Tkac v. Maryland Steel Co.

Briscoe, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The appellant brought suit on the 19th day of March, 1903, in the Baltimore City Court against the appellee to recover damages for injuries sustained by him, while in its employ, by reason of the alleged negligence of the defendant company. The questions in the case are presented upon a single exception, and that is to the action of the Court in granting the defendant’s third prayer, and in overruling a special exception thereto. The third prayer reads as follows: “That the undisputed evidence in this case shows that the risk and danger of walking along the place where the plaintiff was injured was obvious and known to the plaintiff, or ought by the exercise of ordinary care, to have been known to be unsafe and dangerous, and the plaintiff is not entitled to recover under the pleadings in the case.” The case was submitted at the close of the plaintiff’s testimony, and the judgment being for the defendant, the plaintiff has appealed.

We discover no error in the ruling of the Court upon the prayer as granted, or in overruling the special exception to the prayer. There is no evidence in the record that would have justified a verdict or supported a judgment for the .plaintiff, and the ¹⁸¹ Court below was therefore clearly right in withdrawing the case from the jury. The facts briefly stated are these: The appellee is a corporation owning and operating a steel plant, at Sparrows Point, Baltimore County. The appellant was a laborer employed in the steel works of the appellee.

On July 6th, 1902, he was struck by a motor car and in-j'ured while leaving what is called the ore house, where he had been at work. The building is stated to be six to twelve hundred feet long and contained bins into which the ore that is converted into steel, is dumped into the cars. The ore is brought into the house by means of electric cars, located on the west side of the building and running its entire length. There were cross-rails on the platforms of the cars which projected about nine inches, leaving a narrow space between the wall and the nearest rail of the car varying from one inch to forty-two inches.

The plaintiff was injured while walking along the space between the wall and the track, having been struck by a cross-rail, on a platform, attached to the electric car. The basis of the plaintiff’s suit is that the injury was due to the negligence of the defendant in maintaining an unsafe and dangerous path of ingress and egress between the wall and the car track, from the place he worked. The principles