Union Labor Life Insurance v. Parmely

Levine, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal is taken from a summary judgment granted ¹⁴⁷ by the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County (Melvin, J.) in favor of appellee. The dispute arises from an action at law brought by appellee (Francina), who claims to be the beneficiary under two group life insurance policies in which Clyde Parmely (Clyde) was enrolled as a member at the time of his death on September 24, 1972. Both sides filed motions for summary judgment, and clearly there is no genuine issue of material fact.

Francina and Clyde were married in the City of Baltimore on February 18, 1946. Apparently, Clyde took seriously the notion that “in married life three is company and two is none”; 1 in 1966, he also entered into a ceremonial marriage with one Dorothy Pearsall (Dorothy) in the City of Baltimore. Much to the chagrin of appellant, neither Clyde nor Francina ever took any steps to dissolve their marriage. For all we know—since the record is silent in this regard—neither Francina nor Dorothy knew of Clyde’s marriage to the other.

On September 24, 1972, Clyde died of accidental gunshot wounds which were not self-inflicted. Prior to that date, although the record does not indicate when, he became enrolled in a group life insurance policy and a group accidental death policy which had been issued by appellant to the Construction Workers’ Trust Fund. Since Clyde did not designate a beneficiary, under the terms of each policy the eligible beneficiary was his “widow.” 2 Neither policy undertakes to define the term “widow.” Following Clyde’s death, on November 1, 1972, appellant received from Dorothy a sworn statement of claim alleging that she was the wife and nearest relative of Clyde, together with a certification of their marriage and proof of his death. Thereafter, appellant employed a private investigator who merely confirmed the circumstances of Clyde’s death.

On November 13, 1972, appellant paid to Dorothy the sum of ¹⁴⁸ $4,750 for life insurance benefits; and on December 6, 1972, a like sum for accidental death benefits. That appellant did so in good faith and without knowledge of Francina’s existence is not challenged by her. During the week of December 25, 1972, the “Life Claims Division” of appellant received notification by telephone from Francina’s attorney that she was claiming the policy benefits. This was the first information received by appellant that Francina existed; it was followed by a letter dated January 2, 1973.

The letter was accompanied by a copy of the first marriage license, the certification of which was dated September 26,1972. In this Court, appellant makes two arguments: (1) That it was fully discharged from liability under the policies by making payment to Dorothy; and (2) that since Francina requested certification of her marriage on September 26, 1972, only two days after Clyde’s death, she is barred by estoppel because she did not make her claim until three months later. We find no merit in either contention, and accordingly shall affirm the judgment of the circuit court for the following reasons. (1) Appellant relies principally on two cases, Weed v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of U.S., 288 F. 2d 463 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U. S. 821 , 82 S. Ct. 40 , 7 L.Ed.2d 27 (1961) and Avondale v. Sovereign Camp W.O.W., 134 Neb. 717 , 279 N. W. 355 (1938), for its contention that it was effectively discharged upon making payment to Dorothy.

Avondale involved a policy issued by a fraternal benefit society to one Frank Avondale. His designated beneficiary was “Edna Theodora Avondale, wife.” Following his death, the insurer paid the policy benefits to Edna. It developed that their marriage was not valid as Frank had not been divorced from his prior wife. The latter brought suit against the insurer, but the court denied recovery.

In Weed, supra, the insurer issued policies in 1947 and 1948 to George Stevens who designated as beneficiary his ¹⁴⁹ “wife, Louella H. Stevens.” In 1951, he was adjudged insane and in 1952, he was adjudged sane. At that time, he effected a change of beneficiaries by naming his wife, Louella, as the primary beneficiary and their two children as contingent beneficiaries. In 1953, he was again adjudged insane; Louella divorced him in 1954, and he died in 1955. Equitable then paid the policy benefits to Louella, the divorced wife.

In 1957, George’s will, executed in 1952, was set aside on the ground that he lacked