Union United Methodist Church, Inc. v. Burton

CATHELL, J. Union United Methodist Church, Inc., petitioner, filed a declaratory judgment action in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County against Robert M. Burton, et ah, respondents, seeking to have that court declare the proper boundary line between two parcels of land owned by the respective parties. After that court rendered its judgment, petitioner filed an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, in which it presented one question: “Did the trial court err in its ruling that appellees’ lot known as ‘Parcel 146’ extended 64 feet along Elm Street in Upper Marlboro, Maryland, particularly in that the Com ⁵⁴⁵ plaint below contained a prayer for a Declaratory Judgment?” Simply stated, this case concerns one factual issue: the location of the boundary line between two parcels of property. At the intermediate appellate level, petitioner argued that “At a minimum, a Remand is required.” In support of that proposition, petitioner further argued that “With the proceedings below actually lacking a ‘Declaratory Judgment,’ it is not the place for an appellate court to determine the factual disputes that have come before it on the record provided.” The Court of Special Appeals remanded the case to the trial court, but for a limited purpose. It stated: “Similarly, in the present case, the circuit court issued an oral opinion defining the rights and obligations of the parties, and the oral opinion was transcribed, but the record does not show that the opinion was attached to the order that was issued to the parties.

Consequently, we shall remand the case for the court to amend its order by attaching the written declaratory judgment.” The trial court delivered an oral declaration and rendered a judgment from the bench for the respondents, Robert M. Burton, et al., and directed the Court Reporter to transcribe his oral opinion. The Court stated that the transcription when prepared was to be considered the written declaration of the rights of the parties. Petitioner argues that that was insufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Declaratory Judgment Act. The Court of Special Appeals did acknowledge the oral opinion of the trial court and addressed it.

It, in essence, affirmed, that oral opinion although the intermediate appellate court remanded the case in order to attach that oral opinion to the trial court’s judgment. The Court of Special Appeals reiterated the relevant part of the oral opinion of the trial court as follows: “T [the trial court judge] have had an opportunity to examine all of the exhibits that have been introduced, but find two exhibits to be the most [sic] before me, I find the ⁵⁴⁶ testimony of Mr. Leininger, Mr. Ramsey, and Mr. Roshan [ 1 ] more persuasive than testimony of the—testimony offered by the plaintiffs. “ ‘Having made the findings that I have in this oral opinion, I grant judgment to the defendants on Count 2, the action to quiet title, I grant judgment to the defendants on Count 3, the action of ejectment, and I declare the rights of the parties to be that parcels numbered 144, with the street address of 14505 Elm Street and parcel number 146 with the street address of 14508 Elm Street both have 64 feet of frontage on Elm Street.’ “ (Footnote added.) After the trial judge rendered the oral opinion, he and petitioner’s counsel engaged in the following conversation: “ ‘THE COURT: ... Are there any further rights that plaintiff feels that I need declare in this action? [THE CHURCH’S COUNSEL]: I think the declaratory judgment statute called for a written declaration. THE COURT: Well, I’ll ask that the court reporter type the oral opinion that I’ve given and when I receive it, I’ll sign an order indicating that that is in fact my opinion in the case.

Anything further from Plaintiff? [THE CHURCH’S COUNSEL]: The Court has issued its ruling[?] THE COURT: Now, I don’t ask you to agree with it, I’m just asking if there’s anything further. ⁵⁴⁷ [THE CHURCH’S COUNSEL]: I think the Court has ruled on all the counts.’ “ On January 26, 2006, a copy of the transcript was docketed and an order was issued that stated: “FOR THE REASONS stated in the oral opinion given on January 13, 2006, it is this 23rd day[ 2 ] of January, 2006, by the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, Maryland, “ORDERED, that judgment for the Defendants be entered in Counts II and III, and it is further, “ORDERED, that the rights of the parties are declared in the oral opinion.” In its Petition for Certiorari to this Court, petitioner presented two questions: “1. Is it desirable, or in the public interest, for this Court to address whether oral opinions being transcribed and attached to sheets of paper titled ‘Order’ are acceptable, as a matter of public policy, in actions under Maryland’s Declaratory Judgment Act[?] “2. Is it desirable, or in the public interest, for this Court to define and determine the parameters of judicial discretion under Maryland’s Declaratory Judgment Act in conjunction with the judicial power found at Section 14-111 of Maryland’s Real Property Article for determining the location of a disputed boundary line[?]” 3 We issued certiorari to consider these two questions. Union United v. Burton, 402 Md. 352 , 936 A.2d 850 (2007).

We fail to see where the second question presented in the Petition has any relevance to the problem present in this case, in that the trial court judge did what Md.Code (1974, 2003 Repl.Vol.), § 14-111 of the Real Property Article required him to do. Section 14-111, in relevant part, provides as follows: ⁵⁴⁸ “ § 14-111. Survey markers. (c) Boundary lines.—If there is a dispute over any boundary line or if the bounds mentioned in a document are lost, on petition of any party in interest, the circuit court of the county where the property lies may establish the boundary lines or the location of the missing bounds.

The court may appoint engineers, surveyors, or other experts to assist the court in its determination, and the fees of the experts are costs in the proceeding.” As we shall explain, infra, the trial judge did as the statute requires, albeit not as specifically as we would like, but, nonetheless, as Judge Kenney pointed out for the Court of Special Appeals, he provided the method for the establishment of a clear boundary line between the subject properties. Petitioner takes issue as to where (and how) that boundary line was established, not that the trial court failed to exercise discretion, but that it exercised it wrongly or insufficiently. In that respect, respondents assert that the petitioner failed to preserve that issue for review by not raising it when invited to do so by the trial court. As noted above, when the trial court inquired if there was anything else for the court to rule upon, petitioner failed to bring the specific assertions it now makes to that court’s attention.

Because of the rather unique nature of this case and the present circumstances, and because these types of cases invariably impact on questions of title to real property (sometimes impacting on title many years, and many owners, later), we shall address the last issue presented even though we shall hold that the judgment rendered at the trial level was not sufficient to comply with most of our cases requiring a written declaration in declaratory judgment actions. We note, additionally, that Judge Kenney’s opinion for the Court of Special Appeals in relation to the trial court’s location of the boundary line and the proper priorities in the establishment of property ⁵⁴⁹ lines was correct. Therefore, we shall adopt much of his reasoning on that issue. The first question, however, we shall discuss at some length is the proper rendering of declaratory judgments, a recurrent issue raised in appeals, i.e., what are the proper methods for rendering “written” judgments in Declaratory Judgment actions?

DISCUSSION In an opinion rendered after the Court of Special Appeals’ opinion in the case at bar, Bowen v. City of Annapolis, 402 Md. 587 , 937 A.2d 242 (2007), decided on December 14, 2007, the judgment or order rendered by the trial court was: “ ‘In accordance with the foregoing memorandum opinion, and upon consideration of the arguments of the parties and the record from the administrative agency below, it is on this 23rd day of December, 2005, by the Circuit Court ... ORDERED, that the decision of the Civil Service Board of the City of Annapolis be and hereby is REVERSED; and it is further, ORDERED, that the case be and hereby is REMANDED to the Annapolis City [sic] Service Board for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.’ ” Bowen, 402 Md. at 608-09 , 937 A.2d at 254 . Judge Greene, for the Court, held that the above language was insufficient to comply with the requirement that declaratory judgments be declared in writing. He wrote for the Court as follows: “This Court, on numerous occasions, has reiterated that ‘whether a declaratory judgment action is decided for or against the plaintiff, there should be a declaration in the judgment or decree defining the rights of the parties under the issues made.’ Case v. Comptroller, 219 Md. 282, 288 , 149 A.2d 6, 9 (1959); accord Bushey v. Northern Assurance Company of America, 362 Md. 626, 651 , 766 A.2d 598, 611 (2001); Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70, 87 , 660 A.2d 447, 455 (1995); Christ v. Maryland Dep’t of Natural Resources, 335 ⁵⁵⁰ Md. 427, 436, 644 A.2d 34, 38 (1994).

To do otherwise we have held is error.... In Allstate Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto.

Ins. Co., 363 Md. 106 , 117 n. 1, 767 A.2d 831 , 837 n. 1 (2001), we explained this requirement further: ‘[W]hen a declaratory judgment action is brought and the controversy is appropriate for resolution by declaratory judgment, the court must enter a declaratory judgment and that judgment, defining the rights and obligations of the parties or the status of the thing in controversy, must be in writing. It is not permissible for the court to issue an oral declaration.... When entering a declaratory judgment, the court must, in a separate document, state in writing its declaration of the rights of the parties....

Although the judgment may recite that it is based on the reasons set forth in an accompanying memorandum, the terms of the declaratory judgment itself must be set forth separately____’ ” (Some interior citations omitted.) Bowen, 402 Md. at 608-09 , 937 A.2d at 254-55 . In Jackson v. Millstone, 369 Md. 575 , 801 A.2d 1034 (2002), we stated: “Prior to addressing the substance ... we shall comment upon a procedural error committed by the Circuit Court---- “Even if we agreed ... we would be required to reverse the Circuit Court’s decision for failure to file a written declaratory judgment. The Court in Harford Mutual v. Woodfin, 344 Md. 399, 414-415 , 687 A.2d 652, 659 (1997), explained as follows: ‘This Court has reiterated time after time that, when a declaratory judgment action is brought, and the controversy is appropriate for resolution by declaratory judgment, “the trial court must render a declaratory judgment.” ... “Where a party requests a declaratory judgment, it is error for a trial court to dispose of the case simply with oral rulings and a grant of ... judgment in favor of the prevailing party.” ’ ” (Citations omitted.) ⁵⁵¹ Jackson, 369 Md. at 593-94 , 801 A.2d at 1044-45 . That is what occurred in the case at bar.

The trial judge in an oral ruling, rendered judgment for respondents and stated that he intended that it be his judgment, and later rendered a written judgment, without incorporating or signing or in any way indicating that the transcript had been reviewed or that the court approved of it. Even though transcribed, there is, on this record, no way to determine from the trial judge’s written judgment whether his oral judgment had been transcribed properly or expressly made a part of the written judgment he rendered. It is not sufficient to rely simply on past intentions when a trial judge renders a subsequent written judgment in a declaratory judgment action. We again noted the relevant law applicable to such actions, when in Salamon v. Progressive Classic Ins.

Co., 379 Md. 301 , 841 A.2d 858 (2004), Judge Harrell wrote for the Court: “The judge issued no written memorandum or order memorializing his oral ruling granting Progressive’s motion for summary judgment as to the declarations sought in its complaint [ ]. The only written record of the judgment is a 13 December 2002 Notice of Recorded Judgment signed by the Clerk of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County indicating that a judgment in favor of Progressive was entered on 11 December 2002 and listing the ‘Amount of Judgment’ as ‘Costs.’ Neither that Notice of Recorded Judgment, nor any other document indicating the existence of a declaratory judgment, was signed by the judge____ “Even were we to agree with the trial court’s resolution of the substantive issue in this case, we still would be required to reverse the Circuit Court’s judgment for failure to file a written declaratory judgment defining the rights and obligations of the parties.” (Citations omitted.) Salomon, 379 Md. at 307 -08 n. 7, 841 A.2d at 863 n. 7. See also Glover v. Glendening, 376 Md. 142, 156 , 829 A.2d 532, 540 (2003), and cases therein cited. The Court of Special Appeals in its opinion in the present case, although it agreed on the merits with the trial court’s ⁵⁵² findings, was not able to determine whether the transcript of the trial judge’s oral opinion had been attached to the judgment that was mailed to the parties, and remanded the case to the Circuit Court to ensure that the transcript was attached to the judgment and furnished to the parties.

It made no determination as to whether the trial judge had signed the transcript, or whether he was required to sign it or otherwise acknowledge its accuracy or incorporate it in writing in a subsequent written judgment, any of which might make it (although we do not now so hold) a separate written judgment required by the cases of this Court and of the Court of Special Appeals. Our review of the record indicates that the trial judge rendered his oral opinion on the 13th 4 of January 2006, at which time he ordered the court reporter to transcribe that Order which he anticipated being made a part of his judgment. That was done. The court reporter filed the transcript.

While the Clerk’s docket entry indicated that the transcript was not filed until the 26th of January 2006, the transcript has a clearly marked date stamp of the Clerk’s office of the 24th of January (the time of day is not indicated). The trial court, however, rendered its judgment on the 23rd day of January and the Clerk’s office did not docket that judgment until the 26th of January 2006. The apparently conflicting dates can be rationalized by assuming that on the 23rd day of January 2006, the court reporter filed the transcript with the Clerk’s office with a copy to the trial judge. Possibly due either to the volume of documents filed in Prince George’s County or the time of day it was