Union National Bank v. Shriver

Yellott, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The appellee proceeded by writ of attachment against the appellant as garnishee. The writ was issued by a justice of the peace in Carroll County, and, on the 9th of November, 1885, judgment of condemnation was rendered. The defendant'appealed from this judgment; the appeal being taken on the 13th day of February, 1886.

This appeal from the judgment of the justice was, therefore, legally inoperative, as it was taken long after the time prescribed by the statute for taking appeals. The appeal was dismissed. The judgment was recorded on the 15th day of June, 1886, in conformity with the provisions of the Act of Assembly authorizing the recording of judgments rendered by justices of the peace. On the 21st day of March, 1887,. a fieri facias was issued on said judgment, and, on the-26th day of the same month, a motion to quasli was filed. ⁴³⁷ in the Circuit Court for Carroll County from which Court the execution had issued.

The motion to quash was overruled, and from this determination of the Circuit Court the questions involved in controversy have been brought into this Court by an appeal. An effort was made during the argument to obtain a decision of questions which cannot be considered and determined on this appeal. It is clear that if any errors were committed by the justice of the peace, in rendering his judgment, the case could have been carried into the Circuit Court, and there brought under revision so that such errors might be disclosed and corrected. The law having provided a mode by which a revision of the judgment rendered by the justice could have been obtained, a defendant, neglecting to avail himself of an appeal taken in proper time, could not present the same questions for determination on a motion to quash an execution to enforce the judgment.

The judgment not having been satisfied, the issuance of an execution by the Circuit Court for Carroll County was authorized by the Act of 1812, ch. 448. It was contended in argument by the appellant’s counsel, that this Act is unconstitutional. It is not necessary to determine this question, for, even if the Act referred to were unconstitutional, the Act of 1884, ch. 118, which was in full force anterior to