Turner v. Turner

HOLLANDER, Judge. This appeal arises from two law suits instituted by E. Diane Turner, appellant, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. One involves the dissolution of the marriage of appellant and Donald Turner, appellee. The other concerns Mr. Turner and the family business, Baltimore Stage Lighting, Inc. (“BSL” or the “Company”), appellee, 1 a close corporation wholly owned by the Turners. ³⁶¹ In a sense, the Turners epitomize the rags to riches American dream.

At the outset of their lengthy marriage, the Turners were of modest means. Then, they combined their enterprising spirit with creativity and determination to create BSL, a very profitable business. By 1996, BSL had gross earnings of $3,000,000 and approximately 25 employees. In the litigation at issue here, Ms. Turner, a minority shareholder of BSL, sought equal ownership and control of the Company.

The circuit court conducted two separate trials, one in November 1999 and the other in March 2000, “in a consolidated fashion.” By agreement, the evidence adduced at one trial was considered as evidence in the other case. Throughout the duration of these cases, the circuit court issued numerous written opinions, including three that are of particular importance here. The first, issued just after the divorce trial, is reflected in a seven-page Order docketed December 16, 1999. It addressed the matters of temporary alimony pending final disposition of both cases, as well as attorneys’ fees.

The second, issued on April 17, 2000, is a Memorandum Opinion addressing the corporate claims (the “Corporate Opinion”). The third is a Memorandum Opinion of June 9, 2000, regarding the divorce case (the “Divorce Opinion”). The court’s rulings in the Divorce Opinion are reflected in the Judgment of Absolute Divorce docketed on July 19, 2000, by which appellant was granted a divorce on the ground of adultery, ending her marriage to appellee of more than thirty years. 2 Unhappy with the court’s resolution of both cases, Ms. Turner noted this appeal, in which she presents us with a dozen issues. Appellees have moved to dismiss the appeal, claiming that Ms. Turner cannot pursue any of her claims ³⁶² because she accepted payment of the monetary award in the divorce case.

We have rephrased slightly and reordered appellant’s twelve questions, as follows: I. Did the trial court err in attributing $85,000 in annual income to appellant in its determination of alimony?

II

Did the trial court err or abuse its discretion in awarding appellant $2,000 per month in indefinite alimony?

III

In awarding alimony, did the trial court err in failing to consider the parties’ agreement of August 1997?

IV

Did the trial court err in denying appellant’s claim for contribution with respect to the mortgage payments for the marital home? V. Did the trial court err in finding a dissipation by appellee of only $112,000?

VI

Did the trial court err in its award of counsel fees to appellant and in construing the alimony pendente lite as a partial contribution to counsel fees? ■ VII. Did the trial court err in denying appellant’s request for an accounting as a shareholder of BSL?

VIII

Did the trial court err in denying appellant’s claims for corporate' relief based on the doctrine of “unclean hands”?

IX

Did the trial court err in failing to grant appellant ownership of fifty percent of BSL? X. Did the trial court err in refusing to disregard the corporate entity?

XI

Did the trial court err in regard to appellant’s claim for wrongful discharge by BSL?

XII

Did the trial court err in limiting appellant’s right to • inspect and copy BSL documents? For the reasons that follow, we shall deny appellees’ Motion to Dismiss. With respect to appellant’s contentions, we shall affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. 3 ³⁶³ FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY The divorce case was filed on July 15, 1997, initially on the ground of desertion. It was later amended to allege adultery.

The corporate suit, filed on the same date, was also amended. The “Second Amended Complaint for Injunction and Other Relief,” at issue here, was filed against both BSL and Mr. Turner and contains twelve counts. 4 Ms. Turner alleged, inter alia, that Mr. Turner misappropriated corporate funds to finance his drug habit, for which she sought various remedies in her capacities as stockholder and employee. She also claimed an equitable ownership of a 50% interest in BSL. Evidence relating to the divorce case was heard over several days in November 1999, with closing arguments presented in April 2000.

Evidence as to the corporate case was presented in March 2000. As we noted, the evidence from one trial was considered as having been admitted at the other trial. After the trials, the court issued a formal Order of Consolidation, dated June 5, 2000, consolidating the cases “for all purposes.” ³⁶⁴ In light of the consolidated format, our factual summary is derived from evidence adduced at both trials. The Turners met in high school and were married on October 28, 1966, when Ms. Turner was eighteen years of age and Mr. Turner was nineteen years old.

Their only child, Paul, was born in May 1967. Early in the marriage, Ms. Turner held various jobs with companies like McCrary’s, while Mr. Turner was in the armed services and then began working at Burrough’s. After thirty-one years of marriage, the couple separated in June 1997. At the time of the trials, they were in their early 50’s, and generally in good health.

Appellant, however, has had a history of sight problems dating from childhood, and has been a heavy cigarette smoker since she was a teenager, consuming three packs a day. Appellee’s interest in lighting began when he was a youngster, but his hobby did not generate income until 1970, when he created a “light box” that he sold. While working full-time at another job, Mr. Turner devoted his evenings to the development of a lighting business. As the interest in concert lighting generally escalated, the business began to prosper.

By 1974, it had grown so much that appellee began to work for it on a full-time basis. The business evolved into BSL, which incorporated on August 6, 1976. Although Mr. Turner became the president of BSL, it is undisputed that Ms. Turner was actively involved in BSL from its inception, and worked full-time in the business for many years. Indeed, she initially performed many of the same tasks as her husband, such as loading equipment and setting up stage lighting.

Over the years, however, she became increasingly involved in management and finance, while appel-lee pursued technical matters. By 1994, appellant began to handle many of her financial responsibilities from home. While both parties devoted considerable time and effort to BSL, appellee was paid a significantly higher salary than appellant. Moreover, Mr. Turner owned 65 shares of BSL stock, while only 10 shares were titled to appellant.

Ms. Turner testified that she periodically discussed with appellee ³⁶⁵ her desire to hold title to an amount of BSL stock equal to his. She claimed that appellee assured her that they had an “equal” interest in BSL, and “it didn’t make any difference” how the stock was titled. Although Mr. Turner did not specifically recall such conversations, he did not dispute that he may have made such remarks. As BSL prospered, the parties enjoyed a standard of living commensurate with the Company’s success.

The parties purchased their marital home in Mt. Airy in 1991 for the sum of $349,000. Thereafter, they made substantial improvements to it, at a cost of about $223,650. The fair market value of the home was in dispute at trial, with expert valuations ranging from $380,000 to $475,000.

Appellant claimed that she and her husband devised a financial plan in 1996, by which they intended to pay off the mortgage on their home by January 2000, so that they could reduce their financial burden and spend more time on recreation. To accomplish their objective, they made additional payments of mortgage principal each month. Ms. Turner recalled that problems in the marriage surfaced in 1995, when she noticed that Mr. Turner was coming home less frequently. By 1996, she suspected that he was involved with drugs and other women.

Ms. Turner’s concerns were confirmed in January 1997, when she discovered that appellee was using cocaine and had a relationship with another woman. Appellant also learned on June 9, 1997, that appellee had been removing cash from BSL. Soon afterwards, the parties separated. On August 10, 1997, the Turners executed an Agreement providing for the payment to appellant of a weekly salary from BSL of $2500, and a reduction of Mr. Turner’s salary to the same amount, $2500 per week.

They also agreed to the payment of equal Company bonuses. Although BSL apparently paid for appellee’s car, insurance, gas, and cellular telephone, appellant did not receive comparable benefits. Further, the Agreement contemplated Ms. Turner’s continued involvement in BSL, because she was to have access to certain ³⁶⁶ financial records of the Company in order to complete the Company’s tax returns for 1994,1995, and 1996. Following a pendente lite hearing before the master in December 1998, the terms of the Agreement were, in effect, incorporated into an Order dated December 11, 1998. 5 Mr. Turner was ordered to pay $2756.61 per week in alimony, effective August 1, 1998, which represented $2500 per week in alimony, comparable to the salary expressed in the August 1997 Agreement, plus a pro rata weekly portion of an additional monthly payment of $1112 for prepayment of principal on the mortgage.

The mortgage payments were to be made by appellant. At trial, Ms. Turner admitted that from 1976 until 1994 both parties diverted funds from BSL for personal use, and to pay some BSL employees “under the table.” Appellant claimed, however, that the practice originated with appellee. Although the monies were not recorded on BSL’s books, Ms. Turner kept records of the diverted funds, so that she would be able to account for the monies in case they were caught by the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”). The Turners referred to these funds as “NC” money, meaning “not claiming.” When a former BSL employee threatened in 1994 to disclose the parties’ conduct to the IRS, the Turners decided to terminate this practice.

Ms. Turner maintained that she was unaware that appellee had resumed the “NC” practice until the parties separated in June 1997. At that time, she found a folder marked “NC” in appellee’s office, and learned that Mr. Turner had resumed the illegal activity in 1995. Accordingly, appellant demanded an accounting of the monies appellee had taken, and an amount equal to what he took. She also threatened to report appellee to the IRS if he failed to comply.

By March 1999, appellee conceded that he had taken NC funds of approximately $112,000 from BSL. By then, howev ³⁶⁷ er, appellant had already reported her husband’s actions to the IRS. Anticipating that his wife would make good on her threat, appellee also informed the IRS of what had transpired. Consequently, Mr. Turner paid back taxes, penalties, and interest.

When the parties separated, appellee withdrew $48,000 from the parties’ joint account, leaving an equal amount for appellant. Appellant responded by writing a check to herself for approximately $30,000, drawn on BSL. She justified her conduct by claiming she was attempting to prevent appellee from using Company money for drugs. At trial, appellee took the Fifth Amendment when questioned about the $48,000, and when asked about the $112,000 that he had taken in NC monies.

He also declined to explain fully the use to which he put the money that he diverted from BSL. The parties presented expert evidence at trial as to the value of BSL. Andrew R. Lombardo, who testified for appel-lee, valued the Company at $810,799 as of December 31, 1998. Appellant’s expert, R. Christopher Rosenthal, appraised the Company at $1,081,310 as of the same date.

With respect to appellant’s claim for alimony, she insisted that she should not have to find new employment, arguing that it is unfair for appellee to harvest all the benefits of their joint labor with respect to BSL, while she is forced to start over again. The following testimony is relevant: [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: What is it that you are seeking in these proceedings other than a divorce? [APPELLANT]: Equality as far as income from our company. [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: What, if any, objection do you have to going out and getting a job now? [APPELLANT]: I feel that after 25 years I paid my dues, and did, and, if he can stay [at BSL] and continue to reap the benefits of my efforts over 25 years, and I have to go and start all over again, it’s just outrageous. ³⁶⁸ [APPELLEE’S ATTORNEY]: Since your separation you have never tried to get employment; is that correct? [APPELLANT]: That’s correct. * * * [APPELLEE’S ATTORNEY]: And the reason given the Master was that you have your own company. That was what you told her[?] [APPELLANT]: Yes. I believe I am still part of this company. [APPELLEE’S ATTORNEY]: And you don’t feel that you are capable of working because it would be very difficult to work for someone else after working for yourself for so long, correct? [APPELLANT]: I believe for some people it would be. [APPELLEE’S ATTORNEY]: It would be hard for you to take directions from someone else[?] [APPELLANT]: Yes.

I’m used to giving directions. [APPELLEE’S ATTORNEY]: And there are no other reasons why you’re not capable of being employed other than that reason, correct, ma’am? [APPELLANT]: As far as I know. Lee Mintz, a certified rehabilitation counselor, testified as an expert for appellee. She completed an “employability assessment” of Ms. Turner and conducted a labor market survey. Premised upon Ms. Turner’s work history and the survey, Ms. Mintz opined that Ms. Turner was employable and capable of earning a salary of about $35,000 per year.

The following testimony of Ms. Mintz is noteworthy: [MINTZ]: ... I was asked to determine Ms. Turner’s employability and also to determine the salary that she would be able to earn given her skill, experience, etcetera. ³⁶⁹ [A] labor market survey was performed of positions, recently advertised positions, that would encompass duties that were similar to the types of duties that [Ms.] Turner performed in her position and then salaries were named for those positions. [APPELLEE’S ATTORNEY]: Now based on your expertise in this area and based upon your interview of [Ms.] Turner and the market survey that you performed, do you have an opinion based upon reasonable certainty in the vocational area as to whether or not [Ms.] Turner is employable at this time? [MINTZ]: Yes. I believe she’s employable. [APPELLEE’S ATTORNEY]: And upon what do you base that opinion? [MINTZ]: I base it upon her over twenty years of experience in clerical positions and supervisory positions, her indicated skills and knowledge of accounts payable, accounts receivable, payroll, human resources skills and her knowledge of computer — different computer programs that are used in the area, her knowledge of not only just the programs but training people in computers and installing programs. She seemed to have wide skills and experiences. [APPELLEE’S ATTORNEY]: Now, do you have an opinion, ma’am, based upon reasonable vocational certainty as to the range of salaries that would be applicable to [Ms.] Turner’s job description were she to return to the work force? [MINTZ]: Well, I would feel that her — the salary range would probably go anywhere from around $30,000 up into the low $40,000’s probably with an average of about $35,000. [APPELLEE’S ATTORNEY]: What type of position would you believe that she would be best suited for at this time? ³⁷⁰ [MINTZ]: Given everything she’s done before, I would say an accounts payable, accounts receivable or payroll supervisor.

Probably a job that incorporates some human resources, office knowledge. Maybe some office administration. [APPELLEE’S ATTORNEY]: Ma’am, do you have an opinion based upon your expertise, the interview and your market survey and based upon reasonable vocational certainty as to what [Ms.] Turner would be able to average per year were she to return to the work force and employment that you have just described? [MINTZ]: I feel that she would be able to earn an average salary of $35,000 per year. Copies of the parties’ federal and State tax returns were introduced in evidence, some of which were amended returns. In 1994, the Turners had an adjusted gross income of $243,007, including wage income of $238,050.

Their adjusted gross income increased to $282,301 for 1995, inclusive of wages of $276,245. For 1996, the parties had an adjusted gross income of $299,276, with reported wages of $283,449. For 1997, the year when the parties separated, Mr. Turner filed a separate federal tax return in which he personally reported total income of $199,853, inclusive of a salary of $192,260. In August of that year, BSL began to pay appellant $2500 per week, pursuant to the parties’ Agreement.

Appellee subsequently made alimony payments, in the same amount, through 1999. Thus, the court found that for 1997, the parties’ combined income exceeded $300,000. In 1998, Mr. Turner again filed a separate federal tax return. In that year, appellant received $2500 per week from BSL, and Mr. Turner reported total adjusted income of $138,712; his BSL wages were $139,450. 6 ³⁷¹ At trial, appellant claimed current monthly expenses of $12,341, inclusive of monthly legal and accounting fees of $3567 generated by the underlying litigation, and monthly mortgage payments of $2951.

Appellant detailed her expenses in an exhibit that listed items ranging from groceries to pet supplies. The exhibit indicated that, once the marital home was “paid off,” appellant’s expenses would decrease to $9976. Further, without legal and accounting fees associated with the litigation, her expenses would decrease to $6409. Appellee claimed “projected” monthly expenses of $7410.50, and current monthly expenses of $5504.55. 7 Following the divorce trial in November 1999, the court held the matter sub curia, pending resolution of the corporate case, then set for trial in March 2000.

In the interim, based on the evidence adduced at the divorce trial, the court issued a seven-page Order docketed December 16, 1999, addressing the issues of temporary alimony and attorney’s fees. Pursuant to the Order, the court reduced appellee’s alimony obligation from $2500 a week to $2000 per week. The court also required appellee to contribute $1,112 per month “to the prepayment of the principal on the mortgage until that is paid in full,” and one-half of the real property taxes when due. Further, the court found that appellant owed approximately $22,000 in attorneys’ fees and expenses related to the litigation, and that there was “substantial justification” for these fees.

Therefore, the court ordered appellee to make an interim payment of $6000 towards appellant’s attorneys’ fees. In setting the amount of interim alimony, the court considered the monthly expenses that appellant claimed at trial. It noted that at trial appellant projected average monthly expenses of about $13,000 through January 2000, when the mortgage on the marital home was expected to be satisfied. Of that sum, the court observed that there were significant ³⁷² legal and accounting fees associated with the “ongoing litigation,” noting that appellant’s expense statement “contemplates that [the] alimony payment will cover at least a portion of [the] ongoing legal bills.” The court also pointed out that when the house is paid off, appellant’s expenses will decrease to about $10,000 per month.

Upon review, the court completely disallowed $1551 of appellant’s itemized expenses. It found other expenses “excessive,” and reduced them from about $1822 to $1200. In sum, the court rejected about $2100 of appellant’s claimed monthly expenses. By a “Ruling” filed on February 1, 2000, the court denied appellee’s motion to alter or amend, and obligated BSL to pay a bonus to appellant for 1998 equal to appellee’s bonus.

In its Corporate Opinion of April 2000, the court denied the claim for declaratory relief, declined to grant a constructive trust or to disregard the corporate entity, found no grounds for estoppel, and denied the remaining counts based on the doctrine of “unclean hands.” Therefore, the court ruled in favor of Mr. Turner as to all pending counts (Counts II, IV, VI, IX, X and XI). In the Divorce Opinion of June 2000, the trial court valued the Turners’ marital property at $1,555,821.85, of which $488,930 was joint marital property. The court found that Mr. Turner had total assets worth $1,193,465, while Ms. Turner had total assets valued at $360,664. The court then made an “equitable” award to appellant of 55% of the total marital property, amounting to $855,702.

Therefore, the court made a monetary award to appellant of $495,038. 8 Appellant was also ³⁷³ awarded $21,792.71 from Mr. Turner’s pension to equalize the retirement funds. With respect to the value of marital property, the court determined that the family home was worth $440,000. The court ordered its sale, with the proceeds to be divided between the parties. The court did not award appellant any credits for the mortgage and real estate tax payments she had made.

In arriving at the value of BSL, which was the largest component of marital property, the court considered the testimony of the experts and found as the “more reliable method” of valuation the “Excess Earnings (Return on Assets) Reasonable Rate” method utilized by appellee’s expert. Before the application of any discounts, the court valued BSL at $1,158,285. Noting that the “real issue is what if any discounts” to apply, the court determined that the defense’s marketability discount was excessive, and considered a 20% discount as “a fair assessment.” To arrive at the fair market value of appellant’s interest, the court applied another discount of 20% to her shares, based on her lack of control over routine operations at BSL, and her “restrict[ion] to a role as an investor in the business.” The court valued appellee’s BSL stock at $806,166, and appellant’s BSL stock at $96,369. The court also found that appellee dissipated $112,000 by diverting that sum from BSL.

Thus, it attributed that amount to appellee. In making that finding, the court noted that appellee had acknowledged taking $112,000 as NC money, and observed that “Mr. Turner asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege when questioned about the manner in which those funds were taken or utilized.... ” Thus, it said: “[T]he Court is permitted to draw adverse inferences, and will consider that money as extant property, attributable to Mr. Turner, which was used by him.” Nevertheless, the court did not attribute to appellee the legal, tax, and accounting fees generated by the NC misappropriation, which were primarily paid by BSL. Moreover, the court did not attribute to appellee as dissipated marital property any of the $48,950 that he withdrew from the parties’ ³⁷⁴ joint bank account in June 1997. Appellee had explained his use of about $34,000 of that sum, and invoked his Fifth Amendment rights as to the remaining $14,950.

The court also concluded that neither party had any physical or mental condition that “restricts his or her ability to be gainfully employed.” Determining that Ms. Turner is “employable,” the court imputed to appellant earned annual income of $35,000, consistent with the opinion of appellee’s expert. Further, the court found that, prior to the separation, appellee was earning $3000 per week from BSL, plus an annual bonus, totaling about $160,000 per year, while Ms. Turner was paid about $1500 a week from BSL, plus a bonus, totaling about $80,000 to $85,000 a year. Moreover, the court found that for 1997, the year in which the parties separated, they had a combined annual salary of $302,770. Significantly, the court said: “Although Mr. Turner reported a drop in his 1999 salary to $130,000, the Court believes his actual earnings will more likely range between $175,000 and $200,000, and his earning potential is likely to continue to increase.” Of equal import, the court explained why Mr. Turner’s income had declined for that year, stating: “The Court notes that throughout 1999, Mrs. Turner continued to be paid by BSL at the rate of $2500 per week, pursuant to pendente lite orders, which undoubtedly affected the amounts Mr. Turner could draw in salary from the business.” The court added that “it is clear that BSL is financially sound.” Based on the court’s finding as to appellee’s current earnings from BSL ($175,000 to $200,000 per year) and the potential annual earned income attributed to appellant ($35,000), the court found “a significant disparity” in the parties’ incomes for purposes of alimony.

Recognizing “that this was a marriage of long duration,” in which the parties enjoyed “financial success and security ....,” the court expressly determined that the parties’ standards of living “will be unconscionably disparate, when considered in light of the standard of living that the parties worked to achieve and have jointly maintained ³⁷⁵ during the marriage.” Therefore, pursuant to Maryland Code (1999 RepLVol.), § ll-106(c) of the Family Law Article (“F.L.”), the court awarded Ms. Turner indefinite monthly alimony. However, it reduced the amount of alimony from $2000 a week to $2000 a month. With respect to the determination to award indefinite alimony, the court reasoned that appellee’s “career path is set, and will continue to prove lucrative,” while appellant’s “earning potential ... has been significantly reduced,” because the divorce “derailed [her] from her career.” Thus, the court concluded that the divorce “severely impacted [appellant’s] day to day life.” It also determined that, “at this stage of appellant’s life there is no suggestion that additional training is going to increase her marketability.” As we observed, at various times during the litigation, appellant had previously received between $2000 and $2500 per week, either as salary from BSL or as alimony from appellee. In arriving at the alimony award of $2000 per month, the court considered appellant’s assets, the monetary award, and the income that the monetary award was expected to generate.

The court did not specify, however, the amount it believed the monetary award would reasonably yield as a supplement for appellant’s support. Further, the court ordered Mr. Turner to contribute $13,000 towards Ms. Turner’s attorneys’ fees, in addition to the $6000 that had been awarded in December 1999. The Divorce Opinion also included a section titled “Clarification of Rulings on Corporate Claims,” in which the court addressed certain aspects of the corporate suit, previously addressed in its Corporate Opinion, to “avoid any uncertainty.” The Judgment of Absolute Divorce, filed on July 19, 2000, incorporated the terms of the Divorce Opinion. Pursuant to the divorce decree, $150,000 of the monetary award was to be paid to appellant within 45 days of the date of judgment, and the balance was due within six months, without interest.

Both sides timely moved to alter or amend judgment. ³⁷⁶ In appellant’s post-trial motion, filed on July 25, 2000, appellant complained, inter alia, about the amount of the alimony award, the amount of money that the court found appellee to have dissipated, the court’s failure to award “Crawford” credits, and the award of attorneys’ fees. Appellant also argued that the court erred in finding that appellee’s current income was in the range of $175,000 to $200,000 per year. Further, she complained that the court placed “undue emphasis” on the amount of the monetary award in determining the alimony award. In regard to the amount of monthly alimony, Ms. Turner submitted a copy of appellant’s W-2 Form for the 1999 calendar year, which was not available at the time of the divorce trial in November 1999.

It showed that Mr. Turner had a gross income for 1999 of $263,763.15. In addition, appellant pointed out that the “full expenditures” for the marital home would continue until the sale was completed on July -31, 2000. Asserting that “this Plaintiff of 34 years of marriage” faced considerable hardship, appellant pointed out that she had just been mandated to obtain employment, but did not yet have a job. Moreover, she noted that no payment of any portion of the monetary award was due for 45 days following the date of judgment.

Appellant thus claimed a monthly shortfall- of about $4000 between the alimony of $2000 a month and her necessary monthly expenses. On July 31, 2000, settlement was held with respect to the sale of the marital home. The records reflect that parties each received net proceeds of about $150,000. Also on July 31, 2000, appellee moved to alter or amend, claiming, inter alia, that the court erred in failing to find as extant property the unauthorized withdrawal of $30,000 in BSL funds, made by appellant at the time of separation.

In addition, on August 14, 2000, appellee filed a “Response To Plaintiffs [appellant’s] Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, Or In The Alternative, Motion For New Trial.” In his re-' sponse, appellee did not dispute the accuracy of his income as reflected on his 1999 W-2, nor did he assert that the court should not consider his 1999 income in its alimony determina ³⁷⁷ tion. Moreover, appellee did not claim that he had to borrow money to finance the monetary award, nor did he refer to the distribution to the parties of proceeds from the sale of the marital home. Rather, appellee said, in pertinent part: The amount of alimony awarded by the Court was made after due consideration of the monetary award, wife’s interest in jointly held property as well as wife’s continued interest in Baltimore State Lighting, Inc. It amply reflects the reasonable expenses of E. Diane Turner and her absolute employability. No hearing was held on the post-trial motions.

By Order of September 20, 2000, the court corrected the monetary award, increasing it to $500,588 because of a miscalculation with respect to the parties’ burial plots. In all other respects, the court denied the motions. In its opinion, the court explained that it “fully considered” the matter of Crawford credits, and therefore it declined to modify its prior ruling as to that issue. Concerning the amount of alimony, the court said: Ms. Turner also seeks to review the amount of alimony that was awarded, contending that it is inadequate to meet her needs.

In particular, she argues that the Court accorded undue weight to the marital award in determining the amount of alimony. Under FL § 11-106, that was a factor that was considered, but it was not the only factor. It should be noted, however, that the amount of the marital award also clearly impacts on Mr. Turner’s financial needs and resources as it is predicated primarily on the differential in the value of the BSL stock owned by each party. While this stock is an asset of significant value, it is not one that can be sold or liquidated.

This was another fact to be considered in evaluating the financial circumstances of the parties, in light of the marital award, when considering alimony. The factors under the statute were weighed and evaluated by the court when alimony was awarded at the time of the original ruling, and will not be reconsidered at this time. ³⁷⁸ On September 2, 2000, appellee made a partial payment of $70,000 to appellant with respect to the monetary award, leaving a balance of $80,000 on the first portion of the award, due on September 5, 2001. Shortly thereafter, appellant filed a “Notice of Non Payment and Request for Entry of Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc,” seeking to obtain the balance due on the first portion of the monetary award. In addition, she filed á contempt petition in September 2000, which largely concerned corporate issues, but also asserted that, “[d]espite the sale of the family home and Mr. Turner’s receipt of $148,644.00 from the sale of the family home on July 31, 2000, Mr. Turner paid the [wife] only $70,000.00 leaving $80,000.00 unpaid.” On September 26, 2000, the court entered judgment against appellee for $80,000.

The Clerk subsequently issued a Writ of Garnishment against appellee for collection of the judgment. Appellant filed her appeal on October 13, 2000. Thereafter, on November 9, 2000, she filed a contempt petition against appellee for the $80,000 due and owing on the first portion of the monetary award. In addition, she averred that, as of November 8, 2000, appellee had “refused to pay the alimony due November 1, 2000 despite the request of [wife’s] counsel ...' and a personal request by the [wife].... ” The court entered a Consent Order on December 19, 2000, continuing the contempt proceedings and ordering discovery.

Appellant filed another contempt petition on January 16, 2001, in relation to discovery. Thereafter, a judgment was entered against appellee on February 9, 2001, for $350,588, representing the balance of the monetary award due and owing to appellant. On May 9, 2001, approximately ten months after the judgment of divorce was docketed, and about seven months after appellant noted her appeal, Mr. Turner satisfied his obligations as to the monetary award by payment of $361,249.72. We shall include additional facts in our discussion. ³⁷⁹ DISCUSSION I. MOTION TO DISMISS Appellees have moved to dismiss the entire appeal, claiming that appellant is barred from challenging any aspect of the judgment.

They contend that, before and after filing her appeal, Ms. Turner “judicially” sought to enforce the divorce decree by filing three contempt petitions. Because appellant “pursued” and “collected by judicial enforcement” a monetary award in excess of $500,000, appellees argue that appellant “cannot now attack any element of the judgment.” Relying on Chimes v. Michael, 131 Md.App. 271 , 748 A.2d 1065 , cert. denied, 359 Md. 334 , 753 A.2d 1031 (2000), they argue that appellant “is estopped from seeking to question the validity of the Court’s judgment as to all issues.... ” Interestingly, appellees did not contend that appellant did not need the monetary award for support. In her opposition, appellant observes that Mr. Turner did not cross-appeal. Thus, she asserts that “the right to the marital award benefit received is conceded by the Appel-lee....” Ms. Turner also argues that she is not barred from pursuing her appeal because she needed to accept the money from the marital award for “necessary support.” At the time of the divorce decree, appellant was unemployed.

Indeed, at that point, the court had just ruled that she was employable, but she had not yet secured employment. She also explains that the court reduced her alimony from $2000 a week to $2000 a month because it believed the marital award would generate sufficient income for her support. Based on Mr. Turner’s refusal to pay the monetary award when due, however, appellant maintains that she had “little or no income generated.” Indeed, she claims that she was “forced to invade her principal from the marital award to supplement” the court’s reduction in her alimony, adding: “The monetary award monies had to be paid in order to ³⁸⁰ provide the bare minimum necessary support monthly to Ms. Turner until the final adjudication by the Appeals Court.” In her brief, Ms. Turner argues: The Court’s ruling on alimony clearly notes that in determining to award alimony of only $2,000.00 per month, ... the Court was particularly considering the amount of the monetary award and the estimates provided [as to] the income stream that those assets would generate for Mrs. Turner____ Income from investments to Mrs. Turner of between $68,000.00 and $82,000.00 were necessary to meet the standard of living that the parties had worked so hard to achieve and had jointly maintained during their marriage. Accordingly, the receipt of the marital award funds and the income hopefully produced by those funds was therefore necessary for Mrs. Turner to apply towards her day-to-day living expenses....

To extend the acquiescence doctrine as Mr. Turner has requested in this Motion where Mrs. Turner needed income from the investments to meet her living expenses would be a travesty of justice.... The monetary award monies had to be paid in order to provide the bare minimum necessary support monthly to Mrs. Turner until the final adjudication by the Appeals Court. We are guided by the Court of Appeals’s recent decision in Downtown Brewing Company, Inc. v. Mayor and City Council of Ocean City, 370 Md. 145 , 803 A.2d 545 (2002), a condemnation case. There, the Court dismissed the appeal because, “by its conduct,” the appellant “waived” for appellate review the question of whether Ocean City had authority to condemn the property for use in a state highway project.

Id. at 148 , 803 A.2d 545 . The conduct that led to the finding of waiver was the appellant’s acceptance of the condemnation award, despite its challenge to the underlying proceeding. Id. at 146-47 , 803 A.2d 545 . ³⁸¹ The Court recognized the “general rule” that “ ‘an appellant cannot take the inconsistent position of accepting the benefits of a judgment and then challenge its validity on appeal.’ ” Id. at 149 , 803 A.2d 545 (citation omitted). As the Court noted, the “general preclusion has been variously termed as waiver, estoppel, acceptance of benefits creating mootness, and acquiescence in judgment.” Id.

Regardless of the label, “ ‘[t]he right to appeal may be lost by acquiescence in, or in recognition of, the validity of the decision below from which an appeal is taken....’” Id. (quoting Rocks v. Brosius, 241 Md. 612, 630 , 217 A.2d 531 (1966)). Such conduct is “inconsistent” with the right to appeal. Id.

Nevertheless, because the Court regards the doctrine as “a severe one,” it has held that “it should only be applied to actions taken by the same litigant that are necessarily inconsistent and that a claim on appeal that one is entitled to more money is not inconsistent.” Id. Of significance here, the Court expressly identified as an “exception” to the acquiescence rule those cases in which “the right to the benefit received is conceded by the opposing party or where the appellant would be entitled to the proceeds in any event.” Id. at 150, 803 A.2d 545 . In this regard, the Court cited Dietz v. Dietz, 351 Md. 683, 696-97 , 720 A.2d 298 (1998), in which it denied a motion to dismiss the appeal in a domestic case when “only the amount of alimony awarded was contested.” Downtown Brewing, 370 Md. at 150 , 803 A.2d 545 . The Court concluded, however, that the appellant in Downtown Brewing could not “shoehorn” itself into the exception, because its challenge was not confined to the sufficiency of an award.

Id. at 151 , 803 A.2d 545 . Dietz, 351 Md. 683 , 720 A.2d 298 , cited in Downtown Brewing , is instructive. In that case, the trial court ordered partial payment of a monetary award (i.e., $20,000) in thirty days, with the balance of $225,000 payable in monthly installments of $1,250 over a fifteen year period. Id. at 686, 720 A.2d 298 .

On appeal to this Court, the appellant sought an increase in the monetary award. We dismissed the appeal, however, based on the acquiescence doctrine, because the ³⁸² appellant had accepted partial payments of the award. See Dietz v. Dietz, 117 Md.App. 724, 741 , 701 A.2d 1144 (1997). The Court of Appeals disagreed and reversed.

The Court said that, “ ‘[i]f applicable at all in a divorce case, the [acquiescence] bar cannot be raised where the benefits accruing to the wife, by reason of the award, provide necessary support until the final adjudication of the case.’ ” Id. at 695, 720 A.2d 298 (citation omitted). For purposes of the acquiescence rule, the Court analogized the monthly award of payments to those made in workers’ compensation, alimony, and condemnation cases. Moreover, the Court recognized that “the acquiescence doctrine ‘is a severe one and should not be extended.’ ” Id. (citation omitted).

Noting that the appellee did not contest the monetary award, id. at 696 , 720 A.2d 298 , the Court said that “the acquiescence rule does not apply where there is no cross-appeal and the appellant seeks only an increase in an undisputed minimum. ” Id. at 695 , 720 A.2d 298 (emphasis added). Construing Dietz, the Court in-Chimes observed that Dietz reached its conclusion based on the “alimony-like effect of a scheme of monthly payments, rather than on that scheme’s actual nomenclature.” Chimes, 131 Md.App. at 285 , 748 A.2d 1065 . Chimes is factually distinguishable from Dietz. The appellant-in Chimes accepted a monetary award of about $1.5 million, which represented 50% of the marital property, other than stock options.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the court’s disposition of the stock options. This Court dismissed the appeal, however, based on the acquiescence doctrine. We observed that appellant “accepted almost $1.5 million from the equitable distribution of marital assets and appeals the same.” Id. at 281 , 748 A.2d 1065 . Indeed, we pointed out that he filed a statement of satisfaction under Maryland Rule 2-626(a) on the same day that he filed a second notice of appeal; the second notice was filed because the trial court had issued an amended judgment, giving rise to the second appeal.

Id. Moreover, we concluded that “the large lump sum award already enjoyed by [the husband] does ³⁸³ not have the support-like effect of the payments made in Dietz.” Chimes, 131 Md.App. at 286 , 748 A.2d 1065 (footnote omitted). We added: “Dietz is also distinguishable from the present case in that Mrs. Dietz only accepted a small portion of the judgment before she appealed. Chimes, in contrast, accepted the entire monetary award, even seeking to execute on its unpaid portions and filing a Notice of Appeal on the same day that he entered a line stating that the judgment had been satisfied.” Id.

(internal citations omitted). In our view, the case sub judice is more akin to Dietz than to Chimes or Downtown Brewing . The trial court made a monetary award to appellant of $500,588.00, of which $150,000 was due 45 days after the judgment; the balance was not payable until six months from the date of judgment. As we have seen, however, appellee did not timely pay either portion of the monetary award.

By the time of appeal, appellee had only paid $80,000 of the total monetary award, equal to less than 20% of the entire award. Thus, when Ms. Turner appealed, the monetary award was not yet paid in full. Indeed, the monetary award was not satisfied until May 9, 2001, about ten months after the judgment of absolute divorce was docketed. Thus, this case is altogether unlike the situation in Chimes , where the entire monetary award of $1.5 million was paid before the appeal at issue was noted.

Significantly, the court below substantially reduced appellant’s alimony from $2000 a week to $2000 per month, expressly because it believed the marital award would generate an income stream for appellant’s support; it clearly regarded the marital award as a significant component of appellant’s support. The court said: “Both parties will leave this marriage with significant assets. In particular, the Court is considering that amount of the monetary award in evaluating the issue of alimony. Estimates were provided of the income stream those assets will generate for Mrs. Turner.” (Emphasis added).

Of particular import, appellees have not argued that appellant did not need the monetary award as a component of her ³⁸⁴ support. To the contrary,■ they have suggested that the alimony award was adequate precisely because of the income that the monetary award was expected to produce. It is equally noteworthy that appellees did not file a cross-appeal challenging any aspect of the monetary award. As the Court said in Dietz, 351 Md. at 695 , 720 A.2d 298 , “the acquiescence rule does not apply where there is no cross-appeal and the appellant seeks only an increase in an undisputed minimum.” That is precisely the situation here; appellant seeks an increase from an undisputed minimum of $2000 per month in alimony.

Even if, arguendo, the divorce case were not appealable, appellees have not suggested why this would foreclose the appealability of the corporate case. Indeed, appellees have not provided us with any authority to support their assertion that appellant’s conduct in accepting the monetary award in the divorce casé bars her from pursuing the appeal in the corporate case. The court below consolidated the divorce and corporate cases after they were tried, but did not issue a unitary judgment. Moreover, in Yarema v. Exxon Corp., 305 Md. 219 , 503 A.2d 239 (1986), the Court recognized that, “unless the trial court clearly intends that a joint judgment be entered disposing of all cases simultaneously,” id. at 236 , 503 A.2d 239 , consolidated cases are generally not treated as one case for the purpose of Rule 2-602. “[IJnstead, each one of the cases is to be treated as a separate action.” Id.

For all these reasons, we shall deny appellees’ motion to dismiss.

II

Attribution of Income to Appellant As the court noted in its Order of December 16, 1999, appellant had “no intention to seek employment, and her only source of revenue has been alimony payments.” Moreover, appellant believed she had “paid her dues.” Nevertheless, the court imputed earned income to appellant of $35,000. In so doing, Ms. Turner complains that the trial court erred. Ap ³⁸⁵ pellant argues that it was grossly unfair for the court “to essentially force [her] to get employment, inevitably as a start-up employee” given the length of the parties’ marriage, her age, contributions to BSL, and appellee’s egregious conduct. This contention shall not detain us long.

Appellant conflates the court’s finding of employability, for which it attributed income to appellant for purposes of the alimony analysis, with the view that the court has forced her to obtain employment outside the home. As we see it, the court’s finding that appellant is capable of employment does not mean that she must actually obtain employment. Put another way, appellant has not been driven into the marketplace, as she seems to suggest; whether appellant actually chooses to obtain employment remains entirely up to her. Nevertheless, appellant is clearly employable, given her age, health, work experience, skills, and the absence of minor children in the home.

Therefore, the court was more than justified in attributing potential earnings to appellant as a predicate to determining the appropriate amount of alimony. Appellant did not offer evidence that contradicted the expert testimony of Lee Mintz, who opined that appellant is employable and could expect to earn an annual salary of about $35,000. It was clearly the province and responsibility of the court to assess and weigh the testimony of the witnesses. See Binnie v. State, 321 Md. 572, 580 , 583 A.2d 1037 (1991); Hill v. State, 134 Md.App. 327, 355 , 759 A.2d 1164 , cert. denied, 362 Md. 188 , 763 A.2d 735 (2000) (“Weighing the credibility of the witnesses and resolving any conflicts in the evidence are tasks proper for the factfinder.”) The court was entitled to accept Mintz’s testimony.

See Long v. Long, 129 Md.App. 554, 570 , 743 A.2d 281 (2000)(stating that the trier of fact must evaluate the conflicting testimony of expert witnesses and decide which opinion, if any, to accept).

III

The Alimony Award Appellant contends that, even if she is capable of earning $35,000 annually, the court abused its discretion in regard to ³⁸⁶ the amount of its monthly alimony award. Under the circumstances attendant here, she maintains that the alimony award of $2000 a month is “grossly inadequate.” Appellant advances several grounds to support her claim. In particular, she suggests that appellee earns substantially more than the court found, and therefore the court erred as to the annual income attributed to him for purposes of making its alimony determination. Further, while recognizing that she received a sizeable marital award, appellant asserts that the award merely “placed [her] long-term assets on a par with that of her husband.” Appellant also complains of the inequity in being forced out of BSL, a business that she worked hard to develop, and of having to “start all over,” with the attendant difficulty of finding suitable employment, while ap-pellee is allowed to “reap the rewards” of their joint effort.

Appellant is particularly disgruntled in light of appellee’s conduct, which led to the dissolution of the marriage. For his part, appellee argues that, in deciding the amount of alimony, the trial court properly considered the division of marital property and the income stream that appellant’s share will inevitably generate. Appellee also relies on Blaine v. Blaine, 336 Md. 49 , 646 A.2d 413 (1994), for the view that “the formerly dependent spouse ordinarily is not entitled to have his or her standard of living ‘keep pace’ with that of the other spouse after the divorce, or to share in the other spouse’s future accumulations of wealth.” Id. at 70 , 646 A.2d 413 . Before focusing on the contentions raised by appellant,' it is helpful to clarify what is not at issue.

As we noted, the trial court found an unconscionable disparity in the parties’ incomes and standards of living, and those findings have not been challenged by Mr. Turner. Similarly, appellee has not presented a claim of error or abuse of discretion in the court’s decision to award indefinite alimony or with respect to the marital award. Thus, our sole focus here concerns the amount of the monthly alimony award. In analyzing the amount of the award, we are mindful of what the Court said in Crabill v. Crabill, 119 Md.App. 249 , 704 A.2d 532 (1998): ³⁸⁷ “There is no bright line for determining the propriety of an alimony award.... ” Id. at 266 , 704 A.2d 532 (citation omitted).

Rather, each case depends upon its own circumstances “ ‘to ensure that equity be accomplished.’ ” Id. (quoting Alston v. Alston, 331 Md. 496, 507 , 629 A.2d 70 (1993)). It is well settled that “the ‘policy of this State is to limit alimony, where appropriate, to a definite term in order to provide each party with an incentive to become fully self-supporting.’ ” Digges v. Digges, 126 Md.App. 361, 386 , 730 A.2d 202 (quoting Jensen v. Jensen, 103 Md.App. 678, 692 , 654 A.2d 914 (1995)), cert. denied, 356 Md. 17 , 736 A.2d 1065 (1999) ; see Karmand v. Karmand, 145 Md.App. 317, 327-330 , 802 A.2d 1106 (2002). Accordingly, “Maryland’s statutory scheme favors fixed-term, ‘rehabilitative alimony’ rather than indefinite alimony.” Innerbichler v. Innerbichler, 132 Md. App. 207, 244 , 752 A.2d 291 , cert. denied, 361 Md. 232 , 760 A.2d 1107 (2000); see Durkee v. Durkee, 144 Md.App. 161, 174 , 797 A.2d 94 , cert. denied, 370 Md. 269 , 805 A.2d 266 (August 23, 2002); Roginsky v. Blake-Roginsky, 129 Md.App. 132, 142 , 740 A.2d 125 (1999), cert. denied, 358 Md. 164 , 747 A.2d 645 (2000) .

Rehabilitative alimony is intended to ease the transition from dependence to self-support. Turrisi v. Sanzaro, 308 Md. 515, 524-25 , 520 A.2d 1080 (1987); Innerbichler, 132 Md.App. at 244 , 752 A.2d 291 . The goal is “to vitiate any further need for alimony.” Hull v. Hull, 83 Md.App. 218, 223 , 574 A.2d 20 , cert. denied, 321 Md. 67 , 580 A.2d 1077 (1990). In the seminal case of Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md. 380 , 614 A.2d 590 (1992), the Court of Appeals explained: [TJhe purpose of alimony is not to provide a lifetime pension, but where practicable to ease the transition for the parties from the joint married state to their new status as single people living apart and independently.

Expressed otherwise, alimony’s purpose is to provide an opportunity for the recipient spouse to become self-supporting. The concept of alimony as life-long support enabling the dependent spouse to maintain an accustomed standard of living has largely been superseded by the view that the dependent ³⁸⁸ spouse should be required , to become self-supporting, even though that might result in a reduced standard of living. Id. at 391 , 614 A.2d 590 (citations and quotations omitted). The statutory scheme is codified in Title 11 of the Family Law Article.

The statutory factors governing the award of alimony are set forth in F.L. § 11 — 106(b). See Doser v. Doser, 106 Md.App. 329, 355-56 , 664 A.2d 453 (1995). Family Law § 11 — 106(b) states: (1) the ability of the party seeking alimony to be wholly or partially self-supporting; (2) the time necessary for the party seeking alimony to gain sufficient education or training to enable that party to find suitable employment; (3) the standard of living that the parties established during their marriage; (4) the duration of the marriage; (5) the contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party to the well-being of the family; (6) the circumstances that contributed to the estrangement of the parties; (7) the age of each party; (8) the physical and mental condition of each party; (9) the ability of the party from whom alimony is sought to meet that party’s needs while meeting the needs of the party seeking alimony; (10) any agreement between the parties; and ' (11) the financial needs and financial resources of each party, including: (i) all income and assets, including property that does not produce income; (ii) any [monetary] award made ...; (iii) the nature and amount of the financial obligations of each party; and ³⁸⁹ (iv) the right of each party to receive retirement benefits .... Although “the court ‘need not use formulaic language or articulate every reason for its decision with respect to each factor, [it] must clearly indicate that it has considered all the factors.’ ” Digges, 126 Md.App. at 387 , 730 A.2d 202 (citations omitted).

The General Assembly has recognized that rehabilitative alimony is not always appropriate or suitable. Therefore, the statutory scheme allows a trial court, in its discretion, to ensure “ ‘an appropriate degree of spousal support ... after the dissolution of a marriage.’ ” Innerbickler, 132 Md.App. at 246 , 752 A.2d 291 (quoting Tracey, 328 Md. at 388 , 614 A.2d 590 ). In this regard, F.L. § 11-106(c) states: (c) Award for indefinite period.-The court may award alimony for an indefinite period, if the court finds that: (1) due to age, illness, infirmity, or disability, the party seeking alimony cannot reasonably be expected to make substantial progress toward becoming self-supporting; or (2) even after the party seeking alimony will have made as much progress toward becoming self-supporting as can reasonably be expected, the respective standards of living of the parties will be unconscionably disparate. The party seeking indefinite alimony bears the burden of satisfying the statutory criteria.

See Crabill, 119 Md.App. at 260-61 , 704 A.2d 532 ; Doser, 106 Md.App. at 353 , 664 A.2d 453 . Notably, “self-sufficiency per se does not bar an award of indefinite alimony [under F.L. § ll-106(c),] if there nonetheless exists an unconscionable disparity in the parties’ standards of living after divorce.” Tracey, 328 Md. at 392-93 , 614 A.2d 590 . In Roginsky, 129 Md.App. at 146 , 740 A.2d 125 , this Court explained the relationship between F.L. § 11 — 106(c)(1) and (c)(2), stating: Section ll-106(c) of the Family Law Article requires a finding, under subsection (1), as to whether a party can make substantial progress toward becoming self-supporting; if not, that finding may justify a conclusion that alimony be ³⁹⁰ indefinite. If a court projects that a party will become self-supporting, subsection (2) provides that, if and when a party makes as much progress toward becoming self-supporting as can reasonably be expected, an award of indefinite alimony may still be justified if the standards of living will be unconscionably disparate.

In other words, subsection (2) requires a projection into the future, based on the evidence, beyond the point in time when a party may be expected to become self-supporting. It requires a projection to the point when maximum progress can reasonably be expected. Generally, the trial court’s determination of unconscionable disparity under F.L. § 11 — 106(c) is a question of fact, subject to review under the clearly erroneous standard. See Ware v. Ware, 131 Md.App. 207, 228 , 748 A.2d 1031 (2000).

As we explained in Ware : “The existence of ‘unconscionably disparate’ standards of living is a question of fact in the domain of the fact-finder. In fact, the trial judge is given so much discretion on this issue that [, until Roginsky v. Blake Roginsky,'] we have never reversed a trial court’s award of indefinite spousal support in a published opinion.” Id. at 229 , 748 A.2d 1031 (citation omitted). In contrast, the alimony award itself is a matter within the discretion of the chancellor. Blaine, 336 Md. at 74 , 646 A.2d 413 ; Ware, 131 Md.App. at 227 , 748 A.2d 1031 .

Absent an abuse of discretion or legal error, we will not disturb the trial court’s decision. Tracey, 328 Md. at 385 , 614 A.2d 590 ; Crabill, 119 Md.App. at 260 , 704 A.2d 532 . See also North v. North, 102 Md.App. 1, 13-14 , 648 A.2d 1025 (1994) (discussing definition of abuse of discretion). To the contrary, “ ‘appellate courts mil accord great deference to the findings and judgments of trial judges, sitting in their equitable capacity, when conducting divorce proceedings.’ ” Ware, 131 Md.App. at 227, 748 A.2d 1031 (citation omitted).

The court found that appellee “currently” earns between $175,000 and $200,000 from BSL, and that “his earning potential is likely to increase.” Appellee has not disputed those ³⁹¹ findings. To the extent that the court found that appellant currently earns $175,000 per year, or even $200,000 a year, the finding was not supported by the evidence. Among other factors, the propriety of the annual alimony award of $24,000 must be measured against the income appellee actually earns. See F.L. § ll-106(b)(9).

For 1997, the court found that the parties had a combined income in excess of $300,000. In 1998, appellee, individually, reported wages of approximately $140,000. It is fallacious, however, to construe appellee’s 1998 earnings as an accurate measure of his economic position. As the circuit court noted in the Divorce Opinion, the amount appellee could draw in salary from BSL in 1998 was “undoubtedly affected” by the Company’s obligation to pay $2500 per week to appellant pursuant to the Agreement, and appellee’s subsequent court-ordered obligation to pay alimony in that amount.

Indeed, even appellee does not assert that his income in 1998 represented a realistic picture of his earnings history or earnings capacity. Moreover, because appellee’s corporate salary in 1998 ($140,000) was equal to appellant’s salary pursuant to their Agreement, the parties’ combined income from BSL in 1998 exceeded $260,000. Clearly, the court did not regard the $140,000 reported by appellee for 1998 as reflective of his actual earning capacity, given its finding that appellee earns between $175,000 and $200,000. Appellee’s W-2 for 1999, submitted without objection in connection with appellant’s post-trial motion, merely corroborated that appellee’s reported earnings for 1998 were aberrational.

According to the W-2 for 1999, appellee earned a salary of $263,763 from BSL. That sum was consistent with the parties’ earnings in 1995, 1996, and 1997, when their combined, adjusted gross incomes ranged from a low of $282,301 in 1995 to a high of over $300,000 in 1997. Significantly, in light of the divorce, appellant no longer has to divide or apportion between himself and appellant the salaries previously generated by BSL for the two corporate employees who were also the only owners of the Company. ³⁹² Put another way, appellee no longer has to share the monies previously paid to the parties in combined salaries. Because appellant no longer draws a salary from BSL, that money is now available to appellee, minus any cost of hiring someone to do the work that appellant once performed.

Therefore, Mr. Turner can undoubtedly retain for himself a large portion of the $80,000 to $85,000 that appellant, individually, had been paid while the parties were married, or the $130,000 per year that appellant received pursuant to the Agreement and the pendente lite alimony order. 9 It is clear, then, that the earnings that the court attributed to appellee (i.e., a range of $175,000 to $200,000) are not supported by the evidence. Rather, the court’s finding that appellee earns between $175,000 and $200,000 is between $60,000 and $85,000 less than appellee’s actual earnings or earnings capacity over the past several years. Based on the evidence, appellee could reasonably expect to earn about $260,000 annually from BSL. Moreover, as best we can determine, the earnings that the court attributed to appellee did not include the value of the benefits provided to him by BSL, such as a car, insurance, phone, and bonuses.

It follows that appellee’s'current salary of about $260,000 exceeds appellant’s imputed income of $35,000 by about $215,000, exclusive of her investment income, which we discuss, infra. Even if we agreed with the court’s income calculations for appellee of $175,000 to $200,000, our conclusion as to the court’s alimony award would be the same. By the court’s own analysis, appellee’s income is quite substantial and likely to increase. Whether appellee earns $175,000, $200,000, or $260,000 a year, we believe the court erred and/or abused its discretion with respect to its alimony award.

In reaching our conclusion, we rely, in part, on many of the court’s own findings. ■ We explain. ³⁹³ As the circuit court found, this was a marriage of considerable length, and it was appellee’s “conduct [that] gave rise to the estrangement between the parties.” Moreover, the court recognized that during their thirty-one years of marriage, both parties made “significant contributions” and devoted “substantial time and effort” to “the development of BSL from a fledgling company” to a significant corporate entity. The court found that appellant “was equally involved [with appel-lee] in the development of the business,” adding that BSL “would not have been as successful had [appellee] not had the consistent support and assistance of Diane Turner.” Nevertheless, as the court specifically found, Mr. Turner alone retains “the controlling ownership interest” in BSL; only he “remains enmeshed” in BSL, notwithstanding that “BSL has been as much [appellant’s] career and a focal point for her interests ... as it was for her husband.” Of particular import, the court expressly found that, as a consequence of the dissolution of the marriage, appellant “lost her career path .. .,” and now has an earning capacity of $35,000 a year. The parties’ lengthy mutual involvement in the lucrative family business distinguishes this case from others that suggest that, after divorce, a dependent spouse cannot expect to “keep pace” with the economic status of the person who was the primary economic provider during the marriage. See, e.g., Blaine, 336 Md. at 70 , 646 A.2d 413 .

Although we do not suggest that appellant was necessarily entitled to economic parity upon divorce, we recognize, as did the circuit court, that this is a case in which both parties helped to create BSL, and appellant worked for the Company for almost 25 years. Yet, despite appellant’s significant contributions to BSL and her length of service, the Company is now the source of substantial income only for Mr. Turner. While recognizing the length and value of appellant’s efforts, the circuit court noted that Mr. Turner’s “career path is set, and will continue to prove lucrative,” but appellant has been completely “derailed.” In awarding appellant $24,000 a year in alimony, the court was of the view that the “significant assets” with which both ³⁹⁴ parties left the marriage would yield an adequate supplement to appellant’s alimony and earned income. As noted, the court awarded appellant 55% of the marital property, which included the value of BSL.

Appellee maintains that the marital award is sufficient to rectify any inequity in earnings, despite the fact that he received marital property of almost equal value. As the trial court found, appellant played a vital role in helping the parties to amass their wealth. Yet, the almost equal division of the value of the Company hardly puts appellant on an equal footing with Mr. Turner. Appellee alone retains control of BSL, not merely 55% of its value, while appellant is no longer employed by the Company.

Therefore, appellee alone will continue to benefit from the opportunity to maintain lucrative employment with BSL, annually drawing about a quarter of a million dollars in salary, benefits, and bonuses. In contrast, appellant must now decide whether to confront the uncertainties of the marketplace, in the hope of obtaining new employment that will likely yield an income that is less than half of what appellant earned in her own name while at BSL, and a fraction of what the couple earned collectively. While the parties were married, it was not particularly significant as to how they apportioned their salaries, because both benefitted economically from the success of the enterprise that they jointly formed. At trial, Mr. Turner presented expert evidence from Jay Middleton, a financial planner, as to appellant’s potential income • from the investment of the monetary award.

Of course, Middleton could not predict with certainty a precise rate of return on investments. Instead, he provided estimates of the potential annual income that the monetary award would yield, in increments of $100,000, based on different investment strategies. Using a “conservative portfolio,” Middleton indicated that an initial investment of $100,000 would permit a “periodic withdrawal” 10 of $11,400, while an initial investment of ³⁹⁵ $500,000, with the same strategy, would permit an annual “withdrawal” of $57,000. Using a “balanced portfolio” approach, an initial investment of $100,000 would yield an annual “withdrawal” of $12,550, while an initial investment of $500,000 would yield a “periodic withdrawal” of $62,800.

Finally, for an “aggressive portfolio,” his report showed that an initial investment of $100,000 would allow an annual “withdrawal” of $13,500, while an initial investment of $500,000 would yield an annual “periodic withdrawal” of $67,500. Significantly, the court made no finding of even a minimal yield that it anticipated from appellant’s investments, so as to then calculate the amount of alimony it considered appropriate as a supplement for appellant’s support. Instead, it relied on unspecified “estimates” of the “income stream” that appellant’s share of the marital assets “will generate.” Evidently, the court believed that appellant’s investment income — whatever the amount — would prove sufficient to overcome the disparity in the parties’ economic positions. Because the court did not indicate even a minimal amount of money that it believed appellant will have available to her from her investments to use towards her own support, it is not clear how the court arrived at its determination as to an appropriate alimony award.

In other words, without any finding by the court of some amount of anticipated investment earnings, we do not know how the court determined to award appellant monthly alimony of $2000. 11 As we indicated, F.L. § 11 — 106(b)(8) entitles the court to consider the standard of living that the parties established during the marriage. In order to live as appellant was accustomed during the marriage — a lifestyle that she helped ³⁹⁶ the parties to achieve — the unassailable fact is that appellant must supplement her income by using money generated from investments. Middleton’s testimony made clear that, unlike the alimony award of $24,000 and the earned income of $35,000, which are fixed sums, the amount of money that appellant can realistically expect to obtain from investments is by no means certain. Recent times have underscored the difficulty of predicting a yield on investments, and the challenges of relying on the stock market as a supplement to support.

Indeed, the turbulent state of the stock market highlights the unpredictability of potential income from such investments, as well as the risks associated with them. Even cautious investors would not have anticipated that investments in companies like Enron or WorldCom could evaporate overnight. Family Law § 11 — 106(b)(9) provides that, in regard to the alimony determination, the court must consider “the ability of the party from whom alimony is sought to meet” his own needs, along with the needs of appellant. Further, F.L. § 11-106(b)(ll) obligates the court to consider the financial resources of both parties.

In the context of this case, these provisions suggest that, in ascertaining the appropriate alimony award, the court should have considered the extent to which the anticipated growth of the parties’ assets might be affected by their respective needs to use their assets to meet expenses. We explain. Middleton’s predictions varied with the size of the amount available for investment. Clearly, if appellant needed to use a portion of her investment income to meet current needs and expenses, this would impact on the growth potential of her investment assets; a reduction in the size of the investment corpus would affect the income stream that the monetary award can generate.

The court did not indicate the portion of the monetary award that it believed appellant would be in a position to invest. In projecting the income stream for appellant’s support, we cannot determine if the court considered whether or the extent to which appellant will have to use the corpus of the monetary award to meet her needs. ³⁹⁷ In contrast to appellant, because appellee’s career remains intact, and he continues at the helm of a prosperous company, with a salary that far exceeds his expenses, it is unlikely that he will have to use investment income or invade the corpus of investments to meet current expenses. Instead, it appears that Mr. Turner will be in a position to maintain the corpus and reinvest the income generated by his investments, thereby adding to his wealth and widening the disparity in the parties’ economic status. Again, it does not appear that the court considered that circumstance.

In its ruling with respect to appellant’s post-trial motion, which we quoted earlier, the court amplified its reasoning as to the amount of alimony it awarded. It explained that the amount of the marital award “impacts on Mr. Turner’s financial needs and resources as it is predicated primarily on the differential in the value of the BSL stock owned by each party.” The court added that although BSL stock has “significant value,” it cannot be readily “sold or liquidated.” Considering Mr. Turner’s annual salary, together with bonuses and benefits, we fail to understand the relationship between the lack of liquidity of BSL stock and an equitable alimony award. 12 In any event, as F.L. § 11 — 106(b)(11)(i) recognizes, valuable assets are not necessarily liquid, nor are they necessarily of the type to produce periodic income. A house, for example, is a type of asset that may be very valuable, although it does not yield annual income. Its value may also appreciate over time.

At the point of sale, homeowners generally hope to benefit from the appreciated value of the asset. Similarly, appellee’s ownership of stock in BSL may not be liquid, but it is certainly valuable, and his investment may well appreciate and prove lucrative if and when appellee sells the Company. ³⁹⁸ As we said earlier, neither the issue of unconscionable disparity nor the decision to award indefinite alimony is before us. We are faced only with the issue of the propriety of the amount of the alimony award. The court below carefully explained its rationale for the finding of unconscionable disparity and for its determination to award indefinite alimony.

We have searched for some rationale in the court’s opinion to explain its determination to award appellant alimony in the amount of $2000 per month, in light of the particular circum- ■ stances of this case. In sum, what we found is that the court’s decision was predicated on the general assertion that it considered the statutory factors; both parties “will leave this marriage with significant assets”; appellant will receive an undetermined “income stream” generated by her share of the assets; and appellee’s stock in BSL, while “of significant value, ... is not one that