Troxel v. Iguana Cantina, LLC

⁴⁸³ KEHOE, J. This case arises out of a claim filed by appellant, James E. Troxel, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City in which he sought damages for injuries he allegedly received on the dance floor of a nightclub called Iguana Cantina located near the Inner Harbor in Baltimore City. Troxel sued the following defendants: (1) Iguana Cantina, LLC, the entity that operated the club, (2) Timothy S. Bennett, the club’s manager, (3) Lockwood Associates, LLC, the club’s landlord, (4) Parkway Corporation, the managing entity for Lockwood Associates, and (5) the senior principals of Parkway Corporation: Joseph S. Zuritsky (Chairman and Chief Executive Officer), Robert A. Zuritsky (President and Chief Operating Officer) and Richard Elsworth (General Manager). The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Troxel filed this appeal, presenting the following questions, which we have reordered and reworded below: 1.

Did the trial court err in granting appellees’ summary judgment motion on the ground that Troxel’s cause of action sought damages against the appellees on a theory of “dram shop” liability? 2. Did the trial court err in granting appellees’ summary judgment motion on the ground that Troxel failed to present any evidence to sustain a negligence claim? We conclude that the trial court erred in granting appellees’ motion for summary judgment. Appellant’s cause of action exists independently of a claim for dram shop liability and the evidence of negligence is sufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment.

We reverse and remand to the circuit court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Factual and Procedural Background A. The Complaint Troxel alleges that appellees maintained “extremely dangerous conditions at Defendant Iguana’s premises which put patrons of Defendant Iguana at risk of physical harm.” Trox-el further asserts that “Plaintiff would not have suffered the ⁴⁸⁴ beating he experienced on September 25-26, 2008” if it were not for “Defendant Iguana’s failure to provide security for protection of its customers and its failure to use reasonable efforts to control its patrons.... ” Troxel concludes that “Defendants breached the duty of care that they owed to patrons of Defendant Iguana, and that breach of duty by the Defendant is a substantial and proximate cause of the injuries and damages that Plaintiff suffered at the Iguana Cantina in the early morning of September 26, 2008.” B. The Incident at Iguana Cantina on the Morning of September 26, 2008 The physical altercation that gave rise to this lawsuit occurred on the morning of September 26, 2008 at Iguana Cantina. At the time, the club was owned and operated by Iguana Cantina, LLC and under a lease with Lockwood Associates, LLC. Timothy S. Bennett was the general manager of the nightclub.

Every Thursday night, including the night of this altercation, Iguana Cantina hosted a “college night” promotion that permitted adults between the ages of 18 and 21 to attend the nightclub. Troxel, 20 years old at the time, attended that evening, arriving at approximately 10:00 pm on September 25, 2008. At approximately 12:30 am on the following morning, he was involved in an altercation with several unidentified males on the dance floor. Troxel has no recollection of the incident, but he alleges, based on deposition testimony from other patrons at the bar, that three or more young males punched and beat him to the floor and continued kicking him into unconsciousness.

When Iguana Cantina security personnel saw Troxel’s body on the floor, they carried him out of the club. Appellees present a different version of the altercation. Appellees assert that the physical altercation started because “Troxel, intoxicated and apparently unprovoked, pushed a woman named Marie Zoscak to the ground in the area of the dance floor.” Appellees contend that Troxel was only punched once or twice and kicked several times while on the ground. ⁴⁸⁵ The altercation, according to appellees, lasted no more than a minute. In either scenario, it is undisputed that Baltimore City police stationed outside Iguana Cantina soon came to Troxel’s aid and called for an emergency medical team.

Troxel was initially treated at Harbor Hospital but was soon transferred to the University of Maryland Shock Trauma Center. Troxel alleges that, as a result of the beating, he suffers from permanent physical and neurological injuries. C. Iguana Cantina’s “College Night” Promotion and its Relation to Violence In order to establish a potential duty on behalf of Iguana Cantina to protect him against violence, Troxel scrutinizes the “college nights” that were hosted by Iguana Cantina. On these “college nights,” which were first held at least as early as May 2005, patrons were charged a flat fee of $12 to enter the club.

Anyone 21 years of age or older was given a red cup and a wrist band, and anyone under 21 years of age was given a clear cup. The flat fee gave those patrons with red cups and wrist bands access to alcoholic beverages and unlimited refills from the bar. Patrons with clear cups were entitled to unlimited nonalcoholic drinks. Before the night of September 25, 2008, Iguana Cantina had a history of violent incidents occurring within its premises.

According to records from the Baltimore Police Department, in 2006, there were reports of eight aggravated assaults, one robbery and one potential rape, all of which occurred within the premises of Iguana Cantina. In 2007, Iguana Cantina saw a sharp decline in reports of violent incidents within its premises (only two incidents were reported). This decrease in reported violence corresponded with a promise made by David Adams—a representative of Iguana Cantina who described his duties as training the security staff and coordinating with the police department on security measures—to the Board of Liquor License Commissioners for Baltimore City (the “Baltimore City Liquor Board”) that it would no longer hold “college night” promotions as of August 17, 2006 (described ⁴⁸⁶ infra). Iguana Cantina did indeed suspend its “college night” promotions for a period of time following August 17, 2006.

This hiatus was brief, however, and Iguana Cantina resumed the “college night” promotions by the end of 2007. Around the same time, instances of reported violence at Iguana Canti-na increased. During the twelve months preceding the beating of Troxel in September 2008, police reports documented four aggravated assaults, one robbery, one assault on a police officer, and one incident where a police officer was required to use his taser to subdue a suspect. Again, all of these incidents occurred within the premises of Iguana Cantina.

In addition to police reports, Troxel introduced evidence of violence at Iguana Cantina through affidavits and deposition testimony. Zachary Belcher, a former Iguana Cantina security guard who worked at the nightclub from March 2005 through June 2008, said in his affidavit that in his experience as a security guard at Iguana Cantina: More incidents of violence occurred ... on college nights because of the large crowds and the larger [numbers] of underage patrons who were present and who were obtaining alcoholic beverages while in Iguana. The result was more intoxicated young people who started fights and got ejected, and it was common knowledge among the security guards and Iguana’s management that there was more violence in Iguana on college nights. My own experience was that on college nights there was never less than one fight per night, and I experienced up to five fights per night on college nights.

According to Belcher, Timothy Bennet, the club’s manager, arranged for the marketing of Iguana Cantina’s 18-and-older “college night” promotions on local Baltimore-area college and university campuses. Belcher stated that, during those college-night promotions: [A] lot of underage patrons were ... able to obtain alcoholic beverages inside Iguana. Underage patrons got wrist bands from 21-year old and older patrons as they left the club. They would also steal wrist bands by slipping them ⁴⁸⁷ off the arms of older patrons in the darkness and confusion of the crowds.

Some underage patrons simply drank alcohol out of older friend’s cups or poured alcoholic beverages from the older patron’s red cup into their clear cups. It was common knowledge among my fellow employees and Iguana Cantina’s management that underage drinking was occurring on college nights. Similarly, Iguana Cantina security guard Charles E. Shannon, Jr. testified at his deposition that there were probably more fights that occurred on a “college night” than any other weekend night because of the younger people drinking. Another bar employee, Joshua W. Jones, testified at his deposition that he would normally see one fight per night at Iguana Cantina.

D. Iguana Cantina’s History with the Baltimore City Liquor Board From time to time Iguana Cantina was cited for violations of Maryland’s state liquor law. Troxel alleges that these violations are significant because they underscore the relationship between violence at Iguana Cantina and the occurrence of the club’s “college nights.” For example, on August 25, 2005, the Baltimore City Liquor Board heard charges brought against Iguana Cantina’s liquor licensees accusing Iguana Cantina of allowing customers under 21 years of age to consume or possess alcoholic beverages on Iguana Cantina’s premises at its “college night” promotions. The Board found Iguana Cantina guilty and fined it $2500 for two violations of a provision of Maryland’s Alcoholic Beverages Article, namely Md.Code Ann. Art. 2B § 12-108(d) (1957, 2005 Repl.Vol.). The Board’s decision was eventually appealed to this Court.

We affirmed the Board’s determination that Iguana Cantina permitted underage consumption of alcohol by failing to prevent it. Adams v. Bd. of Liquor License Comm’rs, Slip Op., No. 67, September Term, 2006 (filed January 16, 2007). On July 13, 2006, the Baltimore City Liquor Board again heard charges brought against the licensees of Iguana Cantina for once again violating section 12-108(d) by permitting per ⁴⁸⁸ sons under 21 years of age to consume alcoholic beverages at its “college night.” At the hearing, David Adams, a representative of Iguana Cantina involved in implementing Iguana Cantina’s security measures, testified on behalf of the nightclub. Adams spoke about the security difficulties involved in mixing an 18 to 20 year old crowd with a 21 and older crowd.

Adams stated that security personnel had to be very diligent in preventing persons under 21 years old from beating the system. Adams admitted that he had grown tired of people trying to “beat my system” and that Iguana Cantina would be abandoning the “college night” promotions. Adams said “we will be 21 and over. I can’t take any more ...

Iguana Cantina will be 21 and over, with their ID procedures videotaped, and, hopefully, I’ll never have to come back before the liquor board.” The Board found Iguana Cantina guilty of violating § 12—108(d) but it only imposed a fine of $1,000, with its Chairman, Mark S. Fosler, telling Iguana Cantina that: “We mitigated that fine based on the fact that the licensee has agreed to stop doing under-21 promotions and having under-21 consumers and patrons as of August 17th. And we’re glad that that’s going to happen.” Despite the representation from Adams, Iguana Cantina resumed its “college night” promotion by the end of 2007. E. The Summary Judgment Proceeding On March 2, 2010, Iguana Cantina and Timothy Bennett filed a motion for summary judgment. The motion asserted that Troxel’s theory of the case “is tantamount to imposing dram shop liability on the operators of nightclubs in Maryland” and that “[s]uch liability simply does not exist in the state of Maryland.” As asserted by Iguana Cantina and Bennett, Troxel’s argument must also fail because there was “no evidence empirical or otherwise presented that hosting college night promotions substantially increase[d] the risk of injuries to other patrons.” Ultimately, the motion argued that “[t]he proximate cause of Plaintiffs injuries was not the fact that Defendant Iguana Cantina held a college night event on the evening of the occurrence and permitted entrance to the ⁴⁸⁹ nightclub by adults between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one, but the fact that several young men whose identities and ages are not known and whose consumption of alcohol is unknown assaulted the Plaintiff shortly after he shoved a young woman to the ground.” As a result, as posited by Iguana Cantina and Bennett, “[t]hese Defendants have no responsibility for the conduct of the assailants” and “judgment as a matter of law must be entered in favor of Defendants ----” The circuit court conducted a hearing on the motion for summary judgment on May 10, 2010. 1 On June 16, 2010, the trial court issued a memorandum opinion and order granting appellees’ motion for summary judgment.

The court concluded that Troxel’s claim was “clearly an attempt to assert ‘Dram Shop’ liability and no such duty of ‘Dram Shop’ liability exists under Maryland law.” In addition, the circuit court concluded that there was simply no evidence to support a legal duty, a breach of that duty, or causation. The circuit court stated: Though the Plaintiff disagrees, the Defendants Iguana and Bennett could not have known in advance that their hosting of college night would result in a physical altercation involving the Plaintiff or any other patron. There is no evidence that the Defendants could have controlled this dangerous condition or situation. Certainly, the fight which occurred was simply not the type of event or occurrence that could have been reasonably foreseeable.

There is no evidence that the unknown persons who assaulted the Plaintiff had been drinking or the assailants were under 21 years old. This also stands as a bald assertion by the Plaintiff. Even in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, there is nothing to support the contention that the Defendants owed the Plaintiff a duty. ⁴⁹⁰ Since there is no evidence that Defendants Iguana or Bennett breached any duty owed to Plaintiff James Troxel and there is no evidence that any such breach proximately caused Plaintiff Troxel’s injuries, there can be no legal claim to sustain. Troxel filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court.

Standard of Review “We review a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary judgment de novo.” Harford County v. Saks Fifth Ave. Distrib. Co., 399 Md. 73, 82 , 923 A.2d 1 (2007). We determine whether the trial court conformed to Rule 2-501(e), which provides that “the court shall enter judgment in favor of or against the moving party if the motion and response show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party in whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Therefore, in reviewing the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment, we determine whether a dispute of material fact indeed exists, and whether the trial court was legally correct.

Lombardi v. Montgomery County, 108 Md.App. 695 , 673 A.2d 762 (1996). “Furthermore, when reviewing a trial court’s order for summary judgment, we construe the facts properly before the court as well as reasonable inferences that may be drawn from them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Hem-mings v. Pelham Wood Ltd. Liab. Ltd. P’ship, 375 Md. 522, 534-35 , 826 A.2d 443 (2003). In addition, where the trial court relies on alternative independent grounds in reaching its decision, we must “determine that all of the grounds upon which the court relied were improper.” Monumental Life Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar.

Co., 94 Md.App. 505, 523 , 617 A.2d 1163 (1993). Discussion The primary issue in this case is whether appellees, as owners, proprietors and managers of Iguana Cantina, can be held liable for the injuries inflicted by unknown third parties against Troxel, a business-invitee of the nightclub. Troxel ⁴⁹¹ argues that, if viewed in the correct light, this case is a premises liability claim and not a dram shop claim, and the determination of whether Iguana Cantina was negligent in this context should be submitted to the jury. Appellees’ principal arguments are that Troxel’s claim should be rejected because his “argument is tantamount to asserting that ... dram shop liability should be imposed ... in the state of Maryland” and that, even if Troxel could assert a valid cause of action, “his claims would fail because Appellant has not produced any evidence that this duty not to hold ‘college nights’ was a proximate cause of his injuries.” We agree with Troxel.

We discuss in three parts. In Part I of our analysis we discuss the differences between dram shop liability and premises liability, and explain why this case should be analyzed in the latter context. In Part II, we break down the elements of a premises liability claim (duty, breach, proximate cause, injury) and determine whether Trox-el has presented facts sufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment. Finally, in Part III, we address a peripheral argument of appellees, that this Court should not consider certain documents tending to show that Iguana Can-tina had knowledge of prior violent incidents occurring within its premises.

I. Dram Shop Liability v. Premises Liability There are two distinct causes of action that a plaintiff can bring to impose liability on a business for injuries sustained on or off the establishment’s premises: a dram shop liability claim and a premises liability claim. Dram shop liability provides relief to plaintiffs who are injured as a result of the establishment’s sale of alcohol. This type of liability is not recognized as a valid cause of action in Maryland. Felder v. Butler, 292 Md. 174, 183-84 , 438 A.2d 494 (1981); Veytsman v. New York Palace, Inc., 170 Md.App. 104, 123 , 906 A.2d 1028 (2006).

Premises liability provides relief to plaintiffs who are subjected to dangerous conditions on an establishment’s premises. This type of liability is recognized in Maryland and it exists whether alcohol is involved or not. The distinction ⁴⁹² between these two causes of action is critical in this case. We discuss each more fully. 2 A dram shop act is “[a] statute allowing a plaintiff to recover damages from a commercial seller of alcoholic beverages for the plaintiff’s injuries caused by a customer’s intoxication.” Black’s Law Dictionary 531 (8th ed.2007).

More specifically: Dram shop acts are a departure from the common law rule that the act of drinking, and not the service of liquor, was the cause of any resulting injury. Under a dram shop act, a person injured by an adult who was served while intoxicated, or by a minor who was served alcohol, whether intoxicated or not, has a cause of action against the tavern that served the alcohol. H: Hs He H* K< The stated purpose behind many dram shop acts is to provide innocent parties with a cause of action against those persons who are in the best position to prevent the tortfea-sor’s intoxication, namely, the providers of the alcohol. By placing the burden of economic loss on the vendors of alcohol, the dram shop act provides an extremely effective incentive for those vendors to do everything in their power to avoid making illegal sales, and at the same time it ⁴⁹³ provides a remedy to members of the public who are injured as a result of illegal liquor sales.

James F. Mosher, 1 Liquor Law Liability § 2.01 at 2-2 and 2-3 (2010). Dram shop liability, then, holds tavern keepers liable for personal injuries based on the tavern keeper’s illegal sale of intoxicating liquor. Potential liability attaches once the illegal transaction is made and the alcohol changes hands. Generally, a statutory dram shop cause of action requires: (1) a server of intoxicating beverages; (2) a recipient of alcohol who is either an intoxicated person or a minor; and (3) an injury which is proximately caused by the intoxication.

Id. The second type of claim that a plaintiff can bring against a business owner is a premises liability claim. This cause of action is based on common law principles of negligence and derives from an establishment’s lack of supervision, care, or control of the premises. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 344 (1965). “The rule today is usually generalized to include all landowners who open their land to the public for business and to require them to use reasonable care even to protect against criminal acts of third persons.” Dan B. Dobbs, 2 The Law of Torts § 324 at 876 (2001).

Under this type of theory, a tavern owner will have a duty to protect his patrons, and thus be liable for negligence, if: “ ‘(1) the [ownerl controlled [a] dangerous or defective condition; (2) the [owner] had knowledge or should have had knowledge of the injury causing condition; and (3) the harm suffered was a foreseeable result of that condition.’ ” Veytsman, 170 Md.App. at 116 , 906 A.2d 1028 (quoting Hemmings, 375 Md. at 537 , 826 A.2d 443 ). The distinction between a dram shop claim and a premises liability claim was considered by the Supreme Court of Delaware in DiOssi v. Maroney, 548 A.2d 1361 (1988). The plaintiff, an employee of a parking valet service, was struck by an automobile operated by an intoxicated guest at a debutante party hosted at the defendants’ home. “[T]he plaintiff, in resisting summary judgment, argued that his claim against the [defendants] was not based merely on the illegal provision of alcoholic beverages to minors but on the [defendants’] ⁴⁹⁴ failure to protect him from a dangerous condition on their property.” Id. at 1363 . The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment, concluding that “there is no cause of action against a person who serves alcoholic beverages to another who thereafter commits a tort.” Id.

The Supreme Court of Delaware reversed. While the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that “intoxication appears to be a contributing cause to the personal injuries which are alleged,” and that “a private right of action premised upon ‘Dram Shop’ principles should not be judicially created” in Delaware, the Supreme Court stated that this does not “foreclose[] the liability of everyone who serves alcohol to an intoxicated person.” Id. at 1364 . “Under settled Delaware law, the [defendants] owed the plaintiff a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect him from foreseeable dangers that he might encounter while on the premises.” The Supreme Court reasoned as follows: The facts of this case permit [a theory of liability] which arises from the common law duty of a property owner to a business invitee. In our view, the focus of liability in this case is on the exposure of a business invitee to a dangerous activity which the property owner permitted to exist on his land. The fact that the activity arose out of the furnishing of intoxicating liquor does not preclude the fixing of liability, notwithstanding the limitation of such claims against commercial dispensers.

Id. at 1365 . In his amended complaint, Troxel asserts a premises liability claim. The complaint alleges (1) that appellees “retained control” of “the extremely dangerous conditions at Defendant Iguana’s premises,” (2) that appellees were “on notice of Defendant Iguana’s entertainment-tavern business model and its reliance on 18 to 21 year old ‘college-night’ promotions, and the danger that business model posed for patrons of Defendant Iguana,” and (3) that “the damages [Troxel] suffered ... were entirely foreseeable.” As a matter of law, this type of claim may attach regardless of whether the assailants purchased or consumed alcohol on appellees’ prem ⁴⁹⁵ ises. The gravamen of the cause of action is that the injury resulted from appellees’ failure to protect patrons from a dangerous condition, and not from the furnishing of alcohol.

Indeed, in Maryland, cases that involve an injury to a business invitee on the premises of a restaurant, hotel, or bar are routinely analyzed in the premises liability context. See Veytsman, 170 Md.App. 104, 123 , 906 A.2d 1028 (2006); Corinaldi v. Columbia Courtyard, Inc., 162 Md.App. 207, 218 , 873 A.2d 483 (2005); Moore v. Jimel, Inc., 147 Md.App. 336 , 809 A.2d 10 (2002). Appellees are incorrect to characterize Troxel’s claim as an assertion of dram shop liability. The circuit court in this case should have analyzed these facts using a premises liability framework.

II

The Negligence Claim We now turn to whether Troxel presented sufficient evidence, when construing the facts and reasonable inferences drawn from the facts in the light most favorable to Troxel, to sustain a premises liability negligence claim. A properly pleaded claim of negligence includes four elements. The plaintiff must show: (1) that the defendant was under a duty to protect the plaintiff from injury, (2) that the defendant breached that duty, (3) that the defendant’s breach of the duty proximately caused the loss or injury suffered by the plaintiff, and (4) that the plaintiff suffered actual loss or injury. 3 Corinaldi, 162 Md.App. at 218 , 873 A.2d 483 . “Whether a plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence of the elements of negligence is generally a question for the fact finder, but the existence of a legal duty is a question of law to be decided by the court.” Id. We must first determine as a matter of law whether Iguana Cantina owed a duty to Troxel.

If a duty exists, we must then decide whether Troxel presented sufficient factual evidence on his negligence claim to survive a motion for summary judgment. ⁴⁹⁶ A. Duty Duty in a negligence claim is an obligation to conform to a particular standard of conduct toward another. Veytsman, 170 Md.App. at 113 , 906 A.2d 1028 . The duty may arise from a “special relationship” between the parties. Id. at 114 , 906 A.2d 1028 .

A special relationship between a business owner and patron, giving rise to a duty to exercise due care to protect the patron, generally arises when three circumstances are present: “(1) the owner controlled [a] dangerous or defective condition; (2) the owner had knowledge or should have had knowledge of the injury causing condition; and (3) the harm suffered was a foreseeable result of that condition.” Id. at 115-16 , 906 A.2d 1028 . The trial court in this case decided that “there is nothing to support the contention that the Defendants owed the Plaintiff a duty.” We disagree. The landmark decision in Maryland on whether a duty exists in a premises liability case is set out in Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160 , 359 A.2d 548 (1976). Scott was shot and killed by an unknown assailant in the underground parking garage in his apartment building.

Id. at 162 , 359 A.2d 548 . In the months immediately preceding Scott’s death, records from the Baltimore City Police Department indicated that numerous violent incidents were reported to have been committed on or near the apartment premises. Id. at 164 , 359 A.2d 548 . Scott’s estate brought a wrongful death action against the apartment complex claiming that it “had breached a duty owed to Scott as one of [its] tenants to protect him from criminal acts of third parties committed in common areas within [its] control, and that the breach of duty proximately caused Scott’s death.” Id. at 161 , 359 A.2d 548 .

The Court of Appeals, called upon to answer several questions certified to it by the United States District Court of Maryland, stated that, as a general rule, “[i]f the landlord knows, or should know, of criminal activity against persons or property in the common areas, he then has a duty to take reasonable measures, in view of the existing circumstances, to eliminate the conditions ⁴⁹⁷ contributing to the criminal activity.” Id. at 169 , 359 A.2d 548 (emphasis in original). In Corinaldi, 162 Md.App. 207 , 873 A.2d 483 , we discussed the teachings of Scott in setting out three general theories on which a landowner may be held liable when someone is injured by third party criminal activities on the premises. Under the first theory, a duty is imposed on the landowner to eliminate conditions that contribute to criminal activity if the landowner had prior knowledge of similar criminal activity—evidenced by past events—occurring on the premises. Id. at 223 , 873 A.2d 483 .

In the second scenario, a duty is imposed on the landowner to prevent criminal conduct of a specific assailant if the landowner is aware of the violent tendencies of that particular assailant. Id. at 224, 873 A.2d 483 . The third category involves the imposition of a duty on a landowner if the landowner had knowledge of events occurring immediately before the actual criminal activity that made imminent harm foreseeable. Id.

Troxel asserts that the facts of this case fit into the first of the three categories discussed in Corinaldi . Indeed, in this case, like the first category of landowner liability depicted in Corinaldi , “[t]he asserted duty [isl based on knowledge of prior similar incidents” and “the plaintiffs claim [is] based on an asserted duty to eliminate conditions that contributed to the criminal activity, such as providing security personnel, lighting, locks, and the like.” Id. at 223 , 873 A.2d 483 . A similar factual scenario—where a plaintiff attempted to hold a bar liable for criminal activity that occurred on the premises (again, the first of the three categories discussed in Corinaldi)—was before this Court in Moore v. Jimel, Inc., 147 Md.App. 336 , 809 A.2d 10 (2002). That case involved a woman who was assaulted in the restroom of a bar in the Fells Point neighborhood of Baltimore City.

Id. at 337 , 809 A.2d 10 . The woman sued the bar for “negligently having failed to provide the security owed to her as a business invitee.” Id. The Court reiterated the rule set out in Scott , that “when it can be illustrated that the landlord had knowledge of in ⁴⁹⁸ creased criminal activity on the premises, a duty is imposed on the landlord to undertake reasonable measures to keep the premises secure.” Id. at 348, 809 A.2d 10 . In Moore , however, the woman failed to produce any evidence of prior criminal activity.

The Court concluded that “[b]ecause there was no evidence of any prior crime having been committed against a customer on the premises, there was no foreseeability of risk so as to create a special duty in that regard.” Id. at 349 , 809 A.2d 10 . The Court affirmed the granting of summary judgment in favor of the bar owner. Id. Viewing the record as a whole and giving Troxel the benefit of inferences that can be reasonably drawn from the facts presented, the evidence of prior violence that was missing in Moore is present in this case.

In 2006, the Baltimore Police Department reported eight aggravated assaults, one robbery and one potential rape that occurred within the premises of Iguana Cantina. During the twelve months leading up to September 2008, the Baltimore Police Department again reported four aggravated assaults, one robbery, and two assaults on police officers, all occurring inside Iguana Cantina. Zachary Belcher, a former Iguana Cantina security guard who worked at the nightclub from March 2005 through June 2008, stated in an affidavit that in his experience as a security guard at Iguana Cantina, he “experienced up to five fights per night on college nights.” Another Iguana Cantina security guard, Charles E. Shannon, Jr., testified at his deposition that