Turner v. Hastings

ADKINS, J. This case calls for us to explore the interplay between accepting a jury verdict and revising that verdict after the jury is dismissed, as well as, what to do when a verdict appears on its face to have internal inconsistencies. We hold that, for a jury verdict to be properly returned in open court, it must be orally announced, hearkened to by the jury, and subject to an opportunity to poll. Once these requirements are met, the verdict is then taken from the jury and, upon the entering of a judgment, becomes subject to a judge’s revisory powers. Though in some instances revisory powers can be quite broad, they are much more limited when it comes to changing a jury verdict.

Because a judge is forbidden from encroaching on the jury’s fact-finding province, his discretion to revise a jury verdict pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-535 is permissible only to effectuate the true intent of the jury. ⁵⁰² FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY On July 4, 2008, Catherine Turner was employed as a professional taxi cab driver in Ocean City, Maryland. On that night she was making a left-hand turn at a stop light where she had a green arrow allowing her to proceed. At that same time, Direse Hastings was operating a motor vehicle coming from the opposite direction. Hastings ran a red light, striking the taxi cab operated by Turner.

Turner filed suit in Worcester County, and the case went to trial on September 27, 2010, based on theories of negligence and assault. Before beginning deliberations, the jury was given two verdict sheets — one for the negligence count and one for the assault count. The verdict sheet submitted for the negligence count contained four questions and is reproduced below: 1. Has it been proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the Defendant, Direse Helen Hastings, was negligent? _YES _NO IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED “NO” TO QUESTION NO. 1, PLEASE TERMINATE YOUR DELIBERATIONS AND NOTIFY THE BAILIFF.

IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED “YES” TO QUESTION NO. 1, PLEASE RESPOND TO QUESTION NO. 2. 2. Has it been proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Plaintiff, Catherine Lynn Turner, was negligent in the operation of her motor vehicle and that such negligence on her part proximately caused or contributed to the motor vehicle accident referred to in the evidence? __YES _NO IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED “YES” TO QUESTION NO. 2, PLEASE TERMINATE YOUR DELIBERATIONS AND NOTIFY THE BAILIFF. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED “YES” TO QUESTION NO. 1 AND IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED “NO” TO QUESTION NO. 2, PLEASE ANSWER QUESTION NO. 3. ⁵⁰³ 3. Has it been proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Catherine Lynn Turner sustained injuries as a result of the motor vehicle accident referred to in the evidence? _YES _NO IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED “NO” TO QUESTION NO. 3, PLEASE TERMINATE YOUR DELIBERATIONS AND NOTIFY THE BAILIFF.

IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED “YES” TO QUESTION NO. 3, PLEASE ANSWER QUESTION NO. 4. 4. What damages has the Plaintiff proven by a preponderance of the evidence? a. Medical expenses incurred in the past: $ b. Loss of income reasonably probable to have been incurred in the past: $ c.

Non-economic damages including pain and suffering: $ d. Property damage to the taxi cab: $ Upon reaching a verdict, the jury came back into the courtroom, the court clerk read the questions of the verdict sheet aloud from a blank copy, and the jury foreman answered using the completed copy. Apparently, before doing this, no one examined the full verdict sheet as completed by the jury. When the clerk asked the jury about Question 1, the foreman answered ‘Yes”: Hastings was negligent.

In response to Question 2, the foreman answered “No”: Turner was not negligent. In response to Question 3, the foreman answered “No”: Turner had not sustained injuries. Following the instructions on the verdict sheet, the clerk then stopped at Question 3 and did not ask Question 4. Moving to the second verdict sheet, she then asked whether Hastings had committed an assault, to which the foreman answered “No.” The clerk then hearkened the jury to its verdict, rereading the first three questions on the negligence verdict sheet, the single question on the assault verdict sheet, and the jury foreman’s answers to them, to which all jurors answered in the affirmative.

The Court then dismissed the jury. ⁵⁰⁴ It was not until after the jury was dismissed that the judge received the jury’s completed copy of the verdict sheet. Upon reviewing the verdict sheet, the judge discovered that the jury had gone on to answer Question 4 of the negligence count, which was filled in as follows: a. Medical expenses incurred in the past: $325.00 b. Loss of income reasonably probable to have been incurred in the past: $18,000 c.

Non-economie damages including pain and suffering: $0 d. Property damage to the taxi cab: $2,820 The judge then brought the parties back on the record to hear arguments about how to proceed. He ultimately found that “[t]here is no question” that the jury intended to award damages and, therefore, enrolled the verdict sheet as the jury’s verdict, awarding the damages as shown on the verdict sheet to Turner. The Court of Special Appeals, in a reported opinion, vacated the award.

See Hastings v. Turner, 205 Md.App. 413 , 45 A.3d 835 (2012). On September 21, 2012, this Court granted a writ of certiorari, Turner v. Hastings, 428 Md. 543 , 52 A.3d 978 (2012), to answer the following questions: 1. Did the Court of Special Appeals improperly deny your Petitioner damages, that is a monetary award, only because the portion of the jury’s verdict that awarded damages had not been announced in open court? 2. Did the Circuit Court have the power to correct what it saw as an inconsistent verdict?

We hold that the trial judge properly exercised his discretion to revise the verdict, in effectuating the intent of the jury, by including the award of damages as shown on the verdict sheet. DISCUSSION The issues presented call for us to delve into the delicate area of jury verdicts. This topic can quickly cause uneasiness ⁵⁰⁵ for judges, lawyers, and litigants. The jury’s verdict is the essence of the American legal system — a role which judges should not usurp except in the most limited circumstances.

In this case we explore the nature and extent of the judge’s discretion to revise a jury verdict, a foray that requires considering whether a jury’s verdict that has internal inconsistencies can stand. We address these issues below. Revising a Jury Verdict to Include Damages on the Verdict Sheet The issue of whether the jury’s verdict may be revised by the trial judge to include an award of damages contained on the verdict sheet — but not read aloud in open court — implicates two Maryland Rules: 2-522 (Court Decision — Jury Verdict) and 2-535 (Revisory Power). The parties largely disagree as to which of these rules should govern our analysis of the issue.

Turner argues that, under Rule 2-535, a trial court has broad revisory powers, and therefore, the trial judge had authority to revise the judgment to add the damage award reflected on the verdict sheet. Hastings argues that, under Rule 2-522, all jury verdicts must be returned in open court, and therefore, the unreturned damage award cannot be added to the verdict. What the parties fail to discuss, however, is how the two rules relate to each other. Rule 2-522 sets forth the requirements of how the court should properly receive a jury verdict, i.e. how a verdict becomes properly “returned.” In contrast, Rule 2-535 sets forth a judge’s revisory powers, which kick in only after a judgment has been entered.

Starting in chronological order, our analysis begins with Maryland Rule 2-522 and the determination of whether a verdict exists in this case. Returning Jury Verdicts in Open Court in Civil Trials Rule 2-522 lays out the requirements of all jury verdicts in civil cases and requires that, “The verdict shall be returned in open court. On request of a party or on the court’s own initiative, the jury shall be polled before it is discharged.” Md. Rule 2-522(b). ⁵⁰⁶ To support her argument that the damage award was not “returned in open court,” Hastings relies on Jones v. State, 384 Md. 669 , 866 A.2d 151 (2005)—a case, in which we discussed the “returned in open court” requirement in the criminal context. Verdicts in criminal cases are governed by Maryland Rule 4-327, which requires that “[t]he verdict of a jury shall be unanimous and shall be returned in open court.” Md. Rule 4-327(a).

The Rule also provides for the polling of the jury. Md. Rule 4-327(e). Examining what it means for a verdict to be “returned,” in Jones , we stated that historically there have been three requirements: (1) the foreman would orally answer the clerk’s questions and state the verdict; (2) if requested, the jury would be polled “to ensure the unanimity of the verdict;” and (3) finally, the jury would be hearkened to the verdict as a “traditional formality announcing the recording of the verdict.” Id. at 682-84 , 866 A.2d at 159-60 (quotation marks and citation omitted). We then explained that “Maryland Rule 4-327(a) and (e) embody the essence of this historical procedure for ‘returning’ a verdict.” Id. at 681 , 866 A.2d at 158 (footnotes omitted).

In Jones , however, this procedure for returning a verdict was not followed. The jury was given a verdict sheet containing four charges against the defendant, on which the jury found the defendant guilty of all four. Id. at 675-77 , 866 A.2d at 154-55 . When the court clerk read the verdict in court, however, she only asked how the jury found on the first three charges, and the jury forelady only announced the guilty verdicts on the first three charges.

Id. at 676 , 866 A.2d at 155 . The jury was then hearkened to the three verdicts and dismissed. Id. at 676-77 , 866 A.2d at 155 . Nevertheless, at sentencing, the judge imposed a sentence on all four counts— including the fourth count that was not orally announced or hearkened to by the jury.

Id. at 677 , 866 A.2d at 156 . We held that “because the jury was not polled and hearkened to that [fourth] Count in absence of its oral announcement, the verdict of guilt cannot stand and any sentence apportioned ⁵⁰⁷ thereto must be vacated.” 1 Id. at 686 , 866 A.2d at 161 . Relying on Jones , Hastings argues that the award of damages in this case was not properly “returned” and must be vacated. In response to Hastings’s argument, Turner does not provide an explanation of what it means, in her opinion, to return a verdict in open court.

Rather, she only argues the negative — that Rule 2-522 cannot possibly require all civil jury verdicts to be announced in open court and hearkened to, and that the parties be given a chance to poll the jury. In Turner’s view, if these three requirements were imposed on civil jury verdicts, then judges would be stripped of all of their revisory powers — as well as the ability to grant common law remittitur and judgment notwithstanding the verdict — because any revision, modification, amendment, or alteration of the verdict after the jury has been dismissed cannot be announced in open court, hearkened to, or polled. Thus, Turner distinguishes Jones and other criminal cases under the general argument that the nature of civil verdicts “is manifestly different from criminal verdicts.” We do not agree "with Turner’s predicted scenario of horrors, as they are not supported by a proper understanding of the rules. Rule 2-522 sets forth the requirements of how to properly accept a jury verdict, but it does not apply to entering or revising a judgment.

In other words, the requirements of Rule 2-522 have no applicability outside of accepting a jury verdict, and would have no effect on how that verdict, once properly accepted, becomes a judgment or what can be done to that verdict after it becomes a judgment. A judge’s revisory powers, common law remittitur, and judgment notwithstanding the verdict all deal with what may happen to a verdict after it is properly returned, and therefore, are not affected by the requirements of Rule 2-522. These powers can only exist after Rule 2-522 has been satisfied. ⁵⁰⁸ In this regard, we also cannot agree with Turner’s attempt to distinguish away our jurisprudence defining what it means for a verdict to be “returned in open court” in the criminal context. Certainly criminal and civil cases are different, but the differences that Turner highlights, such as, for example, the interests at stake and the burden of proof, are not material to the point at hand. 2 None of the distinctions provide a reason, specific to returning a jury verdict, for why we should apply a different rule in the criminal and civil contexts for how a jury verdict is “returned in open court.” Indeed, Turner’s attempted distinctions fall flat once the specific civil and criminal rules are actually compared to one another.

The rule governing jury verdicts in the civil context is Maryland Rule 2-522, which states: “The verdict shall be returned in open court.” Md. Rule 2-522(b). The rule governing jury verdicts in the criminal context is Maryland Rule 4-327, which provides that “[t]he verdict of a jury shall be unanimous and shall be returned in open court.” Md. Rule 4-327(a). The two rules are identical in the requirement that both verdicts “shall be returned in open court.” Furthermore, tracing the development and history of the rules, it is clear that this similarity is not a coincidence. Both Rule 2-522(b) and Rule 4-327(a) are derived from the same rule — former rule 759(a).

That rule also provided that “[t]he verdict of a jury shall be unanimous and shall be returned in open court.” Importantly, former rule 759(a) was a rule of criminal procedure. As we explained in Jones : Rule 4-327 “is identical to former Maryland Rule 759, which was derived from Rule 40 of the Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on ⁵⁰⁹ Uniform State Laws.” 384 Md. at 681-82 , 866 A.2d at 158 (footnotes omitted). In other words, the current civil rule, requiring jury verdicts to be “returned in open court,” was derived directly from a rule of criminal procedure — a rule which we interpreted in Jones as requiring an oral announcement of the verdict, a hearkening to, and an opportunity to poll the jury. Returning of the Jury Verdict in this Case Based on the clear development of the rules, for a jury verdict in a civil case to be “returned in open court,” there must be an oral announcement of the verdict, hearkened to by the jury, with an opportunity to poll.

The question still remains, though, whether that occurred in this case. Hastings would say no — analogizing the jury’s failure to read the award of damages in this case to the jury’s failure to read its guilty verdict in Jones . But this analogy misses one crucial difference. In Jones , each question on the verdict sheet dealt with its own independent criminal charge — (1) attempted robbery with a dangerous and deadly weapon; (2) attempted robbery; (3) possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a crime of violence; and (4) use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence. 384 Md. at 675 , 866 A.2d at 155 .

Thus, when the jury failed to read its guilty verdict for the fourth count, there was no verdict, whatsoever, for the charge of use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence. Id. at 676 , 866 A.2d at 155 . With no verdict at all, the judge could not sentence the defendant on that charge. Id. at 686 , 866 A.2d at 161 .

The facts of Jones would be analogous to this case if the jury had read its verdict on the negligence count but failed to read its verdict on the assault count. In such a situation, similar to Jones , Turner would not be able to recover damages on the assault count regardless of what was written on the verdict sheet. But that is not what happened here. Instead, in this case, the question that the jury failed to read and hearken to was not a count, but rather, the amount ⁵¹⁰ of damages to be awarded on the negligence count.

In this case, then, the jury did announce in open court and hearken to its verdict that the defendant was negligent, that the plaintiff was not contributorily negligent, and that the plaintiff suffered no injury. This is a sufficient verdict that a jury is rightfully permitted to return and that fully satisfies all the requirements of Rule 2-522, that the verdict be “returned in open court.” Judge’s Power to Revise a Jury Verdict Once Returned The verdict, once properly returned in satisfaction of Rule 2-522, is taken from the jury. Smith v. State, 299 Md. 158, 168 , 472 A.2d 988, 993 (1984) (“[I]t is the acceptance of the verdict upon the poll that removes the verdict from the province of the jury.”); Caldwell v. State, 164 Md.App. 612, 631 , 884 A.2d 199, 209 (2005) (“A case is removed from the province of the jury when the jury is hearkened to its verdict and the verdict is accepted by the court; or when the jury is polled, and the verdict as polled is accepted by the court.”). A judgment is then entered and becomes subject to a court’s revisory powers under Rule 2-535(a).

See Md. Rule 2-535(a) (“On motion of any party filed within 30 days after entry of judgment, the court may exercise revisory power and control over the judgment.... ”). Quoting from our opinion in Southern Management Corp. v. Taha, Turner argues that “[t]he scope of a court’s power under Rule 2-535(a) is broad.” 378 Md. 461, 494 , 836 A.2d 627, 646 (2003). She maintains that “[i]n its discretion, a court may modify a judgment if a party files a motion seeking to revise or set aside that