reaction from Thornton. Officer Scott testified that, after announcing an intention to call for a K-9 unit, he told Officer Zimmerman to "pull [Thornton] out of the vehicle" for a weapons check. During cross-examination, Officer Scott was unable to explain why he would have first asked permission to conduct a vehicle search and then suggested that he would call a K-9 unit if he had truly believed all along that Thornton was carrying a weapon.

Officer Scott could only say that "the hair on the back of [his] ¹⁰⁰ neck ... stood up after a minute," which made him "think [Thornton] ha[d] something." As the circuit court noted, Officer Zimmerman described in "greater detail," relative to his partner, the "specific motions" that Thornton allegedly made. Citing his training and experience from three years with the Baltimore City police, Officer Zimmerman asserted that common indications that a person may be armed include "a bladed stance away from" an officer, "security checks," "favoring one side of [the] body," and, in particular, "holding the area where the weapon is concealed." He asserted that, when trying to determine whether the occupant of a vehicle may be armed, one should "look for a shoulder moving up or down drastically" as a result of the effort "to reach under a seat or to ... further conceal something in [the person's] front waistband." Officer Zimmerman testified that, as he walked to the driver's side of the sedan, he "observed Mr. Thornton raise his right shoulder and kind of bring his elbows together," which Officer Zimmerman characterized as "consistent with attempting to conceal something in the front area of [a person's] body." Officer Zimmerman performed a demonstration of this movement as he described it a second time: "right shoulder up which kind of brings your hand up a little bit higher and then ... elbows together, kind of pushing down." 4 In Officer Zimmerman's opinion, "it was very apparent that [Thornton] was uncomfortable with whatever was in his lap," because he continued "making adjustments" around "where [his] belt buckle would be on [his] pants." Officer Zimmerman said that, although Thornton was not "grabbing anything," it appeared that he was "manipulating something" and that he "was obviously uncomfortable" with the "the position," or "the size," or "the shape" of whatever object he was manipulating. Officer Zimmerman testified that Thornton "would sit back down and attempt to adjust something in his waistband" ¹⁰¹ whenever he "would lean over to the right to address" Officer Scott. This happened "about two or three times," according to Officer Zimmerman.

In total, Officer Zimmerman estimated that Thornton made four or five "distinct movements" or "adjustments" near his waistband during the 30 or 40 seconds before they told him to step out the sedan. In Officer Zimmerman's opinion, those movements "were not ... solely nervous movements[.]" Officer Zimmerman testified that, "[f]rom what [he] observed," he ⁷⁷⁷ "believed that [Thornton] was concealing some sort of weapon ... in his waistband[.]" According to both officers, Thornton was not "free to leave" by the time they told him to step out of his car. Officer Zimmerman testified that he himself opened the door of the sedan and allowed Thornton to stand up. Officer Zimmerman did not recall seeing that Thornton needed to unbuckle his seatbelt when he stood up.

Officer Zimmerman told Thornton to place his hands on his head. Thornton complied. Officer Zimmerman claimed that, at that time, he had not yet made any physical contact with Thornton. Officer Zimmerman started to pat down Thornton's clothing, beginning with the front waistband area.

Officer Zimmerman testified that, "as soon as [he] began" to "touch [Thornton] to begin the pat down," Thornton started to run away. Officer Zimmerman said that he did not feel a weapon as he made contact with Thornton. Officer Zimmerman claimed that Thornton "kind of pushed" him "aside a little bit and then ran, trying to run southbound in the block[.]" Thornton "slipped or fell," and Officer Zimmerman was "able to jump on top of" him while he was face-down with his hands under his chest. The two officers grabbed Thornton's hands and handcuffed him.

When the officers "rolled [Thornton] over," Officer Zimmerman noticed "a handgun on the ground under him." ¹⁰² In Officer Scott's telling of the same events, Officer Zimmerman actually "pull[ed]" Thornton out from the sedan, announced to Thornton that he was going to check him for weapons, and "went down in the [waist] area" to start the pat-down. Then, according to Officer Scott, Thornton "tried to push [Officer Zimmerman] out of the way so he could try to run." Officer Scott said that, as Thornton "pushed away," Officer Zimmerman "was able to grab" him, while he "was trying to still move his feet[.]" Officer Scott said that Thornton "slipped" on some "dead branches" on the ground, which allowed them to regain control of him. According to Officer Scott, "once [they] got him in handcuffs, [they] picked him up, and the handgun was right there underneath of him." Thornton elected not to testify, and defense counsel argued the motion based on the testimony of the two officers. Defense counsel conceded that the officers had the right to investigate Thornton's improperly parked sedan, but challenged whether their observations justified the pat-down.

Defense counsel asserted that, "[a]t worst," the officers may have observed "some kind of movements that in their mind are a characteristic of an armed person[.]" Defense counsel argued that "in fact, if they saw enough to really think that [Thornton] had a gun, they wouldn't have been wasting their time even talking to him about permission to search the car, much less go for the K-9 unit." Defense counsel theorized that the officers were "looking for drugs" when they decided to search Thornton's person after he refused to consent to a vehicle search. As the sole justification for the pat-down, the State pointed to the officers' testimony that Thornton was "reaching into his waistband," considered in light of the officers' testimony about their training and experience in the identification of armed persons. The State also argued that "there really was no search" because the discovery of the gun occurred after what the State called Thornton's "unprovoked flight" as soon as the pat-down started. In response to that second argument, defense counsel asserted that the handgun should be suppressed as "the fruit of the poisonous tree." ^{778 103} After several hours of consideration, the court rendered a thoughtful and cautious oral ruling.

The court noted: "Despite what appears on its face to be simple facts, the legal analysis is actually fairly complicated." While admitting that the case presented "a close question," the court announced that it would deny the motion to suppress. The court, proceeding in chronological order, first determined that the officers had acted lawfully when they initially confronted Thornton. The court recognized that there was "some merit" to the suggestion that the officers were using the parking violation as "an excuse to inquire further into the driver who was sitting in the vehicle." Yet the court concluded that there was in fact "a real issue with an illegally parked car" to justify the initial investigation. The court then examined the officers' "somewhat conflicting stories" about what happened after they approached Thornton's sedan.

The court noted that Officer Scott provided "very few details" about observations that made him suspect that Thornton was armed. The court reasoned that Officer Scott's efforts to search the sedan were "somewhat inconsistent with his genuine belief that there might be a weapon involved." The court concluded: "His testimony frankly was unconvincing." The court said that, if the State had offered only Officer Scott's testimony, the decision would be "relatively easy," because the court would conclude that "his testimony does not convince nor does it establish sufficient cause for a search." By contrast, the court said that Officer Zimmerman's testimony was "substantially different," in that it included "much greater detail" as to "the specific motions" that suggested "that [Thornton] was possibly armed[.]" Specifically, the court mentioned the initial movement toward the waistband that Officer Zimmerman claimed to have seen as the officers were approaching the sedan. The court, "for purposes of the record," recounted that Officer Zimmerman "dipped a shoulder, straightened up, reaching for the belt area" in his in-court demonstration. The court said that this movement "if it took place as described, could be consistent with adjusting the ¹⁰⁴ position of a gun in the waistband or in some other actions toward the band." Nevertheless, citing In re Jeremy P. , 197 Md. App. 1 , 11 A.3d 830 (2011), the circuit court observed that "a security check by itself" typically "is not enough to establish either reasonable cause or probable cause because it could represent any variety of behaviors other than checking on a gun." The court noted the absence of any additional circumstances that might indicate dangerousness or criminality on Thornton's part.

Summarizing the evidence, the court concluded: "All they have is this conduct with his hands while he's being approached by the police officers." Although the court concluded that the officers were entitled to direct Thornton to exit the car, the court declined to conclude that the officers had sufficient justification to pat down his clothing. In the court's words, the officers had "very questionable reasonably articulable suspicion" that Thornton was armed and dangerous when he stepped out of the car. The court said that, "had they done a frisk of him at this point," there would be a "serious question as to the legality of the frisk." Later, the court reiterated its opinion that "the initial search might in fact very well have been improper." Nevertheless, the court said that "the search had not really begun as of the time when [Thornton] turned and ran" from Officer Zimmerman. Recounting the evidence, the court stated: "he begins to run, he is chased, it's not clear how far, he falls to the ground, he gets up[,] and the gun is ⁷⁷⁹ found on the ground." The court reasoned that Thornton's flight "changes in some significant ways the analysis" because flight from the police may contribute to suspicion of criminal activity.

The court also commented that it was "an interesting question" whether "a search t[ook] place or a seizure t[ook] place at all" under the circumstances, because the gun "f[ell] out from [Thornton's] waist[.]" Finally, the court considered "whether, even if the search beg[an], improperly or illegally," there was "a subsequent event that attenuates the initial illegality." The court examined three "attenuation" factors: (1) "the time that has elapsed ¹⁰⁵ between the illegality and the acquisition of the evidence"; (2) "the presence of intervening circumstances"; and (3) "the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct." See Myers v. State , 395 Md. 261 , 285-86, 909 A.2d 1048 (2006) (discussing Brown v. Illinois , 422 U.S. 590 , 603-04, 95 S.Ct. 2254 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) ). Addressing the first factor, the court observed that the time lapse was "very small, very short[.]" Addressing the third factor, the court stated that the officers' conduct was "arguably illegal" when they attempted to frisk Thornton "under circumstances in which the only indicator of potential criminal conduct was the furtive motions of his hands which they felt might have indicated the presence of a gun." The court considered the second factor to be the decisive one, explaining: [T]he presence of the intervening circumstances, i.e., his flight[,] may have attenuated whatever problems there may have been in the initial attempt to do a Terry [ 5 ] search. So in this case, what we have is an attempt to search, that is not completed. The discovery of the gun absent a search, but following what might have been an illegal search under the Terry doctrine.

It's a close question.... I've gone through all these cases and I've thought about this a great deal, and despite the fact as I said, I thought that in particular Officer Scott's testimony was not convincing, but nevertheless, I feel that under the circumstances and as described, I have to deny the motion. The court emphasized that its ruling entailed the resolution of "a close question" of "whether th[e] initial attempted" frisk "might make ... what follows ... the fruit of the poisonous tree." The court suggested that, if Thornton wished to enter a plea, he should do so in a way to preserve his right to seek appellate review of the suppression ruling. Thereafter, Thornton entered a plea of not guilty and submitted the case for trial on an agreed statement of facts.

The court found Thornton guilty of possession of a regulated firearm after a previous conviction for a crime of violence. The ¹⁰⁶ court did not decide Thornton's guilt or innocence as to the other counts. Thornton filed a timely notice of appeal. 6 At Thornton's request, this Court stayed ⁷⁸⁰ his appeal temporarily, until the Court of Appeals decided Sizer v. State , 456 Md. 350 , 174 A.3d 326 (2017), another case involving the attenuation doctrine. DISCUSSION In this appeal, Thornton raises the single question of whether the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence.

Within that challenge, there are three main areas of dispute: (1) whether the discovery of the handgun occurred before or after an event implicating Thornton's constitutional rights; (2) whether the pat-down was justified at its inception by reasonable suspicion that Thornton was armed and dangerous; and (3) if the officers lacked adequate justification for the pat-down, whether the evidence discovered after Thornton's subsequent flight must be suppressed. Before discussing those issues, we will begin with a general outline of the principles implicated in a pat-down of a vehicle occupant during a traffic stop. A. Principles Governing Pat-Down Searches During Traffic Stops The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states, in pertinent part, that the "right of the people ¹⁰⁷ to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated[.]" Ordinarily, evidence obtained in violation of this right is inadmissible in a state criminal prosecution. See, e.g. , Bailey v. State , 412 Md. 349 , 363, 987 A.2d 72 (2010) (citing Swift v. State , 393 Md. 139 , 149, 899 A.2d 867 (2006), which cited Mapp v. Ohio , 367 U.S. 643 , 655-56, 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961) ).

This rule excludes not only evidence obtained as a direct result of an unreasonable search or seizure, but also evidence that is the indirect product of the violation. See, e.g. , Grant v. State , 449 Md. 1 , 29-30, 141 A.3d 138 (2016) (citing Wong Sun v. United States , 371 U.S. 471 , 484, 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) ). Yet even where evidence is discovered after a Fourth Amendment violation, it should not be excluded if it was obtained " 'by means sufficiently distinguishable' " from the illegality, rather than " 'by exploitation of that illegality[.]' " Cox v. State , 421 Md. 630 , 651, 28 A.3d 687 (2011) (quoting Wong Sun v. United States , 371 U.S. at 488 , 83 S.Ct. 407 ). Warrantless searches and seizures are presumptively unreasonable, and that presumption is "subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions[.]" Grant v. State , 449 Md. at 16 -17 , 141 A.3d 138 (citing Katz v. United States , 389 U.S. 347 , 356-57, 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) ).

Once it is established that a search or seizure occurred without a warrant, the State bears the burden of showing that the search or seizure falls within an exception to the warrant requirement. See, e.g. , Bailey v. State , 412 Md. at 366 , 987 A.2d 72 . One such exception is the so-called stop-and-frisk exception established by Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). In Terry , the Supreme Court explained that a "seizure" occurs when a police officer approaches someone on the street and restrains the person's freedom to walk away, and that a "search" occurs when an officer pats down a person's clothing to find items hidden on the person.

Id. at 16 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 . The Court held that an ¹⁰⁸ officer "may conduct a brief, investigative 'stop' " of a particular ⁷⁸¹ person, without a warrant, as long as the officer "has a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot." Crosby v. State , 408 Md. 490 , 505, 970 A.2d 894 (2009) (citing Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. at 17 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 ). During such a stop, if the officer has reason to suspect that the detained person is armed and dangerous, the officer may perform a protective "frisk," by patting down the person's outer clothing to discover any weapons that could be used to assault the officer. See, e.g. , Sellman v. State , 449 Md. 526 , 530 n.1, 144 A.3d 771 (2016).

Much like the stop of a pedestrian, "a traffic stop entails a seizure of the driver 'even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief.' " Brendlin v. California , 551 U.S. 249 , 255, 127 S.Ct. 2400 , 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007) (quoting Delaware v. Prouse , 440 U.S. 648 , 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) ). An officer may stop a vehicle and detain its occupants, regardless of the officer's subjective motivations for doing so, if the officer at least has reasonable suspicion to believe that a traffic law has in fact been violated. See State v. Williams , 401 Md. 676 , 685-91, 934 A.2d 38 (2007) (analyzing Whren v. United States , 517 U.S. 806 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) ). This Court has held that a detention for a "parking violation[,]" such as Thornton's evident violation of TA § 21-1004(a), is "at least the functional equivalent to the stop of a moving vehicle in violation of the motor vehicle laws." Herring v. State , 198 Md. App. 60 , 76, 16 A.3d 246 (2011).

The Fourth Amendment analysis is essentially the same whether the officer stops a car that is in motion or whether the officer detains the occupant of a car that is already parked. See Pyon v. State , 222 Md. App. 412 , 436, 112 A.3d 1130 (2015). Thornton has not disputed the court's finding that he was seated in the driver's seat of "an illegally parked car" or the court's conclusion that this parking violation justified a brief detention. Moreover, because the officers had lawfully detained him, they were entitled as a matter of course to order Thornton to exit the car.

See ¹⁰⁹ Maryland v. Wilson , 519 U.S. 408 , 410, 117 S.Ct. 882 , 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997) (citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms , 434 U.S. 106 , 98 S.Ct. 330 , 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (per curiam) ). Nevertheless, the lawful stop of a vehicle for the purpose of issuing a citation does not itself justify a frisk of an occupant. See Simpler v. State , 318 Md. 311 , 320-21, 568 A.2d 22 (1990). "To justify a patdown of the driver or a passenger during a traffic stop, ... just as in the case of a pedestrian reasonably suspected of criminal activity, the police must harbor reasonable suspicion that the person subjected to the frisk is armed and dangerous." Arizona v. Johnson , 555 U.S. 323 , 327, 129 S.Ct. 781 , 172 L.Ed.2d 694 (2009).

In determining whether an officer has sufficient reason to suspect that a person is armed and dangerous, "due weight must be given, not to [the officer's] inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,' but to the specific reasonable inferences which [the officer] is entitled to draw from the facts in light of [the officer's] experience." Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. at 27 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 . The Court of Appeals has described the standard as follows: When reviewing whether reasonable suspicion exists, the test is the totality of the circumstances, viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, prudent, police officer. The test is objective: the validity of the stop or the frisk is not determined by the subjective or articulated reasons of the officer; rather, the validity of the stop or frisk is determined by ⁷⁸² whether the record discloses articulable objective facts to support the stop or frisk. Reasonable suspicion requires an officer to have specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.

In other words, the officer has reason to believe that an individual is armed and dangerous if a reasonably prudent person, under the circumstances, would have felt that he was in danger, based on reasonable inferences from particularized facts in light of the officer's experience. ¹¹⁰ Sellman v. State , 449 Md. at 542-43, 144 A.3d 771 (citations, quotation marks, and brackets removed). In this appeal, Thornton contends that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to believe that he was armed and dangerous and, therefore, that Officer Zimmerman performed an unreasonable search when he touched Thornton's waistband. He contends that the evidence of the discovery of the handgun should have been suppressed as the product of an unreasonable search. He argues that the circuit court was correct in declining to conclude that the pat-down was justified, but that the court erred in concluding that his flight from the officers attenuated the connection between the pat-down and the discovery of the handgun.

B. The Seizure, Search, and Subsequent Seizure of Thornton Although the State contests each of Thornton's points, it opens its brief with an argument that, as a threshold matter, "the Fourth Amendment does not" even "apply" to this case. Under the State's theory, "there was no Fourth Amendment triggering event until after Thornton ran and fell, exposing the handgun." This argument is based entirely on the Supreme Court's opinion in California v. Hodari D. , 499 U.S. 621 , 111 S.Ct. 1547 , 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991). In Hodari D. , a juvenile tossed aside a rock of crack cocaine as he was running away from police officers, but before an officer tackled and handcuffed him. Id. at 622-23 , 111 S.Ct. 1547 .

The "only issue" presented to the Supreme Court was "whether, at the time he dropped the drugs, Hodari had been 'seized' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Id. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, reasoned that "an arrest, ... the quintessential 'seizure of the person' " ( id. at 624 , 111 S.Ct. 1547 ) under the Fourth Amendment, "requires either physical force ... or , where that is absent, submission to the assertion of authority." Id. at 626 , 111 S.Ct. 1547 (emphasis in original). The Court concluded that Hodari "was not seized until he was tackled" by the officer, so the "cocaine ¹¹¹ abandoned while he was running was ... not the fruit of a seizure[.]" Id. at 629 , 111 S.Ct. 1547 . Because Hodari D. addresses a "narrow question" ( id. at 626 , 111 S.Ct. 1547 ) about exactly when a person is seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, the opinion at most informs our analysis of when Thornton himself was seized.

Without question, the Fourth Amendment was implicated here well before the officers discovered the handgun. The officers displayed authority by pulling directly behind his car, activating emergency lights, approaching his car on both sides with the word "POLICE" displayed prominently on their vests, questioning him for a minute, suggesting that he would be required to wait for a K-9 unit, ordering him to exit his car, and ordering him to put his hands on his head. No reasonable person would conclude that Thornton was "free to leave" under those circumstances. See, e.g. , Swift v. State , 393 Md. at 156 , 899 A.2d 867 .

While Thornton was submitting to the officers' ⁷⁸³ assertions of authority, he was seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, regardless of whether Officer Zimmerman touched him. As part of its reasoning in Hodari D. , the Supreme Court also stated that an arrest through the application of force can occur "whether or not it succeed[s] in subduing the arrestee[.]" California v. Hodari D. , 499 U.S. at 624 , 111 S.Ct. 1547 . Officer Scott described a similar seizure when he testified that he saw Officer Zimmerman "grab" Thornton while Thornton was trying to "move his feet," before Thornton managed to run away. In dicta, the Court in Hodari D. discussed a suspect's escape from an officer's grasp: To say that an arrest is effected by the slightest application of physical force, despite the arrestee's escape, is not to say that for Fourth Amendment purposes there is a continuing arrest during the period of fugitivity.

If, for example, [the officer] had laid his hands upon Hodari to arrest him, but Hodari had broken away and had then cast away the cocaine, it would hardly be realistic to say that that disclosure had been made during the course of an arrest. ¹¹² California v. Hodari D. , 499 U.S. at 625 , 111 S.Ct. 1547 (emphases in original). Emphasizing that passage, the State argues that Thornton was no longer seized for the brief moment (of unknown duration) during which he ran some short distance (of unknown length). Soon afterwards, the officers physically restrained Thornton by getting on top of him, grabbing his arms, placing him in handcuffs, and either rolling him over or lifting him off the ground. Only after they moved him did they discover the handgun underneath where he had fallen.

The State theorizes that forcibly moving a suspect from the ground to reveal an object beneath the suspect is "doctrinally equivalent" to observing a suspect voluntarily discard an object while fleeing. Even if we agreed with that premise, it would fail to address the central issue of Thornton's challenge. Thornton is not even challenging the legality of the seizure or seizures of his person. Rather, Thornton contends that Officer Zimmerman conducted an unreasonable search of his person, leading to the discovery of the handgun.

The State has expressly conceded that Officer Zimmerman made physical contact with Thornton by touching his waistband to initiate a pat-down. It is beyond dispute that the purpose of this contact was to frisk Thornton for weapons, not to restrain his movement. Such a frisk is a "search" subject to the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement. See Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. at 16 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 ("it is nothing less than sheer torture of the English language to suggest that a careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a person's clothing all over his or her body in an attempt to find weapons is not a 'search' ").

A frisk is unreasonable unless it is "justified at its inception[.]" Id. at 20 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 . Hence, " '[b]efore an officer places a hand on the person of a citizen in search of anything, [the officer] must have constitutionally adequate, reasonable grounds for doing so[.]' " Sellman v. State , 449 Md. at 558, 144 A.3d 771 (quoting ¹¹³ United States v. Powell , 666 F.3d 180 , 185 (4th Cir. 2011) ) (further quotation marks omitted). 7 ⁷⁸⁴ It is true that Officer Zimmerman did not feel the handgun during the momentary pat-down and that the officers noticed it only after Thornton's flight and the physical seizure of his person. The exclusionary rule, however, bars the use of "both the primary evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure and ... evidence later discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality, the so-called 'fruit of the poisonous tree.' " Utah v. Strieff , 579 U.S. ----, ----, 136 S.Ct. 2056 , 2061, 195 L.Ed.2d 400 (2016) (quoting Segura v. United States , 468 U.S. 796 , 804, 104 S.Ct. 3380 , 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984) ) (further quotation marks omitted). The circuit court's ruling here turned on whether evidence of the discovery of the handgun needed to be suppressed where the discovery occurred "absent a search, but following on what might have been an illegal search under the Terry doctrine[.]" In other words, as the court explained, the pivotal question was whether an initial unlawful pat-down "might make ... what follows on it ... the fruit of the poisonous tree." The court addressed that question through the attenuation doctrine, one of the exceptions to the general rule excluding evidence derived from a Fourth Amendment violation.

See, e.g. , Utah v. Strieff , 136 S.Ct. at 2061 . 8 At most, Hodari D. negates something that was not even a component of Thornton's challenge. Thornton has not contended ¹¹⁴ that he was continuously seized during the period in which he ran from the officers, nor was he required to make such a showing. To prevail on the suppression motion, he only needed to establish " 'two propositions' ": (1) the " 'primary illegality' " of an unreasonable search; and (2) " 'the cause and effect relationship between the primary illegality and the evidence in issue[.]' " Cox v. State , 421 Md. at 651 -52 , 28 A.3d 687 (quoting Gibson v. State , 138 Md. App. 399 , 404, 771 A.2d 536 (2001) ). The circuit court here reasoned that, even if Thornton could establish the first proposition, he could not establish the second.

C. Existence or Nonexistence of Reasonable Suspicion for the Pat-Down Thornton and the State present competing arguments about whether the pat-down was justified by reasonable suspicion that Thornton was armed and dangerous. At a more basic level, the parties also disagree about how this Court should analyze that issue. As both parties acknowledge, the ordinary standard of review for a suppression ruling is well established. The review of the ruling is based on information from the record of the suppression hearing.

See, e.g. , Sizer v. State , 456 Md. 350 , 362, 174 A.3d 326 (2017). Suppression rulings present a mixed question of law and fact. Swift v. State , 393 Md. at 154 , 899 A.2d 867 . Because the "trial court is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and to evaluate the credibility of witnesses[,]" the appellate court defers to the trial court's factual findings unless those findings are clearly erroneous.

Id. at 154-55 , 899 A.2d 867 (citing State v. Green , 375 Md. 595 , 607, 826 A.2d 486 (2003) ). Under this standard, the appellate court views ⁷⁸⁵ "the trial court's findings of fact, the evidence, and the inferences that may be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the party who prevails on the issue that the defendant raises in the motion to suppress." Hailes v. State , 442 Md. 488 , 499, 113 A.3d 608 (2015) (citing Raynor v. State , 440 Md. 71 , 81, 99 A.3d 753 (2014) ) (quotation marks and brackets removed). By contrast, the appellate court reviews ¹¹⁵ "without deference the trial court's application of the law to its findings of fact." Id. " '[W]here, as here, a party has raised a constitutional challenge to a search[,]" the appellate court makes "an independent constitutional evaluation by reviewing the relevant law and applying it to the unique facts and circumstances of the case.' " Grant v. State , 449 Md. at 14-15, 141 A.3d 138 (quoting State v. Wallace , 372 Md. 137 , 144, 812 A.2d 291 (2002) ).

The usual two-step approach is difficult to follow here, because the circuit court was reluctant to make express factual findings or legal conclusions on the issue of reasonable suspicion. The transcript makes it clear that the court was, at the very least, not fully convinced about whether the officers had reasonable suspicion to justify the pat-down. The court was only confident enough to decide that, under the attenuation doctrine, the evidence should not be excluded even if the officers lacked reasonable suspicion. The court discussed the issue of reasonable suspicion in hypothetical terms, implying that it might have doubts about what the officers actually observed, in addition to doubts about the legal significance of any such observations.

Most notably, the court spoke about the significance of Thornton's conduct "if it took place as described" by Officer Zimmerman, which is not quite the same as a finding that the conduct actually took place as described. In their opening briefs, both parties argue that this Court should decide the issue of reasonable suspicion in their favor, based on the existing record. Thornton asserts that the circuit court concluded, or at least strongly suggested, that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct the pat-down, and he argues that the court was correct in doing so. The State admits that the court "was struggling" to decide whether the officers had reasonable suspicion, but it asserts that the court's ruling was "crafted in such a manner that it did not address" that issue.

Despite the State's assertion that "the judge never reached the issue," the State goes on to argue that, to the extent this Court considers the issue, this Court should view the facts in ¹¹⁶ the light most favorable to the State as the party that prevailed on the motion. In reply, Thornton asserts that, even though the court did not explicitly say so, "the entirety" of the ruling "leaves little doubt that the court would have granted the motion to suppress if the only issue had been whether or not there was reasonable suspicion supporting the frisk." Consequently, Thornton contends that "the evidence regarding that sub-issue should be viewed in the light most favorable" to him. (Emphasis in original.) He argues that it would "not make logical sense" to review all findings in the light most favorable to the State where the State did not prevail on all issues. Generally, where " 'there is no factual statement or conclusion, there is no reason for the appellate court to examine the record with an evidentiary slant in favor of the [prevailing party] in order to sustain a non-existent presumption.' " Grant v. State , 449 Md. at 33, 141 A.3d 138 (quoting Goodwin v. Lumbermens Mut.

Cas. Co. , 199 Md. 121 , 129-30, 85 A.2d 759 (1952) ). Where "one party prevails on one issue that the defendant raises in the motion ⁷⁸⁶ to suppress, but does not prevail on the motion to suppress, the appellate court views the trial court's findings of fact, the evidence, and the inferences that may be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the party that prevailed on the issue insofar as the appellate court considers the issue." Hailes v. State , 442 Md. at 499 n.5, 113 A.3d 608 . Here, the State in no sense prevailed in persuading the court that the officers had reasonable suspicion to justify the frisk.

Although the court did not expressly rule in Thornton's favor, the court had acknowledged earlier in the hearing that the State bore the burden of overcoming the presumptive unreasonableness of a warrantless search. Thus, Thornton would have been entitled to prevail on that issue even if the evidence were inconclusive. See Grant v. State , 449 Md. at 28-29, 141 A.3d 138 (citing Epps v. State , 193 Md. App. 687 , 704, 1 A.3d 488 (2010) ). It would be inappropriate to view the facts in the light most favorable to the State regarding an issue on ¹¹⁷ which the court could not say that the State had carried its burden.

The State's account of the facts preceding the pat-down is noticeably more favorable to the State than is the version described by the circuit court. For example, throughout its brief, the State repeatedly asserts that the court "credited" Officer Zimmerman's testimony. But while it is apparent that the court accepted certain portions of Officer Zimmerman's testimony, the court made no comment about his overall credibility. Cf.

Sizer v. State , 456 Md. at 361 , 174 A.3d 326 (noting that the hearing judge expressly stated that she found the "testifying officers 'to be truthful and credible' and that they had 'testified ... without embellishment[ ]' "). The State insists that there is "no reason in the record" to doubt Officer Zimmerman's testimony, but the State fails to mention that the circuit court asked probing questions to the prosecutor specifically about "the credibility of the assertion that they saw actions consistent with someone being armed[.]" (Emphasis added.) It would be a mistake to interpret the court's statement, that Officer Zimmerman's testimony was "substantially different" from the "unconvincing" testimony of his partner, as a blanket endorsement of everything said by Officer Zimmerman. Considered in context, the court was contrasting the level of specificity in the officers' testimony, not making some sort of binary credibility assessment. 9 The State, treating Officer Zimmerman's testimony as an established fact, asserts that Officer Zimmerman saw Thornton make multiple adjustments to his waistband while the officers were questioning him. Yet in its ruling the circuit court mentioned only the initial movement that Officer Zimmerman ¹¹⁸ said that he observed while the officers were first approaching.

The court made a point to describe for the record Officer Zimmerman's demonstration of that movement. By contrast, the court said nothing about the additional "checks" or "adjustments" that the officers claimed to observe while they were questioning Thornton. The court concluded, "[a]ll they ha[d]" to generate suspicion ⁷⁸⁷ was "this conduct with his hands while he's being approached by the police officers. Any such conduct, the court said, "could be consistent with adjusting the position of a gun in the waistband or in some other actions toward the band." As Thornton points out, Maryland cases have held that an officer's observation of some feature that could be consistent with the possession of a concealed weapon, standing alone, ordinarily is not enough to justify a stop and frisk.

In Ransome v. State , 373 Md. 99 , 816 A.2d 901 (2003), the Court of Appeals concluded that an officer "did not have a reasonable basis for frisking" ( id. at 111 , 816 A.2d 901 ) a man who "had done nothing to attract police attention other than being on the street with a bulge in his pocket at the same time [the officer] drove by." Id. at 109-10 , 816 A.2d 901 . The Court acknowledged that "a noticeable bulge in a man's waist area may well reasonably indicate that a man is armed" ( id. at 107 , 816 A.2d 901 ), but the Court also noted that men often "carry innocent personal objects in their pants pockets" that "will create some sort of bulge." Id. at 108 , 816 A.2d 901 . The Court concluded, generally, that an officer's observation of a bulge in a man's clothing may justify a frisk in "combination" with other "circumstances justifying a reasonable belief that the bulge noticed by the officer may be a weapon or that criminal activity may be afoot[.]" Id. at 109 , 816 A.2d 901 . In addition to citing Ransome , Thornton focuses his argument on In re Jeremy P. , 197 Md. App. 1 , 11 A.3d 830 (2011), a case involving officer testimony about waistband adjustments.

In that case, a detective stopped Jeremy P., a juvenile, after the detective observed him, while walking on the street with a friend, make "maybe two or three" movements that the detective characterized as "indicative of somebody constantly ¹¹⁹ carrying a weapon on them." Id. at 5 , 11 A.3d 830 . The detective gave a series of vague descriptions of the movements: that Jeremy P. "kept playing around with his waistband area"; that he "kept making firm movements in his waistband area"; and that he was "adjusting hi[m]self from the front area" by "fixing" his shirt. Id. at 4 , 11 A.3d 830 .

The detective asserted that the front waistband area is a "high risk area" for possible weapons. Id. at 4, 5 , 11 A.3d 830 . In light of Ransome , this Court reasoned that, "just as a bulge may be created by a wide variety of objects other than a weapon, so, too, can a person touching the area of his waistband be