Tucker v. Tucker

Davidson, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. On 8 July 1968, in the Circuit Court for Talbot County, Judge Harry E. Clark entered a decree which granted the appellee, Charlotte L. Tucker (wife), an absolute divorce from the appellant, Alfred H. Tucker (husband), and awarded her custody of the parties’ two minor children. The decree further provided, in pertinent part, that the husband should provide child support and that he should “pay for all medical expenses incurred by the said Charlotte L. Tucker, either for her own use or for that of the minor children.” No appeal was filed. On 15 April 1975, pursuant to Rule 625 a, the husband filed a “Motion to Revise Decree” alleging that that portion of the 1968 decree requiring him to pay medical expenses “was and is void and without legal force or effect and was entered by mistake of law.” On 7 May 1975, at a hearing held before Judge James A. Wise, he presented evidence to show that there had not been an agreement between the parties for his payment of medical expenses and argued that the court therefore lacked jurisdiction to require him to pay those expenses.

In an opinion and order entered on 6 June 1975, the chancellor found that there was an agreement between the parties and explicitly determined that at the time it entered its 1968 decree, the court had jurisdiction to order the husband to pay medical expenses. He denied the husband’s motion for revision. No appeal was filed. On 8 March 1976, Judge Clark held a hearing to determine whether the husband was in contempt of court for failure to make some of the medical payments.

The husband defended in part on the ground that the 1968 decree was null and void and subject to collateral attack at any time because the court lacked jurisdiction to issue that part of its decree which required him to pay medical expenses. The chancellor sustained the wife’s objections to a line of questions asked for the purpose of establishing the court’s lack of ⁷¹² jurisdiction at the time of the 1968 decree. He found that the question of the court’s jurisdiction at the time of the 1968 decree had been litigated and determined in the 1975 proceeding, and that under the doctrine of res judicata that issue could not be relitigated. The chancellor entered an order finding the husband to be in contempt of court, and, among other things, ordered the payment of arrearages.

This appeal is from that order. Here, as in the court below, the husband contends that the 1968 decree was null and void and subject to collateral attack at any time because the court lacked jurisdiction to issue that part of the decree which required him to pay medical expenses. Relying on Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Nationwide Construction Corp., 1 and Thomas v. Hardisty, 2 he maintains that the doctrine of res judicata is .not applicable to and does not bar relitigation of a jurisdictional question. A judgment is void unless the court which renders it has jurisdiction over the parties or the property and the subject matter.

A judgment which is void because of a lack of jurisdiction may be collaterally attacked at any time. 3 There are exceptions to this rule. If there has been a judicial determination that the court rendering a judgment has jurisdiction, the doctrine of res judicata applies and precludes a collateral attack upon that judgment. As stated in the Restatement of Judgments: 4 “5 j. Effect of ruling by the court as to its jurisdiction.

Although a judgment would otherwise be void because of the lack of jurisdiction of the court over the parties or over the subject matter, and would therefore be open to collateral attack, yet if the court determines that it has jurisdiction, the parties may be precluded from collaterally ⁷¹³ attacking the judgment on the ground that the determination by the court of its jurisdiction is res judicata between them. “10 d. Where jurisdiction in one action is determined in a subsequent action. The principle underlying the rule stated in this Section is applicable where the question of the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is determined not by the court which renders the judgment but by another court. Thus, if a judgment by default is rendered