Tri-State Truck & Equipment Co. v. Stauffer

Menchine, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. On November 29, 1973 a jury in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, Franklin E. Stauffer, against Tri-State Truck and Equipment Co., Inc. [Tri-State], Johnnie Whichard, and Sam Parker, a/k/a Harrison Charles Parker, individually, and t/a Market Transport Company, * 1 in the sum of $48,500.00. Final judgment against Johnnie Whichard and Sam Parker, a/k/a Harrison Parker, individually and t/a Market Transport Company, was extended on December 5, 1973. No appeal from that judgment was taken.

Final judgment against Tri-State was extended on January 9, 1974. It is solely with the latter judgment that the subject appeal is concerned. ²²³ On the 5th of June, 1969 Franklin E. Stauffer, [Stauffer] while operating a motor vehicle, had stopped it at the intersection of U.S. 1 and Cherry Lane, in Laurel, Maryland, preliminary to making a left turn. His left turn signal was flashing. A truck operated by Johnnie Whichard, and owned by Tri-State, struck the Stauffer vehicle in the rear, causing personal injury and property damage.

The negligence of Whichard and the contributory negligence of Stauffer are not in issue. Stauffer had claimed damages from Tri-State upon alternate bases: (a) asserting it was liable under the principle of respondeat superior, and (b) asserting it was liable mder the theory of negligent entrustment. The trial court granted Tri-State’s motion for directed verdict as to the claim asserted under the principle of respondeat superior, but rejected its motion for directed verdict on the theory of negligent entrustment. Appellant makes three contentions on appeal: 1.

That its motion for directed verdict should have been granted because of the absence of any showing that its negligence was a proximate cause of harm to the appellee. 2. That reversible error was committed in the charge to the jury. 3. That reversible error was committed in the admission of evidence. The Motion for Directed Verdict The evidence established that Tri-State was engaged in a large scale 2 car and truck rental business in Baltimore City.

Previous truck rentals had been made by Tri-State to “Market Transportation,” 1399 5th Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. There was evidence that “Market Transportation” was the firm name of Harrison Charles (alias Sammy) Parker, who resided at 941 R Street, N. W., in the District of Columbia. ²²⁴ The evidence bearing upon the rental of the truck involved in the subject collision was conflicting. Robert W. Wentz, the Vice President of Tri-State, called as a witness by Stauffer, testified that he had handled the subject truck rental transaction on June 3, 1969 for the account of Market Transport, having dealt with Charles Parker personally. He said that leasing document Exhibit 14 reflected the transaction accurately; that Parker had presented a driver’s license bearing a sixteen digit number; that the physical description appearing on that license was compared with that of the renter; that he also had compared the signature on the license with that of “C. Parker” on the document. He acknowledged that a second leasing document for the account of Market Transport bearing an identical license number contained the signature “Harrison Parker.” Examination of the two documents demonstrates a marked difference in the two signatures.

Wentz acknowledged that he did not record the date and place of issue of the license. The leasing document that Wentz claimed reflected the transaction in question was on a different form than other documents showing rentals for the account of Market Transport. Wentz’s explanation was that it was a “new form.” Other leasing documents offered in evidence, however, dated both before and after the subject transaction, used the “old form.” There was evidence that Charles Harrison (Sammy) Parker was licensed to drive in Virginia but not in Maryland or the District of Columbia. The testimony of the defendant Parker told a different story.

He said that he never had loaned that license to another; that the Virginia license had his photograph upon it and that Whichard did not in any way resemble him. He said that one Hicks 3 and Whichard had gone to Baltimore to get a truck from Tri-State and that “I got a call from Tri-State. The man said it was a man there to pick the truck up, and he didn’t have any license. And he said, ‘I’m going to let this dude use one of these old papers.

I want to get the hell out of ²²⁵ here, and I’m going to send him back.’ ” The witness also said: “ * * * the mechanic issued this truck. They have a big heavyset colored fellow that they leave there on duty to take care of these kinds of things.” When shown Exhibit 14, that Tri-State contended reflected the rental transaction in question, Parker said, “This is not my signature. And there is still no time on this thing. This is something someone just wrote up.

This has no time on it. 4 Because it’s not a rental company in the world that will rent you a truck and let you take a truck out at 8:00 o’clock in the morning and bring it back at 2:00 o’clock the following day. This don’t happen.” Commenting on other leasing documents representing rentals for the account of Market Transport bearing both prior and subsequent dates, Parker said, “ * * * I’m saying from looking at the rest of them, where somebody signed for the truck each time, each one of them here has got somebody’s signature on it that I do know and can bring them here, except this here one, right here (Exhibit 14) I don’t know who this is.” Parker testified, “I understood that, you know, that he [Whichard] was not too good with a truck.” He said that Whichard was driving the truck when it arrived at the market in Washington, D. C. on the date of the rental. A State Trooper who investigated the collision at the scene, testified that Johnnie Whichard was not licensed either in the District of Columbia or in Maryland, and that he charged him with operation of the vehicle without a license. Whichard, who resided at 124 Kentucky Avenue, S. E., Washington, D. C., did not appear at the trial.

Tri-State offered no evidence at the close of the plaintiff’s case. The question whether there was a negligent entrustment by Tri-State to Whichard such as would give rise to a cause of action by Stauffer against Tri-State depends upon the facts and circumstances surrounding the truck rental and its subsequent use as influenced or affected, if at all, by the ²²⁶ provisions of Article 66V2, § 8-103 (formerly § 114) of the Annotated Code of Maryland. Section 8-103 (114) reads as follows: “Renting motor vehicles to another. (a) To be rented to licensed person only. — No person shall rent a motor vehicle or trailer to any person for operation unless the person who will operate the rented motor vehicle or trailer is duly licensed hereunder or, in the case of a nonresident, duly licensed under the laws of the state of his residence; provided that state requires an examination for qualification to operate a motor vehicle and in which state residents of Maryland are given the same privilege.

(b) Inspection of driver’s license. — No person shall rent a motor vehicle or trailer to any other person for operation until the person in possession of the motor vehicle or trailer to be rented has inspected the driver’s license of the person by whom the motor vehicle or trailer is to be operated and compared and verified the signature thereon with the signature of the person written in his presence and compared and verified the physical description thereon with the physical description of the person. (c) Record. — Every person renting a motor vehicle or trailer to another shall keep a record of the registration number of the motor vehicle or trailer rented or, if only a trailer is rented, the registration number of the trailer and the motor vehicle used to haul the trailer, the name and address of the person to whom the motor vehicle or trailer is rented, the number of the driver’s license of the person who is to operate the motor vehicle or haul the trailer and the date and place of issuance of the driver’s license. The record shall be open to inspection by any peace officer or employee of the Department.” In almost classic understatement the brief of appellant ²²⁷ declares: “Appellant admits that this evidence was sufficient, if believed, to allow the jury to conclude that appellant did not fulfill the requirements of Article 66V2, § 114 (now § 8-103), which required that vehicles be rented to drivers who present proof of a valid driver’s license.” In this appeal we are required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff-appellee. Buchanan v. Galliher and Harless, 11 Md. App. 83, 87 , 272 A. 2d 814, 816-817 .

This rule applies as well to the issue of causation. In Ness v. Males, 201 Md. 235 , 93 A. 2d 541 , it was said at 241 [544]: “Causation, like negligence, is a jury question where the material facts are controverted.” See also: Schweitzer v. Showell, 19 Md. App. 537, 539 , 313 A. 2d 97, 98-99 . So viewed, the evidence would permit the jury to find that appellant willfully and purposefully violated § 8-103 (114) and having done so, thereafter fabricated a leasing agreement in efforts to cover up that violation. If the testimony of Parker was believed by the jury, the inference is inescapable that Tri-State was totally unconcerned whether Whichard was a dangerously incompetent driver or not.

The jury could find that the telephone call made by the Tri-State employee afforded a clear opportunity for inquiry as to Whichard’s skill but that none was made. Tri-State contends that its violation of § 8-103 (114) was not a proximate cause of the harm sustained by Stauffer. The question whether a particular negligent act constitutes a proximate cause of harm is an issue that has long perplexed the Courts. In Prosser, Law of Torts, Ch. 7, § 41 (4th Ed. HB, 1971) it is said at 236: “An essential element of the plaintiff’s cause of action for negligence, or for that matter for any other tort, is that there be some reasonable connection between the act or omission of the defendant and the damage which the plaintiff has suffered.

This connection usually is dealt with by the courts in terms of what is called ‘proximate cause,’ or ‘legal cause.’ There is perhaps nothing in the entire field of law which has called forth more ²²⁸ disagreement, or upon which the opinions are in such a welter of confusion. Nor, despite the manifold attempts which have been made to clarify the subject, is there yet any general agreement as to the proper approach. Much of this confusion is due to the fact that no one problem is involved, but a number of different problems, which are not distinguished clearly, and that language appropriate to a discussion of one is carried over to cast a shadow upon the others. “ ‘Proximate cause’ — in itself an unfortunate term — is merely the limitation which the courts have placed upon the actor’s responsibility for the consequences of his conduct. P. 241 “On the issue of the fact of causation, as on other issues essential to his cause of action for negligence, the plaintiff, in general, has the burden of proof.

He must introduce evidence which affords a reasonable basis for the conclusion that it is more likely than not that the conduct of the defendant was a substantial factor in bringing about the result. A mere possibility of such causation is not enough; and when the matter remains one of pure speculation or conjecture, or the probabilities are at best evenly balanced, it becomes the duty of the court to direct a verdict for the defendant. P. 242 “The plaintiff is not, however, required to prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt. He need not negative entirely the possibility that the defendant’s conduct was not a cause, and it is enough that he introduces evidence from which reasonable men may conclude that it is more probable that the event was caused by the defendant than that it was not.

The fact of ²²⁹ causation is incapable of mathematical proof, since no man can say with absolute certainty what would have occurred if the defendant had acted otherwise. Proof of what we call the relation of cause and effect, that of necessary antecedent and inevitable consequence, can be nothing more than ‘the projection of our habit of expecting certain consequents to follow certain antecedents merely because we had observed these sequences on previous occasions.’ If as a matter of ordinary experience a particular act or omission might be expected, under the circumstances, to produce a particular result, and that result in fact has followed, the conclusion may be permissible that the causal relation exists.” It is, of course, well settled in Maryland that the violation of a statute regulating the use and operation of motor vehicles is evidence of negligence and if such violation causes or contributes to the injuries complained of, it constitutes actionable negligence. Ford v. Bradford, 213 Md. 534, 541 , 132 A. 2d 488, 491-92 . In Volkswagen of America v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 218 , 321 A. 2d 737, 746 , it was said: “Legislative or administrative requirements that persons or businesses conduct their operations in a particular manner, and adhere to specified standards, have never been viewed as supplanting tort liability.

On the contrary, such statutory or regulatory requirements are deemed to furnish standards by which courts or juries determine, along with other circumstances, whether or not conduct is negligent. Failure to adhere to those standards is evidence of negligence for the court or jury to consider.” It is widely held that the mere violation of a licensing statute will not be regarded as the proximate cause of a collision. Maryland subscribes to that view. Davis v. Gordon, ²³⁰ 183 Md. 129 , 36 A. 2d 699 .

There is no such general agreement, however, respecting statutes expressly forbidding owners to allow unlicensed persons to operate their vehicles. This distinction is noted in 6 Blashfield, Automobile Law and Practice, 2d Ed. 1966, § 254.26, at 383, et seq “The fact that an owner permits an unlicensed person to drive his automobile ordinarily will not of itself subject the owner to liability on the theory that he has permitted the use of the car by an unskillful operator. However, under a statute requiring licenses for the protection of the public by confining the right to drive to qualified persons and forbidding owners to allow unlicensed persons to operate their automobiles, a violation is evidence bearing on the owner’s negligence, or is negligence per se. “So, where an examination is required to test the competency of the applicant before the issuance of a license and it is provided by statute that no person shall knowingly permit his automobile to be driven by an unlicensed person, a violation of the statute makes a prima facie case against the owner in favor of one injured through the negligence of the unlicensed driver. Moreover, it has been held that one who intrusts his automobile to a person under the statutory age required for a license is liable for injury resulting from the latter’s negligence without proof of the driver’s actual incompetence. “Under a statute making it unlawful to rent a motor vehicle without first ascertaining that the driver had an operator’s license, an owner renting an automobile to a person who had no license, without making inquiry as to the ability or competence of such person, may be held liable to a person injured by the driver.” ²³¹ Harper & James, The Law of Torts, Vol. 2, subscribes to the same view with respect to the effect of statutes similar to § 8-103 (114), saying at 1120-21: “Where the car is entrusted to an unlicensed driver, or where defendant himself drives it without a license, a similar question is presented (if the licensing statute is thought to have safety in mind and not exclusively revenue, or some other unrelated purpose), namely, did the harm result from the want of a license, or (more accurately) because of the risk of unskilled driving which the licensing statute sought to prevent?

If the car was driven with all the skill and care the law requires, then the harm did not proceed from such a risk; if the car was negligently driven, then it did. * * * The legislature has decided that the general safety requires the activity in question to he limited to those who can demonstrate at least a minimum of special skill. It is fair to assume that the unlicensed as a class are far less likely than those licensed to have the skill for which a license is required. And it is certainly true that when the unskilled attempt what it takes skill to do, some of the intangible factors that go to make up lack of skill are far more likely than not to have contributed to any mishap that occurs. Frequently they do this in ways that are hard to prove; moreover, what evidence there is in the matter is likely to be in the defendant’s hands.

Both probability and policy, therefore, call for the rule that breach of a licensing statute, if it is negligence to the plaintiff at all, should be prima facie evidence that it is the ‘proximate causé’ of any injury that ensues.” (Italics supplied.) The question whether the violation of a statute prohibiting knowing permission to an unlicensed driver to use a motor vehicle will support an action for damages against the owner of such vehicle has been presented in two Maryland cases. The question was left unanswered in both. ²³² In State use of Weaver v. O’Brien, 140 F. Supp. 306 , (U.S. D.C., D. Md., 1956) Chief Judge Rozel C. Thomsen referred to Article 66V2, § 111, providing that, “No person shall authorize or knowingly permit a motor vehicle owned by him or under his control to be driven upon any highway of this State by any person who is not authorized to operate such motor vehicle under this Article.” and stated at 309-10: “Under Maryland law the mere violation of a statute does not support an action for damages, but it is evidence of negligence, and where such violation is the proximate cause of an injury, a right of action accrues to the party injured. Hopper, McGaw & Co. v. Kelly, 145 Md. 161, 169 , 125 A. 779 ; Kelly v. Huber Baking Co., 145 Md. 321, 334 , 125 A. 782 ; Cumberland & Westernport Transit Co. v. Metz, 158 Md. 424, 438 , 149 A. 4 , 149 A. 565 ; Brown v. Bendix Radio Division, 187 Md. 613 , 51 A.2d 292 ; Gosnell v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 189 Md. 677 , 687, 57 A.2d 322 ; State, for Use of Parr v. Board of County Commissioners, 207 Md. 91 , 113 A.2d 397, 402 . See also Gordon v. Bedard, 1929, 265 Mass. 408 , 164 N.E. 374 and Kenyon v. Hathaway, 1931, 274 Mass. 47 , 174 N.E. 463 , 73 A.L.R. 156 . “It is not necessary in this case to determine whether the mere fact that Chaney permitted O’Brien to drive without a chauffeur’s license is sufficient to take the case to the jury against Chaney on the issue, since that fact must be considered in connection with the evidence of O’Brien’s drinking.” 5 ²³³ In U-Haul Co. v. Rutherford, 10 Md. App. 373 , 270 A. 2d 490 , the violation of this very statute — § 8-103 (114) itself was urged as the basis for recovery.

In U-Haul, however, we said at 381 [494]: “We have no need to decide whether an entruster would know or have cause to know that the entrustee would be likely to use a motor vehicle in a manner involving an unreasonable risk of physical harm merely because the rental of it was in violation of § 114 as we find here that the evidence was insufficient in law to prove that the statute was violated.” We added at 385 [496-97]: “ * * * it was not established that U-Haul violated § 114 as declared and it was error requiring reversal to deny the motion for a directed verdict made on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to show the violation.” In the subject case we must decide the issue. Although the comments in Blashfield and Harper & James, supra, would seem to make the issue quite simple, there are decisional differences upon the question of the proximate cause of such a prohibitory rental statute. We shall cite but two cases representative of the respective rationale. The case of Christy v. Baker, 439 P. 2d 517 (Ct. of Appeals of Ariz. 1968) adopts the view that violation of such a statute is not the proximate cause of harm.

In Arizona the statute provided: ²³⁴ “No person shall rent a motor vehicle to another until he has inspected the operator’s or chauffeur’s license of the person to whom the vehicle is to be rented and compared and verified the signature thereon with the signature of the person written in his presence.” (A.R.S. § 28-477) Violation of the statute by the entrustor was conceded, as was the negligence of the entrustee. The Court in Christy said at 518-19: “Our Supreme Court has held that in order to recover, the plaintiff must show that violation of a statute or ordinance was the proximate cause of his injury. In Pratt v. Daly, 55 Ariz. 535 , 104 P.2d 147 , 130 A.L.R. 341 (1940), the court said: ‘ * * * Whenever a valid statute or regulation provides that a certain thing must or must not be done, if a failure to comply with such regulation is a proximate cause of injury to another, such failure is actionable negligence per se. * * * ’ (Additional emphasis ours) 55 Ariz. at 537 , 104 P.2d at 148 . This rule is still the law and has been adhered to recently by both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court.

(Beaty v. Jenkins, 3 Ariz. App. 375 , 414 P.2d 763 (1966) and Brand v. J. H. Rose Trucking Company, supra). The rule has recently been summarized by the