United Railways & Electric Co. v. Woodbridge

Pearce, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This action was brought by Mary S. Woodbridge in the Baltimore City Court against the United Railways and Electric Company to recover for personal injuries sustained while a passenger upon a car of the defendant company. The declaration charges that the plaintiff paid her fare and thereby became a passenger on the car of the defendant which was a common carrier of passengers for hire; that when said car reached a point where plaintiff desired to leave the car, it was stopped to allow her and others to alight therefrom; that by reason of the negligence of the defendant when plaintiff was alighting, with her feet on the steps of the car, and in the act of stepping down into the street, the car was prematurely started, whereby she, was thrown down in the street and injured. The case was tried before a jury under instructions from the Court, and a verdict was given for the plaintiff for $500.

The only exception was to the ruling on the prayers. ⁶³¹ The plaintiff testified that with her son-in-law, Joseph Susco, she boarded the car on Pratt street, near Light, that they paid their fares, and asked and received transfers to the Edmond-son avenue line, the transfer point being at the intersection of Howard and Franklin streets; that as the car was going up Howard street, when it got to Franklin it stopped, and the conductor called out, “Franklin street, transfer to Edmondson avenue;” that her son-in-law got off and she got right up and started off right behind him; that as she was in the act of stepping down on the ground with the handle-bar in her right hand, the car started and she was thrown flat on her back. She subsequently said the car was not up to the corner of Howard and Franklin streets, when she fell and that she guessed it was about 50 or 60 feet off. Joseph Susco testified that he paid the fares and asked for transfers to Edmond-son avenue line; that he was not well acquainted with the city, and did not know where he was, but when the conductor “hollered” to transfer to Edmondson avenue, the car came to a stop, and he got off; that the plaintiff got off right behind him, but “kind of hung on the car,” and the car started before she was on the ground. There was full proof of the plaintiff’s injuries, offered by her.

John B. Falk, for defendant, testified that he was a passenger on the car and saw the accident; that the car was going-slow, following a wagon, and that when about 60 or 70 feet from P'ranklin street, a man got off, and a woman followed htm and fell in the street; that the conductor was then forward on the footboard collecting fares; that the passengers called his attention to the plaintiff falling off, and he stopped the car and went back to see if she was hurt, and that the car had only moved up five or seven feet. William Urban, the conductor, testified that he was in front collecting fares; that the car was going very slow, following a wagon; that as soon as the wagon got out of the way the car started up, and somebody shouted to him that some one had fallen off, when he looked around, saw plaintiff falling, and stopped the car. ⁶³² Clarence Ryan, the motorman, testified substantially as Urban did as to the movements of the car. William A. Decource, a passenger, testified that the car was going very slow, “kept inching up, and stopping (not quite); it had not exactly come to a stop, but it would make a lurch and catch up to the wagon and then lurch back,” that he saw her rise as if to get off, and he said “the car aint stopped yet,” and she took her seat; that when the car was about ioo feet from Franklin street, she jumped up and tumbled out of the car; that he did not see anyone with her or get off just before her, but he saw “several parties making a dive to get off.” Dr. Trimble testified that he examined plaintiff and could discover no evidence of any injury, and Dr. Preston testified that he had examined her and did not think she was suffering from locomotor ataxia. There were no other witnesses, but the following notice was admitted to have been posted in the car.

Warning. No one is permitted to ride on the steps or platform, or get on or off when the car is in motion. Persons are warned of the danger. Cars stop to take on and let off passengers at near side of cross streets.

Those violating this notice do so at their own risk. No officer or agent of the company has the authority to waive these regulations. Smoking is permitted on the three rear seats. Wm.

A. House, General Manager. The plaintiff offered six prayers all of which were granted, and the defendant offered four, all of which were granted except the first, which asked an instruction that there was no evidence in the case legally sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to recover, and to the rejection of this prayer, and the granting of each of the plaintiff’s prayers, the defendant excepted. This rejected prayer will be first considered. The testimony of the plaintiff, which we have recited, goes to show that being a passenger on defendant’s car, and desiring to transfer to Edmondson avenue, notice was given by the conductor to change for that line, and the car was stopped, apparently to enable her and others to do so, and that while ⁶³³ attempting to alight, the car was started and she was injured as alleged in the declaration.

In the recent very similar case of United Railways v. Beidelman, 95 Md. 483 , this Court said, “That this was evidence going to prove the allegations of the narr, in respect to the negligence of the defendant, needs no argument or authority to establish. Proof of the occurrence of an accident and injury to a passenger is prima facie evidence of negligence in the carrier, and throws upon him the onus of rebutting the presumption by proving there was no negligence on his part. Pittsburg & Conn. R. R. v. Andrews, 39 Md. 353 ; Phil., Wil. & Balt.

R. R. v. Anderson, 72 Md. 519 . The proof adverted to, taken by itself, making a prima facie case of negligence against the defendant, it only remains to inquire what appeared in the other facts of the case to rebut, excuse, or relieve the defendant from the consequences of such negligence, and whether if anything, this was properly submitted to the trying tribunal.’’ In the light of this emphatic language, which we find applicable to the facts of the present case, there can be no doubt that this prayer was properly rejected. All the plaintiff’s prayers are objected to on the ground that the plaintiff disregarded the warning posted in the cars that they stopped to take on and let off passengers at near side cross streets, and that as the car had not actually reached the near side of Franklin street the plaintiff in getting off before reaching that point, even if the car had stopped, was guilty of such contributory negligence as to preclude recovery; and the fifth prayer was further objected to on the ground that there was no evidence to support the hypothesis that “ the defendant’s servants and agents might have seen the position of the plaintiff by using ordinary prudence and care, and might have avoided the injury.” As to the last objection, it is sufficient to say that the record does not disclose any special exception on this ground. Albert v. The State, 66 Md. 334.

The plaintiff’s xst, 2nd and 3rd prayers have been so often approved that they cannot be questioned in this case, unless there was such contributory negli ⁶³⁴ gence as required the case to be taken from the jury on that ground. In view of the assertion of such negligence now, in the argument on the granted prayers, it appears singular that a prayer was not offered by the defendant withdrawing the case from the jury on that distinct ground. But we are to deal with the case as presented by the record. The fourth prayer instructed the jury that if they found the plaintiff’s fare was paid and a transfer was given her for Edmonson avenue; that as the car approached the transfer point the conductor called out, “ Franklin street, transfer to Edmondson avenue,” and the car came to a stop; and that while the car was standing still, and plaintiff was alighting and using ordinary care, the car was prematurely started, whereby the plaintiff was thrown to the ground and injured, then she was entitled to recover.

This instruction does not require the jury to find that the car had reached the near side of Franklin street at which point alone the defendant contends, under the regulation of the company posted in the cars, the plaintiff had a right to get off; so that the question involved is, first, whether such is the true construction of the rule, and second, whether the conduct of the defendant’s agent, notwithstanding such construction, did not lead her to believe that she had reached the place of transfer, and that she was directed or invited to leave the car when the car stopped as stated in the. prayer. The defendant’s contention is that the regulation means that cars will stop only at the near side of crossings to take on or let off passengers, and that anyone getting on or off at any other place, and under any circumstances, is precluded from recovery, if injured by reason of the negligence of the company. But we cannot agree that such an inflexible and inexorable rule, fraught with such far reaching consequences, can be properly deduced from the language employed. It is doubtless true that they can be reqidred to stop for such purpose, only at such places, and it is an entirely reasonable rule that a passenger should not have the right to stop a car in the middle of the block nor at the far side of a crossing, but the passenger’s rights are not necessarily controlled by that regulation ⁶³⁵ under all