Uninsured Employers' Fund v. Pennel

THIEME, Judge. Appellants appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Allegany County affirming the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Commission (“the Commission”) in favor of appellee. The appellants in this case are the employers, Robert F. Greise and Betty F. Greise (collectively referred to in this opinion as “Greise”), and the Uninsured Employers’ Fund (“the Fund”). 1 Appellee is the employee, Kevin Pennel. Appellants present for our review the following questions, which we have reordered in the interest of efficiency. 1.

Did the Circuit Court err in finding that the value of breakfast prepared by the farmer’s wife must be considered in calculating “payroll” for the purpose of determining whether the farm worker is a covered employee under Maryland Workers’ Compensation Law, Maryland Labor and Employment Annotated Code, § 9—210(b)(2)(ii)? 2. Did the Circuit Court err in affirming the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Commission because it applied an incorrect standard of review? 3. Did the Circuit Court err in affirming the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Commission based on a motion for summary judgment when the Claimant gave varying statements under oath as to his belief regarding whether he considered breakfast as part of his compensation or as an entitlement in connection with his employment? ²⁸⁶ We hold that the court properly found that the breakfasts prepared for appellee constituted “payroll” under the Workers’ Compensation Act and that the court applied the correct standard of review in arriving at its decision. We further find that the court did not err in affirming the Commission’s order on the basis of a summary judgment motion.

In his brief to this Court, appellee cross-appeals and presents the following question: Did the Circuit Court err in granting the motion of Greise to be joined as a party plaintiff? We answer “no” to this question and affirm the judgment of the circuit court. Facts Robert and Betty Greise, husband and wife, operated a 205 acre dairy farm called the Greise Dairy Farm (“the Farm”) in Cumberland, Maryland. Kevin Pennel was the sole employee on the farm.

Pennel’s gross pay was $279.89 per week. After various tax deductions, he received $236.00 by check or in cash for every week that he worked. During his vacation week, he received $150.00, either by check or in cash, instead of his regular pay. For the year before August 14, 1997, the date Pennel was injured, his weekly payments by check and in cash totaled $14,424.39.

Pennel worked at the farm for sixteen years. For twelve years, he worked seven days per week, fourteen hours per day, except Sundays, when he worked six hours. Pennel was off one week per year during deer hunting season. Mrs. Greise prepared breakfast for Pennel consisting of eggs, bacon or sausage, and milk every morning except Fridays when she had her hair appointments.

By written stipulation, the parties agreed that for the year before August 14, 1997, the meals provided to Pennel had a value of $918.00. Therefore, the stipulated value of the meals added to the weekly cash and check payments totaled $15,342.39. On August 14,1997, Pennel sustained a work-related injury to his right eye. On September 2, 1997, he filed a claim with ²⁸⁷ the Workers’ Compensation Commission, alleging that he was working as a dairy farmer on the Farm on the date of his injury.

The Commission held a hearing on July 27, 1998. Pennel claimed that, as a result of the injury, he was temporarily and totally disabled from August 14,1997, through April 28,1998. The parties did not dispute the nature and cause of the injury, the reasonableness and necessity of the related medical treatment, or the claimed lost time from work. Rather, the sole issue in dispute was whether the breakfasts prepared by Mrs. Greise were included in the meaning of the word “payroll” as used in the Workers’ Compensation Act (“the Act”).

If the meals were part of the Greise “payroll,” then Pennel was a “covered employee” under the Act and was eligible to receive compensation for his injury. The Commission found that Pennel was a covered employee and entered an award of compensation on August 4,1998. Mr. and Mrs. Greise appealed the Commission’s decision to the Circuit Court for Allegany County. Pennel and the Fund noted their intent to participate in the appeal.

The parties stipulated as to the facts and agreed that Greise and the Fund would seek a legal interpretation of the term “payroll” by filing a motion for summary judgment solely as to that issue. The court denied the motion and affirmed the decision of the Commission. The Fund filed a timely appeal to this Court; Greise did not. After the time for appeal expired, Greise filed a motion to join the appeal as a party plaintiff.

The court granted the motion and denied Pennel’s request for reconsideration. Pennel’s cross-appeal concerns the order joining Greise as a party plaintiff. Discussion Standard of Review In reviewing administrative agency decisions, this Court’s function is “precisely the same as that of the circuit court.” Department of Health & Mental Hygiene v. Shrieves, 100 Md.App. 283, 303-04 , 641 A.2d 899 (1994). Like the ²⁸⁸ circuit court, we “must determine whether the agency’s decision is ‘in accordance with the law or whether it is arbitrary, illegal, and capricious.’” Curry v. Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services, 102 Md.App. 620, 626-27 , 651 A.2d 390 (1994), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 340 Md. 175 , 665 A.2d 1038 (1995) (quoting Moseman v. County Council, 99 Md.App. 258, 262 , 636 A.2d 499 , cert. denied, 335 Md. 229 , 643 A.2d 383 (1994)).

When the agency’s factual, findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record and the decision is legally correct, we must affirm the agency’s decision. See, e.g., Carriage Hill v. Maryland Health Resources Planning Comm'n 125 Md.App. 183, 212 , 724 A.2d 745 (1999) (and cases cited therein). As this Court recognized in Department of Health and Mental Hygiene v. Riverview Nursing Centre, Inc., “[t]o the extent the issues on appeal turn on the correctness of an agency’s findings of fact, such findings must be reviewed under the substantial evidence test.” 104 Md.App. 593, 602 , 657 A.2d 372 , cert. denied, 340 Md. 215 , 665 A.2d 1058 (1995). Our task is to determine “whether there was substantial evidence before the administrative agency on the record as a whole to support its conclusions,” without substituting our judgment for that of the agency.

Maryland Commission on Human Relations v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 86 Md.App. 167, 173 , 586 A.2d 37 , cert. denied, 323 Md. 309 , 593 A.2d 668 (1991). When an agency’s interpretation of a statute or regulation is at issue, however, the substituted judgment standard applies and we will substitute our judgment for that of the agency. See Carriage Hill, 125 Md.App. at 212 , 724 A.2d 745 ; see also Curry, 102 Md.App. at 627 , 651 A.2d 390 (“When reviewing issues of law ... the court’s review is expansive and it may substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”). In particular, when reviewing a decision by the Workers’ Compensation Commission, “the standard to be employed by the circuit court, as well as the appellate court, is limited to determining whether the Commission exceeded the powers granted to it by [the Maryland Code], and whether it misconstrued the law and facts applicable to the case decided.” ²⁸⁹ Workers’ Compensation Comm’n v. May, 88 Md.App. 408, 416 , 594 A.2d 1232 (1991) (and cases cited therein).

Section 9-745 of the Labor and Employment Article, Maryland Code, provides the following regarding appellate proceedings: (b) Presumption and burden of proof—In each court proceeding under this title: (1) the decision of the Commission is presumed to be prima facie correct; and (2) the party challenging the decision has the burden of proof. (c) Determination by court.—The court shall determine whether the Commission: (1) justly considered all of the faets about the accidental personal injury, occupational disease, or compensable hernia; (2) exceeded the powers granted to it under this title; or (3) misconstrued the law and facts applicable in the case decided. * * * (e) Disposition.—(1) If the court determines that the Commission acted within its powers and correctly construed the law and facts, the court shall confirm the decision of the Commission. (2) If the court determines that the Commission did not act within its powers or did not correctly construe the law and faets, the court shall reverse or modify the decision or remand the case to the Commission for further proceedings. Md.Code (1991, 1999 Repl.Vol.), § 9-745 of the Labor and Employment Article.

In the case sub judice, the parties stipulated that there were no material faets in dispute and that the issue before the court, whether meals are included in the term “payroll,” was purely a legal question. Therefore, in this appeal, we substitute our judgment for that of the Workers’ Compensation ²⁹⁰ Commission to determine whether it misconstrued the law as it applies to the facts of this case. Definition of “Payroll” in § 9-210 The sole question before the trial court, and indeed the sole question properly before this Court, is how to interpret the word “payroll” as it is used in § 9-210 of the Workers’ Compensation Act, Maryland Code (1991, 1999 Repl.Vol.), Title 9 of the Labor and Employment Article. In pertinent part, the Act provides as follows: (b) Employee covered.—Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, an individual, including a migrant farm worker, is a covered employee if: (1) the individual receives compensation from a farmer for any service other than office work, including: (1) operating a machine connected with animal, crop, or soil management; (ii) constructing or repairing a fixture or machine; or (iii) handling an animal or crop with or without a machine; and (2) the farmer has: (i) at least 3 full-time employees; or (ii) an annual payroll of at least $15,000 for full-time employees.

Md.Code (1991, 1999 Repl.Vol.), § 9-210 of the Labor and Employment Article. In this case, Pennel’s annual salary, paid by check and in cash, totaled $14,424.39. At that salary, as the sole employee, Pennel would not be considered a “covered employee” under the Act, as § 9-210(b)(2)(ii) specifies that the annual payroll must be at least $15,000.00. If, however, the meals prepared by Mrs. Greise are included in the payroll calculation, Pennel’s salary “increases” to $15,342.39, which makes him eligible for workers’ compensation under the Act.

Therefore, to determine whether Pennel may recover, we must determine whether the ²⁹¹ term “payroll,” as it is used in the Act, includes the value of meals. We hold that it does. As the Court of Appeals recently stated in Sacchet v. Blan, 353 Md. 87, 92 , 724 A.2d 667 (1999), “the cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the true legislative intent that lies behind the statutory enactment, itself.” See also Catonsville Nursing v. Loveman, 349 Md. 560, 570 , 709 A.2d 749 (1998); Jones v. State, 311 Md. 398, 405 , 535 A.2d 471 (1988). To determine the legislative intent, we primarily look to “the plain language of the statute, with the words given their ordinary and natural meanings.” Sacchet, 353 Md. at 92 , 724 A.2d 667 ; see also Whack v. State, 338 Md. 665, 672 , 659 A.2d 1347 (1995).

In this case, we are concerned with the meaning of the term “payroll.” Because “payroll” is not defined in the Act, we must examine the “ordinary and natural meaning” of the term. The American Heritage Dictionary 912 (2d ed.1982) defines “payroll” as: “1. A list of employees receiving wages, with the amounts due to each. 2. The total sum of money to be paid out to employees at a given time.” Similarly, Miriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 854 (10th ed.1997) provides that payroll is: “1: a paymaster’s or employer’s list of those entitled to pay and of the amounts due to each; 2: the sum necessary for distribution to those on a payroll; also: the money to be distributed.” Finally, Black’s Law Dictionary 1151 (6 th ed.1990) defines “payroll” as: “1.

A list of employees to be paid and the amount due to each of them. 2. The total compensation payable to a company’s employees for one pay period.” None of these definitions explicitly limits the term “payroll” to include only the monetary payments due to employees. 2 Indeed, each definition leaves room for the possibility that “payroll” also includes other forms of compensation or, ²⁹² at least, the monetary value of that compensation. Therefore, more than one meaning could attach to the term “payroll,” and our task is to “ascertain the legislative intention and-place that intent into effect.” Subsequent Injury Fund v. Chapman, 11 Md.App. 369, 375 , 274 A.2d 870 , aff'd, 262 Md. 367 , 277 A.2d 444 (1971). When the words in a statute could be given more than one meaning, “the court may consider the consequences resulting from one meaning, rather than another, and adopt the construction that promotes the most reasonable result in light of the objectives and purpose of the enactment.” Fox v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 126 Md.App. 279, 285 , 728 A.2d 776 , cert. denied, 355 Md. 612 , 735 A.2d 1106 (1999) (citing Tucker v. Fireman’s Fund Ins.

Co., 308 Md. 69, 75 , 517 A.2d 730 (1986)). As we noted in Chapman , “we are mindful of the rule that where there is ambiguity in the compensation law the uncertainty should be resolved in favor of the claimant.” Chapman, 11 Md.App. at 376 , 274 A.2d 870 (citing Barnes v. Ezrine Tire Co., 249 Md. 557, 561 , 241 A.2d 392 (1968)). Indeed, the “primary purpose of the [Workers’ Compensation] Act ... is to protect workers and their families from hardships inflicted by work-related injuries.” Ametek v. O’Connor, 126 Md.App. 109, 116 , 727 A.2d 437 , cert. granted, 355 Md. 610 , 735 A.2d 1105 (1999). As the Court of Appeals stated in Philip Electronics v. Wright, “The Maryland Workers Compensation Act was originally enacted in 1914 to compensate employees for the loss of earning capacity resulting from accidental injury, disease, or death occurring during the course of employment.” 348 Md. 209, 215-16 , 703 A.2d 150 (1997).

The Act is “remedial in nature” and should therefore “ ‘be construed as liberally in favor of injured employees as its provisions will permit in order to effectuate its benevolent purposes.’ ” Wright, 348 Md. at 216 , 703 A.2d 150 (quoting Para v. Richards Group, 339 Md. 241, 251 , 661 A.2d 737 (1995)); see also Lovellette v. City of Baltimore, 297 Md. 271, 282 , 465 A.2d 1141 (1983); Tortuga v. Wolfensberger, 97 Md.App. 79, 84 , 627 A.2d 56 , cert. denied, 332 Md. 703 , 632 A.2d 1209 (1993).. Therefore, “in interpreting the Act, we do ²⁹³ not apply the canon of construction that a statute in derogation of the common law should be strictly construed.” Wright, 348 Md. at 216 , 703 A.2d 150 . In addition, “all sections of the Act must be read together, in conjunction with one another, to discern the true intent of the legislature.” Wright, 348 Md. at 216 , 703 A.2d 150 ; see also Vest v. Giant Food Stores, Inc., 329 Md. 461, 466-67 , 620 A.2d 340 (1993); Ryder Truck Lines v. Kennedy, 296 Md. 528, 537 , 463 A.2d 850 (1983). Statutes which relate to the same thing or general subject matter, and which are not inconsistent with each other are in pari materia, and should be construed together so that they will harmonize with each other and be consistent with their general object and scope, even though they were passed at different times and contain no reference to each other.

Consistent with this established rule of statutory construction, we think all Sections of the Workmen’s Compensation Law (Article 101) must be read and considered together in arriving at the true intent of the Legislature, as they form part of a general system; indeed, the rule has been applied by the Court of Appeals in interpreting the Motor Vehicle Code (Article 66)6), ... the Retail Sales Tax Act (Article 81), ... the Defective Delinquent Law (Article 31B), ... and the Alcohol Beverages Code (Article 2B)---- Chapman, 11 Md.App. at 375 , 274 A.2d 870 (citations omitted). With these considerations in mind, we examine § 9-602(a) of the Act, which addresses the method for computing an employee’s average weekly wage. In pertinent part, the statute provides as follows: (a) Computation—In general.—(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the average weekly wage of a covered employee shall be computed by determining the average of the weekly wages of the covered employee: (i) when the covered employee is working on full time; and (ii) at the time of: 1. the accidental personal injury; or ²⁹⁴ 2. the last injurious exposure of the covered employee to the hazards of an occupational disease. (2) For purposes of a computation under paragraph (1) of this subsection, wages shall include: (i) tips; and (ii) the reasonable value of housing, lodging, meals, rent, and other similar, advantages that the covered employee received from the employer.

Md.Code (1991, 1999 RepLVol.), § 9-602 of the Labor and Employment Article (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals has recognized the nexus between the terms “payroll” and “average weekly wage” as they are used in the Act. In Crowner v. Baltimore United