Todd v. State

BLOOM, J. At a bench trial in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County, appellant, Lowell Hudson Todd, Jr., was convicted of causing a life-threatening injury by motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, driving while intoxicated, driving while under the influence of alcohol, driving while intoxicated per se, and negligent driving. 1 The court merged the lesser offenses into the greater offense and sentenced Todd to three years’ imprisonment for causing a life-threatening injury by motor vehicle while intoxicated. ISSUES In this appeal, Todd argues, in essence: I. The statute that prohibits and penalizes the causation of a life-threatening injury by motor vehicle while intoxicated or under the influence of alcohol is unconstitutionally vague.

II

Even if the statute is not unconstitutionally vague, the trial court erred by applying an incorrect standard in determining that the injuries in question were life-threatening. ³³⁷ III. The evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that the injuries in question were life-threatening. Finding no merit in any of these arguments, we shall affirm the judgment of the trial court. FACTS Todd’s convictions stem from a two-car accident that occurred in Wicomico County on the early evening of August 3, 2001.

Todd does not now dispute that the car he was driving crossed the center line and collided head-on with a car that was being driven by James Vance and in which Vance’s three children were riding. Nor does Todd dispute that he was intoxicated at the time. The State presented evidence that Vance and all three of his children suffered injuries. The most seriously injured was 12-year old Sarah Vance, who had been riding in the back seat, on the passenger side.

Immediately after the crash, James Vance turned to check on his children and saw that Sarah had “a big hole in her head.” Wallace Bennett, an emergency medical technician who was driving behind Vance and saw the accident occur, testified that he stopped to help. Bennett told the court that Sarah was his “priority patient” because “she was in and out of consciousness, she had a cut on her forehead that was pretty well deep around, her eyes were turning black and blue.” Another witness, Jack Bozek, was standing by the side of the road and witnessed the crash. Bozek approached the vehicles to try to help. He noticed that Sarah’s “head was all split wide open” and he “thought she was dead.... ” Trooper George Noonan of the Maryland State Police arrived on the scene within minutes of the accident.

He testified that, because “all of the injuries ... seemed to be life threatening at the time,” his first priority was “to make sure they get them to the hospital.” More emergency medical personnel arrived, and the Vances as well as Todd were then ³³⁸ taken to Peninsula Regional Medical Center (“Peninsula”) in Salisbury. Kathy Vance, the wife of James Vance and mother of the three injured children, met her family at Peninsula. As to Sarah’s condition, Mrs. Vance testified: Well, when I first got there I didn’t even know her.... She was, had a cut from ear to ear across the top of her head, and she was bleeding pretty badly.

She was, her face was swollen so much that it was almost black, and her eyes were swollen shut. She had a lot of blood on her face. They were working on her trying to get a breathing tube down her throat to stabilize her so they could take her to surgery. She was unconscious.

She didn’t know anything. Mrs. Vance then explained that the physicians at Peninsula “couldn’t stabilize” Sarah, and because Sarah had bleeding on her brain they “had no choice but to ... take her to surgery right away.... ” Mrs. Vance testified that, after the physicians at Peninsula operated, “they did not close the wound, they just pulled the skin up over the wound and put a bandage on her and left her like that.” The next day, after Sarah’s condition was sufficiently stabilized, “she was flown to Johns Hopkins where they were waiting for her to take her into surgery.” At Johns Hopkins Hospital (“Hopkins”), “they pulled [the] skin back and operated on her head more for the bleed on the brain.” Mrs. Vance testified that Sarah “was taken to the ICU” immediately after the surgery at Hopkins, and then “was taken to ... a step-down unit for several days.” She added that since then Sarah has undergone several additional surgeries to repair portions of her face that were “completely crushed” in the accident. Sarah’s medical records from both Peninsula and Hopkins were admitted into evidence. The emergency room physician at Peninsula who treated Sarah upon her arrival wrote in his report: “THIS IS A 12-YEAR-OLD WITH SEVERE CRANIAL INJURY, EPIDURAL BLEED, WHO NEED[S] EM ³³⁹ ERGENT CRANIOTOMY.” He added, “Once she is stable from a neurosurgical standpoint, she will be transferred to a specialty center for attention to her orbital fracture.” I. Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine Todd was found guilty of, inter alia, violating former Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol., 2000 Cum.Supp.), § 388B(b) and (c) of Art. 27 in connection with Sarah Vance’s injuries.

The statute provided: (b) Driving while intoxicated. — A person who causes a life[-]threatening injury to another as a result of the person’s negligent driving, operation, or control of a motor vehicle or vessel while intoxicated or intoxicated per se is guilty of a misdemeanor to be known as “life[-]threatening injury by motor vehicle or vessel while intoxicated or intoxicated per se,” and on conviction the person shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than 3 years or a fine of not more than $5,000 or both. (c) Driving while under the influence of alcohol. — A person who causes a life[-]threatening injury to another as a result of the person’s negligent driving, operation, or control of a motor vehicle or vessel while under the influence of alcohol is guilty of a misdemeanor to be know as “lifer-]threatening injury by motor vehicle or vessel while under the influence of alcohol,” and on conviction the person shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than 2 years or a fine of not more than $3,000 or both. Section 388B became effective on October 1, 1996. See 1996 Laws of Maryland, Chapter 427.

Todd points out that, prior to the enactment of that statute, there was some discussion among legislators concerning whether the term “life-threatening injury” should be defined and, if so, how it should be defined. See bill files for Senate Bill 277 (1996) and House Bill 32 (1996). At least one lawmaker urged that the term be defined as “an injury that creates an immediate and substantial risk of death.” See bill file for Senate Bill 277 (1996). ³⁴⁰ The 1996 General Assembly ultimately decided not to define the term, however. 2 Todd argues that the legislature’s failure to include a definition of “life-threatening injury” in the statute left the term “impermissibly ambiguous because reasonable people can and do reach widely divergent conclusions on what it means.” He therefore concludes that the statute is void for vagueness. “The void-for-vagueness doctrine as applied to the analysis of penal statutes requires that the statute be ‘sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties.’ ” Galloway v. State, 365 Md. 599, 614 , 781 A.2d 851 (2001) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 990 , 122 S.Ct. 1547 , 152 L.Ed.2d 472 (2002). As the Court of Appeals has summarized: In determining the constitutionality of statutes, “[t]he basic rule is that there is a presumption” that the statute is valid....

We are reluctant to find a statute unconstitutional if, “by any construction, it can be sustained.” ... If, however, a statute violates a “mandatory provision” of the Constitution, “we are required to declare such an act unconstitutional and void.” ... Therefore, if it is established that a statute is vague — offends due process — and/or over-broad — sweeps within the ambit of constitutionally “protect ³⁴¹ ed expressive or associational rights” — then the statute is unconstitutional. The party attacking the statute has the burden of establishing its unconstitutionality....

Id. at 610-11 , 781 A.2d 851 (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted). “[W]hen considering the void-for-vagueness doctrine, courts consistently consider two criteria or rationales. The first rationale is the fair notice principle that ‘persons of ordinary intelligence and experience be afforded a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that they may govern their behavior accordingly.’ The standard for determining whether a statute provides fair notice is ‘whether persons “of common intelligence must necessarily guess at [the statute’s] meaning.” ’ A statute is not vague under the fair notice principle if the meaning ‘of the words in controversy can be fairly ascertained by reference to judicial determinations, the common law, dictionaries, treatises or even the words themselves, if they possess a common and generally accepted meaning.’ ” Id. at 615 , 781 A.2d 851 (citations omitted) (emphasis omitted). See also Eanes v. State, 318 Md. 436, 459 , 569 A.2d 604 (1990) (“A law is not vague simply because it requires conformity to an imprecise normative standard”). “The second criterion of the vagueness doctrine regards enforcement of the statute. This rationale exists ‘to ensure that criminal statutes provide “legally fixed standards and adequate guidelines for police, judicial officers, triers of fact and others whose obligations it is to enforce, apply and administer the penal laws.” ’ ” Galloway, 365 Md. at 615-16 , 781 A.2d 851 (citations omitted). [A] statute is not unconstitutionally vague “merely because it allows for the exercise of some discretion on the part of law enforcement and judicial officials.

It is only where a statute is so broad as to be susceptible to irrational and selective patterns of enforcement that it ³⁴² will be held unconstitutional under this second arm of the vagueness principle.” Id. at 616 , 781 A.2d 851 (citation omitted). “As a general rule, the application of the void-for-vagueness doctrine is based on the application of the statute to the ‘facts at hand.’ ” Id. (citation omitted). “[T]he vagueness doctrine is designed to balance the need for criminal statutes ‘ “general enough to take into account a variety of human conduct and sufficiently specific to provide fair warning that certain kinds of conduct are prohibited.” ’ ” McKenzie v. State, 131 Md.App. 124, 137 , 748 A.2d 67 (2000) (citations omitted). Upon interpreting the “facts at hand,” the Court of Appeals rejected vagueness challenges in: Galloway, 365 Md. at 608 , 781 A.2d 851 upholding former Md.Code (1957, 1996 RepLVol., 2000 Cum.Supp.), § 123(c) of Art. 27 (now Md.Code (2002), § 3-803(a)(l) of the Criminal Law Article (C.L.)), which prohibited a person from “following] another person in or about a public place or maliciously engaging] in a course of conduct that alarms or seriously annoys another person ... [w]ith intent to harass, alarm, or annoy the other person”; Williams v. State, 329 Md. 1, 8 , 616 A.2d 1275 (1992) (upholding former Md.Code (1957, 1992 Repl.Vol.), § 286(g) of Art. 27 (now Md.Code (2002), C.L. § 5-613(a)), which prohibited persons from being drug kingpins and defined “drug kingpin” as an “organizer, supervisor, financier, or manager” in a drug conspiracy; Eanes v. State, 318 Md. at 461 , 569 A.2d 604 upholding former Md.Code (1957, 1987 Repl.Vol.), § 121 of Art. 27 (now, in substantive part, Md.Code (2002), C.L. § 10-201(c)(5)), which prohibited “loud and unseemly noises” as disorderly conduct); and Bowers v. State, 283 Md. 115, 125 , 389 A.2d 341 (1978) upholding former Md.Code (1957, 1976 Repl.Vol.), § 35A(b)(7)(A) of Art. 27 (now Md.Code (2002, 2004 Cum.Supp.), C.L. § 3-601, which defined child abuse as, inter alia, the “cruel or inhumane” treatment of a minor). Similarly, in McKenzie, 131 Md.App. at 137 , 748 A.2d 67 , this Court upheld Maryland’s anti-hazing statute, which defined “haze” as “doing an act or causing any situation which recklessly or intentionally subject a student to the risk of serious bodily ³⁴³ injury for the purpose of initiation into a student organization of a school, college, or university.” Former Md.Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol.), § 268H of Article 27 now Md.Code (2002), C.L. § 3-607. “In contrast, ... when Maryland Courts have held statutes and ordinances void for vagueness, the enforcement action challenged had created an absurd result, explicitly illustrating for the court the problems with the statute.” McKenzie, 131 Md.App. at 140 , 748 A.2d 67 .

For example, in In Re Leroy T., 285 Md. 508 , 403 A.2d 1226 (1979), a juvenile who was arrested while allegedly trying to break into a car was accused of, and adjudicated delinquent for, the possession of a burglary tool— in his case a pair of pliers — in violation of former Baltimore City Code, Art. 19, § 9(a)(5). The juvenile argued upon appeal that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague, and the Court of Appeals agreed. The Court observed that § 9(a)(5) prohibited the possession of any “device, instrument, or article commonly used, designed or specially adopted for criminal use.” 285 Md. at 510 , 403 A.2d 1226 . The State admitted, and the Court concluded, that “almost any common article or instrument