Triplin v. Jackson

PER CURIAM. At issue in this case is the propriety of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City’s denial of a motion to strike or revise a judgment it entered against Anthony Triplin and Alice Triplin, Husband and Wife, the petitioners. We granted certiorari and now reverse. The petitioners were sued in the District Court of Maryland sitting in Baltimore City by Willie Jackson, the respondent.

The complaint alleged that the petitioners were responsible for water damage to the respondent’s premises, for which the respondent sought $1600.00 in damages. See Maryland Code (1974, 1989 Repl.Vol.) § 4-405 of the Courts & Judicial Proc. Article. 1 When the trial resulted in a judgment being entered for the petitioners, the respondent noted an appeal, which was to be heard de novo in the circuit court. § 12 — 401(d) (1991 Cumm.Supp.). 2 The petitioners were not present when the case was called in the circuit court and the record did not reflect that they had been notified. 3 Nevertheless, the court proceeded to try the ⁴⁶⁴ case. It found in favor of the respondent, entering a judgment for $1600.00.

The petitioners moved, within 30 days of its entry, to strike and/or revise the judgment. See Maryland Rule 2-535(a). 4 The petitioners alleged, supported by their affidavits, that they “never received a notice of trial date from the clerk of the circuit court.” They also asserted that they only became aware of the judgment against them when they received notice of outstanding court costs, that granting their motion would not prejudice the respondent, and that they had a meritorious defense. A hearing was held, but no evidence was taken. The court denied the motion.

The petitioners’ motion was filed within 30 days of the entry of the judgment against them. It was supported by affidavits in which they swore that they had not received notices of the trial date. As indicated, the record did not reflect, by docket entry, copy of notice, or testimony that notice had been sent by the circuit court or that the petitioners were aware of the trial date. Only the unsworn statements of the respondent suggested that the petitioners may have been avoiding service and, therefore, that their denial of receipt of notice was a subterfuge.

Under