Tyrone W. v. DANIELLE R.

²⁶⁶ BYRNES, Judge. The Circuit Court for Talbot County denied appellant Tyrone W.’s motion for blood or genetic testing and to set aside an enrolled declaration of paternity respecting T.R., a male child. Tyrone challenges those rulings in this appeal, in which T.R.’s mother, Danielle R., and the Talbot County Bureau of Support Enforcement (“Bureau”) appear as appellees. Because we conclude that the lower court erred in denying Tyrone’s request for blood or genetic testing, we shall vacate the judgment of the circuit court, and remand the case for further proceedings.

FACTS Danielle gave birth to T.R. on January 8, 1989. Four months later, on April 27, 1989, Danielle and Tyrone entered into a written agreement (“Agreement”) in which Tyrone acknowledged paternity of T.R. and promised to pay $35.00 per week in child support and a portion of T.R.’s medical expenses not covered by insurance. 1 On May 3, 1989, Danielle filed a paternity action in the Circuit Court for Talbot County. The action was filed with the consent of the Talbot County State’s Attorney’s Office. 2 It contained a “Notice to Defendant” advising Tyrone of his right to have the issue of paternity tried by a jury and informing him that unless he elected a jury trial, that right would be deemed waived and the matter would be tried by the court. Danielle attached the Agreement to her complaint.

Six days later, on May 9, 1989, the circuit court entered a judgment of paternity declaring Tyrone to be the father of ²⁶⁷ T.R. and ordering him to pay child support and medical expenses in accordance with the terms of the Agreement. Further tracking the Agreement, the court granted custody and guardianship of T.R. to Danielle and visitation rights to Tyrone, and ordered that Tyrone’s support obligations continue until T.R. should reach the age of eighteen, die, marry, or become self-supporting. The record in the 1989 paternity action does not contain a docket entry reflecting service upon Tyrone. It is undisputed, however, that Tyrone was aware of the court’s judgment and abided by it.

On April 7, 1998, almost nine years after the entry of the paternity judgment, Danielle and the Bureau filed in the 1989 paternity case a petition for increase in child support, pursuant to Md.Code (1984, Repl.Vol.1999), § 10-115 of the Family Law Article (“F.L.”). Tyrone responded by filing a paper entitled “Response to Petition for Increase in Child Support and Complaint to Set Aside Declaration of Paternity.” He alleged that several years after T.R.’s birth, he discovered that during the approximate time of T.R.’s conception, Danielle had engaged in sexual intercourse with other men and that, contrary to what Danielle had told him before he signed the Agreement, he is not T.R.’s biological father. Tyrone asked the court to order Danielle and T.R. to submit to blood or genetic testing in accordance with F.L. § 5-1029, and further requested that it set aside the 1989 paternity judgment, should the testing confirm his belief that he is not T.R.’s biological father. The circuit court referred Tyrone’s motion for blood or genetic testing to a domestic relations master.

On August 7, 1998, the master held an evidentiary hearing, at which Tyrone and Danielle testified. Tyrone explained that when Danielle told him she was pregnant with his child, he had not known that she had any other boyfriends. After T.R. was born, he was approached by a representative of the Talbot County State’s Attorney’s Office who presented the Agreement to him and told him that he “could get blood tests at that time.” Tyrone testified that he decided not to have blood tests done ²⁶⁸ then because he believed Danielle when she told him he was the baby’s father, and he had no reason to think otherwise. According to Tyrone, by the time that T.R. had reached the age of five, Tyrone could see that there was no physical resemblance between them.

A few years later, Tyrone learned from a friend that around the time that T.R. was conceived, Danielle had been involved with a man named James P. Tyrone noticed that T.R. resembled James P. Tyrone introduced into evidence a photograph of T.R. and a high school yearbook containing a photograph of James P. at age fifteen or sixteen. 3 Tyrone testified that when he confronted Danielle about T.R.’s resemblance to James P., she responded angrily, saying that “if’ T.R. was determined to be “his” (Tyrone’s) child, she would try to get an increase in child support to $70.00 per week “for putting [her] through this.” Tyrone took Danielle’s use of the word “if’ as a concession that she had doubts as to whether he was T.R.’s biological father. . Tyrone testified that he saw T.R. only rarely and that they were not close. In her testimony, Danielle acknowledged that she had been involved in a sexual relationship with James P., but explained that the relationship had occurred three years before T.R. was conceived and again three years after T.R.’s birth. She denied being sexually involved with James P. at the time of T.R.’s conception, and testified that she is positive that Tyrone is T.R.’s biological father.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the master issued a report recommending that genetic testing be performed to establish scientifically whether Tyrone could be excluded as T.R.’s biological father. The master found that Tyrone had admitted paternity in the past because he had had no reason to think he was not T.R.’s biological father and that, when the issue of paternity resurfaced years later, Danielle’s response to it indicated that she was uncertain about Tyrone’s paternity of ²⁶⁹ T.R. The Bureau filed exceptions to the master’s report and recommendation. It did not request a hearing. On August 18, 1998, the circuit court issued a memorandum opinion and order rejecting the master’s recommendation and denying Tyrone’s motion to set aside the 1989 paternity judgment.

The court noted, “there is no authority under Maryland law which permits a court to revise a paternity judgment after 30 days except in the case of fraud, mistake, irregularity, or clerical error.” It further stated that even if Tyrone were to prove that “he was ‘mistakenly’ made the father [of T.R.,]” his motion to set aside the enrolled judgment would fail because “by waiting over nine years after a final judgment was entered before filing a motion to vacate” Tyrone had “failed to act with ordinary diligence.” Concluding that Tyrone had “had full knowledge of the original paternity complaint, and [that] he had knowingly waived his right to counsel, a blood test, a trial by judge or jury, and the right to call and cross-examine witnesses[,]” the circuit court ruled that Tyrone “is bound by the 1989 judgment.” In his appeal to this Court, Tyrone poses three questions for review, which we have rephrased: I. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in ruling that the 1989 paternity judgment could not be vacated except upon a finding of fraud, mistake, irregularity, or clerical error?

II

Did the trial court err as a matter of law or fact in denying his request for blood or genetic testing under F.L. § 5-1029?

III

Were the trial court’s findings of waiver and lack of ordinary diligence legally incorrect and/or clearly erroneous? DISCUSSION I. Timing of Appeal Although not raised by the parties, we first address the jurisdictional question whether this appeal was timely filed. ²⁷⁰ Newman v. Reilly, 314 Md. 364, 387-88 , 550 A.2d 959 (1988)(holding that timeliness of filing of notice of appeal is a jurisdictional issue). The circuit court’s memorandum opinion and order was docketed on August 19, 1998. On September 16, 1998, at Tyrone’s request and with the consent of Danielle and the Bureau, the court issued an “Order of Finality” purporting to certify for appeal, under Rule 2-602(b), the resolution of Tyrone’s challenge to the paternity judgment.

Tyrone noted this appeal the same day. At that time, the claim for an increase in child support was still pending before the circuit court. By an order dated November 4, 1998, and docketed November 6, 1998, the court granted the requested increase. The circuit court’s September 16, 1998 “Order of Finality” did not include an express finding of “no just reason for delay.” For this reason, its attempt to finalize Tyrone’s claim for appeal under Rule 2-602(b) was ineffective.

Waters v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 328 Md. 700, 707-08 , 616 A.2d 884 (1992); Town of Port Deposit v. Petetit, 113 Md.App. 401, 409 , 688 A.2d 54 (1997). It was not until November 6, 1998, when the order granting an increase in child support was docketed, that an order constituting a final, appealable judgment was entered. Thus, the present appeal was noted prematurely, and the thirty-day period in which to note an appeal from the November 6, 1998 final judgment has expired.

As we shall explain below, Rule 8-602(e) nevertheless enables us to assume jurisdiction over the appeal. Cf. Jenkins v. Jenkins, 112 Md.App. 390, 424-26 , 685 A.2d 817 (1996)(holding that that Court did not have jurisdiction over appeal pursuant to Rule 8-602(e) where appellant noted appeal prematurely because the trial court erroneously ordered a final judgment when it did not have such discretion under Rule 2-602). Rule 8-602(e), entitled “Entry of judgment not directed under Rule 2-602,” provides, in relevant part: (1) If the appellate court determines that the order from which the appeal is taken was not a final judgment when the ²⁷¹ notice of appeal was filed but that the lower court had discretion to direct the entry of a final judgment pursuant to Rule 2 — 602(b), the appellate court may, as it finds appropriate ...

(D) if a final judgment was entered by the lower court after the notice of appeal was filed, treat the notice of appeal as if filed on the same day as, but after, the entry of the judgment. Rule 2-602(b) permits a circuit court to finalize for appeal an order or decision that adjudicates fewer than all of the claims in an action or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties. This discretionary authority is to be used sparingly, in order to minimize “piecemeal appeals and duplication of efforts and costs in cases involving multiple claims or multiple parties.” Maryland-Nat’l Capital Park & Planning Comm’n v. Smith, 333 Md. 3, 7 , 633 A.2d 855 (1993). In this ease, the circuit court had discretion under Rule 2-602(b) to enter a final judgment with respect to Tyrone’s challenge to the paternity declaration, attendant upon an express determination by the court that there was “no just reason for delay.” Tyrone’s motion to set aside the paternity judgment was a separate claim for purposes of certification under Rule 2-602.

The claim was based on a set of operative facts discrete from the facts relevant to the claim for an increase in child support, requested an entirely distinct form of relief, and could have been separately enforced. See Medical Mutual Liab. Ins. Soc’y v. B. Dixon Evander & Assocs., 331 Md. 301, 309-10 , 628 A.2d 170 (1993), on subsequent appeal, 339 Md. 41 , 660 A.2d 433 (1994); Diener Enters., Inc. v. Miller, 266 Md. 551, 556 , 295 A.2d 470 (1972).

Furthermore, despite the subsequent judgment increasing child support, appellant only seeks review of the denial of his affirmative claim — there is no danger of multiple, piecemeal appeals from the judgment below. Accordingly, we invoke our discretion under Rule 8-602(e) to treat the notice of appeal as if it had been filed on the same day as, but after, the entry of a final judgment on November 6,1998. ²⁷² II. Applicability of the 1995 Amendment to F.L. § 5-1038(a) to the 1989 Paternity Judyment The Tandra S. v. Tyrone W. Decision In Tandra S. v. Tyrone W., 336 Md. 303, 306-08 , 648 A.2d 439 (1994), the Court of Appeals held that an “enrolled” paternity judgment (i.e., one entered by the court more than 30 days prior) could not be set aside except upon proof of fraud, mistake, or irregularity, under Md.Code (1974, 1998 Repl.Vol.), § 6-408 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“C.J.”), and Rule 2-535(b). The facts in the Tandra S. case are well known to Tyrone because he was the “adjudged father” in that case, too. 4 The Tandra S. case concerned T.W., a baby girl born in 1990.

Soon after the child’s birth, Tyrone accepted the mother’s representation that he was the child’s father, and entered into a 'written agreement in which he acknowledged paternity and promised to pay child support. Tandra S. then filed a paternity action based on the agreement, in the Circuit Court for Talbot County. A paternity judgment was entered against Tyrone. Two and one-half years later, Tyrone filed motions for blood testing 5 and to set aside the paternity declaration.

He alleged that Tandra S. recently had told him that he was not T.W.’s father. The circuit court granted Tyrone’s motion for blood testing. The test results excluded Tyrone as T.W.’s ²⁷³ biological father. On that basis, the circuit court vacated the enrolled paternity judgment.

The Court of Appeals granted certiorari prior to the consideration of Tyrone’s appeal by this Court. 6 In a split decision, it reversed, holding that the enrolled judgment of paternity could not be revised solely on the basis of scientific evidence establishing that Tyrone was not T.W.’s biological father. The majority cited the strict limitation on the court’s revisory power over enrolled judgments as set forth in Rule 2-535(b), 7 discussed the well-developed body of case law interpreting that limitation, and concluded that even though it had been proven scientifically that Tyrone was not T.W.’s biological father, Tyrone had not met the exceptional showing of fraud, mistake, or irregularity necessary to warrant the vacation of an enrolled judgment. In reaching its holding, the majority in Tandra S. took into account and interpreted F.L. § 5-1038, which appears in the “Paternity Proceedings” subtitle of the Family Law Article ²⁷⁴ and is captioned, “Finality; modification.” At the time that Tandra S. was decided, that statute provided, in relevant part: (a) Declaration of paternity final. — Except in the manner and to the extent that any order or decree of an equity court is subject to the revisory power of the court under any law, rule, or established principle of practice and procedure in equity, a declaration of paternity in an order is final. (b) Other orders subject to modification. — Except for a declaration of paternity, the court may modify or set aside any order or part of an order under this subtitle as the court considers just and proper in light of the circumstances and in the best interests of the child.

Md.Code (1984, 1991 Repl.Vol.), F.L. § 5-1038. The Court construed those subsections of F.L. § 5-1038 to mean that the circuit court had broad discretion to modify an order relating to paternity (such as a judgment establishing the amount of child support to be paid) but only could set aside a declaration of paternity on one of the bases prescribed by Rule 2-535(b). Two judges dissented in Tandra S. They reasoned that F.L. § 5-1007 compelled a contrary result. That statute provides: Any rule of court or statute that relates to procedure applies to a proceeding under [the Paternity Proceedings] subtitle only to the extent that the rule or statute is: (1) practical under the circumstances; and (2) not inconsistent with this subtitle.

Writing for the dissent, Judge Eldridge explained that “a paternity action differs significantly from other adjudications and merits different treatment.” Tandra S., 336 Md. at 326 , 648 A.2d 439 (Eldridge, J., dissenting). He distinguished paternity actions from ordinary legal actions in that, in the former, courts are called upon “to declare a scientific, biological fact” — whether an individual is the biological father of the child in question. Id. at 327 , 648 A.2d 439 . After discussing the accuracy of modern day blood and genetic testing, Judge Eldridge observed, “It is absurd, in the face of incontrovertible scientific evidence, for a court to treat as binding, for the ²⁷⁵ future, a patently erroneous declaration of biological fact.” Id.

On that basis, the dissenters in Tandra S. took the position that Rule 2-535(b) is a procedural rule and that it could not be applied in a practical manner to the facts in Tandra S., and therefore could be relaxed under F.L. § 5-1007. Id. at 329, 648 A.2d 439 . The General Assembly Amends F.L. § 5-1038(a) Tandra S. was decided by the Court of Appeals on October 7,1994. During the following legislative session, in early 1995, the General Assembly enacted House Bill 337, which repealed and reenacted, with amendments, F.L. § 5-1006 and F.L. § 5-1038.

The amendment to F.L. § 5-1006 extended the limitations period for a paternity action to “any time before the child’s eighteenth birthday.” 1995 Md. Laws, ch. 248. F.L. § 5-1038(a) was amended to permit a court to modify or set aside a paternity judgment on the basis of scientific evidence establishing that the child’s adjudged father is not his biological father. Subsection (a) of F.L. § 5-1038 now provides: (a) Declaration of paternity final; modifications. — (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, a declaration of paternity in an order is final. (2) (i) A declaration of paternity may be modified or set aside: 1. in the manner and to the extent that any order or decree of an equity court is subject to the revisory power of the court under any law, rule, or established principle of practice and procedure in equity; or 2. if a blood or genetic test done in accordance ivith § 5-1029 of this subtitle establishes the exclusion of the individual named as the father in the order.

(ii) Notwithstanding subparagraph (i) of this paragraph, a declaration of paternity may not be modified or set aside if the individual named in the order acknowledged paternity knowing he was not the father. ²⁷⁶ F.L. § 5-1038(a) (emphasis added). 8 The Act stated that it “shall take effect October 1,1995.” In the case sub judice, the parties dispute whether F.L. § 5-1038(a)(2)(i)(2), as enacted in 1995, applies to the 1989 paternity judgment respecting T.R. Tyrone contends that the 1995 amendment to F.L. § 5-1038(a) permits a circuit court to vacate a paternity judgment if blood or genetic testing performed in accordance with F.L. § 5-1029 excludes the adjudged father, irrespective of when the paternity judgment was entered, so long as the child at issue is not yet eighteen years old. From that position, Tyrone reasons that if blood or genetic testing were to reveal that he is not T.R.’s biological father, the circuit court would be authorized to exercise its discretion to vacate the 1989 paternity judgment. Therefore, the circuit court erred in denying him access to blood or genetic tests that he believes will show that he is not T.R.’s biological father, and in ruling on his motion to set aside the paternity judgment without taking the test results into consideration. Danielle and the Bureau counter that the 1995 amendments to F.L. § 5-1006 and F.L. § 5-1038 do not apply to a paternity judgment entered six years before.

Even if blood or genetic testing had been ordered and the test results scientifically had excluded Tyrone as T.R.’s biological father, the trial court would have been without authority to set aside the paternity judgment on that basis. They maintain that because any blood or genetic test results thus would have been immaterial, the circuit court properly denied Tyrone’s request for testing. Retroactive operation vel non of F.L. § 5-1038(a)(2)(i)(2) A statute that applies retroactively or retrospectively is one that “purports to determine the legal significance of acts or events that have occurred prior to the statute’s effec ²⁷⁷ tive date.” State Comm’n on Human Relations v. Amecom Div. of Litton Sys., Inc., 278 Md. 120, 123 , 360 A.2d 1 (1976). “Thus a statute, though applied only in legal proceedings subsequent to its effective date and in that sense, at least, prospective, is, when applied so as to determine the legal significance of acts or events that occurred prior to its effective date, applied retroactively.” Id. The prior “acts or events” affected by a statute that operates retroactively include the rendering of a judgment by a court.

See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Klauber, 284 Md. 306, 308 , 396 A.2d 253 (1979). Thus, for Tyrone to be able to avail himself of the 1995 revision to F.L. § 5-1038(a) to set aside the 1989 judgment of paternity, that statutory revision must have had retroactive effect. (i) Whether a statute operates retrospectively or only prospectively is in the first instance a question of legislative intent. See Young v. State, 14 Md.App. 538, 552-53 , 288 A.2d 198 (1972)(in determining retroactivity vel non of legislation, it is the intent of the legislature in enacting the law that controls.). “Because of the potential for interference with substantive rights, however, and because of the resulting prejudice against retroactive application,” a statute that affects substantive rights is presumed to operate prospectively.

State Comm’n on Human Rel. v. Amecom Div., 278 Md. 120, 123-24 , 360 A.2d 1 (1976); see also Informed Physician v. Blue Cross, 350 Md. 308, 327 , 711 A.2d 1330 (1998). That presumption may be rebutted by a clear expression in the statute to the contrary. Janda v. General Motors Corp., 237 Md. 161, 168-69 , 205 A.2d 228 (1964); Tax Comm. v. Power Company, 182 Md. 111, 117 , 32 A.2d 382 (1943)(presumption is rebutted when the statute’s “words are so clear, strong and imperative in their retrospective expression so that no other meaning can be attached to them, or ... the manifest intention of the Legislature could not be otherwise gratified.”). If the Legislature meant for a law affecting a matter of right or substance to operate retrospectively, the law will be given that ²⁷⁸ effect so long as doing so is not unconstitutional and does not interfere with vested rights.

Amecom, 278 Md. at 123 , 360 A.2d 1 ; Janda, 237 Md. at 169 , 205 A.2d 228 . An analysis of whether a statute applies retroactively thus embraces three questions: 1) did the Legislature intend the statute to operate retroactively? 2) did the Legislature have the power to enact the statute retroactively? and 3) would retroactive application of the statute interfere with vested rights? Waters Landing Limited Partnership v. Montgomery County, 337 Md. 15, 28-29 , 650 A.2d 712 (1994). When a statute affects only a procedure or remedy, and not a substantive right, the presumption in favor of prospective application does not apply.

Informed Physician Services, Inc., 350 Md. at 327 , 711 A.2d 1330 ; Amecom, 278 Md. at 124 , 360 A.2d 1 . To the contrary, procedural and remedial enactments are presumed to operate retroactively, unless a contrary legislative intent is expressed. State Administrative Board v. Election Board of Baltimore, 342 Md. 586, 601 , 679 A.2d 96 (1996); Grandison v. State, 341 Md. 175, 257 , 670 A.2d 398 (1995); Mason v. State, 309 Md. 215, 219-20 , 522 A.2d 1344 (1987); Aviles v. Eshelman Elec. Corp., 281 Md. 529, 533 , 379 A.2d 1227 (1977)(“[a]bsent a contrary intent made manifest by the enacting authority, any change made by statute .or court rule affecting a remedy only (and consequently not impinging on substantive rights) controls all court actions whether accrued, pending or future.”) The same rules of statutory interpretation apply to amendatory acts.

State Tax Comm’n v. Potomac Elec., 182 Md. 111, 117 , 32 A.2d 382 (1943); Harlow v. Schrott, 16 Md.App. 31, 37 , 294 A.2d 349 , reversed on other grounds, Blocher v. Harlow, 268 Md. 571 , 303 A.2d 395 (1973). In this case, the contents of the legislative bill file for House Bill 337 make plain that the 1995 amendment to F.L. § 5-1038(a) authorizing courts to revise enrolled paternity judgments on the basis of scientific evidence obtained pursuant to F.L. § 5-1029 and excluding the adjudged father as the biological father was enacted in response to the Court of ²⁷⁹ Appeals’s decision in Tandra S. The bill file contains a copy of the Tandra S. opinion, an October 23, 1994 Baltimore Sun article about the case, entitled “Md. High Court’s Paternity Ruling Fathers Bizarre Justice,” and several letters commenting about the bill that refer expressly to the Tandra S. case. The Act itself provides that it is “[f]or the purpose of clarifying the statute of limitations applicable to paternity proceedings; authorizing a court to modify or set aside a declaration of paternity under certain circumstances; and generally relating to paternity proceedings.” 1995 Md. Laws, ch. 248. Neither the words of the statute nor the material in the bill file addresses, however, the question of prospective or retrospective application of the statutory amendment.

The answer to that question turns, therefore, on whether the amendment is one affecting a substantive right or affecting only a procedure or remedy. If the former is the case, the 1995 amendment operates prospectively, because it is presumed to do so and there is no clear statement of legislative intent to the contrary. If the latter is the case, the inverse presumption is applied and the statutory amendment has retrospective effect. A statute that is purely procedural is one that has to do with the steps that must be taken to enforce a right.

Such a statute will be “construed as operating on all proceedings instituted after its passage whether the right accrued before of after that event.” Kelch v. Keehn, 183 Md. 140, 145 , 36 A.2d 544 (1944). Because procedural enactments will not be applied so as to undo already concluded proceedings, see Holland v. Woodhaven Bldg. & Dev., Inc., 113 Md.App. 274, 287 , 687 A.2d 699 (1996), they are retroactive in effect in the sense that they apply immediately to actions that already have accrued. See Roth v. Dimensions, 332 Md. 627 , 632 A.2d 1170 (1993)(holding that statute mandating an extension of time in which a plaintiff in a medical malpractice case may file a certificate of qualified expert circumstances was procedural and therefore applied retroactively to cases pending when the law was enacted); see also The Wharf At Handy’s Point, Inc. ²⁸⁰ v. Department of Natural Resources, 92 Md.App. 659, 675 , 610 A.2d 314 (1992). In our view, the 1995 amendment to F.L. § 5-1038 is not procedural.

It did not specify or delineate the measures that must be taken by a party to a paternity action to seek revision of an enrolled paternity judgment. Indeed, the process for seeking revision of a paternity judgment is no different today than it was before F.L. § 5-1038 was amended. Compare Colgan v. Hammond, 58 Md.App. 120 , 472 A.2d 497 (1984)(holding that 1982 statutory amendment allowing certain blood test results to be used as affirmative evidence of paternity was procedural in nature, did not affect parties’ substantive rights and, therefore, applied retrospectively to paternity action filed in 1981). Rather, the amendment to F.L. § 5-1038(a) added to the four grounds for revision of an enrolled paternity decree (extrinsic fraud, mistake, irregularity, and failure of an employee of the court or the clerk’s office to perform a required duty) a new scientific ground on which the court may exercise its discretion to relieve a party from an enrolled paternity judgment.

Whether a statute is remedial in the sense that it relates to a remedy without affecting substantive rights is a thornier question. A remedial enactment may be one affecting a remedy in that it provides a new method for enforcing a preexisting right or changes an existing remedy for enforcing a preexisting right. Amecom, 278 Md. at 125 , 360 A.2d 1 . See also 2 Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 60.02 at 152 (5 th ed. 1993)(“Generally, remedial statutes are those which provide a remedy, or improve or facilitate remedies already existing for the enforcement of rights and the redress of injuries.”).

A statute that goes beyond that and provides a new form of relief that itself constitutes a substantive right is not purely remedial, however, and will not be presumed to apply retroactively. Id. Thus, notwithstanding that an enactment extinguishing a cause of action or barring a party from prosecuting a cause of action is characterized as remedial, it affects substantive rights, and therefore is not ²⁸¹ remedial. See Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm’n v. Riverdale Fire Co., 308 Md. 556, 560 , 520 A.2d 1319 (1987); Southerland v. Norris, 74 Md. 326, 329 , 22 A. 137 (1891).

As we have explained, the 1995 amendment to F.L. § 5-1038(a) added, in paternity actions, a new basis on which the circuit court may exercise its discretion to revise an enrolled judgment. The common law recognized the power and authority to revise its judgments as inherent in the court. North v. Toum Real Estate Corp., 191 Md. 212, 216 , 60 A.2d 665 (1948); Waters v. Engle, 53 Md. 179, 182 (1880). Because the countervailing public policy in favor of bringing litigation to a conclusion strongly militated against the broad invocation of the courts’ revisory powers, the courts came to strictly limit the circumstances warranting the exercise of that power.

Kemp v. Cook, 18 Md. 130, 138 (1861). The rule thus emerged at common law that during the term of court in which a judgment was entered, the court’s authority to exercise its discretion to revise the judgment was unlimited, but that after the expiration of the term, the court’s revisory authority was restricted to a small and fixed set of circumstances calling for equitable intervention (extrinsic fraud, mistake, or irregularity). Smith v. Black, 51 Md. 247, 251 (1879); Taylor v. Sindall, 34 Md. 38, 40 (1871). The common law rule has been adopted and delineated in Maryland in Rule 2-535(b) and its predecessor rules, and in C.J. § 6-408.

See Eliason v. Comm’r of Personnel, 230 Md. 56, 58-9 , 185 A.2d 390 (1962)(commenting that Rule 625, predecessor to Rule 2-535, merely restated the substance of the common law rule governing the exercise by the court of its revisory power). A circuit court’s decision about whether to grant a party relief from a judgment (except from a judgment that is void as having been entered without jurisdiction, see Eisenhardt v. Papa, 46 Md.App. 375, 384-85 , 416 A.2d 784 (1980); Miles v. Hamilton, 269 Md. 708, 713 , 309 A.2d 631 (1973)) on one of the grounds available for doing so is an equitable consideration within its sound discretion. Kemp v. Cook, 18 Md. at 139 . “[T]he decision involves taking account of several ²⁸² incommensurable factors, some relating to the particular case and others to the larger system of administered justice.” Restatement of Judgments, Second, § 74, cmt. g. Consistent with equitable principles, the party seeking relief from an enrolled judgment must show that he exercised ordinary diligence in discovering the ground for relief and in requesting relief, that he acted in good faith, and that he has a meritorious claim or defense.

J.T. Masonry Co., Inc. v. Oxford Construction Services, Inc., 314 Md. 498, 506 , 551 A.2d 869 (1989). A court’s discretionary exercise of its revisory power to afford a party relief from an enrolled judgment is thus in the nature of an equitable remedy. By amending F.L. § 5-1038(a) to add a new basis on which the court may exercise its power to grant relief from an enrolled judgment of paternity, the General Assembly affected a remedy by broadening it. So long as by doing so it did not create a new substantive right or disturb a preexisting substantive right, the statutory amendment is remedial and is presumed to apply retrospectively.

We will return to that topic shortly. An enactment also may be regarded as “remedial in nature” if its object is to correct existing law, “to redress existing grievances[,] and to introduce regulations conducive to the public good.” State v. Barnes, 273 Md. 195, 208 , 328 A.2d 737 (1974)(holding “remedial in nature” the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act of 1965). As such, remedial statutes “are to be liberally construed in order to advance the remedy and obviate the mischief.” Id.; Coburn v. Coburn, 342 Md. 244, 256 , 674 A.2d 951 (1995); see also Janda, 237 Md. at 171 , 205 A.2d 228 (holding that statute would be applied retroactively when to do so would better effect the remedial intentions of the Legislature in enacting it.). At their inception, the Maryland civil paternity laws, of which F.L. § 5-1038 is a part, were remedial in nature.

Civil paternity laws first were enacted in Maryland effective June 1, 1963, as part of Laws of Maryland (1963), chapter 722. They replaced the existing criminal bastardy and fornication laws, ²⁸³ which were repealed by the same Act. 9 As the Court of Appeals discussed at some length in Gill v. Ripley, 352 Md. 754 , 724 A.2d 88 (1999), the 1963 changes in the law to a large extent implemented recommendations made by the Commission to Study Problems of Illegitimacy. See Gill, 352 Md. at 778 , 724 A.2d 88 . In its 1961 Final Report to the Maryland General Assembly, the Commission concluded that under the bastardy and fornication laws then in effect, any concern for the support and maintenance of “illegitimate children” merely was derivative of the legislative goals of punishment and of keeping “bastards” from becoming public charges.

Final Report of the Commission to Study Problems of Illegitimacy at 12-13 (December, 1961)(“Final Report”). “The child’s welfare, custody and proper maintenance ha[d] received generally little or no consideration.” Id. at 13. The determination of paternity was incidental to the criminal charge of fornication brought against the putative father. See Final Report at 22. 10 The paternity laws enacted in 1963 contained an explicit statement of purpose: “The General Assembly declares its ²⁸⁴ conviction that the State has a duty to ameliorate the deprived social and economic status of children born out of wedlock .... ” 1963 Md. Laws, ch. 722, § 1, 1499. The legislation sought to promote “the general welfare and best interests of such children by securing to them, as near as practical, the same right to support, care and education as legitimate children,” and to that end imposed “upon both parents of such children the basic obligations and responsibilities of parenthood.” Id.

In Corley v. Moore, 236 Md. 241, 243 , 203 A.2d 697 (1964), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Toft v. Nevada ex rel. Pimentel, 108 Md.App. 206, 217 , 671 A.2d 99 (1996), the Court relied upon the General Assembly’s pronouncement of its statements of legislative intent in holding the paternity laws remedial and applying them to a proceeding involving a child born before the legislation’s effective date. Corley, 236 Md. at 243 , 203 A.2d 697 . 11 It was clear at the inception of the new paternity subtitle that the obligations imposed upon the “parents” of a child born out of wedlock were the obligations of the biological parents of the child. See Final Report at 16 (“[MJeasures to hold natural parents to basic responsibilities cannot wait.”).

By securing to children born to unmarried parents “the same right to support, care and education,” the statute plainly referred to the ancient common law and statutory duty of natural, i.e., biological, parents to support their children. See Middleton v. Middleton, 329 Md. 627, 633 , 620 A.2d 1363 (1993) (statutory duty of support is “reflective of the common law”); Blades v. Szatai 151 Md. 644, 647 , 135 A. 841 (1927) (common law duty). The legal determination of paternity was, and is, a means to confer upon a child whose biological parents were not married the common law and statutory rights that he would have if his biological parents had been married. We hold that the 1995 amendment to F.L. § 5-1038(a) is remedial in both senses in which that term is used, and that it ²⁸⁵ therefore operates retrospectively, applying to enrolled paternity judgments entered before its effective date.

It is remedial in that it is an expansion of the equitable grounds on which a court may relieve from the effect of a paternity judgment an adjudged father who later has been determined not to be the biological father of the child in question. In addition, it is remedial in that it advances the purpose of the remedial subtitle of which it is a part: to assure to children born out of wedlock the same rights with respect to their biological parents that children of married parents have with respect to their biological parents. We also conclude, as is integral to our holding, that the statutory amendment at issue is one affecting a remedy but not affecting substantive rights. The civil paternity laws were enacted to replace laws that served the primary purpose of punishing the parents of children born out of wedlock with laws designed to aid children bom out of wedlock by providing a means to determine biological paternity and requiring that biological fathers (as well as mothers) protect their children as required by law.

Under the common law, a biological child, whether born in wedlock or out of wedlock, was entitled to support and care from his biological parents. In Carroll County v. Edelmann, 320 Md. 150 , 577 A.2d 14 (1990), the Court stated: Parenthood is both a biological and legal status. By nature and by law, it confers rights and imposes duties. One of the most basic of these is the obligation of the parent to support the child until the law determines that he is able to care for himself.

As it is the obligation of the parent to provide the support, so it is the right of the child to expect it ... The duty of parents to provide for the maintenance of their children is a principle of natural law; an obligation ... laid on them not only by nature herself, but by their own proper act, in bringing them into the world ... By begetting them, therefore, they have entered into a voluntary obligation ... And thus the children