Traylor v. Grafton

O’Donnell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Early in 1968 Earl Deshner (Deshner), a Maryland and Pennsylvania developer, knowing of the interest of the appellants, Raymond P. Traylor and M. Jacqueline Traylor, his wife (Traylors), in purchasing a small farm, apprised Mrs. Traylor, a real estate salesperson, of a listing with one Philip W. Eppley (Eppley), a York County realtor, of a 115 acre farm owned, occupied and operated by the appellees, Corbin C. Grafton and Margaret K. Grafton, his wife (Graftons), in lower Chanceford Township, Pennsylvania. Deshner, interested in acquiring the farm and in developing the land for a mobile home park, was willing, upon acquisition, to sell off to the Traylors a parcel of approximately 18 acres, including the dwelling. Mrs. Traylor was accompanied by Deshner, who was introduced as her “uncle” in order to conceal his true identity as a prospective developer, when she inspected the property; he counseled her throughout the negotiations, advising the submission of an offer of $44,000, but told her that his backer — one Christopher Peter Eilers of Harford County — would “go as high as $45,000.” After rather minimal negotiations the Traylors, on March 27, 1968, entered into a standard form realty contract provided by the York Board of Realtors, Inc., by which the ⁶⁵² Graftons agreed to sell them the farm, dwelling, fixtures, heating and plumbing systems and crops in the ground for $45,000.

A deposit in the amount of $500 was made from funds advanced by Deshner. 1 The balance due under the contract “to be paid at settlement,” scheduled on or before June 30, 1968, was “subject to obtaining $25,000 mortgage for 20 years at 6% interest. Said financing to be obtained within 30 days of this agreement.” The contract contained, printed therein, a forfeiture provision which read as follows: “It is mutually agreed that should either party hereto fail or neglect to perform his part of this contract, the injured party may, at his option, elect to pursue his remedy for specific performance of this contract or accept a sum equal to ten (10%) percent of the agreed price of sale as liquidated damages, which said sum the other party hereby agrees to pay.” All acts in connection with the execution of the contract, including the initialed amendment whereby the offer was increased from $44,000 to $45,000 occurred in York County, Pennsylvania. Under it Eppley, the realtor, was to be paid commissions of $2,700. Immediately following execution of the contract the Traylors and Eppley visited a Delta bank seeking information on the availability of financing, but no mortgage application was ever there made.

Shortly after signing the contract the Traylors were introduced to the Eilers who advised that they would “finance the whole deal”; the Eilers had agreed to take a mortgage from the Traylors on the parcel of land to be conveyed to them. When, several days before the scheduled settlement, Eppley made inquiry of Mrs. Traylor she stated that there was “no problem about financing,” and upon receiving ⁶⁵³ additional assurances from her that the Traylors could obtain the financing, the Graftons, at public auction on June 20,1968, sold their cattle, all farm implements and moved to another home (which they had constructed). The date for settlement was mutually extended to July 17, 1968, to be held at the office of an attorney in York, Pennsylvania. Upon a reinspection of the property, on the day before the rescheduled settlement, complaint was made by the Traylors that certain fixtures — a first floor bathtub, first floor heating unit, and kitchen cabinets — had been removed from the premises.

Grafton denied that a downstairs bathtub had ever been in the premises, that the heating unit, loaned by a neighbor, had been returned, and that the kitchen cabinets had been re-erected. Mrs. Traylor testified that when her husband indicated he would not settle “without the stove or range being replaced,” Grafton, with some irritation, forcefully declared that you can “forget the whole thing”; this was denied by Grafton. When the Traylors reported the missing fixtures to Deshner he advised them that he would “take care of everything” at the settlement, it being understood that under an assignment made by the Traylors to him he would appear at the settlement and the entire matter would be negotiated by him. An unsigned, undated assignment of contract to Deshner was offered in evidence with testimony that Deshner had the executed original.

There was similarly offered in evidence an unsigned, undated assignment from the Traylors to the Eilers which had been prepared in the office of the attorney scheduled to conduct the settlement. When the new settlement date arrived neither Deshner nor the Traylors appeared, although the Graftons and Eppley were on hand. Although there was testimony that Deshner had been negotiating with the Eilers and the funds used to complete the settlement were to be received from the sale by Eilers of another property, such collateral transaction was not apparently consummated. The Graftons instituted suit against the Traylors in the ⁶⁵⁴ Circuit Court for Harford County and asserted liquidated damages in the amount of $4,000 ($4,500 less the $500 down payment).

When, pursuant to Maryland Rule 315, the Traylors impleaded Deshner, their theretofore undisclosed principal, as a third-party defendant, the Graftons, in an amended declaration, set forth three “alternative” causes of action: in Count I they sued the Traylors; in Count II they sued both the Traylors, as agents, and Deshner, as principal, alleging a joint and several liability; under Count III Deshner alone was sued as the principal of the Traylors. The Graftons in their declaration gave notice of their intention to rely upon the law of Pennsylvania in accordance with the provisions of Maryland Code (1957,1965 Repl. Vol.) Art. 35, § 50 (now Maryland Code (1974), Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article § 10-504), and at a pretrial conference the Circuit Court (Dyer, J.) ruled that the law of Pennsylvania controlled on the issue of liquidated damages and granted the motion of the Graftons to restrict the testimony to preclude any evidence that the property had been subsequently sold with no resultant actual damages to the Graftons. During the trial of the case the trial court (Proctor, J.) upon a proffer made by the Traylors to show that no actual damages had been sustained by the Graftons ruled as a matter of law that the claimed liquidated damages were not a penalty.

The case was submitted to the jury under each of the three counts on behalf of the Graftons, as well as upon the third-party claim by the Traylors against Deshner, but the court instructed the jury only under Counts I and III and the third-party claim. After counsel had noted their respective exceptions to the court’s instructions, and immediately prior to argument, counsel for the Graftons, “in order to attempt to make an election, pursuant to Maryland Rule 320,” moved “to amend their declaration to strike Count III against Earl Deshner.” Although Judge Proctor recognized that under the rule an “amendment” could be made at any time, in his discretion he denied the motion. During the course of its deliberations the jury addressed a written question to the trial court as follows: ⁶⁵⁵ “If we find that the verdict is for the Plaintiff, and further find that the Traylors are responsible to Plaintiff, and then find for the Traylors against Deshner in the third-party claim, does it make Deshner fully responsible for the penalty?” Following discussion with counsel in chambers the court in response to the inquiry replied as follows: “In legal theory, yes. Under such verdicts, Plaintiffs could proceed to try and collect from the Traylors.

If successful, Traylors could then proceed to try and collect from Deshner. Under such verdict, Plaintiffs could not proceed to try and collect directly from Deshner.” The Traylors excepted to the entire reply by the trial court, contending that the response should have been a simple “No”; the Graftons filed exception to the last sentence of the court’s supplemental instruction. After approximately an additional hour of deliberation the jury addressed another question to the court. This question read: “If we rule Plaintiff (Grafton) against Traylor and Deshner, with Traylors as agents to principal (Deshner) is the third party suit dissolved, or can we rule Traylor against Deshner in the third party suit?” The Court, in consultation with counsel, advised of the answer he proposed to submit.

Counsel for the Graftons excepted on the ground that the proposed answer was contrary to Pennsylvania law. Counsel for the Traylors excepted to the proposed reply on the ground that “the simple answer” should be: that if the verdict is that the Traylors were acting as agents for Deshner as principal and so find a verdict against Deshner, then, in such event, the third-party suit would be “dissolved.” Overruling the exceptions, the court’s written response to the jury, as proposed, read as follows: “You cannot bring in a verdict in favor of ⁶⁵⁶ Plaintiffs against both Traylors and Deshner. However, if you find Traylors acted as agents for Deshner, you can either (1) bring in verdict under Count 1 against Traylors, and verdict under the third party claim against Deshner; or (2) bring in verdict against Deshner under Count 3, in which event the third party claim would be dissolved.” Judge Proctor then, sua sponte, directed the court reporter to prepare three questions for submission to the jury which he believed “will resolve the whole thing.” Those questions were as follows: “1. Do you find there was a subsisting contract on July 16th, 1968?

Answer yes or no. 2. Do you find that the contract was made by Traylors as agents for Deshner? Answer yes or no. 3. Do you find that that contract was made by Traylors on their own behalf, and not as agents for Deshner?

Answer yes or no.” Before the questions were typed the jury “knocked with verdict”; the foreman announced that “We considered the contract valid, and we ruled in favor of the Plaintiffs, the Graftons, and against the Traylors. Insofar as the third party suit we ruled — as we considered the Traylors the Plaintiffs — we ruled for the Traylors against Earl Deshner.” Judge Proctor then directed the clerk to enter a verdict for the plaintiffs on the first count and verdict for the plaintiffs in the third-party claim and a verdict for defendants “on the third count.” When he directed the clerk to have the jury hearken to their verdict, counsel for the Traylors moved for a poll of the jury. Judge Proctor himself undertook the poll and stated: “The verdict as stated by the foreman is verdict for the Plaintiffs, the Graftons against Traylors under the first count; verdict for Defendant in the action of Graftons against Deshner under the third count; and verdict for Plaintiffs Traylors against ⁶⁵⁷ Deshner in the third-party claim. That’s the way the foreman has stated the verdict, and I’ll ask each of them if that is their verdict.” Then the following dialogue took place between the trial court and the jury after the foreman requested the court “to mention the second count”: “THE COURT: Well, it’s really technically the third count of the declaration.

I told you in the charge you could return, as you have done, a verdict against the Traylors under the first count and third-party claim against Deshner; but I told you that you could not return a verdict against the Traylors in the first count and Deshner under the third count, so that’s verdict for the Defendants. Is that what your understanding was, because I can’t give you the verdict. JURY FOREMAN: We looked at the third-party as the Traylors against Deshner. THE COURT: That’s right; that’s the third-party claim.

JURY FOREMAN: Right; and we ruled for the Traylors. THE COURT: That’s correct, Traylors. And in the original suit there was Count 1 which is the suit of Graftons against Traylors, and you returned a verdict there in favor of Graftons against the Traylors. JURY FOREMAN: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Also in the original suit was Count 3, which was the suit of the Graftons against Deshner. Now, you didn’t actually announce a verdict on that. JURY FOREMAN: That’s right. THE COURT: And you’ll have to return a verdict on that.

I have instructed you in the charge that you couldn’t bring in a verdict in favor of the Plaintiffs on both of these counts. ⁶⁵⁸ JURY FOREMAN: Right, so we ruled for the Plaintiffs against Traylors, and not Deshner. THE COURT: Right. That still doesn’t clear it, because you have to then return automatically under my charge a verdict in favor of Defendant Deshner in the third count of the original suit. You still have your verdict of Traylors against Deshner in the third-party claim.

I want to be sure that’s what your verdict is. JURY FOREMAN: Do you want us to retire for a minute? THE COURT: I have dictated three questions which counsel I believe have agreed — which are very simple questions based upon your announced verdicts — and I think if I submit those questions to you, and you answer those questions, you wouldn’t have to worry about it and that would resolve that. FOREMAN: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: All right; we’ll recess a minute and give you those three questions.” After retiring the jury returned and answered issues numbers one and two affirmatively; in accordance with the court’s instruction no answer was required to issue number three. Following these responses by the jury the trial court stated that the entry of verdicts would be held sub curia in order to permit counsel to submit memoranda concerning whether or not the court had improperly removed from consideration by the jury the claim of the Graftons asserted under Count II, against both the Traylors and Deshner, alleging a joint and several liability. The Traylors noted their exception to the procedure instituted by the court since it had not been agreed upon at the time of submission of the case to the jury, nor before argument and deliberations that the case would be decided upon issues submitted, and that the issues submitted were inconsistent with the charge given the jury. ⁶⁵⁹ In the memoranda from counsel the Graftons then requested the court to permit them “to strike by amendment Count 2 and Count 3 of their declaration” and requested the entry of a verdict against the Traylors for $4,000; Judge Proctor in an opinion filed on July 3,1973, concluded that he had erroneously refused the plaintiffs election to dismiss Count II (charging the Traylors and Deshner to be jointly and severally liable), and Count III (against Deshner alone as a principal). Relying upon the holdings in Hospelhorn v. Poe, 174 Md. 242, 257-62 , 198 A. 582, 589-91 (1938), the court directed the clerk to enter that Counts II and III “were voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiffs” and upon the jury’s responses to the issues, a verdict was to be entered under Count I in favor of the plaintiffs against the Traylors in the amount of $4,000, and that under the third-party claim a verdict was to be entered against Deshner in favor of the Traylors in the same amount.

Judgments nisi were directed to be entered upon those verdicts. A motion for a new trial, apparently was denied. In their appeal the Traylors here contend (1) that there was error in determining that the law of Pennsylvania rather than the law of the forum governed the provision in the contract as to damages, (2) that it was error not to permit evidence of a want of actual damages and the fact that the property was later sold at a price exceeding the contract price, (3) that the instructions to the jury in response to the written question from the jury were erroneous, (4) that it was error to submit issues to the jury after its verdict was announced and after a request that the jury be polled, (5) that the court erred in ruling as a matter of law that although certain items had been removed from the property the plaintiffs were prepared to substantially perform their obligations under the contract, and (6) that the court erroneously refused a requested instruction that the obtaining of the specified mortgage financing was a condition precedent to liability under the contract. 2 ⁶⁶⁰ Damages The Traylors argue that the law of the forum governs the remedy, that the liquidated damage clause in the contract was in fact a “penalty” and as such was unenforceable. While it is true that the remedy for breach of contract is regulated by the law of the forum, Mandru v. Ashby, 108 Md. 693, 695 , 71 A. 312, 313 (1908), it is a general rule of comity that the law of the place of contracting determines the validity and effect of a contract with respect to the nature and extent of the duty owed by a party who becomes bound to perform.

Mackubin v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 190 Md. 52, 57 , 57 A. 2d 318, 321 (1948); Union Trust Co. v. Knabe, 122 Md. 584 , 89 A. 1106 (1914); Mandru v. Ashby, supra. As was stated in Union Trust Co. v. Knabe, supra: “ ‘the lex loci contractus controls the nature, construction and validity of the contract. Courts will always look to the lex loci, to give construction to an instrument, and will impart to it validity, according to those laws, unless it would be dangerous, against public policy, or of immoral tendency to enforce it here.’ ” 122 Md. at 608 , 89 A. at 1115 . Contracts relating to the sale of realty are generally governed by the law of the jurisdiction in which the property is located.

See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 189, comment b (1971), noting that this includes enforceability of a liquidated damage clause. See also 15A C.J.S. Conflict of Laws § 19(2) (1967). In Latrobe v. Winans, 89 Md. 636 , 43 A. 829 (1899), our predecessors held that where an offer to purchase land situated in this state was made by letter posted in England and the acceptance occurred here the contract was entered into in Maryland, the lex loci applied and the agreement was to be construed under Maryland law. Most states are said to apply the usual rules of contracts concerning their nature, construction and validity when a conflict of laws problem arises under a land contract.

See Note, Choice of Law Governing Land Transactions, 111 U. Pa. L. Rev. 482 at 486 (1963). In H. Goodrich, Conflict of Laws § 91, at 259 (3d ed. 1949), the general rule is stated to ⁶⁶¹ be that whether an agreement for liquidated damages is valid or not depends upon the law of the place of contracting unless it is against the public policy of the forum to enforce such a provision. We have defined “liquidated damage” as a “ ‘specific sum of money .. . expressly stipulated by the parties to a . . . contract as the amount of damages to be recovered by either party for a breach of the agreement by the other.’ ” See Massachusetts Indent.

Life Ins. Co. v. Dresser, 269 Md. 364, 368 , 306 A. 2d 213,216 (1973). Both our decisions and those of Pennsylvania have held that a liquidated damage clause is within the substantive law of contracts, and — if not a “penalty” — is an enforceable provision as a sum agreed upon by the parties to be paid in the event of a breach, enforceable as any other provision or valid promise in the contract. Massachusetts Indent,.

Life Ins. Co. v. Dresser, supra; John Cowan, Inc. v. Meyer, 125 Md. 450 , 94 A. 18 (1915); Foster v. Hudson Valley Lumber Co., 37 F. Supp. 381 (D. Md. 1941); Mathews v. Sharp, 99 Pa. 560 (1882); Streeper v. Williams, 48 Pa. 450 (1865); Bruno v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 865 (E.D. Pa. 1966). See also 5 A. Corbin, Contracts § 1054, at 319 (1964). The nomenclature used by the parties, although a circumstance, is not determinative in passing upon whether or not the payment of the designated sum is in fact a penalty.

See Mt. Airy Milling Co. v. Runkles, 118 Md. 371, 376 , 84 A. 533, 534 (1912). In accord, Commonwealth v. Musser Forests, Inc., 394 Pa. 205 , 146 A. 2d 714 (1958); Gross v. Exeter Machine Works, Inc., 277 Pa. 363 , 121 A. 195 (1923). The decisive element is the intention of the parties — whether they intended that the sum be a penalty or an agreed-upon amount as damages in case of a breach and this is to be gleaned from the subject matter, the language of the contract and the circumstances surrounding its execution.

Siler v. Marshall, 251 Md. 342 , 247 A. 2d 385 (1968); Macon v. Zeiler, 233 Md. 160 , 195 A. 2d 687 (1963). In accord, Lackawanna Boiler & Grate Co. v. Lee Coal Storage Co., 290 Pa. 561 , 139 A. 315 (1927); City of York v. York Ry., 229 Pa. 236 , 78 A. 128 (1910). ⁶⁶² If the sum agreed upon is a reasonable forecast of the just and fair compensation for the harm that would result by a breach of the contract and the resultant injury is difficult to estimate accurately or actual damages could not be easily ascertained, such a clause has been held enforceable as liquidated damages. Massachusetts Indem. Life Ins.

Co. v. Dresser, supra; Goldman v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 251 Md. 575, 582 , 248 A. 2d 154, 158 (1968); Hammaker v. Schleigh, 157 Md. 652, 667 , 147 A. 790, 796 (1929); Mt. Airy Milling Co. v. Runkles, supra; Willson v. Mayor & C.C. of Balto., 83 Md. 203 , 34 A. 774 (1896).

See also 5 S. Williston, Contracts § 778, at 694 (3d ed. 1961). The Pennsylvania decisions are in accord with these holdings. See Mathews v. Sharp, supra; Streeper v. Williams, supra; Bruno v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc., supra. Where, however, the amount agreed upon and inserted in the agreement is shown to be grossly excessive and out of all proportion to the damages that might reasonably have been expected to result from such breach of the contract, the amount specified removes it from the ambit of “liquidated damages.” Cowan v. Meyer, supra, 125 Md. at 463 , 94 A. at 21 , quoting from Baltimore Bridge Co. v. United Rys. & Elec.

Co., 125 Md. 208, 214-15 , 93 A. 420, 422 (1915). In Siler v. Marshall, supra, where the contract for the sale of land at a purchase price of $916,905 provided for the forfeiture, as liquidated damages, of the deposit .made thereunder in the amount of $25,000 (amounting to approximately 2.7% of the purchase price) in the event of a breach by the purchaser, this Court upheld the enforcement of the forfeiture clause and Chief Judge Hammond, writing for the Court, concerning the nature of liquidated damages stated as follows: “As long ago as the case of Geiger v. The Western Md. R.R. Co., 41 Md. 4,15 , our predecessors said: ‘ [W]here the parties have declared in clear and unambiguous terms that a certain sum shall be paid by way of compensation, upon a breach of the contract * * * the damages arising from the ⁶⁶³ breach of which are uncertain, and incapable of being ascertained by any fixed pecuniary standard, and especially where the contract provides that the sum so claimed shall be paid as liquidated damages, the sum so fixed and agreed upon will be considered as compensation for damages resulting from the breach and not a penalty.’ In Cowan v. Meyer, 125 Md. 450, 463 , the Court adopted the language of Judge Pattison for the Court in Baltimore Bridge Co. v. United Railways and Electric Co., 125 Md. 208, 214-215 , that: ‘ “From the authorities given above, it may be stated as a settled rule of law, that where the parties, at or before the time of the execution of the contract, agree upon and name a sum therein to be paid as liquidated damages in lieu of anticipated damages which are in their nature uncertain and incapable of exact ascertainment, that the amount so named in the agreement will be regarded as liquidated damages and not as a penalty, unless the amount so agreed upon and inserted in the agreement be grossly excessive and out of all proportion to the damages that might reasonably have been expected to result from such breach of the contract. And whether it is excessive or whether the damages are incapable of exact ascertainment should be determined from the subject-matter of the contract considered in the light of all the surrounding facts and circumstances connected therewith and known to the parties at the time of its execution.” ’ ” 251 Md. at 346-47, 247 A. 2d at 387-88 . In Streeper v. Williams, supra, apparently the progenitor of the Pennsylvania decisions, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in holding that an agreement to forfeit a $500 ⁶⁶⁴ deposit made under a contract to purchase a hotel for $14,000 was liquidated damages and not a penalty, stated: “A sum expressly stipulated as liquidated damages will be relieved from, if it is obviously to secure payment of another sum capable of being compensated by interest.

On the other hand, a sum denominated a penalty, or forfeiture, will be considered liquidated damages where it is fixed upon by the parties as the measure of the damages, because the nature of the case, the uncertainty of the proof, or the difficulties of reaching the damages by proof, have induced them to make the damages a subject of previous adjustment. In some cases the magnitude of the sum, and its proportion to the probable consequence of a breach, will cause it to be looked upon as minatory only. Upon the whole, the only general observation we can make is, that in each case we must look at the language of the contract, the intention of the parties as gathered from all its provisions, the subject of the contract and its surroundings, the ease or difficulty of measuring the breach in damages, and the sum stipulated, and from the whole gather the view which good conscience and equity ought to take of the case....” 48 Pa. at 454 . After pointing out the impediments, inconveniences and difficulties respectively faced by the seller and the buyer in searching for new homes, raising large sums of money and in many ways incurring losses and expenses which either might be unable to prove, and very difficult to be ascertained, the court further stated: “Now, every one knows how difficult it is to reach and estimate the real losses men suffer from disappointment in their plans, and many of the subjects of loss cannot be put in evidence.

An accurate account can scarcely be stated in dollars and cents, and yet but few, if asked to name a sum for a total abandonment of such a contract, would ⁶⁶⁵ be willing to take the risk much lower than at the sum stipulated here. From all these circumstances, added to the intention deduced from the contract, we conclude that the parties fixed the sum stipulated, as the measure of the damages either would probably suffer from a total failure, and the compensation to be made therefor. . . 48 Pa. at 456 . Similarly, in Mathews v. Sharp, supra, the court sustained the forfeiture of a $500 deposit on the contract to purchase 14 acres of farm land at $450 an acre. Under the agreement between the parties if the purchaser defaulted his deposit was to be forfeited; if the seller reneged, in addition to the return of the deposit it was covenanted that he would similarly forfeit $500 to the purchaser.

On the authority of Streeper v. Williams, the court held, in determining whether the sum named as a forfeiture for noncompliance was intended to be a penalty or liquidated damages, it was necessary “to look at the whole contract, its subject-matter, the ease or difficulty in measuring the breach in damages, and the magnitude of the stipulated sum, not only as compared with the value of the subject of the contract but in proportion to the probable consequences of the breach. . . .” 99 Pa. at 564 . In Guardian Constr. Co. v. Dinkin, 267 Md. 325 , 297 A. 2d 242 (1972), we affirmed a judgment in the amount of $1,000 paid as a deposit on account of the purchase of a home exceeding $40,000 (approximately 2.5% of the purchase price), where the sellers declared the deposit forfeited when the purchasers failed to appear for settlement. In Macon v. Zeiler, supra, this Court affirmed a judgment in favor of the sellers in the amount of $1,000, the deposit made under a contract in the amount of $20,000 for a dwelling and a portion of a lot (amounting to 5% of the purchase price), where it was expressly provided in the contract that the deposit was to be forfeited if the buyers did not go through with their bargain.

In Alois v. Waldman, 219 Md. 369 , 149 A. 2d 406 (1959), although the contract was silent as to what disposition was to be made of a deposit in the amount of ⁶⁶⁶ $3,500 in the event of a default by the buyers under an agreement to purchase a residence and a tract of land for $35,000 (amounting to 10% of the purchase price), this Court held that “the retention of the deposit by the sellers could be supported on the theory that it was in the nature of liquidated damages rather than a penalty.” In Kraft v. Michael, 166 Pa. Super. 57 , 70 A. 2d 424 (1950), on the authority of Streeper v. Williams, supra, it was held that the forfeiture of $1,600 made as a deposit on the purchase of a home for $16,000 (10% of the purchase price), was liquidated damages and not a penalty. The court, which cited Restatement of Contracts § 339 (1932), stated that, considering the language of the agreement, “we can come to no other conclusion than that the sum stipulated bore such a reasonable relation to the purchase price that the court below did not err in treating it as liquidated damages and not as a penalty.” In Tudesco v. Wilson, 163 Pa. Super. 352 , 60 A. 2d 388 (1948) allocatur ref d, the agreement for the sale of real estate provided for the forfeiture of the down payment in the amount of $1,600 if the buyer defaulted in the purchase of premises for $16,000; the buyers, who made the deposit by check, had stopped payment.

The court concluded that “[wjhere, in an agreement of sale of real estate, there is a provision for liquidated damages and the vendee repudiates the agreement the vendor is entitled to the sum agreed upon as liquidated damages.” (Citations omitted.) 163 Pa. Super, at 355, 60 A. 2d at 390 . 3 Compare, however, Ellis v. Roberts, 98 Pa. Super. 49 (1930), where, in holding that a provision in a contract of sale for forfeiture of a deposit of $2,500 on account of a purchase price of $16,800 — or 15% of the purchase price — was so excessive and unreasonable as not to constitute “liquidated damages, but rather amounted to a penalty,” the court stated: “In the light of the amount of the purchase price, the knowledge which plaintiff had of defendants’ ⁶⁶⁷ financial condition, the relation which the sum agreed upon as liquidated damages bears to the purchase price and all the other circumstances, we are led to the conclusion that plaintiff intended the provision in the contract for liquidated damages to compel specific performance by defendants. This made it a provision for a penalty and precludes plaintiff from recovering more than just compensation for the breach of the contract by defendants, and requires us to open the judgment.” 98 Pa.

Super, at 60. Conceding, arguendo, the applicability of the Pennsylvania decisions, the appellants urge that since they all involve the forfeiture of a deposit or “earnest money” in the hands of the vendor, the forfeiture of an amount equal to nine times the deposit must be considered as a “penalty.” It is true that in the majority of the cases the sum agreed upon as liquidated damages was the amount of the deposit, but nowhere in any of our decisions, nor in those of Pennsylvania, is there any indication that the amount fixed as liquidated damages is limited by the amount of the deposit. In the absence of an agreement for forfeiture the amount of down payment has been generally considered to have been properly forfeited. See Alois v. Waldman, supra; Macon v. Zeiler, supra; Quillen v. Kelley, 216 Md. 396 , 140 A. 2d 517 (1958).

See as well Roberts v. Roesch, 306 Pa. 435 , 159 A. 870 (1932); Sanders v. Brock, 230 Pa. 609 , 79 A. 772 (1911); Luria v. Robbins, 223 Pa. Super. 456 , 302 A. 2d 361 (1973) allocatur ref'd. When an amount specifically agreed upon is designated as the sum to be collected upon the other’s default it makes no difference what down payment or deposit may have been made and the sum agreed upon is enforceable as liquidated damages so long as it meets all the necessary criteria. Under both our decisions and those of Pennsylvania the determination of whether a particular clause in a contract is to be construed as providing for liquidated damages, or as a penalty, depends on the facts and circumstances in each case and ordinarily is a question of law for the court.

H. J. ⁶⁶⁸ McGrath Co. v. Wisner, 189 Md. 260, 264 , 55 A. 2d 793, 795 (1947); Hammaker v. Schleigh, 157 Md. at 667 , 147 A. at 796 ; March v. Allabough, 103 Pa. 335 (1883); Laughlin v. Baltalden, Inc., 191 Pa. Super. 611 , 159 A. 2d 26 (1960). The reasonableness of the amount fixed as liquidated damages is to be determined from the standpoint of the parties at the time the contract was made. Hammaker v. Schleigh, supra; Baltimore Bridge Co. v. United Rys. & Elec.

Co., 125 Md. 208 , 93 A. 420 (1915). Similarly, whether damages are difficult of ascertainment is to be determined from the status of the parties when the contract was entered into, not when it was broken. H. J. McGrath Co. v. Wisner, supra. The damage provision in the contract was available upon a failure to perform to both the Graftons and the Traylors.

When it is considered that the Graftons obligated themselves under the contract to the payment of a real estate commission of $2,700 to Eppley and in reliance upon its performance conducted a public auction of their livestock and farm equipment and moved to another dwelling they purchased, and it is further considered that Mrs. Traylor was a realty salesperson, and the Traylors had agreed to acquire the total acreage for Deshner and to move their residence from Harford County to Pennsylvania, it cannot be said that the agreement to pay an amount equal to ten percent of the sale price was grossly excessive and out of all proportion to the damages which might reasonably have been expected — on the part of the vendors as well as the vendees — resulting from a failure to perform. See Alois v. Waldman, supra; Kraft v. Michael, supra; Tudesco v. Wilson, supra; and Luria v. Robbins, supra — each sustaining as liquidated damages an amount equal to ten percent of the selling price. It is apparent that at the time of the execution of the contract damages to either of the parties which might arise from its breach were uncertain and incapable of exact ascertainment. Considering the nature of the agreement and all the facts and circumstances surrounding the parties at the time of the execution of the contract it seems clear that they mutually intended to ⁶⁶⁹ liquidate the agreed upon damages in advance.

Under both the lex foñ and the lex loci contractus the subject clause must be construed to provide for the payment of liquidated damages — and not a penalty. Since the land which was the subject matter of the contract was situate in Pennsylvania, since each and every act in connection with its negotiation and execution occurred in that state and since counsel for the Graftons gave notice of their intention to rely upon the law of Pennsylvania, 4 we conclude that both Judge Dyer and Judge Proctor correctly ruled that the law of Pennsylvania was applicable and correctly construed it as providing for the payment of liquidated damages. This construction of the contract clause eliminates the question of actual damages resulting from a failure or neglect to perform and the issue of actual damages — or a want of them — becomes immaterial since the parties became bound by their agreement. Roberts v. Roesch, supra; Sanders v. Brock, supra; Kelso v. Reid, 145 Pa. 606 , 23 A. 323 (1892); Kraft v. Michael, supra.

The decisions of this Court are in accord. John Cowan, Inc. v. Meyer, supra. See also Siler v. Marshall, supra; Macon v. Zeiler, supra; and Alois v. Waldman, supra. The same contention here raised by the appellants was asserted and rejected in Kraft v. Michael, supra, where the Pennsylvania court stated: “The averment that the property was later sold for more than the amount that appellants had agreed to pay for it would not be proper ground for opening the judgment, assuming it to be a fact.

The same point was squarely raised and met in Sanders v. Brock, 230 Pa. 609 , 79 A. 772 [1911] ” 166 Pa. Super, at 60-61, 70 A. 2d at 426 . In Cowan, supra, our predecessors, in holding that after a breach of a contract in which there is a provision for ⁶⁷⁰ liquidated damages, the actual damages, whether less or more than the stipulated amount, became immaterial, since the parties are bound by their stipulation, stated: “[T]he effect of the clause we are considering is to substitute the amount agreed upon as liquidated damages for the actual damages resulting from the breach, and, as said by Mr. Brantly in his excellent work on Contracts, ‘the party who failed to perform the contract will not be heard to say that the other party has not suffered any damages from the breach, or that his loss did not equal the sum named. The very object of the clause is to prevent such a controversy.’ Brantly on Contracts (2nd Ed.), section 163; Willson v. Baltimore City, 83 Md. 203 ; Baltimore Bridge Company v. United Railways, etc., Company, supra.” 125 Md. at 465, 94 A. at 22 .

The appellants reliance upon Wade v. Lake County Title Co., 6 Cal.App.3d 824 , 86 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1970); Haas v. Crisp Realty Co., 65 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1953); Paffile v. Sherman, 84 Idaho 63 , 368 P. 2d 434 (1962); and National Co-op Refinery Ass’n v. Northern Ordnance, Inc., 238 F. 2d 803 (10th Cir. 1956), in urging that evidence concerning actual damages should have been allowed, is misplaced. In each of the cases the amount designated as liquidated damages appeared to be a penalty. In Wade the forfeiture of $15,000 was held to be a penalty in light of a California statute fixing the standard for computing damages in land contracts and forfeitures of down payments; in Haas the case was remanded to determine whether the retention of an amount approximating thirty-eight percent of the purchase price of a new home was “shocking to the conscience.” Similarly, Paffile ordered a remand to determine whether an amount retained by the sellers as a forfeiture amounting to approximately eighteen percent of the purchase price was unconscionable in relation to the actual damages occasioned by the breach; in National Co-op Refinery Ass’n the court, applying Kansas law, held that the amount stipulated for forfeiture — in the case of even an immaterial breach — bore no reasonable relationship to the actual damages which ⁶⁷¹ might be suffered.

In none of the cases were there present the prerequisites necessary for an enforceable liquidated damages provision and thus the cases are clearly distinguishable from the rule followed under both our decisions and those of Pennsylvania. We conclude that the pretrial ruling by Judge Dyer, restricting the testimony so as to preclude any evidence that the property had been subsequently sold by the Graftons with no resultant damage, and the denial by Judge Proctor of the proffer made by the Traylors to show that the Graftons had sustained no actual damages, were correct as a