Turner v. Evans

Urner, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. By the will of Clara I. Turner, late of Cecil County, the residuary estate of the testatrix was devised and bequeathed in trust for the benefit of her daughter, M. Genevieve Turner, upon a condition expressed in these words: “provided she does not intermarry with the person who is now paying court to her, it being my intention not to interfere with my said daughter marrying any person whom I regard as her social equal, but so far as in my power to prevent her contracting an unsuitable marriage.” It was directed by the testatrix that in the event of her daughter “not marrying the objectionable person” referred to, “but marrying someone who is her social equal,” then the trust should terminate and the whole of the trust estate should be distributed and paid to her daughter, and that in case of her marriage to the person previously designated, or to some person not her social equal, the trust should continue, but she should cease to receive any portion of the income, which, in that event, was to be paid during her life to certain other persons, and after her death the estate was to pass to her children. The pending bill of complaint, filed by the daughter- of the testatrix, disputes the validity of the provisions just noted upon the theory that they impose illegal restrictions upon her marriage. It is contended that the condition against her marriage to the person to whom the will referred is invalid because it would require the breach of a pre-marital engagement which- had been entered into before the will was executed, and that the condition as to her marrying a-person who is her social equal istvoid for uncertainty.

Since the bill' was filed the marriage to which the testatrix objected has been consummated; The testimony of the plaintiff and her husband is to the effect that their engagement ²⁴⁰ occurred several years before tbe date of tbe will, sbe being tben twenty-two and be forty-one years of age, but wbetber tbe testatrix was at any time aware tbat tbey were engaged is a question upon wbicb there is a conflict in tbe evidence It is clear, however, from tbe proof in tbe case tbat sbe openly and earnestly opposed tbe courtship from wbicb tbe engagement and marriage resulted. A condition in a will or deed which operates in only partial restraint of marriage is valid and effective unless it unreasonably limits the right of the beneficiary to enter into such a relationship.. Pacholder v. Rosenheim, 129 Md. 462 ; 40 Cyc. 1699. Tbe validity of conditions in restraint of marriage with a particular person has been uniformly sustained.

Bostick v. Blades, 59 Md. 233 ; Re seaman, 218 N. Y. 77 ; Graydon v. Graydon, 23 N. J. Eq. 229; Jenner v. Turner (1880), L. R. 16 Ch. Div. 188; Case Note L. R. A., 1917, A. 44. The decisions upon this question have not been.based upon a consideration of the motives for such provisions, but upon tbe conclusion that they are inherently not unreasonable. In no case cited in the argument or discovered in our investigation has it been held that the validity of a condition like the present one is affected by the circumstance that it may interfere with an existing engagement for the marriage wbicb it is intended to prevent.

This objection was raised and overruled in the case of Graydon v. Graydon, supra, where the legatee to whom the condition applied was a minor son of the testator, and the decision was based on the ground that the pre-existing engagement of such a person to marry, contrary to the terms of the will, was without binding effect because of bis minority, and could afford no ground for bolding the condition inoperative. The question whether a prior engagement would ordinarily be sufficient to invalidate such a condition was not decided but was expressly reserved in that case. Fo convincing reason has been suggested why tbe general and undisputed rule which supports tbe validity of condi ²⁴¹ tions in restraint of a marriage with a designated person-should he held applicable only to cases in which the