Travelers' Insurance v. Nicklas

Fowler, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The Travelers’ Insurance Company of Hartford, Connecticut, issued a policy on the life of William' Nicklas of Baltimore City. The insured died in December, 1896, from the effect of a pistol wound in his head, and the insurance company refused to pay the full amount ⁴⁷² oí the policy, less the sum of $300 which was admitted to be due to it by the insured — and this refusal was upon the ground that the death.of the insured was the result of suicide. Whereupon this suit was instituted by the plaintiff, the widow of the insured and the beneficiary named in the policy.

All other defences, save that of suicide, were expressly waived by the defendant. The verdict was in favor of the plaintiff, and the defendant has appealed. During the course of the trial only one exception was taken, and that was to the ruling of the Court upon the prayers. The plaintiff’s first and fourth prayers were granted, and the defendant’s second, third and fourth prayers were rejected.

The provision of the policy upon which the defendant relies is as follows: if the insured “ shall die by suicide, whether the act be voluntary or involuntary, felonious or otherwise, or whether the insured be sane or insane at the time of the act, then . . . this policy shall be null and void and of no effect, except in the case provided for in the sixth section of this policy.” The sixth section provides that in case of death by suicide a small amount to be ascertained as therein provided, which in this case amounts to $125, should be paid by the company. But we are not concerned with this last-named provision in this case, and we will briefly consider the questions presented by the ruling upon the prayers. By the first prayer of the plaintiff the jury were instructed that where death results from a pistol shot wound self-destruction is not to be presumed, but the law presumes the wound was the result of accident, and the burden of proof is upon the defendant to show by a preponderance of testimony the wound was intentionally self-inflicted, and that it was not the result of accident; and that unless the jury find from the evidence that the insured intentionally shot himself, their verdict must be for the plaintiff. We do not understand that it was seriously contended that the propositions of law set forth in this prayer are ⁴⁷³ not sustained by authority, for they are: Bliss on Life Insurance, sec. 337; Leman v. Ins.

Co., 46 La. Ann. 1189 ; 24 L. R. A. 589; Travelers’ Ins. Co. v. McConkey, 127 U. S. 661 ; Home Benefit Asso. v. Sargent, 142 U. S. 691 ; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Simpson, 28 S. W. Rep. 840 ; Mutual Life Ins. v. Wiswell, 56 Kans. 765 ; 35 L. R. A. 258.

But the objection of the appellant appears to be that the law contained in the prayer has no application to this case, because the facts are such as to preclude the operation of the legal presumption against suicide. Of course if the facts were such as to show suicide there could and there would be no room for the presumption of law, but we are unable to agree with counsel for appellant that the facts of this case are of that character. On the contrary, the jury found, and in our opinion were fully justified, under the instructions of the Court, in so finding and in giving full effect to the presumption of law, that death was not intentionally inflicted upon himself by the