Trieber v. Knabe

Le Grand, C. J., delivered the opinion of this court. This is an action of replevin, and comes before us on the ruling of the court below on an agreed statement of facts. The suit involves the title to a piano. The facts agreed upon, which are material to be stated for the decision of this case, may be thus enumerated: The piano in controversy belonged to the plaintiffs, and was by them hired to one Stinebecker, a music teacher, in Cumberland, in the summer or fall of the year 1854; Stinebecker boarded and lodged with one Helfelfinger, the keeper of the “Revere House,” and the tenant of the defendant.

The “Revere House” was a public hotel. After the piano had been for some time in the room occupied by Stinebecker, in consequence of his removal to a smaller ⁴⁹⁴ room in the hotel, the piano was removed to the private family room of Helfelfinger, and there remained until, in the month of February 1856, it was taken by virtue of a distress for rent due from the tenant, Helfelfinger, to his landlord, the defendant. It is admitted the distress was in due form, and also “that all the property on the premises at the time of the distress, and liable to be distrained, was not sufficient to pay the whole rent” due. The piano was sold under the distress warrant, and the defendant became the purchaser of it.

The question which arises on this state of facts is, was the piano, so circumstanced, under the law, exempt from liability to distress for rent? We are of the opinion it was not. We have carefulIy examined the cases referred to by counsel in argument, and duly weighed the reasons addressed to our judgments, but in neither do we discover any justification for us, as a court in Maryland, to decide in favor of the exemption of the piano from liability. As a general principle, all movables found on the demised premises are subject to distress.

To this there are, however, some exceptions, and the question in the present case is, does this piano, under the circumstances, fall within any of these exceptions? In the case of Simpson vs. Hartopp, Willes, 512, Lord Chief Justice Willes, in an opinion of clearness and precision, lays down the whole law as applicable to what is, and what is not, liable to distress. After stating the general principle, he proceeds as follows to state the exceptions to it: “1st. Things annexed to the freehold. “2nd.

Things delivered to a person exercising a public trade, to be carried, wrought, worked up, or managed in the way of his trade or employ. “3rd. Cocks or sheaves of corn. “4th. Beasts of the plough, and instruments of husbandry. “5th. The instruments of a man's trade or profession. “The first three sorts were absolutely free from distress, and could not be distrained, even though there were no other goods besides.

The last two are only exempt sub modo; that is, upon a supposition that there is sufficient distress besides." ⁴⁹⁵ Prom the rendition of the judgment in Simpson vs. Hartopp, to the present time, the correctness of the opinion of the court therein has never been questioned, so far as we know, either in England or this country. The most that has been contended for is, that, within the reason and principles of that decision, the courts are authorized, with a view to the public good and convenience, to embrace within the exceptions to the general rule a large class of cases in which there would be great hardship and serious interruption to the safe dealings of the community, if they were not so included. We are free to confess this view has been enforced with a good deal of sound reasoning and good sense. It rests mainly on the quasi feudal origin of the right of distress, the change in the business and intercourse of the world since distress became a part of the law’ of landlord and tenant, and the facilities which an enlightened policy should afford to the meritorious pursuits of life.

This aspect of the question the curious will find very forcibly put by Baron Parke, in Muspratt vs. Gregory, 1 Mees. & Wels., 650; by Justice Bay, in Youngblood vs. Lowry, 2 McCord, 39 ; and by Chief Justice Gibson, iu the case of Riddle vs. Welden, 5 Whart., 1 . We refer