Trustees of St. Charles College v. Carroll

Pattison, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. On the 17th day of August, 1912 / the appellee, who is one of the heirs at law of Charles Carroll of Carrollton, instituted an action of ejectment in the Circuit Court for Howard County against the Trustees of Saint Charles College, a body corporate, to recover a tract of land lying in that county containing two hundred and fifty-four and a half acres of land. The case was tried before a jury in that Court and resulted in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for a one-eleventh undivided interest in the land sued for, and from that judgment the defendant has appealed. The appellant was incorporated by the Act of 1829, Chapter SO, by the name of the Trustees of Saint Charles College, and the purpose of its creation was the education of young men of the Roman Catholic religion for the ministry of the Gospel.

The preamble to the Act recited that Charles Carroll of Carrollton, having it in contemplation to found a seminary to prosecute such work, had applied to the General Assembly for leave to convey to certain named persons and their successors forever a tract of land in trust for the purposes aforesaid. The first section of the Act declared the persons named to be a body corporate, and that they and their successors should have perpetual succession. Power was granted to the corporation “to receive and hold the said donation, deed and gift of the said Charles Carroll of Carrollton, as designated in the preamble of this Act, and to receive and ⁴⁶⁷ hold any property, real and personal, acquired either hy purchase, gift, grant or devise, not exceeding the whole yearly value of six thousand dollars, in trust for the purpose designated in the preamble hereto.” By the fifth section of the Act it was provided: “That all property which shall be received, and held by the said corporation, as well real as personal, and whether derived by gift, devise, bequest, purchase or otherwise, shall be held by them, to and for the only purpose, and in trust exclusively for the education of pious young men of the Catholic persuasion for the ministry of the Gospel.” Section eight provided that the corporation should have full and perfect control over all the property belonging to it for the purpose of the trust aforesaid; provided, that none of its funds or property, of which it should become possessed, should be appropriated otherwise than for the trust declared in the Act. On the 27th of March, 1830, Charles Carroll of Carrollton executed a deed to the Trustees of Saint Charles College by which he granted and conveyed to it the land which is the subject-matter of this suit.

The deed referred to the Act of Incorporation and recited its power to receive and hold in trust for the purpose therein declared and to the extent and amount therein limited, any property, real or personal. It then, in consideration of the trust therein mentioned to be performed and of the sum of five dollars, granted and conveyed unto the Trustees of Saint Charles College the tract of land containing two hundred and fifty-four and a half acres and which is described by metes and bounds, courses and distances. This is the same land described in the declaration. The land in express terms was granted to the Trustees of Saint Charles College and their successors forever in trust and for the uses and objects set forth in the Act of Incorporation.

The deed contained a proviso which is here transcribed: “Provided always that the tract of land and premises hereby conveyed shall never be sold or aliened by ⁴⁶⁸ the said Trustees of Saint Charles College, or their successors, hut that they shall forever faithfully apply the proceeds of said land to the uses, objects and trusts in said Act of Assembly before referred to specified and set forth, and also that the said Trustees of Saint Charles College shall as soon after they come into possession of said tract of land as their funds will allow cause to be erected on the premises hereby conveyed such buildings as may be proper and necessary to the purposes of this trust; and also that said Trustees of Saint Charles College and their successors shall continue the .seat and location of said College upon the premises hereby conveyed forever; and provided lastly that upon the breach of any of the conditions above stated it shall and may be lawful to and for the said Charles Carroll of Carrollton, his heirs and assigns, into the premises hereby conveyed or unto any part thereof in the name of the whole to re-enter and the same to have again, possess, occupy and enjoy as in his former estate, and then and in such case this deed and clause, matter and thing therein contained shall from thenceforth be utterly void and non-effect in law and equity.” The appellant took possession of the property under the deed in 1830, and has ever since remained in possession of it. It erected a fine college building, chapel, and other valuable improvements upon the property. The teachers and the entire body of students resided permanently at the college from about the year 1848 until March 16th, 1911, on which date the college was destroyed by fire. The questions of rebuilding and the cost of construction were taken up by the college authorities, and the matter was referred to his Eminence Cardinal Gibbons.

He was at first decidedly in favor of rebuilding upon the old location, but when it was pointed out to him that the cost of transportation of material to the old site would be so great and the greater length of time it would require to complete the work ⁴⁶⁹ in Howard County, he concluded not to insist upon his preference to relocate the college upon its former site, and remitted the question of a new location to the judgment of the trustees, and they decided to locate the college at Cloud Cap, in Baltimore County, which place is about ten miles distant from its original location. The reason which induced the location at Cloud Cap is thus tersely stated by Mr. O’Connor, the builder: “Upon estimates being made, we found that the cost of rebuilding there (the old location) would really be prohibitive, and under the most favorable conditions it would cost at least $60,000.00 more to build a college there instead of at Cloud Cap near Catonsville. It would take two or three times as long to get there, it would take a great deal longer to build there, and the desirable help would have to be paid more to go there to work. It really would have cost about $100,000.00 more to build there than at Cloud Cap.” There is no question in this case of any breach of trust on the part of the Trustees of Saint Charles College.

They have faithfully and scrupulously applied all its funds, property and income to the trust declared in its charter and in the deed mentioned. But the evidence is clear and full to the point that,_ because of the prohibitive cost of erecting the new building on the old location in Howard County, they have permanently abandoned “the seat and location of said college upon the premises” granted by the deed of March 27th, 1830. Does this fact by a true construction of that deed cause a forfeiture of said land whereby it has reverted to the heirs of the grantor ? If it does, then the plaintiff had a right to recover his undivided interest in the property.

We think it perfectly clear, upon the authority of Bennett v. Humane Imp. Society, 91 Md. 10 ; The Woman's Foreign Missionary Society v. Mitchell, 93 Md. 199 ; Baltzell v. Church Home, 110 Md. 244 , and other eases in this Court, that the deed from Charles Carroll of Carrollton to the Trustees of Saint Charles College was in all respects valid, and that it passed title to the property conveyed to the grantee for the clearly defined corporate purpose mentioned ⁴⁷⁰ in its charter, subject, however, to the legal operation and effect, if any, of the provisos contained therein. • In Woman's Foreign Missionary Society v. Mitchell, supra, the Court had under consideration the construction of the will of Maria A. Sherman. Two questions were presented for decision: first, whether the appellant society was the devisee and legatee intended to be named and actually described in the residuary clause of the will; and secondly, whether that clause was valid. That clause was in these words: “I direct that my two houses and lots in Mountain Lake Park, Garrett County, Maryland, and my lots in Covington, Kentucky, and the stock in the Southern Building-Association held in care of W. G. Hay, of Hagerstown, Maryland, and all other property, both -real and personal, other than that already bequeathed, be sold, and the proceeds thereof, together with whatever monies I may die possessed of, be held in trust by the Board of Managers of the Foreign Missionary Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church of the United States of America for the following purposes: After all my debts, bequests and provision for my burial, etc., be paid, that sufficient be used to educate as Bible readers in India six girls, one to be named “Dorcas Sherman”; one “Avis Cecil Sherman”; one “Mary Jane Sherman”; one “Sarah Jennie Sherman”; one “Jennie Smith”; one “Grace Mabel Sherman”; the money remaining after that set aside for the education of the aforesaid Bible readers to be applied to the purchase of a building to be used for the education of girls in India to be called the “M. Adelaide Sherman Home” and the location of said building to be left to the decision of Bishop Thoburn or his successors.” This clause was assailed upon the ground that it created a trust whose objects were indefinite and uncertain.

The Court decided, upon the facts before it, that there had been a misnomer of the devisee and legatee, and that “the Woman’s Foreign Missionary Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church” was the corporation intended by the testatrix, though misnamed in her will, to take the residuary estate. It then ⁴⁷¹ consulted the charter powers of the society, and found “that the particular business and object of said society is to engage and unite the efforts of Christian women in sending female missionaries to women in foreign mission fields of the Methodist Episcopal Church, and in supporting them and native Christian teachers and Bible readers in those fields,” and that India was one of those fields. Judge McSherry, speaking for the Court then propounds this question: Is the residuary clause void by reason of its creating a trust whose objects are vague, indefinite and uncertain? “Hot a great deal need be said in disposing of this inquiry. If there is no trust created, or if none was intended to be created, as to this residuum, then there can be no trust that is void by reason of the objects of it being indefinite and uncertain.

So, clearly, the first question to be determined is whether there is a trust which has been actually created pursuant to an intent to create one? It is true the testatrix declared that the property should ‘be held in trust by the Board of Managers, etc., for the following purposes.’ These purposes, it is alleged are, after the payment of debts, bequests and funeral expenses, ‘that sufficient be used to educate as Bible readers in India six girls’ to be named as directed in the clause, and that ‘the money remaining after that set aside for the education of the aforesaid Bible readers’ should ‘be applied to the purchase of a building to be used for the education of girls in India to be called the “M. Adelaide Sherman Home,” and the location of said building to be left to the decision of Bishop Thoburn or his successors.’ Excluding the sums applicable to the payment of debts, legacies and funeral expenses, there is and can be no trust at all. If there be a manifest design not to establish a trust, then no trust will be declared though the words employed would or might but for the contrary intention, be sufficient to create a trust. Bennett v. Balto.

Humane So., 91 Md. 10 . How, perhaps, had the precise phraseology, which is found in the will before us, been used in making a like devise and bequest to a natural person, it might be said ⁴⁷² that the design was to create a trust, because the purposes indicated are not those ordinarily performed by an individual ; but when it is remembered that the very end which the corporation here made the beneficiary was organized to effect is the education of Bible readers and the instruction of girls in foreign lands, it becomes evident that the property was given to the corporation not in trust for indefinite objects, but that it was given to it to be used for its recognized and clearly defined corporate purposes. The specific design of the gift is that the proceeds of the property shall be used, that is spent, by the beneficiary for its chartered ends and not for some one else’s benefit. The corporation is not to hold the fund for the use of others, hut it is to spend that fund in the prosecution of its missionary work.

The declaration by the testatrix that the funds should be used to educate six Indian girls as Bible readers impresses no trust upon the fund, because the education of the girls, whether six, or more or less, as Bible readers is precisely the purpose to which the funds would have been applied had the gift been made to the same devisee and legatee without these superadded words. It may and probably would be accurate to say that the provision requiring six girls to be educated who are