Trail v. Terrapin Run, LLC

DALE R. CATHELL, Judge, retired, specially assigned. With the inclusion of certain of the amici (via their briefs), this case, in one sense is a continuation of legislative battles that began in the early 1990s, where representatives of the environmental protection and professional land planning interests attempted to establish that the State, or State planners, should exercise greater control than theretofore enjoyed over most aspects of land use decision-making that then reposed in the local jurisdictions. 1 ⁵²⁶ David Trail, et al., petitioners, presented only one question in their Petition for Certiorari: “May a board of appeals deriving zoning authority under Article 66B grant a special exception, in the absence of an affirmative finding that the proposed use conforms to the jurisdiction’s comprehensive plan?” 2 We presume that petitioners are asserting that the administrative entity making the decision must mention the term “conform,” because it now appears in the relevant section of the State statute, Article 66B, 3 and then explain its decision in relation to petitioners’ (and some of the amici’s) versions of the definition of the term “conform” as it relates to the local jurisdiction’s plans. 4 We hold that the agency did that which ⁵²⁷ the statute required it to do. We believe that the term “conform,” standing alone, as first used by the Legislature in 1970, is the semantical equivalent of the phrase “in harmony with” which has long been the standard utilized in Maryland land use administrative practice. 5 We shall attempt later in our opinion to explain the history of the “local control/state control via mandates” issue from an examination of the legislative actions over the years. 6 ⁵²⁸ Facts The site at issue is located in the A and C zones in Allegany County. In those zones planned unit developments, such as that in the case at bar, are permitted as special exceptions to the provisions of the zoning code.

The site had been expressly designated for urban development as far back as 1995 and that designation continued through the 2002 version of the County Comprehensive Plan. The site was not included under the County’s master plans as a “sensitive area.” There is nothing we have found in the record of this case indicating that the Maryland Department of State Planning prior to this action ever objected to the inclusion of this site as suitable for urban development in the County’s Master Plans. Prior to the application at issue here, the Allegany Planning Commission had visited the site and determined that the proposed development then contemplated, that later was the subject of the application and of the grant of the special exception at issue, was consistent with the Comprehensive Plan. In August 2005, Terrapin Run, LLC (“respondent”) applied to the Board of Appeals of Allegany County (the “Board”) for a special exception provided for in the local zoning code to establish a planned residential development (the “development”).

The development was to be located on 935 acres of ⁵²⁹ land, primarily zoned as District “A” (Agricultural, Forestry and Mining), with a portion of the tract located in District “C” (Conservation). The 935-acre tract of land abuts Route 40 and Shipley Road on the east side, and Green Ridge Road on the west. Green Ridge State Forest is located to the east of the tract, and there are also forested lands south of the tract. 7 The development would consist of 4,300 residential units, an equestrian center, a community building and a 125,000 square foot shopping center. Additionally, the development would require a sewage treatment plant, to be located along Route 40.

The Board noted that the project would take twenty years to complete and during that time, 150 to 200 separate permits and approvals would be required for its completion. As relevant to the case at bar, after eight sessions in which the Board heard from 11 experts (nine for the applicants and two for the protestants), and received more than 80 exhibits, the Board, in a lengthy finding of facts, found that the proposed development would be in harmony with the Allegany County Comprehensive Plan, 2002 Update (the “Plan”). The Board opined that the Plan was advisory in nature, rather than regulatory, and that strict conformance with the plan was not required. Included in its findings were the following “conclusions,” as stated in Respondent’s brief to the Court of Special Appeals: 8 “• There is a specific statement in the Allegany County Plan stating that it is the function of the Plan to serve as a guide; • It is commonly understood that Master Plans are guides in the development process, which guidelines are mandatory only if an Ordinance so provides; ⁵³⁰ • The Allegany County Ordinance contains no requirement of strict adherence to the Plan and affords it no regulatory authority; • That conformity to the Plan is not required; and • That the proper issue to be decided by the Zoning Board is ‘whether the use in the particular case is in harmony with the general purpose and intent of the Plan’.” (Internal citations omitted.) Consistent with Article 66B’s requirement that if some jurisdiction desires to exercise zoning power, it must first develop a Master or other Comprehensive Plan, Allegany County, as we have indicated, had adopted such a Plan.

Included in that Plan at the relevant time were the “vision” statements which were required to be included. Additionally, the Plan included a sensitive areas compilation as required by Article 66B. As previously indicated, the subject site was not included as a sensitive area in the Comprehensive Plan and was indicated for future Urban Development. 9 The Plan describes that its purpose or intent is as a “guide” in respect to the issue of land use. The Maryland Department of Planning 10 was privy to the County’s actions in adopting its Master Plan and there is nothing in the record before us to which our attention has been directed indicating that the Department made any objection at the time in respect to the inclusion of the subject site as an area for urban development.

The request for a special exception was eventually approved by the Board using the traditional “in harmony with” stan ⁵³¹ dard. Petitioners objected to the “in harmony” standard set forth by the Board of Appeals, and appealed to the Circuit Court for Allegany County. They contended that the Board erred as a matter of law in granting a special exception where there was no finding that the proposed use “conformed” to the Plan. At the Circuit Court, petitioners primarily relied on the definition of a special exception as set forth in the Maryland Code (1957, 2003 RepLVol.), Article 66, § l(k), which now states: “ ‘Special exception’ means a grant of a specific use that would not be appropriate generally or without restriction and shall be based upon a finding that certain conditions governing special exceptions as detailed in the zoning ordinance exist, that the use conforms to the plan and is compatible with the existing neighborhood.” Petitioners relied on the definition of “Plan” as set forth in Article 66, § 1(h), which states: “(1) ‘Plan’ means the policies, statements, goals, and interrelated plans for private and public land use, transportation, and community facilities documented in texts and maps which constitute the guide for the area’s future development. “(2) ‘Plan’ includes a general plan, master plan, comprehensive plan, or community plan____” On May 5, 2006, the Circuit Court issued a judgment and opinion remanding the case to the Board with directions that it determine whether the proposed use was “consistent with” the policies and recommendations of the Plan.

In arriving at that standard, it referred to the Allegany County Zoning Ordinance, which at one point had stated as part of its legislative purpose: “[T]o ensure that these uses are consistent with the policies and recommendations of the Allegany County Comprehensive Plan----” (Emphasis added.) Petitioners appealed the decision of the Circuit Court to the Court of Special Appeals, asserting that the proper standard is conformance, rather than harmony (or consistency). Respondents cross-appealed, arguing that the standard ⁵³² of harmony set forth by the Board was correct, and that the Board’s decision should be affirmed for the reasons it had given. The Court of Special Appeals filed its decision on April 6, 2007, reversing the judgment of the Circuit Court, and affirming the decision of the Board. Relying in part on Schultz v. Pritts, 291 Md. 1 , 432 A.2d 1319 (1981), 11 and Richmarr Holly Hills, Inc. v. American PCS, L.P., 117 Md. App. 607 , 701 A.2d 879 (1997).

Judge Eyler, James R., in an excellent opinion for that Court, held in relevant part: “It is beyond question that different words or phrases ' may connote different meanings. On the other hand, words have synonyms, and they must be viewed in context to determine if the choice of a particular word or phrase, as compared to a similar word or phrase, represents a semantical difference or a substantive difference. “Article 66B is a general enabling statute and, by its express terms, rests land planning and land use controls with local jurisdictions. The ‘Plan’ is referred to several times in Art. 66B as being merely a guide. The definition of ‘Plan’ in Art. 66B, section 1.00(h)(1), states: “ ‘Plan’ ” means the policies, statements, goals, and interrelated plans ... which constitute the guide for the area’s future development----Art. 66B, section 3.05(a)(2)(i), discussing the pow ⁵³³ ers and duties of the local planning commission, states that the plan shall ‘Serve as a guide to public and private actions and decisions to ensure the development of public and private property in appropriate relationships.’ ...

Article 66B, section 3.05(a)(4)(i) states that the plan shall contain a ‘statement of goals and objectives, principles, policies, and standards, which shall serve as a guide for the development and economic and social well-being of the local jurisdiction.’ “Additionally, the terms that appellants allege have different meanings, requiring different levels of accord, are used interchangeably in Art. 66B without any discernible intended difference.” “In Schultz v. Pritts,[ 12 ] Judge Rita Davidson, writing for the majority, stated the required finding as follows: ‘The special exception use is a valid zoning mechanism that delegates to an administrative board a limited authority to allow enumerated uses which the legislature has determined to be permissible absent any fact or circumstance negating that presumption. The duties of the Board are to judge ... whether the use in the particular case is in harmony with the general purpose and intent of the plan.’ [Schultz v. Pritts, 291 Md.] at 11, 432 A.2d [at 1325] (emphasis added). “The Court of Appeals was clearly aware of the definition of special exception contained in section 1.00(k), as that provision was reproduced in its entirety in the Court’s opinion.... The Court’s inclusion of the statutory definition of special exception, coupled with the language that the proposed use must be in ‘harmony with the general purpose and intent of the plan,’ necessarily means that the Court was of the view that the different words conveyed essential ⁵³⁴ ly the same meaning. That meaning, under Article 66B, is that special exception use does not have to strictly comply with a plan.

It is up to the local jurisdiction, if it so chooses, to make it so. “In our view, nothing within the zoning code or the comprehensive plan itself acts to elevate the plan beyond a mere guide. Whether we describe the Board’s analysis as examining whether the special exception use is in harmony with, consistent with, or in conformity with the plan, the terms differ only semantic ally. In the present case, each term connotes only a general compatibility with the purpose and intent of the plan, as opposed to a strict adherence of the plan.” ' Trail v. Terrapin Run, LLC, 174 Md.App. 43, 50-57 , 920 A.2d 597, 601-05 (2007). 13 We agree with the reasoning of the Court of Special Appeals. Before we address the legislative history of the relevant statutes, we point out once again that in Maryland, with some possible exceptions, local governments generally are not required to adopt zoning ordinances, master plans, comprehensive zoning plans, and the like.

What is sometimes forgotten in the battles in the land use arena is that Article 66B was never intended to mandate that local governments adopt zoning. What it did was to empower them to do so, if they chose to do so, and if they so choose, Article 66B imposed suggestions, guides, and, in some instances, restrictions on how it was to be done. Its general permissive character was, and is, recognition that in adopting Article 66B the State was permitting local governments to interfere with a property owners constitutional and common-law rights to use his/her property in any manner (so long as a common-law nuisance is not created by the unrestricted use). ⁵³⁵ The Legislature’s intent in enacting general zoning legislation was not to mandate that local governments adopt zoning, it was merely empowering them to do so. It, in essence, stated: “If you want to do it, here is how you can tell property owners how their property may, and how it may not, be used.” Its general intent was not to require, but to permit.

Accordingly, when it is argued that a provision was intended to be mandated, that provision must be examined in light of the general permissive aspect of Article 66B and not some perceived mandatory aspect. Thus, while the State might be able, so long as the language is sufficiently specific, to create mandated requirements, an intent to create compliance absolutism is not presumed—it must be proven from specific language and/or the intent of the Legislature in enacting statutes. We are also cognizant of the general rule relating to the interplay between zoning issues (as opposed to subdivision issues) and Master Plans. The appellate courts of this State have repeatedly noted that, generally, Master Plans, Comprehensive Plans, and the like, are advisory, guides only, and not normally mandatory insofar as rezonings, special exceptions, conditional uses and the like are concerned.

Seventeen years after the 1970 statute that first inserted the word “conform” in a definitional section that defined “special exception,” this Court, in West Montgomery County Citizens Ass’n v. Maryland-Nat’l Capital Park and Planning Comm’n, 309 Md. 183, 186-96 , 522 A.2d 1328, 1329-34 (1987), opined: “A county enjoys no inherent power to zone or rezone, and may exercise zoning power only to the extent and in the manner directed by the State Legislature.... “In October, 1980, the Functional Master Plan for the Preservation of Agriculture and Rural Open Space in Montgomery County ... was approved and adopted.... ⁵³⁶ “Similarly, in Montgomery] Co[unty] v. Woodward & Lothrop, 280 Md. 686, 704 , 376 A.2d 483 [, 493] (1977).... Chief Judge Murphy said for the Court that land use planning documents such as General or Master plans ‘represent only a basic scheme generally outlining planning and zoning objectives in an extensive area, and are in no sense a final plan; they are continually subject to modification in the light of actual land use development and serve as a guide rather than a strait jacket.’ That remains the general rule. More important even, in analyzing land use issues that impact upon the fundamental constitutional rights of property owners, it is appropriate to start with a position stated by this Court long ago (and still relevant) in Landay v. Zoning Appeals Board, 173 Md. 460, 465-66 , 196 A. 293, 295-96 (1938): “In a constitutional sense, the only justification for the restrictions imposed by such[zoning] laws as the ordinance under consideration on the use of private property is the protection of the public health, safety, or morals____ “Such ordinances are in derogation of the common law right to so use private property as to realize its highest utility, and while théy should be liberally construed to accomplish their plain purpose and intent, they should not be extended by implication to cases not clearly within the scope of the purpose and intent manifest in their language.” (Citations omitted.) And see Aspen Hill Venture v. Montgomery County Council, 265 Md. 303, 313 , 289 A.2d 303, 308 (1972), where we stated further: “[W]e are mindful of the fact that ‘the constitutionality and validity of zoning laws depend essentially upon a reasonable balancing of public interest in zoning as against opposing private interests in property*.... In such a situation we must not forget the underlying principle that, ‘such ordinances [zoning ordinances] are in derogation of the common ⁵³⁷ law right to use private property as to realize its highest utility, ... they should not be extended by implication____’ ” (Citations omitted.) ⁵³⁶ I ⁵³⁷ See also White v. North, 356 Md. 31, 48 , 736 A.2d 1072, 1082 (1999), where after reaffirming the Landay statement above, we additionally said: “In Landay [ ], we noted that ‘[i]n a constitutional sense, the only justification for the restrictions ... on the use of private property is the protection of the public health, safety, or morals.’...

See also Gino’s of Maryland, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 250 Md. 621, 642 , 244 A.2d 218, 230 (1968) (‘[Zjoning ordinances are in derogation of the common law and should be strictly construed.’); County Comm’rs v. Zent, 86 Md.App. 745, 751 , 587 A.2d 1205, 1208 (1991); Lone v. Montgomery County, 85 Md.App. 477, 494-95 , 584 A.2d 142, 150-51 (1991).” See also Stansbury v. Jones, 372 Md. 172, 187 , 812 A.2d 312, 321 (2002) (quoting Landay, 173 Md. at 466 , 196 A. at 296 ). We now examine the relevant statutes. A. The 1970 Legislation Prior to the 1970 legislation (and at least since 1957), the Maryland Code, Art. 66B, § 7. Board of zoning appeals., (the then general section outlining the powers of boards of appeals) had provided in relevant part that “said board of zoning appeals may ... make special exceptions to the terms of the ordinance in harmony with its gemral purpose and in accordance with general or specific rules therein contained.” (Emphasis added.) In the late 1960s, a Final Report of the Maryland Planning and Zoning Law Study Commission, dated December 1969, was issued in support of proposed 1970 legislation. 14 The 1970 ⁵³⁸ statute that resulted changed the relevant language relating to special exceptions by the insertion of a general definition clause 15 in the new Article 66B.

As relevant to the case at bar, it read as follows: “ § 1.00. Definitions. “ ‘Special exception ’ means a grant of a specific use that would not be appropriate generally or without restriction and shall be based upon a finding that certain conditions governing special exceptions as detailed in the zoning ordinance exist, that the use conforms to the plan and is compatible with the existing neighborhood.” (Underlining added.) The use of the word conform, or its derivatives, appears to date from this 1970 statute. The question then becomes— “Why did the Legislature change the relevant language in 1970?” As we have noted, we have been unable to access any bill files from that 1970 era in respect to the statute at issue. We have, however, found the report (the “Final Report ” supra) that provided the impetus for the re-codification of Article 66B which resulted from the passage of Chapter 672 of the Laws of 1970.

That report, fully titled as “Legislative Recommendations-Final Report, (Dec.1969),” was prepared by the Maryland Planning and Zoning Law Study Commission that was Chaired by the Honorable Goodloe E. Byron of Frederick, Maryland, and included members from all geographical regions of the State. Upon our reading of the Final Report and its appendices, notes and commentary, we find no indication that the State, by its use in the statute of the word “conform,” intended to force on local governments an absolute requirement for complete compliance with their respective local master and other comprehensive plans. ⁵³⁹ In a Note relating to the Commission’s proposal for the inclusion of the definition section, the report stated: “ ‘Special Exception ’—This term, was not defined informer Article 66B. The definition has been extracted from Montgomery County v. Merlands Club, 202 Md. 279 , [288,] 96 A.2d 261 , [26U-65] (1953), where the court drew a clear distinction between this term and a ‘variance.’ In addition, the more recent opinion by Barnes, J. in Cadem v. Nanna, 213 Md. 536 , [5)3,] 221 A.2d 703 [, 707] (1966)[,] provided guidelines in regard to this power. “This definition effects a change in the case law of Baltimore City. In the past, there has been no distinction in Baltimore City between the terms ‘variance’ and ‘special exception’ since both could be granted if there were ‘practical difficulties or unnecessary hardship.’...” (Citation omitted.) Maryland Planning and Zoning Law Study Commission, Legislative Recommendations-Final Report, at 18 (Dec.1969).

While the reference in respect to Merlands Club in the Note primarily dealt with attempting to create a distinction in Baltimore City between “variances” and “special exceptions,” the Merlands Club case was one which involved the then standards in Montgomery County for the granting of a special exception. The Montgomery County administrative entity had repeatedly in the case declined to use the “in harmony with” standard of the applicable County statute. We opined in that case, as relevant here, that: “What Section 13 g [the section creating the ‘in harmony with’ standard] does is to delegate to the Zoning Board a limited authority to permit enumerated uses which the legislative body finds in effect prima facie properly residential, absent any fact or circumstance in a particular case which would change this presumptive finding. The duties given the Board are to judge whether the neighboring properties and the general neighborhood would be adversely affected, and whether the use, in the particular case, is in ⁵⁴⁰ harmony with the general purpose and intent of the zoning plan .... “Under the legislative enumeration of Section 13 g, private clubs are prima facie to be permitted in a residential use area.

The applicant for such a use need not show either practical difficulties, un-necessary hardship, or great urgency, but only that the club is a private club and that it would be in general harmony with the zoning plan and would not adversely affect the neighboring properties and the general neighborhood.” (Emphasis added.) Merlands Club, 202 Md. at 287-90 , 96 A.2d at 264-65 . It is clear from the language in Merlands Club and in this Note to the Final Report that the inclusion of a definition section had nothing to do with an attempt by the Legislature to impose mandatory requirements or some standard beyond the previously accepted “in harmony with” standard. It was primarily to create for the first time a definition and to create a distinction in Baltimore City between “special exceptions” and “variances.” 16 The Cadem case involved a private contract. It had relatively little relevance to the matter for which it was cited.

It merely noted as dicta that special exceptions and zoning reclassifications were vastly different zoning matters, traditionally governed by different standards. In a Note addressing the recommendation in respect to the inclusion of proposed Section 4.07(d) (which re-codified the pre-1970 Section 22) the Final Report noted: “Section (e) through (g) [formerly Sections (d), (e),(g)[ 17 ] and (f) respectively] have not been changed, but have only been moved to a ⁵⁴¹ more logical place within Section 1.07. There has been no substantive change in any of these subsections ” Maryland Planning and Zoning Law Study Commission, Legislative Recommendations-Final Report, at 32 (Dec.1969) (brackets in original). The proposed Purposes clause of the recommendations of the Final Report, and the statute as enacted in 1970, both contained clauses stating that plans adopted pursuant to the statute’s authority were to be guides to land use, not absolute requirements.

At one point, on page 74, the Final Report proposed that the Purposes clause of the proposed statute contain the statement: “The powers granted here in shall be exercised with forethought and reasonable restraint so that the measures adopted will promote the economic prosperity of this State, secure continued improvement in the living conditions for all segments of the population and offer the maximum encouragement to private initiative for the accomplishment of these goals.” Maryland Planning and Zoning Law Study Commission, Legislative Recommendations-Final Report, at 74 (Dec.1969). Nowhere, in the proposed plan or the statute was it stated that the provisions in master plans were to be mandates. Section “3.06 Purposes in View,” provided, as relevant here, “The plan shall be made with the general purpose of guiding and accomplishing the coordinated, adjusted, and harmonious development of the jurisdiction____” Maryland Planning and Zoning Law Study Commission, Legislative Recommendations-Final Report, at 25 (Dec.1969) (emphasis added). Ultimately, the Commission recommended that a “Model Land Development Code,” Id. at 11, be adopted, and attached a copy of what it was proposing, drafted by Professor Jan Krasnowiecki of the University of Pennsylvania Law School, now retired.

In attaching a copy of the document as Appendix C to the Final Report, the Commission also included its comments and notes, some of which are of interest in respect to the Commission’s intentions and purposes as to the changes ⁵⁴² being proposed. In those Notes at page 59 of the Final Report, the Commission stated, in relevant part: “Indeed, the definition of ‘development’ is only one element of the boundary—the outer limits imposed by this Code on the exercise of the powers. Other elements of the boundary are that the local government must adopt regulations, that it must follow certain prescribed procedures. These are minor elements by comparison to the overriding elements which are (a) that the local government cannot go beyond the stated purposes of the Code (Section 201); and (b) that it cannot go beyond the limits imposed by the Constitution of this State or of the United States.

Within the boundaries imposed by these elements, the local government is authorized to control the subject matter defined as ‘development’ and ‘land use, ’ but it is not required to do so. Furthermore, if it decides to control some of the subject matter, it is not required to use the same words. In that sense, the definitions in the Code are internal to the Code. With this understanding, we now turn to the individual definitions. ‘“Local government.’ Section 201(1) vests the power to regulate ‘land use’ and ‘development’ in ‘every local government.’ Obviously, the definition of ‘local government’ is critical, since it will determine the applicability of the Code.

Because this is a highly sensitive political decision, it was felt best to discuss the various alternatives in this comment. There are, basically, two approaches. “Mandatory Applicability. An attempt to make the Code applicable to certain described local governments on a mandatory basis presents grave difficulties because of the crazy-quilt pattern now prevailing in the laws from which local governments draw their zoning and planning powers “Optional Applicability. Any lingering constitutional problem and the incipient political problems would disap ⁵⁴³ pear if the applicability of the Code were left to local option.

All hope of uniformity might likewise evaporate .... ” (Underlining added.) Maryland Planning and Zoning Law Study Commission, Legislative Recommendations-Final Report, at 59-67 (Dec.1969). The version ultimately adopted for recodification by the Legislature, for the most part, was that of Optional Applicability. The Commission at page 71 also noted that: “But there are clearly two ways in which a map or plan can restrict development, the continuation of a land use. The zoning map, for example, restricts development because it serves to locate the land to which the text of the zoning ordinance applies....

Similarly, a plan (or plat) adopted pursuant to Section 31, Article 66B, has the effect through the intermediacy of the statute itself ... of prohibiting buildings in the bed of the planned street. The same, however, is not true of a ‘master plan’ adopted pursuant to Section 15-18 of Article 66B. If a master plan marks the owner’s property as a ‘proposed park, ’ there is no prohibition against building so long as the zoning permits it. If the zoning ordinance prohibits it, the owner can complain that he is unreasonably restricted by the zoning....

Otherwise, the master plan is only a guide to,future public action (i.e., future acquisition or condemnation), an announcement of intent.” (Underlining added.) Maryland Planning and Zoning Law Study Commission, Legislative Recommendations-Final Report, at 71 (Dec.1969). The Commission included in its Notes a discussion of the nature of master plans, i.e., comprehensive plans, and the pros and cons of making compliance with such plans mandatory, noting at page 107: “Consequently, local governments have found that it is impossible to secure a proper pattern of land use and development by making general and impartial rules—particularly if these rules must be so detailed as to leave nothing to administrative discretion.... It is as if the legislature were being asked to sit down one day and ⁵⁴⁴ describe with infinite particularity an end state for the community by establishing rules which would cause all land use and development in the future to march towards that end with unerring aim. Plainly the ‘end state’ concept of land use control is bankrupt and it has been in this condition from the beginning.

The [proposed] Code abandons this view of land use control completely by giving significance to the administrative function on the local level and by otherwise preserving complete neutrality on the issue whether land use and development should be controlled by detailed legislative rules or by general legislative standards to be implemented by an administrative agency .... Indeed, where the flexible administrative approach is used, the rules and standards established to guide the administrative agency may themselves be in need of occasional change. “The General Assembly has the power to require that the local government state standards for itself and it is arguable that it has done so. That is the argument about the phrase ‘in accordance with a comprehensive plan.’ “The difficulty with the ‘comprehensive plan’ requirement is this: either the comprehensive plan is something that the local legislative body adopts for itself, or it is something that is adopted by others and imposed on the local government—as, for example, by a regional agency or by the courts. If it is the former, then one must face squarely the question: when a local government amends a zoning ordinance in a way which appears to be in conflict with the comprehensive plan, why is not the amendment of the ordinance a pro tanto amendment of the plan? ... “[WJhere the amendment does not involve a public improvement, how do the courts come to the conclusion that the amendment is in conflict with ‘the comprehensive plan’ rather than to the conclusion that the amendment is a pro tanto amendment of the plan? ... “If there is agreement that these narrow concepts have done more to hamper than to aid the proper planning and development of a community, what should be substituted in ⁵⁴⁵ their stead?

The answer which has been urged over the past decade is to require that the local government adopt a ‘comprehensive plan.’ But that only brings us back to the point of beginning. Should this plan be a ‘physical’ plan, disposing of all future development in minute detail? Should it be a ‘policies ‘plan, the detail to be filled in as the community moves along. Or should it be something in between?

The dilemma, of course, is that the less detailed and ‘physical’ is the plan, the less decisive it is in any particular zoning controversy. ...” Maryland Planning and Zoning Law Study Commission, Legislative Recommendations-Final Report, at 107-08 (Dec.1969). At page 109 the Final Report noted: “Aside from having the effect of requiring that the legislative body consult with its planning agency and of discouraging, as a practical matter, actions which would take the legislative body on a frolic of its own, what is the function of the plan itself? ... But a plan can be a commitment that may be as foolish as it may be wise and men do not distinguish well between wisdom and folly when it comes to admitting a mistake.” (Underlining added.) Maryland Planning and Zoning Law Study Commission, Legislative Recommendations-Final Report, at 109 (Dec.1969). At another point, Section “201.

Grant of Power: Purposes” in the Model Plan attached to the Final Report, the text included: “(1) ... The powers granted herein shall be exercised with forethought and reasonable restraint so that the measures adopted will promote the economic prosperity of this State, secure continued improvement in the living conditions for all segments of the population and offer the maximum encouragement to private initiative for the accomplishment of these goals.” (Underlining added.) Maryland Planning and Zoning Law Study Commission, Legislative Recommendations-Final Report, at 74 (Dec.1969). The Commission’s Note to this section states: ⁵⁴⁶ “In addition, Subsection (1) reaffirms the salutary principle that ‘maximum encouragement’ should be given to ‘private initiative’ for the accomplishment of these goals. “Finally, Subsection (1) demands that in all of these matters the local government shall proceed ‘with forethought and reasonable restraint. ’ The word forethought lends special emphasis to the ‘ongoing planning’ requirement of Section SOS and this word together with the specific provisions of Section SOS, replaces the words ‘in accordance with a comprehensive plan.’ ” Maryland Planning and Zoning Law Study Commission, Legislative Recommendations-Final Report, at 75 (Dec.1969). In another discussion in reference to the proposed Model Plan, beginning on page 77 of the Final Report, the Commission noted: “The [proposed] Code does not attempt to prescribe the degree of specificity a rule or standard must attain in order to qualify as a sufficient ‘guide. ’ In their concern to prevent unbridled administrative discretion, courts have long recognized that the degree of specificity must vary with the nature of the subject matter.

There is no such thing as an invariable measure of specificity. The most that can be said is that the standards must go as far as delineating the bounds of administrative discretion as is possible, as the practicalities of the situation allow, taking into account the nature of the subject matter and the public interests to be served by the controls that are devised. Accordingly, the precise level of specificity must be left to the sound judgment of the local government and, ultimately the courts.” (Underlining added.) Maryland Planning and Zoning Law Study Commission, Legislative Recommendations-Final Report, at 77-78 (Dec.1969). This note (especially the underlined portions) submitted to the Legislature at the time of the enactment of the 1970 statute and evidentially available to its members, would seem to contradict any proposition that by including, for the first time, a definition of the term “special exception,” which con ⁵⁴⁷ tained the word “conform,” the Commission was proposing that the Legislature attempt to impose a mandatory State requirement for absolute compliance by local governments with every part of their local master or other comprehensive plans. 18 This passage, which includes a reference to a “guide” standard, seems to belie any argument that the Commission in 1969 was suggesting to the Legislature that requirements should be imposed by the State statute (Article 66B) that would require local governments to insist that applicants for special exceptions (or even applicants for certain other approvals) be held to a strict and absolute requirement with every element of the “guide” plans—the local government master plans.

In summary, the Final Report of the Commission that recommended to the Legislature that it define the term “special exception” in Article 66B with language that included the word “conform,” was not recommending that by inserting the definitional language in the Code, it was proposing that the State mandate that local governments require absolute compliance with local master plans when considering special exceptions (and other zoning changes). The contrary appears to be the case. Moreover, a glance at dictionary definitions of the time indicate that the term “conform” was generally considered to be the equivalent of the phrase “in harmony with.” 19 The Random House Dictionary of the English Language 308 (1983), contains this definition of “conform:” “coniform (konform), v.i. 1. to act in accord or harmony; comply (usually fol. by to): Being obstinate, she refused to ⁵⁴⁸ conform, to the town’s social pattern. 2. to be or become similar in form, nature, or character. 3. to comply with the usages of an established church ... v.t. 4. to make similar in form, nature, or character. 5. to bring into agreement, correspondence, or harmony.” (Underlining added.) Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 477 (3rd ed.1961), definition includes the following language: “conform ... ADAPT ... bring into harmony or agreement ... this regulation to existing business practices ... 1: to have the same shape, outline, or contour ... be in agreement or harmony ... 2a: to be obedient ... act in accordance with prevailing standard or custom----” We fail to see any sufficient indication or support in the abbreviated legislative history surrounding the passage of the 1970 recodification legislation, in the general permissive character of Article 66B (that does not require zoning in the first instance), or in the dictionary definitions prevalent at the time, that the Legislature was attempting to change the longstanding court recognized standard of “in harmony with” to some type of mandatory imposition of absolutism in the consideration by local governments of the relationship between “special exceptions” (and other land use devices) and local master or comprehensive plans or other local land use ordinances or regulatory devices.

There is no sufficient evidence that the General Assembly was attempting to change long accepted legal standards in “special exception” practice. Moreover, we generally do not construe recodifications as creating substantive changes in the absence of specific indications otherwise. We recently reiterated in Marzullo v. Kahl, 366 Md. 158, 189-90 , 783 A.2d 169, 187 (2001), that: “Furthermore, we have held that a change in a statute as part of a recodification will not modify the law unless the intent of the legislative body to change the law is clear. In Blevins & Wills v. Baltimore County, 352 Md. 620, 642 , 724 A.2d 22, 32-33 (1999), we stated that: ‘We have long recognized and applied the principle that “a change in a statute as part of a general recodification ⁵⁴⁹ will ordinarily not be deemed to modify the law unless the change is such that the intention of the Legislature to modify the law is unmistakable” That is because the principal function of code revision “is to reorganize the statutes and state them in simpler form” and thus “changes are presumed to be for the purpose of clarity rather than for a change in meaning.” ’ ” (Emphasis in Marzullo.) (Some citations omitted.) Neither have we been directed to any holding of this Court since 1970, and we know of none, where we have held that the use of the word “conform” in the 1970 statute created an absolute requirement in Article 66B that in order for special exceptions to be granted they must be in full and complete compliance with every aspect of the various types of land use plans and ordinances adopted by the respective local governments.

Our cases prior to the 1970 statute, immediately after the 1970 statute, and since, even after the subsequent statutes in 1992 and 2000, have consistently applied the “in harmony with” standard. Prior to the 1970 legislation, in 1954, in the case of Oursler v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 204 Md. 397, 401-02 , 104 A.2d 568, 570 (1954), we noted: “It is the function of the Zoning Commissioner, and the Board of Zoning Appeals on appeal, to determine whether or not any proposed use for which a special [exception] is sought would be in harmony with the general purposes and intent of the Zoning Regulations, and whether it could be conducted without being detrimental to the welfare of the neighborhood. Accordingly, in Baltimore County ... an applicant for a permit to conduct a restaurant in a residential zone ... must show only that the exception would be in harmony with the zoning plan....” 20 (Emphasis added.) In March of 1970 (apparently prior to the effective date of the 1970 recodification), we decided Rockville Fuel and Feed Co. ⁵⁵⁰ v. Board of Appeals, 257 Md. 183, 188 , 262 A.2d 499, 502 (1970). There, in interpreting our prior case of Merlands Club, supra, we stated: “In [Merlands Club], we went to some pains to stress that the special exception is a valid zoning mechanism that delegates to an administrative board a limited authority to permit enumerated uses which the legislative body has determined can, prima facie, properly be allowed in a specified use district, absent any fact or circumstance in a particular case which would change this presumptive finding.

We said: ‘The duties given to the Board are to judge whether the neighboring properties and the general neighborhood would be adversely affected, and whether the use, in the particular case, is in harmony with the general purpose and intent of the zoning plan.’ In accord is [Oursler ].” (Emphasis added.) Then, just three years after the enactment of the 1970 legislation with its definition that included the use of the word “conform,” we decided Turner v. Hammond, 270 Md. 41, 54-55 , 310 A2d 543, 550-51 (1973). There, shortly after the passage of the 1970 statute, we reiterated what had been said before: “Occasionally the bar and less often the bench lose sight of the concept that the conditional use or special exception, as it is generally called, is a part of the comprehensive zoning plan sharing the presumption that as such it is in the interest of the general welfare and, therefore, valid.... “While the applicant has the burden of adducing testimony which will show that his use meets the prescribed standards and requirements he does not have the burden of showing affirmatively that his proposed use accords with the general welfare____ [I]f there' is no probative evidence of harm or disturbance in light of the nature of the zone involved or of factors causing disharmony to the functioning of the comprehensive plan, a denial of an application for ⁵⁵¹ a special exception is arbitrary, capricious and illegal.” (Last emphasis added.) Eight years later, eleven years after the enactment of the 1970 legislation, we decided what some have called the seminal case in the Maryland law of special exceptions, Schultz v. Pritts, supra, and there, after the inclusion of the definition containing the word “conform,” we recognized no substantive change caused by the 1970 legislation, reiterating the traditional and long accepted standard to be used by administrative entities considering special exceptions. In that case, Judge Rita Davidson, for the Court said: “The special exception use is a part of the comprehensive zoning plan____The duties given to the Board are to judge whether ... the use in the particular case is in harmony with the general purpose and intent of the plan. “Whereas, the applicant has the burden of adducing testimony which will show that his use meets the prescribed standards and requirements, he does not have the burden of establishing affirmatively that his proposed use would be a benefit to the community____But if there is no probative evidence of ... factors causing disharmony to the operation of the comprehensive plan, a denial of an application for a special exception use is arbitrary, capricious, and illegal.” (Citations omitted.) (Emphasis added.) Schultz, 291 Md. at 11 , 432 A.2d at 1325 . As relevant to the case at bar, we quoted the above emphasized language from Schultz as the special exception standard as late as our case of Alviani v. Dixon, 365 Md. 95, 113 , 775 A.2d 1234, 1244 (2001).

We conclude, therefore, that there is virtually no basis for the proposition that the 1970 recodification’s use of the word “conform” in its definition of “special exception” was intended, or did, create a compliance absolutism in respect to comprehensive plans when appropriate administrative entities grant special exceptions. ⁵⁵² B. The 1992 Legislation 21 We have not discovered any significant legislation between 1970 and 1992 that has special relevance to the issue being addressed, other than a failed statute in 1991 that ultimately found its substantive terms being incorporated in HB 1003 of 1992, which also failed of passage. In 1992, the General Assembly was considering two bills in respect to land use and zoning that are relevant to the present issue—the Bill supported by advocates of state control—HB 1003, aforesaid, and the Administration Bill, HB 1195 (there were Senate counterparts). House Bill 1195 survived to become Chapter 437 of the Laws Maryland 1992. The proposed bills’ titles are indicative of their general intent.

House Bill 1195’s title was Economic Growth and Resources Act of 1992. House Bill 1003’s title was Growth Management—Comprehensive Plan Enforcement. The contrasting titles stated the issue and the conflict being debated in the General Assembly. House Bill 1003 which provided that land use decisions must be “SUBSTANTIALLY CONSISTENT WITH THE PLAN,” contained several other provisions that met with much opposition in the Legislature.

There was a provision in the State Finance and Procurement section (5-409) of proposed HB 1003 that the “Office,” (presumably the Office of State Planning): “(B) ... SHALL REVIEW FOR SUBSTANTIAL CONSISTENCY WITH THE COMPREHENSIVE PLAN THE LAND USE LAW ADOPTED BY EACH JURISDICTION UNDER ARTICLE 66B, § 3.05(E) OF THE CODE. ⁵⁵³ (C) (1) THE OFFICE MAY TAKE 1 OR MORE OF THE ACTIONS STATED IN PARAGRAPH (4) OF THIS SECTION IF THE OFFICE DETERMINES THAT: (I) A SUBSTANTIAL INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN A LOCAL JURISDICTION’S COMPREHENSIVE PLAN AND LAND USE LAW EXISTS: AND (II) THE INCONSISTENCY IS OF MORE THAN LOCAL IMPACT, AND IS OF SUBSTANTIAL STATE OR REGIONAL CONCERN. [ (4) 3(III)IMPOSE A STATE FUNDING MORATORIUM ON THE JURISDICTION, UNDER WHICH THE JURISDICTION MAY NOT RECEIVE ANY STATE FUNDS OR FEDERAL GRANT MONEYS THROUGH A STATE UNIT THAT SUPPORTS DEVELOPMENT IN THE JURISDICTION, INCLUDING THE FOLLOWING PROGRAMS: 1. TRANSPORTATION TRUST FUND DISTRIBUTION FOR NEW ROADS OR BRIDGES.... 2. PUBLIC SCHOOL CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM DISTRIBUTIONS FOR NEW PUBLIC SCHOOL CONSTRUCTION OR EXPANSION OF EXISTING PUBLIC SCHOOLS 3.

WATER POLLUTION CONTROL FUND DISTRIBUTIONS FOR SEWERAGE SYSTEM CONSTRUCTION OF NEW SYSTEMS OR EXPANSION OF EXISTING SYSTEMS.... 4. STATE AID FOR POLICE PROTECTION FUND DISTRIBUTIONS RELATING TO ANY INCREASED AID IN THE LOCAL JURISDICTION.... 5. STATE FIRE, RESCUE, AND AMBULANCE FUND DISTRIBUTIONS FOR NEW GRANTS OR INCREASED GRANTS.... 6. THE PROCEEDS OF ANY BOND ISSUED UNDER THE CHESAPEAKE BAY WATER QUALITY LOAN AS AUTHORIZED IN CONSOLIDATED BOND LEGISLATION FOR ANY FISCAL YEAR ...

FOR THE ⁵⁵⁴ ACQUISITION, CONSTRUCTION, OR EQUIPMENT OF NEW OR EXPANDED WATER SUPPLY FACILITIES.” HB 1003, as proposed, also contained a mandatory arbitration requirement that although it permitted local governments to request arbitration of any decision by the “Office,” the “Office” in essence would control that process as well. The local jurisdiction and the “Office” selected the arbitrators, but only from “A LIST OF LOCAL PLANNERS MAINTAINED BY THE OFFICE ” (Emphasis added.) The arbitration part of the statute concluded with “(VII) THE FINAL DECISION OF THE PANEL SHALL BIND BOTH THE OFFICE AND THE LOCAL JURISDICTION, NEITHER THE OFFICE NOR THE LOCAL JURISDICTION MAY TAKE ANY ACTION ON THE MATTER INCONSISTENT WITH THE DECISION OF THE PANEL. THE FINAL DECISION OF THE PANEL MAY NOT BE APPEALED TO ANY COURT ” (Emphasis added.) In other words the “Office” made the decision, objections would be heard by the “Office’s” arbitrators, and there would be absolutely no recourse in the courts for property owners. As might be imagined, this Bill (and the opposing HB 1195) engendered intensive political and lobbying activity.

The Bill files for the two bills includes the following indicating support for HB 1003 (less local control) or opposition to HB 1195 (more local control): ► League of Woman Voters of Maryland, Inc. February 17,1992 “The League of Women Voters supports HB 1003.” ► Chesapeake Bay Foundation February 17, 1992 “Conclusion: House Bill 1003 provides for the two essential elements in a growth management bill—consistency and enforcement. We support HB 1003 with an amendment that would add the third element—establishment of a body to further dis ⁵⁵⁵ cuss the implementation of the visions and growth management.” ► The Johns Hopkins University Institute for Policy Studies February 14,1992 “Each of the bills before you has some merits, and each has some limitations. The Administration Bill (HB 1195) encourages economic growth, but does not focus it to areas of existing population, making it likely to further sprawl and use of the automobile. Further, the Administration Bill leaves implementation in the hands of local jurisdictions ‘to the extent practicable,’ which is unfortunately weak and meaningless language.

We feel that Bill 1003 more closely meets our concerns, as it requires compliance and provides substantial penalties for noncompliance.” ► Clean Water Action February 17,1992 “Clean Water Action strongly opposes HB 1195____It vests total authority for implementing the visions with the local jurisdictions; does not require consistency; has no enforcement provisions.... ” “Recognizing the necessity to build consensus, representatives of the environmental community have agreed over the past several months to seek a compromise position in order to move forward on this issue. In that spirit, amendments to an earlier draft of the Administration bill were offered. Those amendments were rejected in total in favor of a new and significantly weaker version of the administration bill-the version we are debating today. “HOUSE BILL 1003 “Clean Water Action supports House Bill 1003 provided that it is amended to require a Commission, appointed by the ⁵⁵⁶ Governor, that is charged with developing guidelines, such as those described above, within which local jurisdictions are directed to implement the visions.” ► Pam Lindstrom POSITION: FWA(1195) Audubon Naturalist Society “SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY: [Wjouldn’t support HB 1195 w/o amndt’s. How you implement visions.

(James Madison quote) HB 1195 is more like the Articles of Confederation, than the Constitution. This isn’t enough. Would like to charge the Commission with looking at master plans and work on guidelines to implement.” ► Jim Gracie POSITION: OPP (1195); FWA (1003) Tract Unlimited Volunteer “SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY: “Must remove ‘to the extent practicable.’ It’s unenforceable----[Y]ou need enforcement mechanisms, if consistency is required. Problems it causes in sensitive areas, they may not have the expertise at the local level.” ► Jane Nichols POSITION: FWA (BOTH) Ches.

Bay F’n “SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY: 1195-not support unless w/ these amendments ... State whistleblowing authority is a must. • consistency • enforcement provision: Serious intent to withhold [state funds]; make it explicit. • process for interpretation of vision (consist State and locals) accept regional____ ⁵⁵⁷ We support enactment w/ amendments only. W/o, 1195 is not effective.... Chr: Do you think a different + better consensus could be developed for next year?

Jane: We know you’d take a risk: but 1195 isn’t a consensus document, because it doesn’t include the environmentalists. I believe that these three bullets aren’t radical changes. Has your side, or [ jother side done any attempt[ ] to meet? VT: Concern over ‘the bill’—I believe that some ... testified that they don’t have the ability to withhold some funds.

Jane: We’d prefer to see ‘withholding’ in the bill.” ► Sierra Club February 17,1992 TESTIMONY OF NANCY DAVIS “Last year [1991] the Sierra Club put great resources into supporting growth management legislation which was viewed by our membership as a compromise. We were willing to compromise in a spirit of cooperation for the higher goal of implementing the 2020 visions. “Again, earlier this year we thought we were working in good faith with the administration to come up with meaningful growth management legislation. Sierra Club cannot support this legislation [HB 1195] as introduced. We cannot compromise away our goals for saving the Bay and our quality of life.

We find the Bill [HB 1195] to be lacking in key elements: a. [HB 1195] does not set specific guidelines or specific performance standards for protecting sensitive areas. b. It does not require consistency between comprehensive plans and zoning regulations. c. It does not call for a broad-based commission charged to create a framework that insures that the visions are implemented throughout the [S]tate. d. There is no enforcement mechanism for non compliance. ⁵⁵⁸ e.

There is no time frame for compliance.” The support for the Administration Bill, HB 1195 (much of what also includes objections to HB 1008) included: ► Howard County Chamber of Commerce March 3,1992 “The Chamber supports House Bill 1195 Economic Growth & Resources Act of 1992 and opposes House Bill 1003 Growth Management-Comprehensive Plan Enforcement for a number of reasons. “Critical to the Chamber’s support of House Bill 1195 is the addition of a seventh vision to the original six visions of last year’s 2020 legislation. That seventh vision recognizes the importance of economic growth throughout our [S]tate. We believes the bill balances other goals with that of economic growth and reducing increasing regulatory costs. We also support the bill because it permits region-wide planning and coordination between counties, but leaves ultimate responsibility for implementing the seven visions to local governments, who are most familiar with the problems their jurisdictions face.

We feel that House Bill 1195 provides a unique opportunity to encourage region-wide and state-wide planning but at the same time retain flexibility at the local level to deal with individual problems. The Chamber of Commerce opposed House Bill 1003, because we believe that it does not offer the opportunity to address unique local problems in this matter.” ► Maryland Builders Association “We opposed last year’s bill because it set up a State plan that was not responsive to the needs of local governments “This [HB 1195] is NOT a ‘Nothing-Burger,’ but is a rational approach to growth management that puts land use decisions in the hands of local governments, where it belongs.” ► Maryland Builders Association February 12,1992 ⁵⁵⁹ “Dear Chairman Guns: “The Maryland Builders Association ... is OPPOSED to HB 1003 ... which you will hear in your Committee on February 17,1992. “We do not support giving the Maryland Office of Planning what amounts to a Veto over local government’s comprehensive plans. Local elected officials and local planners are best suited to determine land use within their own jurisdictions .... We support the Administration’s bill [HB 1195].... “We do not support the total withholding of State funds, [provided for in HB 1003] nor should the Office of State Planning be dictating to the other [S]tate agencies what funds should be placed in a moratorium. “We urge an UNFAVORABLE report on HB 1003” ► Carroll County Chamber of Commerce February 18, 1992 “The Legislative Committee of the Carroll County Chamber of Commerce opposes this bill [HB 1003].

Bureaucrats in the Office of State Planning could superimpose their views on decisions made by local elected officials. “We therefore ask that your committee members give this bill an unfavorable report.” ► Maryland Municipal League February 17,1992 “The Maryland Municipal League [MML] ... has consistently endorsed the goals of the visions of 2020 and the protection of sensitive areas. In HB 1195, the Administration has provided a vehicle that addresses these ends while retaining the role of municipal and county governments in establishing how these ends will be met. Within this framework of local determination, the League supports the Administration’s efforts through HB 1195 to meet the objections raised by MML and other parties to 2020 legislation that was considered during the 1991 General Assembly session. League objections last year included the supplant ⁵⁶⁰ ing of the planning judgments of local elected officials by non-elected [S]tate officials, the imposition of unfunded [Sjtate mandates, and the fact that future growth would be channeled around the existing cities and towns without addressing the need to annex those growth areas. “For the same reasons, the League opposes the approach offered in HB 1003.

While the Administration’s bill [HB 1195] ensures that decision making concerning local sensitive areas protection and implementation of the visions is made by local elected officials throughout the [Sjtate, HB 1003 provides for such judgements to be made ultimately by non-elected state officials in Baltimore unfamiliar with local conditions. Moreover, in these difficult economic times for both state and local governments, HB 1003 provides for a most severe club of revenue withholding powers wielded in Baltimore to ensure that the judgments of [Sjtate bureaucrats are implemented locally. “The Maryland Municipal League urges this committee to provide a favorable report to HB 1195. We feel however that it is particularly important that this be done without the inclusion of amendments that will once again raise the concerns of local government about [Sjtate intrusion into local planning and zoning authority.” ► State of Maryland Office of the Governor Testimony of Steven B. Larsen, Governor’s Legislative Office “The legislation [HB 1195] takes into account the need for economic growth. The framework for this legislation is the ‘visions’ conceived by the 2020 Panel of Experts.

Importantly, the six visions of the Panel have been expanded to include a seventh vision[:j Economic Growth is Encouraged and Regulatory Mechanisms are Streamlined. • Environmentally sensitive areas will be addressed in a new ‘Sensitive Areas’ element in comprehensive plans. ⁵⁶¹ The bill leaves the responsibility for defining and determining the specific level of protection to each local jurisdiction .... • Local jurisdictions are encouraged to streamline their review processes, promote flexible development standards which can lower costs, protect the environment and promote better site design, and direct new growth to designated areas. (Emphasis added.) • Each jurisdiction will follow a procedure to ensure that zoning ordinances, subdivision regulations, and other land development regulations implement the comprehensive plan and the visions. The bills [HB 1195 and its Senate companion SB 611] provide for no State approval process, but establish a cooperative process whereby the responsibility for preparation and approval lies with local jurisdictions and the responsibility for reporting and review is assigned to the Economic Growth and Resource Commission [an entity created by the legislation]. “IV. Conclusion “The experience of Maryland and other states across the country is that when it comes to growth management legislation, it is both the product and the process that matter.

HB 1195/SB 611 allow Maryland’s governments and interest groups to use the comprehensive planning process to work together to resolve the difficult issues of growth in an equitable manner, based on the tradition of local land use planning.” (Emphasis added.) ► Mayor’s Task Force for Liaison with the General Assembly Mr. Ernest Freeman Director of the [Baltimore City] Planning Department February 17,1992 “This recognition of the unique conditions and regulatory structure