Travel Committee, Inc. v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.

ALPERT, Judge. From Daedalus and Icarus, to Orville and Wilbur Wright, mortals have dared to dream of flying. It is the realization of that dream that brought us the airline travel industry. A conflict between participants in that industry brings us this appeal.

We face the task of untangling this case’s factual context and procedural background with no small amount of trepidation, and caution the reader that we have pursued clarity at the expense of brevity. ¹³¹ The dispute evolved from a series of business transactions between one of the best known airlines, here and abroad, and a large-volume travel agency. Eventually, the parties took their differences to court, litigating a fifteen-count complaint, and a fourteen-count counterclaim. Judgment eventually was entered against the travel agency, which now appeals. Additionally, the appellees noted a cross appeal.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY Pan American World Airways, Inc. (Pan Am) filed a fifteen-count Fifth Amended Complaint against Travel Committee, Inc. (TCI), Travel Destinations Unlimited, Inc. (TDU), Travel Destinations, Inc. (TDI), and their principals, Ira Weiner and Stanley Levin. 1 TCI and TDU filed a fourteen-count Amended Counterclaim. A three week trial was held in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, Murphy, J., presiding, and on August 20, 1990, and August 24, 1990, the court entered certain judgments on the plaintiffs Fifth Amended Complaint and on the defendant’s Counterclaim. On October, 11, 1990, the court ruled upon certain motions, and entered judgments in the amounts of $404,726.77 against TCI, and $1,570,083.26 against TDU, TCI, Weiner, and Levin. No judgment was entered on several of the claims and counterclaims, and, by virtue of a clerical error, no judgment was entered for or against TDI.

On October 1, 1991, this court ordered the trial court to enter an Order, which it did on October 7, 1991, directing the clerk of the Circuit Court to enter a judgment of $1,974,810.03, the sum total of the monetary judgments, against TDI on count fourteen of Pan Am’s Fifth Amended Complaint. The defendants appealed on ¹³² November 9, 1990; Pan Am filed a cross appeal on November 16, 1990. FACTS a. Travel Industry Background Information Retail agencies sell airline seats to the public at published airline prices, then pay the airline those prices minus a commission.

Wholesalers, who market air tours that include rooms and land travel, and consolidators, who deal only in high-volume air travel, sell bulk blocks of tickets to retail agencies. Wholesalers and consolidators buy “net tickets” in bulk from the airlines at reduced prices, and sell them through retail agencies that book reservations for their customers. The wholesaler/consolidator and the airline enter “net ticketing agreements” that set net prices and restrictions for tickets bought in bulk. The Airlines Reporting Commission (ARC), an organization owned by 130 airlines, accredits travel agencies and furnishes them standard ticket stock to use in writing tickets for any of the airlines in the ARC system.

An airline that appoints an ARC-accredited travel agency to act as its agent gives the agency an “ARC plate,” 2 to use in validating tickets the agency writes. These tickets are valid for any airline in the ARC system. An ARC agency must file with ARC a weekly report of tickets it wrote during the previous week. Ten days after the end of each reporting period, ARC gives the airlines a draft on the agency’s bank account for the net remittance, minus the agency’s commission: this means that member agencies make only one payment for tickets sold.

Agencies must make full payment of all amounts owed to airlines. Agents hold ticket sale proceeds, minus the agent’s commission, in trust for the carrier. ARC does not require agencies to segregate into separate accounts the money an agency collects from passengers, and ARC does not segre ¹³³ gate the funds it collects that are destined for the individual airlines. If an agent defaults on its payments to ARC, ARC or the airlines may repossess the agent’s ARC plates for writing tickets.

Alternatively, an airline may agree to a “direct form of payment” for a particular weekly report, in which case, the agent and the airline settle collection issues between themselves, and the agent pays the airline directly for tickets written through ARC. The airlines and the agents each audit ARC’S reports. If an airline has been underpaid, the airline issues a debit memo showing the additional amount due. An agency that makes an overpayment submits a sales summary adjustment showing the refund the carrier owes the agency.

If an agent writes a new ticket to replace a lost ticket, the agent submits to the airline a “lost ticket advice” to obtain reimbursement for the duplicate payment. According to the appellants, wholesalers routinely “batch” reservations by booking the reservations into the airline’s reservation system and collecting the fares in advance of a tour, but they write and deliver the tickets to passengers just two or three weeks before the tour departs. This practice exposes the passengers or the agency to the risk that in the interim, the airline will raise its rates. According to Pan Am, “in the airline industry, the ticketing is what guarantees the fare.” b.

The Case Stanley Levin and Ira Weiner, the appellants/counterappellees, began a travel business in 1968, and in 1970 incorporated Travel Destinations Unlimited, Inc. (TDU), 3 a retail travel agency, and Travel Committee, Inc. (TCI), a wholesaler/consolidator travel agency. TCI is a wholly owned subsidiary of TDU. TDU was ARC-accredited, and had ARC plates for every major airline. ARC viewed TCI ¹³⁴ as a “branch office” of TDU, and permitted it to use TDU’s plates.

TCI began selling Pan Am charter flights in 1975 or 1976, but as the charter business dissipated in the mid-1980s, airlines began to offer surplus seats on regularly scheduled flights at prices the airlines classified as “B class” fares. TCI began selling “B class” seats; Pan Am was TCI’s major carrier. After June, 1986, TCI’s consolidator business improved, and during the summer and fall of 1986, Pan Am urged TCI to sell as many of the new “B class” fares as it could. In December 1986 or January 1987, Pan Am gave TCI its 1987 summer schedule of net ticket prices for “B class” fares.

TCI used this information to produce its summer brochure, and began marketing “B class” seats for the summer, and taking reservations at the prices Pan Am set in the summer schedule. TCI alleges that it did this with Pan Am’s blessing, and that Pan Am urged TCI to sell as many “B class” seats as possible. We note, however, testimony acknowledging that Pan Am indicated to TCI that it was “thinking about, but ... hadn’t at that time, put in some form of different class air service____” In March, 1987, Pan Am informed TCI that it had created a new “H-class,” and that it would give TCI blocks of these seats on its 1987 flights. Pan Am also told TCI that reservations at the fares contained in its summer schedule were to be booked in the new blocks of “H-class” seats, instead of in “B class” seats, including the reservations TCI already had booked.

This change limited the number of seats TCI could sell at its net ticket prices, forcing TCI to cancel previously booked reservations and re-book them in “H-class” seats in order to honor the fares quoted to passengers with “B class” reservations. Fewer “H-class” seats were available than the number of reservations TCI had already sold, and no “H-class” seats were available to certain destinations. ¹³⁵ Weiner complained to John (Jerry) Murphy, Pan Am’s Vice President and General Sales Manager. Murphy told Weiner that TCI could continue to book passengers in “B class” seats, but that these seats would cost $120 more than originally quoted and charged to passengers who already had reserved seats. TCI paid that extra cost from its own pocket to protect customers for whom reservations already had been made.

On June 3, 1987, Pan Am told TCI that each “H-class” ticket that had not been written by June 6 would cost an additional $60. TCI already had booked 25,000 reservations on Pan Am flights scheduled to depart during the summer and early fall. Following its normal practice, TCI had “batched” these reservations so that tickets would be written two to three weeks before departure. We note, however, that Pan Am indicates that other wholesalers writing “H-class” tickets did not “batch” their tickets.

TCI complained to Pan Am that it was impossible for the agency to write 25,000 tickets in three days, and Pan Am extended its deadline to July 3. By then, TCI, with Pan Am’s assistance, had written and paid for 19,000 tickets. TCI paid the $60 per ticket increase for the remaining 6,000 tickets because it could not pass on the increase to passengers who already had paid for their tickets. 4 TCI experienced a cash shortage in the fall of 1987, and failed to remit Pan Am $329,726.77 for tickets it sold, and passed along $75,000 in worthless checks. That October, Weiner and Levin met with Murphy and other Pan Am personnel to discuss TCI’s financial problems.

Pan Am agreed to allow TCI to pay it directly for several ARC reports, so that TCI could avoid defaulting with ARC, and sent in auditors to check TCI’s books. Pan Am also sent Steven Glasberg to review TCI’s operations and finances, and to determine what assistance Pan Am should give TCI. Glasberg was a Pan Am System ¹³⁶ Director of Budget and Analysis, but later became System Director of Sales and Market Development. Although Glasberg was a novice in the travel agency business, he nevertheless became TCI’s primary contact with Pan Am.

Weiner and Levin reported regularly and frequently to Glasberg on all of TCI’s operations, finances, and cash flow, and on all of their marketing ideas. Glasberg directed TCI’s operations and cash flow management for several months, and according to TCI, misled it into “believing that he knew what he was doing and that he was acting with the full support of Pan Am’s top management.” Pan Am agreed to allow TCI to postpone paying the money it owed to the airline on the ARC reports and on certain dishonored checks TCI presented to Pan Am’s ticket office. Pan Am also accepted TCI’s $404,726.77 promissory note, due September 30, 1988. 5 TCI alleges that Glasberg told Weiner and Levin that “TCI would never have to pay the note because he was working up a ‘marketing agreement’ under which Pan Am would forgive the debt in exchange for an equity interest in TCI.” Pan Am regards TCI’s 1987 financial troubles as self-inflicted — inflicted, inter alia, by TCI’s inability to cope with the volume of business it received in 1987 and its strategy for increasing commissions wherein it over-sold its inventory of Pan Am “H-class” seats. TCI’s practice of “batching,” whereby it obtains full payment from customers months before it prints the tickets, exacerbated TCI’s problems by preventing TCI from guaranteeing passengers a set fare.

Glasberg told TCI that he would help it develop new and profitable travel products. He drafted a marketing cooperation agreement between Pan Am and TCI, but Weiner and Levin rejected the first draft in December, 1987, because it gave Pan Am nearly complete control over TCI. ¹³⁷ In December, 1987, James Fannan, President of Soviet Pan American Travel Effort (SPATE), called Weiner and Levin. SPATE was a joint venture between Pan Am and Aeroflot, the Soviet airline, to develop tours to the Soviet Union. Fannan planned to offer those tours to wholesalers, who would market them to the public.

He knew that TCI had experience in making charter tour arrangements to the Soviet Union. In view of TCI’s financial problems, Weiner and Levin agreed to market the project, but refused to guarantee any specific volume of SPATE tour sales. Fan-nan developed nine different SPATE itineraries, and gave seven of them to TCI to market. The first of the tours was scheduled to leave in May, 1988, and TCI immediately developed brochures and began marketing them.

Pan Am alleges that despite TCI’s cumulative losses and its large 1987 debt to Pan Am, Weiner and Levin “siphoned” TCI’s corporate assets in the form of “loans” and “management fees” that they were not expected to pay back. Pan Am also indicates that in 1987 and 1988, Weiner and Levin improperly took $111,900 in “management fees” earned by TCI for work done for TDU. TCI countered this assertion by pointing to testimony to the effect that shareholder loans to Weiner and Levin began in the 1970s and that officers’ loan accounts are common in closely-held businesses, that interest was charged, and that Weiner and Levin made periodic payments on those loans. During January and February, 1988, Glasberg continued to talk about developing travel products, and TCI urged him “to firm up those products so that it could market them for Pan Am.” Because of Glasberg’s assurances, Weiner and Levin believed they were going to have “another bumper year.” Glasberg urged Weiner and Levin to hire a consulting firm to streamline their operations because in 1987 they had trouble handling TCI’s large volume of business.

The firm hired Michael Whitesage, President of PRISM Group, Inc., to review TCI’s operations. Whitesage recommended that TCI transfer small specialty tour groups to TDU, Weiner ¹³⁸ and Levin’s retail travel agency and the parent of TCI, because it was better equipped to handle such groups. He also recommended that TCI focus exclusively on high-volume, bulk business. At Whitesage’s behest, TCI also substantially upgraded its computer and telephone systems.

Glasberg continued to advocate the marketing cooperation agreement, promising Weiner and Levin “wonderful things once they signed.” Weiner and Levin’s understanding of the agreement was that TCI would be Pan Am’s partner, and would receive favored treatment by having exclusive access to products. Weiner and Levin also believed that Pan Am probably would exercise its option to obtain TCI stock and forgive the promissory note. They believed that if they did not sign the agreement, TCI would lose the SPATE tours it was marketing, and other promised programs. Indeed, Weiner testified that Glasberg threatened to put TCI out of business if it didn’t sign the agreement.

Weiner and Levin signed the marketing cooperation agreement on March 15, 1988. The parties agreed to the following: TCI acknowledged $329,726.77 and $75,000 in debt to Pan Am, which Pan Am was willing to defer in exchange for promissory notes. TCI promised to do everything reasonably necessary to market Pan Am’s services. Pan Am would “utilize its best efforts to assist TCI in its marketing and sale of Pan Am services.” The agreement included a non-exclusivity agreement, assumption of risk and indemnity clauses, and a force majeure clause.

TCI agreed to treat Pan Am as its most favored supplier. Pan Am was given a stock purchase option at a set price, or, in Pan Am’s discretion, for forgiveness of repayment of the amount owed. Pan Am had power to approve distributions during the stock option period. The agreement also contained restrictive covenants and Pan Am’s, TDU’s, and TCI’s representations and warranties.

Pan Am alleges that Weiner and Levin acted to insulate TCI’s assets from the $404,726.77 debt owed in the promis ¹³⁹ sory note: Weiner told TCI’s former comptroller, Michael King, that a new company, TDI, had been established to insulate TCI and TDU from creditors. These allegations led to Pan Am’s complaint that TCI was attempting to defraud it. According to TCI, however, TDI was incorporated in 1982 — well before the events leading to this case. During this period, Pan Am’s management changed, and Thomas Plaskett was appointed its new president in January, 1988.

Plaskett’s new policy for the company involved marketing low-cost airline seats through retail agencies, thereby eliminating the airline’s dealings with wholesalers such as TCI. Before the parties signed the marketing cooperation agreement, Pan Am gave TCI prices for the summer of 1988, and the restrictions on “H-class” tickets. TCI began marketing those seats, first with a flyer, and then a full brochure. There followed a series of revisions and amendments to Pan Am’s ground rules for TCI in 1988.

Pan Am withdrew TCI’s authorization to sell flights to Eastern Europe after TCI printed and sent brochures to some 15,000 travel agents advertising travel to Eastern Europe, forcing TCI to tell travel agents responding to the brochure that it could not book the advertised seats. Pan Am told TCI that TCI could not take reservations more than thirty days in advance of departure, even though some of its competitors were allowed to do so. Pan Am also ordered TCI to stop using “electronic Q-ing,” a method by which high-volume retail agencies obtain direct access to a wholesaler’s computer to book reservations directly. This caused TCI to lose what it alleges was close to $1,000,000 in annual bookings.

Again, Pan Am did not impose these restrictions on other wholesalers. Finally, Pan Am stopped TCI’s practice of writing tickets through ARC, insisting that it write its tickets through Pan Am’s City Ticket Office in Washington, ¹⁴⁰ D.C. This required TCI to pay for tickets three weeks before they were written, instead of ten days afterwards. 6 Pan Am also alleges that on June 24, 1988, Weiner directed TCI to report and remit to ARC only half the amount of the fares TCI owed to Pan Am. TCI paid other airlines in full. Weiner later directed that all Pan Am tickets would be written through TCI, “the shell company.” On July 1, 1988, Weiner directed that TDU’s and TCI’s assets and accounts were to be transferred to TDI.

After that date TDU’s sole function was to hold the ARC plates under which TCI traded as a branch office. Pan Am alleges that the transfer left TCI nothing with which to pay Pan Am. Pan Am was not notified of the transfer, even though TCI’s promissory note was coming due in September, 1988, and even though the marketing cooperation agreement called upon TCI to disclose any asset transfer. TCI ignored Pan Am’s contract restrictions concerning ARC ticketing of “H-class” tickets, and the proscription on ticketing “H-class” outside of 30 days.

TCI wrote large numbers of tickets and delayed reporting them. This deferred TCI’s obligations to pay for the tickets, and allowed TCI to retain the money for those tickets. TCI also wrote and delivered tickets to passengers who had not yet paid in full. Weiner and Levin scheduled a July 18 meeting with Pan Am to present a sales program.

TCI indicated that Pan Am’s changing policies had caused TCI considerable finan ¹⁴¹ cial problems and that TCI would go out of business if Pan Am did not assist it with the new travel products it presented to Pan Am. TCI did not disclose that it was continuing to purchase “H-class” tickets through ARC in violation of Pan Am’s requirements and that it was remitting only half of what it owed to Pan Am. Nor did it disclose that TCI was writing tickets for unpaid reservations and that all of TCI’s and TDU’s assets had been transferred to TDI on July 1. Glasberg called TCI the next day, praised its presentation, and indicated that Pan Am would act on TCI’s proposals.

Nothing happened, however, despite Weiner’s and Levin’s numerous calls to Murphy and Glasberg, which went unreturned. By late July, Weiner and Levin had no confidence that Pan Am would honor reservations TCI had booked and “batched” to be ticketed later. TCI began writing tickets for passengers who had made reservations. TCI listed some of the tickets on its July 24 and August 7 ARC report, and paid for them in full.

TCI listed the remaining tickets on its August 7 report, and listed more tickets on its August 14 report. Pan Am alleges that TCI wrote checks to Pan Am in August knowing that it could not pay them. By the end of the reporting period on August 7, 1988, TCI owed Pan Am $1,295,150.29. On August 17, TCI’s Weiner, Levin, Whitesage, and Mark Pestronk (their attorney), met with Pan Am’s Murphy, Garvett, Cooper, and others.

TCI told Pan Am about the August ARC reports, for which it could not pay, and asked Pan Am to approve “direct form of payment” for those reports. It again presented Pan Am a proposal showing how TCI could repay Pan Am if Pan Am would cooperate. That meeting adjourned without resolution. The parties held another meeting on August 23.

Among those present were Pan Am’s in-house counsel and its outside attorney, Paul Brown, and TCI’s attorneys. Brown ¹⁴² conducted the meeting, and listed Pan Am’s demands. He said that if TCI gave Pan Am a $50,000 deposit, Pan Am would agree to let TCI use “direct form of payment” for the August ARC reports, thereby allowing TCI to avoid default and forfeiture of the ARC plates. The next day, TCI gave Pan Am a certified check for $50,000, and Pan Am allowed “direct form of payment” for the August 7 ARC report.

It did not, however, do the same for the August 14 report, leaving TCI in default to ARC. Pan Am retrieved its ARC plate from TDU, and filed suit against TCI on September 1, alleging that in 1987 and 1988, TCI sold several million dollars of Pan Am airline tickets that it refused to pay for, and that TCI retained commissions, and monies belonging to Pan Am. Pan Am also alleged that in 1988, TCI engaged in fraudulent conduct in an effort to avoid its obligations and insulate itself from liability. TCI had continued to do business with SPATE, but Fan-nan withdrew SPATE’S winter programs from TCI, explaining that he could not deal with TCI while Pan Am’s suit was pending.

Fannan wrote to TCI assessing it $250,000 in under-utilization penalties; in January 1989, SPATE filed suit in New York claiming $759,000 in under-utilization penalties. TCI denies having sales quota obligations to SPATE, but Pan Am alleges that SPATE passes to its tour operators all the terms and conditions of its contracts with INTOURIST, the Russian government’s tourism agency that sets underutilization penalties. The case leading to the appeals sub judiee was tried for three weeks, during which the jury considered Pan Am’s fifteen-count complaint against TCI, TDU, TDI, Weiner, and Levin, as well as TCI and TDU’s fourteen-count counterclaim. On October 11, 1990, judgments were entered in the amounts of $404,726.77 against TCI, and $1,570,083.26 against TDU, TCI, Weiner, and Levin.

The judgments later were corrected to include a $1,974,810.03 judgment against TDI on count fourteen of the Fifth Amended Complaint. ¹⁴³ TCI, et al., noted this appeal on November 9, 1990, requesting this court to reverse the lower court, and asking us to answer the following questions. I. A. Where a jury renders irreconcilably inconsistent special verdicts and the court dismisses the jury without requesting it to reconcile the verdicts, must the court order a new trial? B. May a trial court rearrange a jury’s special verdict in order to award a party more damages than the jury could validly have awarded?

II

Where a jury has affirmatively and consistently found no fraud to have been committed by corporate officers and stockholders, may the court nevertheless pierce the corporate veil to impose liability on the individuals?

III

Can a fiduciary duty be found even though no such duty was imposed by contract or custom?

IV

Can a JNOV be entered where there is competent evidence in support of the jury verdict? V. Can an airline collect a debt based on a contract that violated federal law by virtue of the carrier’s failure to file tariffs with the regulatory authorities?

VI

Were the trial court’s rulings on the Counterclaim wrong? Pan Am noted a cross appeal on November 16, 1990, and asks: I. Is a trial court entitled to use its discretion in applying the conclusions of a jury on a special verdict sheet to the counts brought by parties in the case, as long as it does so consistently?

II

A. May a trial court pierce the corporate veil of a corporation to impose liability in order to enforce a paramount equity? B. Did the Trial Court err in rejecting fraud as a basis for piercing the corporate veil? ¹⁴⁴ III. Can a fiduciary duty be found where a formal trust exists and where the relationship between the parties is that of principal to agent?

IV

Is a party prevented from raising as an affirmative defense to the allegations of a state court civil proceeding an issue that has been reserved to the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts? V. Did the Trial Court err in failing to enter judgment against TDU, Weiner and Levin on Count 2 (Promissory Note) and against all Defendants on Count 7 (Conversion) and Count 11 (Breach of Contract)?

VI

Did the Trial Court err in dismissing Count 8 of Pan Am’s Fourth Amended Complaint?

VII

Did the Trial Court err in not submitting the issue of punitive damages to the jury, where, on the basis of the evidence adduced at trial, a reasonable person could find that the Defendants acted with malice and fraud?

VIII

A. Did the Trial Court err in neglecting to award pre-judgment interest on the amounts owed to Pan Am by reason of Defendants’ failure to remit proceeds from the sale of tickets? B. Should the pre-judgment interest rate applied to the unremitted monies be compounded, given the fiduciary duty owed by the Defendants to Pan Am with respect to those monies?

IX

Is an award of attorney’s fees to the Plaintiff appropriate when such fees are expressly provided for in a promissory note? We now move to the task of answering these questions, addressing them in turn. I. VERDICT ISSUES A. [This addresses TCI’s I.A & B, and Pan Am’s I] TCI argues that the jury’s verdicts on Sections I, II, and III of the special verdict sheet are so irreconcilably incon ¹⁴⁵ sistent with one another and with the judge’s instructions, that they cannot be allowed to stand. The verdict sheet, prepared by the trial judge, posed the following interrogatories to the jury.

I February 19, 1988 Promissory Note A. Which — if any — of the defendants) is/are liable? Yes No 1. TCI _x_ _ 2. Mr. Levin x 3.

Mr. Weiner x 4. TDU x B. Are there any credits credits [sic] against this obligation? YES, in the amount of $- NO_ II Breach of Marketing Cooperation Agreement A. Was there a breach of the [Marketing Cooperation Agreement]? YES NO _ B. Which — if any — of the defendants) is/are liable?

YES NO 1. TCI _x 2. Mr. Levin _x_ 3. Mr. Weiner _x_ 4.

TDU x C. What amount of damages resulted? $ _0_ III Debts shown on the August, 1988 ARC Reports A. do you find for the plaintiff or for the defendants? 1. for the plaintiff in the amount of $ 1,570,083.26_ 2. for the defendants _0_ B. which of the defendants is liable? YES NO 1. TCI _ 2. Mr. Levin x _ 3.

Mr. Weiner x _ 4. TDU _jl_ _ C. Additional Credits Against ARC Obligation NO YES in the amount of 1. [Lost Ticket Advicel x $- 2. debit memos x - 3. unrefunded deposits x - ¹⁴⁶ NO YES in the amount of 4. sales summary ad- justments x _ 5. other refunds x _ TOTAL $_ The remaining questions asked the jury to determine whether Levin and Weiner conspired to defraud Pan Am, and whether the transfer of management fees and the transfer of TDU’s assets to TDI was fraudulent. The jury answered in the negative to both questions. As to the counterclaim, the jury concluded that Pan Am breached the marketing cooperation agreement.

It found that Pan Am improperly interfered with the contract relationship between TCI and SPATE, but that this did not induce the litigation. It found damages in the amount of $500,000. 7 The marketing cooperation agreement contains the following provision: 17. Option Period. TCI, TDU and the Principals represent, warrant and agree that, during the entire period between the date hereof and the exercise of the Option, if at all or termination, whichever is earlier (the “Option Period”): (I) all expenses, taxes, fees and all other liabilities of whatsoever kind for which TCI shall become liable in the operation of its business or otherwise will be timely paid; Pan Am argued that because Levin and Weiner signed the agreement as individuals, and in their corporate capacity, this paragraph constituted Levin’s, Weiner’s, and TDU’s guarantee of TCI’s obligations (hereinafter the guarantee theory), including TCI’s obligation to pay the $404,726.77 promissory note.

See Pan Am’s Fifth Amended Complaint, ¹⁴⁷ Count Two. The jury, however, found only TCI liable for the promissory note. Pan Am also argued that TCI breached the marketing cooperation agreement and the Net Ticketing Agreements (setting prices and restrictions on tickets bought in bulk), and that the same marketing cooperation agreement, quoted supra, obligated TDU, Levin, and Weiner to pay the debts incurred as a result of TCI’s breaches. TCFs alleged breaches included, inter alia, underremitting monies due Pan Am, granting refunds of non-refundable tickets, failing to report sales and retaining the proceeds, failing to collect taxes, failing to turn over financial information on a timely basis, failing to conduct ticketing through Pan Am’s Washington, D.C. City Ticket Office (rather than through ARC), failing to remit payments for tickets sold in July and August of 1988, and underremitting monies for periods in June and July.

The amounts involved were $1,295,150.29 for the ARC report week ending August 7, 1988, and $342,893.63 for the ARC report week ending August 14, 1988. See Pan Am’s Fifth Amended Complaint, Count Three. Pan Am additionally charged that TCI owed it $1,295,-150.29 for the tickets it sold through ARC between August 1 and August 7. Unable to pay ARC, TCI negotiated with Pan Am for a “direct form of payment” for this amount, but never paid it.

Pan Am argued that the same marketing agreement provision made TDU, Levin, and Weiner liable for this debt. See Pan Am’s Fifth Amended Complaint. We point out that this count duplicates one of the allegations contained in the previous count. The jury found that TCI, Levin, Weiner, and TDU breached the marketing cooperation agreement, but that no damages resulted from this breach.

See Verdict Sheet Section II. The jury also found that TCI, Levin, Weiner, and TDU were liable in the amount of $1,570,083.20 for TCFs failure to pay the August 1988 ARC reports for which Pan Am had agreed to accept “direct form of payment.” See Verdict Sheet Section III. ¹⁴⁸ TCI argues that these results are irreconcilably inconsistent with each other and with the judge’s instructions. It argues that the jury necessarily rejected Pan Am’s argument that the marketing cooperation agreement’s section 17(1), see supra, page 146, made TDU, Levin, and Weiner liable for TCI’s debts when it found that they were not liable for TCI’s promissory note. Given this, the jury could not conclude that TDU, Levin, and Weiner were liable for the August ARC report debt.

TCI also argues that Levin, Weiner, and TDU could not be liable for the August 1988 ARC report unless it was by virtue of breaching the marketing cooperation agreement, and because the jury found that although they breached the agreement, no damages resulted, its conclusion that they were liable is erroneous. Pan Am counters this by arguing that even if the jury in Section I rejected Pan Am’s guarantee theory derived from section 17 of the marketing cooperation agreement, and this barred the jury's use of that theory in Sections II and III, this would not prevent the jury from using other theories to find TDU, Levin, and Weiner liable. They paint the following possible scenarios. TCI signed the promissory note for which the jury found it liable in Section I; Weiner, Levin, and TDU did not sign the promissory note.

The jury in Section I therefore could have concluded that TCI alone was liable for the note. Weiner, Levin, and TDU signed the marketing cooperation agreement in their personal capacities as well as in their corporate capacities, and the jury might have concluded from this that they were responsible for breaching this agreement, as per Section II, but not financially responsible for the promissory note. Likewise, Pan Am argues that if the jury rejected its guarantee theory, it might have imposed liability in Section II (for breach of the marketing cooperation agreement) upon Levin, Weiner, and TDU, on the basis that they breached their fiduciary duty, or upon a conversion theory, or upon a theory of piercing the corporate veil. Any of ¹⁴⁹ these would reconcile the Section II finding with the Section I finding.

Finally, Pan Am argues that Sections II and III of the verdict are not inconsistent: TCI has “mixed and matched the issue of damages with that of liability. A finding of no damages in Section II does not affect the jury’s conclusion that all four defendants were liable for breach of the MCA. That finding is, in turn, completely consistent with the jury’s finding in Section III that all four defendants were liable for debts shown on the August 1988 ARC reports.” Pan Am adds that in Section IIIA, the jury intended to identify the exact basis for Pan Am’s recovery. Ordinarily, this court will not interfere with a jury verdict, even one that is inconsistent.

As we indicated in Eagle-Picher v. Balbos, 84 Md.App. 10 , 578 A.2d 228 (1990), cert. granted, 325 Md. 248 , 600 A.2d 418 (1992): Inconsistent jury verdicts generally are not sufficient grounds for an appellate court to reverse a jury’s verdict. As the Court of Appeals stated[,] ... ‘That the verdict may have been the result of compromise, or of a mistake on the part of the jury, is possible. But verdicts cannot be upset by speculation or inquiry into such matters.’ In so holding, we realize that this precedent had previously been applied by Maryland courts only in criminal cases. We believe, however, that the rationale for this principle is equally valid when applied in civil actions.

Here too, we are reluctant ‘to interfere with the results of unknown jury interplay’ at least without proof of ‘actual irregularity.’ We recognize that inconsistency may be the product of lenity, mistake, or a compromise to reach unanimity. The continual correction of such matters would undermine the historic role of the jury as the arbiter of questions put to it. Id. at 35-36, 578 A.2d 228 (citations omitted). The court may act, however, when the jury’s verdict is irreconcilably defective.

See S & R v. Nails, 85 Md.App. 570, 590 , 584 A.2d 722 (1991) (e.g., an irreconcilably defective verdict is ¹⁵⁰ one in which one of the jury’s answers to a question in a special verdict form would require a verdict for the plaintiff, and another answer would require a verdict for the defendant). We do not find Sections I and II of the jury’s verdict irreconcilably inconsistent. The jury might plausibly conclude that TCI alone was liable on the note because the signature of one of its officers, in his corporate capacity, was the only one appearing on the note. Likewise, the jury might well conclude that all of the defendants (TCI, TDU, Levin, and Weiner), having signed it, breached the marketing cooperation agreement — Levin signed for TCI and TDU, then Weiner and Levin each signed for himself, making themselves personally liable.

See Lanier v. Bank of Virginia-Potomoc, 39 Md.App. 589, 595 , 387 A.2d 614 (1978) (“where an officer of a corporation endorses his name to a promissory note with the addition of his official title but without the name of the corporation or a designation of whom he is acting in a representative capacity for, he is prima facie personally liable”) (citing Belmont Dairy Co. v. Thrasher, 124 Md. 320 , 92 A. 766 (1914)). The trial judge’s instructions are consistent with the theory that the jury might have been persuaded to find liability based upon who signed each of the documents. In reviewing the verdict sheet for the jury, the judge illustrated his instructions with the following hypothetical: So, let’s say for example — this is only a for example. Let’s say you are persuaded that the Travel Committee Inc. signed the Note and let’s say you are persuaded that Mr. Levin and Mr. Weiner also signed the Note in their individual capacities and that the Travel Destinations Unlimited is also responsible by virtue of the Note itself, if you are persuaded by a preponderance of the evidence that those facts are so, you would answer yes to that question unless you are also persuaded that there was a subsequent forgiveness of that Note.

The burden of proving forgiveness of the Note would be on the Defendants. ¹⁵¹ So, your answer would be yes, if you are persuaded that the Note was signed by these individuals in a capacity that would find these individuals, your answer would be yes to question I A.I.; A.2.; A.3.; A.4. If you are persuaded that they signed the Note in a way that makes them binding. Your answer would be no if you are either not persuaded that the particular Defendant signed the Note in a way that makes it binding against that Defendant or if you are persuaded by the defense evidence that the Note was subsequently forgiven. Given this, we do not find any inconsistency of the magnitude that would lead us to disturb the jury’s verdict: the jury could have determined the parties’ liability on the basis of their signatures to the two documents in issue.

The apparent inconsistency among the jury’s findings in Sections II and III arises from the assumption that the jury's verdict sheet sections align with particular counts in Pan Am’s complaint which, if true, would suggest that the jury’s rejection of Pan Am’s guarantee theory, as narrated in counts two and three of its complaint, make it impossible for the jury to simultaneously conclude that TDU, Levin, and Weiner are liable for the August ARC reports. We see no reason, however, to interpret the verdict sheet as an item by item account for Pan Am’s complaint. The rule governing special verdicts does not require this kind of alignment, and the document’s structure suggests that the judge arranged its format to logically cover factual issues raised, without submitting each allegation of the complaints as drafted by the parties. The judge indicated that, “It is my duty to instruct you with respect to all of the issues that you will be working with.

That’s why I prepared the verdict sheet.” Another issue that concerns us is the apparent inconsistency between the jury's finding that the defendants’ breach of the marketing cooperation agreement did not result in damages and its finding that the defendants were liable to Pan Am in the amount of $1,570,083.26 for debts reflected in the August ARC reports. A threshold issue hinges upon ¹⁵² whether the jury’s numbered findings correspond precisely to Pan Am’s complaint and thus convey the jury’s implicit rejection of Pan Am’s guarantee theory. For the reasons stated above, we do not think that the judge intended the verdict sheet to align with Pan Am’s complaint. Nevertheless, we think that the defendants could not be simultaneously liable for the ARC-related debts and not liable for damages associated with their breach of the marketing cooperation agreement.

We pause again to examine the judge's instructions to the jury. He said that: The fact that you make a particular finding on any of these issues in this verdict sheet should not control the finding you make on another issue. All of the evidence has been presented in the sense that you will be evaluating all of the evidence, but you would not, for example, say we made a certain finding on page one so obviously we’ll do something different on page three or we will simply check off a certain thing on page three. You give each issue your individual attention.

The fact that you have made a certain finding in one place doesn’t mean that you must, therefore, automatically make a certain finding elsewhere. We point out that the defendants could have breached the marketing cooperation agreement in various ways, and the judge’s instructions to the jury reflect this. So, if you are persuaded by a preponderance of the evidence that there was a breach of the Marketing Cooperation Agreement, you answer the question yes. Then you go to the second page and you identify at the top of the second page here B. 1. through 4. which of the Defendants you are persuaded violated the Marketing Cooperation Agreement.

You have heard evidence that the Marketing Cooperation Agreement was breached by the Defendants in a number of ways: failure to ticket as they agreed to ticket, failure to remit monies that they were obliged to remit, and so forth. ¹⁵³ It is not difficult to imagine that the jury determined that the defendants breached this agreement on some count that did not cause damage. The jury’s conclusion in Section III, which repeats one of the allegations in Section II concerning the ARC report is troubling, however, because one would expect these to be subsumed under the previous allegations. Absent evidence that the defendants undertook responsibility for the ARC reports in some capacity other than the one spelled out in the marketing cooperation agreement, we cannot see how they breached the one, but caused no damage, and yet are liable on the other. Nevertheless, we conclude that although inconsistent, the verdicts are not irreconcilable to an extreme that impels us to reject the jury’s finding.

As we have seen, supra, an irreconcilably inconsistent verdict is one that compels a finding for the plaintiff, on the one hand, but also compels, on the same issue, a finding for the defendant. For example, the jury could not find that both parties breached the same marketing cooperation agreement provision. The trial judge made this plain in offering his instructions to the jury as to TCI’s counterclaim. He told jurors that if they were “satisfied that it was the Defendants who breached the agreement, then you would also be persuaded that Pan Am did not and your verdict would be no on the issue of breach.” Puzzling though it is, we do not find the jury’s decision in Section III hopelessly irreconcilable with its decision in Section II.

B. TCI also argues that the court entered what amounted to a de facto judgment notwithstanding the jury’s verdict when it reformed the jury’s verdict by entering a $1,570,-083.26 judgment in Pan Am’s favor as to count three of its complaint instead of on count four of the complaint. Count three alleged that TCI breached the marketing cooperation agreement and the net ticket agreements and that TDU, ¹⁵⁴ Levin, and Weiner were liable for this by virtue of the agreement’s paragraph 17(1). Count four claimed $1,295,-150.29 for TCI’s failure to remit that amount pursuant to the August 7 ARC report. We point out that according to the August 7, 1988 ARC report, TCI owed Pan Am $1,295,150.29, and at first glance the jury’s decision in Section III to award Pan Am $1,570,-083.26 is perplexing.

Indeed, Pan Am’s count four asks for the lesser amount. Again, however, we think it wrong to assume that the verdict sheet’s queries were intended to address Pan Am’s complaint one item at a time. Specifically, we see no reason to require that the jury’s answer in Section III A correspond to Pan Am's count four. The verdict sheet asked the jury to determine the amount owed, if any, for “[d]ebts shown on the August, 1988 ARC Reports.” Importantly, the verdict sheet does not specify an ARC report date, of which there were two in August.

The jury reasonably could make a damage assessment that included both reports, as complained of in Pan Am’s count three alleging that TCI failed to remit $1,295,150.29 for the August 7 report, and $342,893.63 for the August 14 report. The judge’s entry of judgment on count three was not improper. C. Finally, TCI argues that we should reverse the court’s entry of judgment on Pan Am’s count three, and the jury’s award of damages on Pan Am’s count four, to accord with Pan Am’s count four claim for damages in the amount of $1,295,150.29. The reader will recall that the jury awarded Pan Am $1,570,083.26 in Section III of the verdict sheet, and that TCI argues that this award corresponds to count four of Pan Am’s complaint, and that the judge improperly reformed this award in attributing it as responsive to count three of the complaint.

In Scher v. Altomare, 278 Md. 440, 442 , 365 A.2d 41 (1976), the Court of Appeals indicated that a plaintiff’s ¹⁵⁵ recovery may not exceed the sum claimed in the ad damnum clause, or the damage actually proved. Nevertheless, in light of our finding, supra, that the jury’s award need not be confined to a particular count of Pan Am’s complaint, we need not conform the damage amount to the ad damnum clause in Pan Am’s count four. We distinguish the case sub judice from Scher on the ground that the plaintiff in Scher argued only one theory of recovery, whereas the results on the verdict sheet plausibly could reflect the jury’s determination as to more than one of Pan Am’s complaints.

II

PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL [This addresses TCI’s II and Pan Am’s IIA & B] TCI contends that because the jury found that TCI’s corporate officers and stockholders committed no fraud, the trial judge improperly pierced the corporate veil. Pan Am’s complaint, count fourteen, alleged that Levin and Weiner, personally and in their capacities as TCI’s, TDU’s, and TDI’s officers and directors, engaged in conduct designed to defraud Pan Am. They charged, inter alia, that Levin and Weiner’s false representations that TCI would pay its debt to Pan Am induced Pan Am to accept TCI’s promissory note, to agree to allow TCI “direct form of payment” for monies owed through the ARC, and to enter into the marketing cooperation agreement and net ticketing agreements. Additionally, Pan Am alleged that Levin and Weiner directed TCI to write large Pan Am ticket orders through ARC even though they knew that TCI could not pay for the tickets.

Significantly, Pan Am also claimed that Levin and Weiner transferred substantially all of TDU’s assets to TDI, leaving TCI and TDU unable to meet their obligations to Pan Am. Pan Am claimed $2,600,000 in damages and asked the trial court to “prevent this fraud, or in the alternative, to enforce paramount equity” by piercing TCI’s, TDU’s, and TDI’s corporate veils to hold Levin and Weiner personally liable. See Pan Am’s Fifth Amended Complaint, Count Fourteen. The trial judge indicated that: ¹⁵⁶ [I]t seems to me under the tests of piercing the corporate veil that now apply to successor corporations, and I rely on the language in Miller versus Nissen, 8 ... it seems to me in accordance with the jury’s verdict and the evidence presented in this case, that a judgment should be entered as to Count 14 in favor of all — in favor of Pan Am against all defendants, TDU, TCI, TDI, Mr. Levin and Mr. Weiner and that the judgment under Count 14 should be in the amount of one million, nine hundred and seventy-four thousand, eight hundred and ten and three cents.

That represents the promissory note of $404,726.77 and the ARC reports that total one million, five hundred and seventy thousand, eighty-three dollars and twenty-six cents. My calculation, if my math is right, brings the amount of the judgment to one million, nine hundred and three cents. So a judgment is entered in Count 14 against all of the defendants in favor of the plaintiff in that amount. This is the sum of the awards derived from Sections I and III of the verdict sheet.

TCI points out that the jury rejected Pan Am’s allegations that Weiner and Levin conspired to defraud Pan Am and fraudulently transferred TCI’s and TDU’s assets. See Verdict Sheet, Sections IV and V. And it notes that absent a finding of fraud, “no Maryland court has pierced the corporate veil.” Therefore, TCI argues, no defendant could be held liable under count fourteen. Pan Am counters by alleging that Levin’s and Weiner’s conduct was in fact fraudulent, and that even if it weren’t, the trial court could pierce the corporate veil for other reasons — namely, to enforce paramount equity. We disagree with Pan Am’s argument insofar as it touches upon the court’s ability to pierce the corporate veil for reasons other than fraud.

We shall explain. ¹⁵⁷ Corporations usually are separate and distinct from their shareholders, insulating those shareholders from liability. Nevertheless, in certain circumstances, a court will “lift the corporate veil” to impose personal liability. A court may lift the corporate veil to find the principals liable if there has been a fraud. The verdict sheet indicates the jury’s conclusion that Levin and Weiner did not conspire to defraud Pan Am, and they did not fraudulently convey management fees or TDU’s assets.

The jury heard three weeks of testimony and reviewed scores of documentary exhibits on both sides of this issue, and we must accept its verdict that Levin and Weiner were not guilty of fraud. DiLeo v. Nugent, 88 Md.App. 59, 76 , 592 A.2d 1126 (1991) (“In making a determination or finding of fact, a jury assesses and evaluates the weight to be assigned to the evidence presented to it and decides its effect. Neither the trial court nor this Court is permitted to substitute its evaluation of the evidence for that of the jury. To do so would be an invasion of the jury’s province.”).

But Pan Am argues that fraud is not the only ground for piercing the corporate veil, and it is to this argument that we turn. The Court of Appeals occasionally alludes to enforcing a paramount equity as an alternate justification for setting aside the corporate fiction. See Bart Arconti & Sons, Inc. v. Ames-Ennis, Inc., 275 Md. 295 , 340 A.2d 225 (1975), in which the Court of Appeals indicated that: Although a number of variations upon the same theme may be found, the most frequently enunciated rule in Maryland is that although the courts will, in a proper case, disregard the corporate entity and deal with substance rather than form, as though a corporation did not exist, shareholders generally are not held individually liable for debts or obligations of a corporation except where it is necessary to prevent fraud or enforce a paramount equity. ¹⁵⁸ Id. at 310 , 340 A.2d 225 (citations omitted). See also Dixon v. Process Corp., 38 Md.App. 644, 654 , 382 A.2d 893 (1978) (“Maryland law is crystalline ‘that the corporate entity will be disregarded only when necessary to prevent fraud or to enforce a paramount equity.’ ”); See “Piercing the Corporate Veil” in Maryland: An Analysis and Suggested Approach, 14 U.B.L.Rev. 311, 324-25 (1985) (tracing history in Maryland and collecting cases).

Notwithstanding its hint that enforcing a paramount equity might suffice as a reason for piercing the corporate veil, the Court of Appeals to date has not elaborated upon the meaning of this phrase or applied it in any case of which we are aware. We note, however, that the Arconti court declined to find a paramount equity even in a case in which the three corporations commingled equipment, operated from a single place of business, permitted one corporation to become dormant as the other two corporations improved, and made personal loans and transferred insurance policies to the principals. Arconti, 275 Md. at 309 , 340 A.2d 225 . None of this bodes well for Pan Am’s argument, and our review of the approaches taken in other jurisdictions supports our inclination to find that the trial court erred in piercing the corporate veil.

We here examine the factors outlined in a Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decision, DeWitt Truck Brokers v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681 (4th Cir.1976), because our survey indicates that its list represents factors used elsewhere to establish a paramount equity. The court wrote that: [Ejqually as well settled as is the principle that plain fraud is not a necessary prerequisite for piercing the corporate veil is the rule that the mere fact that all or almost all of the corporate stock is owned by one individual or a few individuals, will not afford sufficient grounds for disregarding corporateness. But when substantial ownership of all the stock of a corporation in a single individual is combined with other factors clearly supporting disregard of the corporate fiction on grounds of fundamental equity and fairness, courts have experienced ¹⁵⁹ ‘little difficulty’ and have shown no hesitancy in applying what is described as the ‘alter ego’ or ‘instrumentality’ theory in order to cast aside the corporate shield and to fasten liability on the individual stockholder. Id. at 685 (citations omitted).

The court recounted other factors that weigh in the analysis. These include: whether the corporation was grossly undercapitalized, the corporation’s failure to observe corporate formalities, non-payment of dividends, the debtor corporation’s insolvency, the dominant stockholder’s siphoning of corporate funds, the non-functioning of other officers or directors, the absence of corporate records, and the corporation’s status as a facade for the stockholders’ operations. Id. at 686-87 . We find no evidence that the corporations here involved failed to observe corporate formalities or pay dividends.

The officers and directors are involved in corporate activities, and no one suggests that corporate records are absent. Pan Am alleged that Levin and Weiner siphoned corporate funds for their own use, but evidence to the contrary also was submitted. See Comment, supra, 14 U.B.L.Rev. at 319 (elaborating upon the “Many Factors Approach”). We cannot on the record before us justify disregarding the corporate entity.

The jury concluded that Levin and Weiner did not act fraudulently, and the evidence does not suggest that lifting the veil is necessary to enforce a paramount equity. We therefore find erroneous the trial court’s decision to pierce the corporate veil. We note that this will be scant solace to the individuals, however, in that they still are liable under the marketing cooperation agreement because they signed that document in their personal capacities.

III

FIDUCIARY DUTY [This addresses TCI’s argument III and Pan Am’s argument III] Pan Am’s complaint alleged that TCI had a fiduciary obligation to hold and preserve ticket sale proceeds for Pan Am’s benefit, and to remit these to Pan Am after ¹⁶⁰ deducting its own commissions and fees. Pan Am alleged that TCI’s failure to remit those funds, and TCI’s and TDU’s breach of the marketing cooperation agreement and the Net Ticket Agreements, each constitute a breach of fiduciary duty. The issue did not reach the jury, but the judge endeavored to “conform” the jury’s Section II verdict to the counts of the claim and the counterclaim. He entered judgments in the amount of $1,570,083.26 in counts four and six against TCI, TDU, Levin, and Weiner.

On October 11, he rejected TCI’s argument that the relationship was a debt- or/creditor relationship, and reaffirmed his earlier decision. He said that “I’m persuaded of a couple of things, that as of this moment I’m alive and that there is a fiduciary duty in this case____ Clearly there is a fiduciary duty here. There has to be a fiduciary duty. If this isn’t a fiduciary case, what is one?” (The judge reiterated this sentiment a number of times.) TCI argues that neither ARC nor the airlines believe that the ARC agent reporting agreement creates a fiduciary relationship between agencies and airlines, in spite of language in the agreement that might suggest otherwise.

The agreement provides that: The agent shall designate a bank account for the benefit of ARC and the carrier for deposit of the [sale] proceeds ____ The Agent recognizes that the proceeds of the sales, less the Agent’s commissions, on these ARC traffic documents are the property of the carrier and shall be held in trust until accounted for to the carrier. All monies and credit card billing documents, including any special “direct form of payment” credit documents which a carrier has expressly authorized, less applicable commission, collected by the Agent for sales hereunder are the property of the carriers. Agent Reporting Agreement, Sections VII(B) & VIII(A)(5). The distinction between debtor-creditor relationships and fiduciary relationships is significant for TCI: its liability on ¹⁶¹ this issue hinges upon how its relationship to Pan Am is characterized.

The gist of TCI’s argument is that the fiduciary relationship does not exist because ARC does not require agents to segregate ticket sale funds, and ARC commingles funds it draws from agents’ accounts: ARC only requires that the agency’s designated account contain sufficient funds when ARC presents its draft. TCI argues that absent an ARC prohibition against commingling that would demonstrate otherwise, the parties intended to establish a debtor-creditor relationship, and not an agency relationship that would produce a fiduciary obligation. It gleans additional support from the marketing cooperation agreement, which provides that TCI must pay Pan Am interest for any amount it owes but does not remit in full. A variety of circumstances may give rise to a fiduciary relationship, but the relationship between a principal and an agent perhaps is one of the most common.

Pan Am argues that the defendants are travel agents, and that their status as agents is illustrated by their obligation to hold in trust for the airlines funds they collect from ticket sales. Pan Am adds that TCI breached its fiduciary duty to Pan Am when the defendants sold more than three million dollars in tickets, even though they knew that they could not pay for them, and urges us to affirm the trial court’s entry of judgment on count six. We first must determine whether a fiduciary relationship existed, then turn to consider whether the trial judge reasonably concluded that TCI breached its duty to Pan Am. A fiduciary relationship is one in which one party must act for the other’s benefit concerning matters within the scope of the relationship.

An agency-principal relationship is a species of fiduciary relationship, and an agent’s duty to her principal is similar to the duty imposed in fiduciary relationships. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 387. Although not clearly defined, Maryland case law