Trotta v. County Car Center, Inc.

Smith, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Because we believe the nearsightedness or myopia of the injured workman in this case did not combine with the disability for which claim was made to create a greater disability on the part of the workman so as to require apportionment under Code (1957, 1964 Repl. Vol., 1978 Cum. Supp.) Art. 101, § 36 (7), we shall reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals in an unreported opinion which relied upon Blanding v. J. H. Andrews & Sons, 36 Md. App. 14 , 373 A.2d 19 (1977).

Kevin M. Trotta was injured on November 1,1978, during the course of his employment. An electrical fuse struck his left eye, resulting in a detached retina. His vision was reduced to 20/400, uncorrected. The parties stipulated that under our statute this normally would entitle him to compensation for 100% loss of vision to that eye.

It is further stipulated that had his eyesight been perfect prior to the accident, the injury he sustained would have caused 100% loss of use of that eye. The problem here arises under § 36 (7) which states in pertinent part: "Whenever it shall appear that any permanent disability from which an employee is suffering following an accidental injury, is due in part to such injury, and in part to a preexisting disease or ⁶⁶² infirmity, the Commission shall determine the proportion of such disability which is reasonably attributable to the injury and the proportion thereof which is reasonably attributable to the preexisting disease or infirmity, and such employee shall be entitled to compensation for that proportion of his disability which is reasonably attributable solely to the accident and shall not be entitled to compensation for that proportion of his disability which is reasonably attributable to the preexisting disease or infirmity.” The Workmen’s Compensation Commission awarded Trotta 100% disability. The employer appealed to the Superior Court of Baltimore City. The employer there contended that since Trotta’s myopia resulted in a 15% loss of vision, the most to which he could be entitled by way of an award was 85%.

The trial judge regarded himself bound by Blanding and reversed. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed upon the strength of Blanding . We granted the writ of certiorari in order that we might address the matter. We are by no means certain that the Court of Special Appeals has correctly applied the decision in Blanding, but if it did, Blanding obviously would in no way be binding upon us.

There are certain principles to be borne in mind as we address the issue here. First of all, although statutes in derogation of the common law generally are to be strictly construed, Art. 101, § 63 specifically provides that this rule shall not be applicable to cases arising under Art. 101. Secondly, as provided in § 56 (c), "In all court proceedings under or pursuant to [Art. 101], the decision of the Commission shall be prima facie correct and the burden of proof shall be upon the party attacking the same.” Thus, as Judge Digges stated for the Court in Frank v. Baltimore County, 284 Md. 655, 658 , 399 A.2d 250 (1979), a court should reverse a Commission ruling "only upon a finding that its action was based upon an erroneous construction of the law or facts ....” Finally, as Judge Davidson pointed out for the Court in Queen v. Agger, 287 Md. 342, 343 , 412 A.2d 733 (1980), the ⁶⁶³ Act "is designed to provide workers with compensation for loss of earning capacity resulting from accidental injury, disease or death arising out of and in the course of employment ...Accordingly, as the Court said in Howard Co. Ass’n, Retard. Cit. v. Walls, 288 Md. 526, 530 , 418 A.2d 1210 (1980), "LT]he Workmen’s Compensation Act should be construed as liberally in favor of injured employees as its provisions will permit in order to effectuate its benevolent purposes.

Any uncertainty in the law should be resolved in favor of the claimant.” The section of the Workmen’s Compensation Act with which we are here concerned was not a part of the original act as enacted in 1914. This provision came in by Ch. 363 of the Acts of 1931. In Cabell Con. Blk.

Co. v. Yarborough, 192 Md. 360 , 64 A.2d 292 (1949), Judge Belaplaine said for the Court: "In March 1931, the Commission appointed by Governor Ritchie to make recommendations for