University System v. Baltimore Sun Co.

⁸¹ BELL, C.J. This case concerns a request to the University of Maryland, College Park (“UMCP”) for public records, made by The Baltimore Sun and Jon Morgan, one of its sports reporters (collectively, the “appellees”) pursuant to the Maryland Public Information Act (hereafter “the MPIA”). The MPIA is codified at Maryland Code (1984, 1999 Repl.Vol., 2001 Cum.Supp.) §§ 10-611 et seq. of the State Government Article. 1 I. This case had its genesis when the appellees made a written MPIA request to the Athletic Department of UMCP seeking “copies of the original and revised employment contracts for head football coach Ralph Friedgen .... [and] any separate letters of understanding, side letters or similar documents specifying incentives, bonuses, broadcast agreements, athletic footwear contracts, and other matters concerning the terms and conditions of [Coach Friedgen’s] employment and compensation.” In response, University Counsel disclosed that Coach Friedgen’s annual salary was $183,920, 2 and denied the remainder of the request, citing § 10 — 616(i) 3 and § 10—617(f), 4 ⁸² which prohibit the disclosure of personnel and certain financial information. Dissatisfied with the UMCP’s response, the appellees retained counsel, who sought reconsideration of UMCP’s decision to disclose only those documents related to Coach Fried-gen’s salary and to refuse disclosure of documents “describing other employment related compensation due” him. They argued that.UMCP’s reliance on § 10-616(i) and § 10 — 617(f) was flawed because UMCP improperly and narrowly interpreted the term, “salary,” and, at the same time, improperly construed the term, “personnel,” broadly, both inconsistently with the “bias in favor of disclosure recognized by the courts.” 5 ⁸³ The UMCP was not persuaded and maintained its position.

Responding to the appellees’ request for reconsideration, it wrote: “Although we understand the MPIA’s general construction favoring disclosure of public records, we remain constrained by its specific prohibitions. With respect to the Baltimore Sun’s request, the MPIA expressly requires us to deny inspection of Coach Friedgen’s personnel records, as well as any part of a record that contains information about his finances, including income. (See §§ 10 — 616(i) and 10 — 617(f) of the MPIA). The only exception to these requirements is limited to his “salary” as a State employee.

(See §§ 10-611(g)(2) and 10-617(0(1) of the MPIA). “With respect to salary, we have concluded, in consultation with the Maryland Attorney General’s Office, that the MPIA requires the disclosure of the total amount of an employee’s State earnings.” Nonetheless, perhaps in an attempt to avoid the threatened lawsuit, Coach Friedgen voluntarily agreed to provide additional information about his compensation. Accordingly, the UMCP disclosed the following additional information: “Coach Friedgen receives a salary of $179,753 in 2001-2002. Also, he has earned the maximum amount of compensation for competitive achievement (ACC Championship and BCS Bowl), automobile allowances, radio and television appearances and apparel/endorsement compensation, which totals $762,000. The availability of student athlete academic achievement and citizenship bonuses is evaluated subsequent to the completion of the fiscal year.” In the meantime and prior to receipt of the additional information voluntarily disclosed by Coach Friedgen, the appellees made another MPIA request of the UMCP Athletic ⁸⁴ Department, this one seeking information with respect to the compensation and income of UMCP’s head basketball coach, Gary Williams. 6 The University responded to that request as follows: “Except for salary of a State employee, the MPIA requires State agencies to deny access to personnel records and financial information of an individual, including income.

See § 10-616(i) and § 10 — 617(f) of the MPIA. Therefore, University of Maryland legal counsel has advised Intercollegiate Athletics to provide the following information in response to your request. “Coach Gary Williams receives a regular salary of $202,991 in FY 2002. To date, he has also earned $540,400 for competitive achievement (ACC Regular Season Championship and NCAA National Championship), automobile allowance and radio, television and personal appearances. The availability of additional University compensation based upon student-athlete academic achievement and NCAA compliance is evaluated at a later date.

His apparel/endorsement compensation is received directly from the apparel company. “We must decline to provide you with copies of Coach Williams’ employment contract and/or any other records in the University’s possession pertaining to other income, ⁸⁵ which Coach Williams may receive directly from outside sources (e.g., apparel/equipment endorsements, sports camps, consulting, speaking engagements outside the scope of the contract, etc.) Such documents would constitute personnel records and/or contain personal financial information other than the salary of a State employee, and their disclosure is prohibited under § 10 — 616(i) and § 10 — 617(f) of the MPIA.” Thus, UMCP reaffirmed its previously communicated interpretation of the MPIA and, accordingly, refused to disclose any information relating to Coach Williams’ non-University related income. Nor did it disclose a copy of Coach William’s University contract. The appellees filed suit in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, naming as defendants the University System of Maryland, Deborah A Yow, Ph.D., the athletic director at UMCP, and David Haglund, the assistant director of Intercollegiate Athletics at UMCP (collectively, the “appellants” or the “University”). The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, at the center of which was the question whether the University was required to disclose, not only each coach’s total salary from the University, but, the underlying contracts and agreements relating to each coach’s income.

The appellants argued that the plain language of the applicable sections of the MPIA statute requires state agencies to deny disclosure of a state employee’s personnel and financial records, with a narrow exception for salary derived from State funds. The appellees, on the other hand, maintained that the records sought were subject to the mandatory disclosure requirements of the MPIA and that the appellant’s interpretation “accords broad secrecy to the terms of a state employee’s compensation contrary to the MPIA’s mandate that the salary of public employees should be a matter of public record.” The trial court found in favor of the appellees. It reasoned: the legislature has directed that the MPIA “shall be construed in favor of permitting inspection” of public records; the term “salary” unambiguously is included in the definition of “public record” in § 10 — 611(g)(2); the financial records exclusion con ⁸⁶ tained in § 10-617(f) does not apply to the salary of a public employee; and, salary related documents are not personnel records within the meaning of the statute. Consequently, the trial court granted the appellees’ motion for summary judgment and denied the appellants’ cross-motion.

Accordingly, the court ordered that the records requested by the appellees be produced. 7 The court instructed that, to the extent that salary information and personnel records coexist in the same document, the personnel information should be redacted before the records are delivered to the appellees. The appellants moved to alter or amend the judgment, in an attempt to have any references to payments to the coaches from third parties deleted from the court’s order. They argued, in that regard, that such payments did not constitute “salary” of a public employee and pointed out that the appellees requested information only about payments to the coaches “by the State University from public funds” and indicated that the records it sought did “not reveal anything about the coaches’ personal finances other than how much taxpayer ⁸⁷ money they are paid from their public employment.” The trial court denied that motion, whereupon the appellants timely noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. Prior to any proceedings on the merits in the intermediate appellate court, 8 this Court, on its own initiative, issued a writ of certiorari.

University System of Maryland v. The Baltimore Sun Co., 374 Md. 81 , 821 A.2d 369 , (2003).

III

We recently considered the applicability of the MPIA in Hammen v. Baltimore County Police Department, 373 Md. 440, 455-156 , 818 A.2d 1125, 1134-36 (2003). In that case, we commented that the MPIA requires that a “custodian shall permit a person ... to inspect any public record at any reasonable time” except as otherwise provided by law. Id., citing § 10-613. 9 We explained that the “provisions of the ... Act reflect the legislative intent that the citizens of the State of Maryland be accorded wide-ranging access to public infor ⁸⁸ mation concerning the operation of their government.” Id., quoting Kirwan v. The Diamondback, 352 Md. 74, 81 , 721 A.2d 196, 199 (1998) (emphasis in original).

Moreover, we made clear that the MPIA “is to be construed in favor of disclosure.” Id., citing § 10-612(b). 10 See also, Fioretti v. Maryland State Board of Dental Examiners, 351 Md. 66, 73 , 716 A.2d 258, 262 (1998) (“ ‘the provisions of the Public Information Act reflect the legislative intent that citizens of the State of Maryland be accorded wide-ranging access to public information concerning the operation of their government.’ ”), quoting A.S. Abell Publishing Co. v. Mezzanote, 297 Md. 26, 32 , 464 A.2d 1068, 1071 (1983) (the provisions of the statute “must be liberally construed ... in order to effectuate the Public Information Act’s broad remedial purpose”); Cranford v. Montgomery County, 300 Md. 759, 771 , 481 A.2d 221, 227 (1984); Faulk v. State’s Attorney for Harford County, 299 Md. 493, 506-507 , 474 A.2d 880, 887 (1984). To be sure, the parties do not dispute that the records sought by the appellees are public records. They dispute only whether those records fall within the category of documents and/or information that the statute mandatorily instructs a custodian to deny, 11 or permit, inspection. As a preliminary ⁸⁹ matter, it is important to note the differences in the documents requested by the appellees and how these documents came to be public records.

Both Coach Friedgen and Coach Williams are employees of the University of Maryland, College Park, a part of the University System of Maryland, an instrumentality of the State of Maryland. Consequently, both coaches are employees of the state of Maryland. Both also have entered into written agreements with the University, outlining the terms and conditions, including salary, of the employment arrangement. These written agreements, and any amendments thereto, similar to other government contracts, come under the definition of “public record” as § 10-611(g) 12 defines it, as they originated as documentary evidence in the transaction of public business.

Indeed, § 10-611(g)(2) is clear, a public record “includes a document that lists the salary of an employee of a unit or instrumentality of the State ⁹⁰ government or of a political subdivision.” Clearly, employment contracts on file with the University are public records. The University is a member of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”). 13 Pursuant to NCAA regulations, contractual agreements between a member institution and its athletic coaches, and hence between UMCP and both coaches in this case, must include an express stipulation that NCAA Enforcement Provisions shall apply to the terms of the employment contract. § 11.2.1. 14 Violations of these provisions by a coach, it is further stipulated, can result in disciplinary or corrective action, including suspension without pay and termination, for serious and deliberate violation of NCAA regulations. § 11.2.1.1. 15 In addition, the NCAA bylaws, see § 11.2.2, provides that an athletic coach must report annually to the member institution the sources of his or her athletically related income from third parties. 16 To be sure, therefore, ⁹¹ coaches may earn supplemental pay, § 11.01.7, 17 see § 11.3.2.1 (“A staff member may earn income in addition to the institutional salary by performing services for outside groups”); however, the NCAA recognizes the institution’s control of the coaches’ employment and salary, see § 11.3.1, 18 by both limiting and prohibiting the source of, and how, supplemental pay may be earned. Section § 11.3.2.2, for example, prohibits “[a]n outside source ... from paying or regularly supplementing an athletic department staff member’s annual salary and ⁹² from arranging to supplement that salary for an unspecified achievement.” Similarly, § 11.3.2.3 limits bonuses to “direct cash payment[s] in recognition of a specific and extraordinary achievement (e.g., contribution during career to the athletic department of the institution, winning a conference or national championship, number of games or meets won during career/season), provided such a cash supplement is in recognition of a specific achievement and is in conformance with institutional policy.” Additionally, “An institution’s coaching staff member may not promote a noninstitutional camp or clinic by permitting the use of his or her quotations and/or pictures in the camp or clinic brochure, unless that coaching staff member is employed by the camp.” Bylaw § 11.3.2.6. Consequently, pursuant to the NCAA reporting requirements with respect to the ability of athletic coaches to earn outside income, the University has come into possession of documents that contain references to contracts for remuneration, and other financial arrangements, between the coaches and third parties.

These documents evidence, at least purportedly, income in addition to both coaches’ state-provided salaries, i.e., in NCAA parlance, “institutional salary,” see ByLaw, § 11.01.7, that is derived from athletically related sources outside of the University. Again, the documents, as all parties agree, fall within the definition of “public record” as defined in § 10-611(g). The interplay between the NCAA reporting requirements and the MPIA, as it relates to state employees, is, as we have said, at the heart of the dispute sub judice. Without the NCAA reporting requirement, the University, potentially, would not be in possession of the records the respondent seeks.

Or, if both coaches were employed by a private university in Maryland, although subject to the same NCAA reporting requirements, the MPIA would not be applicable and the appellees could not compel their disclosure, since the MPIA does not apply to the business records of a private entity. ⁹³ Whether, in this case, the records in the possession of the University need be disclosed depends solely upon the legislative intent in enacting the MPIA. That is a question of statutory construction, the principles of which are well settled. Most recently, the principal canons of statutory construction, and those relevant to the decision of the case sub judice, were reviewed by this Court in Bank of America v. Stine, 379 Md. 76, 85-86 , 839 A.2d 727, 732-733 (2003): “[T]he primary goal of [statutory construction is] to ‘ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.’ Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35 , 660 A.2d 423, 429 (1995). In order to discern legislative intent, we first examine the words of the statute and if, giving them their plain and ordinary meaning, the statute is clear and unambiguous, we will end our inquiry.

Comptroller of the Treasury v. Kolzig, 375 Md. 562, 567 , 826 A.2d 467, 469 (2003). As we have recognized, however, ‘[a]n ambiguity may ... exist even when the words of the statute are crystal clear. That occurs when its application in a given situation is not clear.’ Blind Indus. & Servs. of Md. v. Md. Dep’t of Gen. Servs., 371 Md. 221, 231 , 808 A.2d 782, 788 (2002).

Therefore, a statutory provision may be ambiguous: ‘1) when it is intrinsically unclear; or 2) when its intrinsic meaning may be fairly clear, but its application to a particular object or circumstance may be uncertain.’ Gardner v. State, 344 Md. 642, 648-49 , 689 A.2d 610, 613 (1997). Further, “when the statute to be interpreted is part of a statutory scheme, ... [we read it in context, together with the other statutes] on the same subject, harmonizing them to the extent possible.... ’ Mid-Atlantic Power Supply Ass’n v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 361 Md. 196, 204 , 760 A.2d 1087, 1091 (2000).

We also ‘seek to avoid constructions that are unreasonable, or inconsistent with common sense,’ Frost v. State, 336 Md. 125, 137 , 647 A.2d 106, 112 (1994), and we will presume that ‘the Legislature ‘intends its enactments to operate together as a consistent and harmonious body of law,’” Toler v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 373 Md. 214, 220 , 817 A.2d 229, 234 (2003), quoting State v. Ghajari, 346 Md. 101, 115 , 695 A.2d 143, 149 (1997) ⁹⁴ (quoting State v. Harris, 327 Md. 32, 39 , 607 A.2d 552, 555 (1992)), so that ‘no part of the statute is rendered meaningless or nugatory.’ Id., (citing Gillespie v. State, 370 Md. 219, 222 , 804 A.2d 426, 428 (2002)); see also Montgomery County v. Buckman, 333 Md. 516, 523-24 , 636 A.2d 448, 452 (1994). In our endeavor to harmonize the provisions of all of the relevant statutes, this Court will prefer an interpretation that allows us to avoid reaching a constitutional question. East Prince Frederick Corp. v. County Board of Comm’rs, 320 Md. 178, 182 , 577 A.2d 27, 29 (1990). Automobile Trade Ass’n v. Ins.

Comm’r, 292 Md. 15, 21 , 437 A.2d 199, 202 (1981).” See Comptroller of the Treasury v. Olaf A. Kolzig, 375 Md. 562, 567-69 , 826 A.2d at 469-70 (2003). At the threshold, we point out that the MPIA does not require the carte blanche, and unrestricted disclosure, of all public records. To the contrary, it clearly requires the custodian of public records, in some circumstances, to deny inspection of public records and disclosure of specific information, e.g. §§ 10-616(i) and 10-617(f), and, in certain other circumstances, where disclosure would be contrary to the public interest, § 10-618, 19 gives the custodian discretion to deny ⁹⁵ inspection of parts of a public records. Moreover, the MPIA recognizes that “an unwarranted invasion of the privacy of a person in interest” 20 is reason to deny inspection of a public record.

See § 10-612(b). Read in its totality and in context, it is clear that, in enacting the MPIA, the General Assembly was attempting to balance the right of the public to unfettered access to government records against the “unwarranted invasion of the privacy of a person in interest,” see § 10-612(b), that unrestricted disclosure would cause. Clearly, it is the threat of, and protection against, an unwarranted invasion of privacy that led to the exclusions found in §§ 10-616 and 10-617. Nonetheless, the Legislature has also instructed, and we have repeatedly affirmed, see Hammen, supra, 373 Md. at 457, 818 A.2d at 1136 ; Caffrey v. Dept. of Liquor Control for Montgomery County, 370 Md. 272, 305 , 805 A.2d 268, 287-288 (2002); Office of the Attorney General v. Gallagher, 359 Md. 341, 343 , 753 A.2d 1036, 1037 (2000); Fioretti v. Md. State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 351 Md. 66, 73 , 716 A.2d 258, 262 (1998); Kirwan supra, 352 Md. at 96-97 , 721 A.2d at 207 , that the MPIA is to be construed in favor of permitting inspection of public records.

Our case law interpreting the MPIA’s disclosure requirements is instructive. For example, in Hammen , a retired Baltimore County Police Officer, pursuant to an MPIA request, sought to inspect surveillance tapes taken of his activi ⁹⁶ ties. The videotapes were taken by the county to be used in a separate administrative proceeding related to the re-evaluation of the officer’s disability retirements benefits. Denying the request to inspect the videotape, the Baltimore County Office of Law opined that disclosure of the videotapes would be contrary to the decision in Shenk v. Berger, 86 Md.App. 498 , 587 A.2d 551 (1991).

In that case, the Court of Special Appeals addressed the issue of whether surveillance videotapes of an injured party, taken by the opposing party after the alleged injuries had occurred, were subject to Maryland’s discovery rules. The intermediate appellate court held that they were, provided that, prior to disclosure, the party having to disclose is afforded the opportunity to depose the injured party. Shenk, supra, 86 Md.App. at 506-507 , 587 A.2d at 556 . In Hammen , the defendant agreed to honor the MPIA request, if Hammen would agree to be deposed in a separate proceeding, which he agreed to do.

Nevertheless, we concluded that Shenk was not applicable because it involved “a private personal injury civil action and did not involve statutorily guaranteed access to public records by a ‘party in interest’ ” Hammen, supra, 373 Md. at 452, 818 A.2d at 1133 . We held that “the rules of discovery applicable to circuit court proceedings are not, generally, applicable in respect to MPIA proceedings,” id. at 453 , 818 A.2d at 1133 , explaining that an MPIA request “is an attempt to gain statutorily guaranteed access to ‘public information,’ not private information.” Id. at 457, 818 A.2d at 1135 (emphasis added). Thus, absent some rule of law to the contrary, whatever rights the appellees have to compel disclosure and, conversely, whatever rights the appellants have to deny disclosure, are embodied within the MPIA. Prior to Hammen , this Court addressed the scope of the MPIA in two cases, Office of the Governor v. Washington Post Co., 360 Md. 520 , 759 A.2d 249 (2000) and Kirwan v. The Diamondback, 352 Md. 74 , 721 A.2d 196 (1998).

The MPIA request in Washington Post sought disclosure of the telephone records of the Governor of the State of Maryland for “all phones in the Governor’s Mansion (Government House); his State House offices; all phones in Shaw House (an annex ⁹⁷ office in Annapolis); all phones in the Washington and Baltimore offices; all car phones and cellular phones used by the governor and anyone on his staff.” In addition, the Washington Post asked to review the scheduling and appointment records of the Governor for a two-year period. Asserting executive privilege, the Governor’s Office, denied the request, choosing instead to disclose only the aggregate cost of the telephone calls. In addition, it released the Governor’s public agenda, but refused to release the appointment and scheduling records, which, in its opinion, did not constitute public records. We addressed, as a preliminary matter, whether the provisions of the MPIA applied to the Governor’s office.

Concluding that the statutory language “clearly encompassed ... [the Governor’s office] as a unit or instrumentality of the State government,” this Court determined that records of the Governor’s office are subject to the right of inspection guaranteed in the MPIA. 21 We concluded that there was no statutory exclusion in the MPIA for certain of the records sought by the Washington Post and, accordingly, required their disclosure. More important, however, to the case sub judice, was the determination that phone records from the Governor’s Mansion, although technically property owned and paid for by the State and in the possession of the Governor’s office, did not come within the definition of “public record,” “in light of one’s reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her own home.” 360 Md. at 537 , 759 A.2d at 258 . The Court explained: “In light of the nature of Government House and the role of the Government House Trust, the Governor and his family might not have the identical expectation of privacy while living there as one has in his or her privately owned home. ⁹⁸ Nonetheless, we do not believe that the Governor and his family must relinquish all normal expectations of privacy in their home simply because, in accordance with constitutional and statutory provisions, their home and furnishing, including telephone service, are supplied by the State.” Washington Post, supra, 360 Md. at 537-38 , 759 A.2d at 259 . Thus, the determination in Washington Post, with respect to the Governor’s home telephone bills, turned on this Court’s construction of those records as being in their nature private and, therefore, not being the kinds of records that are encompassed within the definition of a “public record” intended by the Legislature.

Id, at 538, 759 A.2d 249 . Also at issue in Kirwan v. Diamondback, supra, was the scope of an MPIA request involving the records of parking citations issued by UMCP to student-athletes, and, coincidentally, to the UMCP head basketball coach, Gary Williams. The MPIA request, made by the campus student-newspaper, was denied by the University, the custodian of the parking citation records, on the basis that they were either personnel records exempt from disclosure under § 10 — 616(i) of the MPIA or, in the alternative, financial information exempt from disclosure under § 10 — 617(f) of the MPIA. This Court rejected both rationales.

We concluded, instead, that a citation for a parking violation is, in sum, “a charging document accusing the recipient of a petty crime, and the monetary penalty imposed for a parking violation is a fine rather than a debt.” 352 Md. at 87 , 721 A.2d at 202 . As such, we stated, such records did not constitute financial information as defined under the statute and, moreover, “did not fit within the commonly understood meaning of the term ‘personnel records.’ ” Id. at 83 , 721 A.2d at 200 . We also were not persuaded by the University’s argument, pursuant to § 10-618 (permissive denials), that disclosure of the records “is against the public interest.” Id. at 87-88, 721 A.2d at 202-03 . That argument was premised upon the, supposed, “chilling effect” disclosure would have on the University’s obligation to self report NCAA violations.

The Court concluded that the “public interest” argument did not fall ⁹⁹ clearly into categories recognized in § 10-618’s permissive denials. Id. Finally, the University argued, citing § 10-612, that disclosure of parking ticket records would be “ ‘an unwarranted invasion of privacy’ because it would subject student-athletes and their families ‘to extreme embarrassment and humiliation.’ ” 352 Md. at 88 , 721 A.2d at 203 . In response, we stated “When an adult commits or is formally charged with committing a criminal offense, even a petty one, it is doubtful that any ‘invasion of privacy’ occasioned by an accurate newspaper report of the matter is ‘unwarranted.’ Nevertheless, assuming arguendo that one might reasonably believe that such disclosure is an unwarranted invasion of privacy, the Maryland Public Information Act does not contain an exemption for particular cases whenever the disclosure of a record might cause an ‘unwarranted invasion of privacy.’ Section 10-612(b), previously quoted, related to the ‘General Construction’ of the Act.

It provides that the Act ‘shall be construed in favor’ of disclosure ‘unless an unwarranted invasion of the privacy of a person in interest would result.’ The statutory construction issues raised in the present case regarding the Maryland Public Information Act concern the meaning of the terms ‘personnel records’ and ‘financial records.’ As explained in Part II A and II B above, the records sought in the present case do not constitute personnel records or financial information. Furthermore, we do not believe that a broader definition of these terms would be justified under the statutory construction principles set forth in § 10-612(b).” Id. at 88-89, 721 A.2d. at 203 . Our cases thus instruct that, in a dispute relating to an MPIA request, a party’s right to deny or compel inspection of public records is grounded, almost, if not exclusively, within the Act. The express exemptions set out in §§ 10 — 616(i) and 10-617(f), are intended to address the reasonable expectation ¹⁰⁰ of privacy that a person in interest has in certain types of records identified by the Legislature.

To be sure, the MPIA expressly requires the disclosure of a state-employee’s salary as a matter of public record. See § 10 — 611(g)(2) (defining a public record to include “a document that lists the salary of an employee of a unit or instrumentality of the State government.”) and § 10-612. The appellants, while acknowledging that a document evidencing a state-employee’s salary is subject to MPIA’s disclosure requirements (Petitioner’s Brief at 7), maintain that the employment contracts sought by the appellees are either personnel records or financial information exempt under §§ 10 — 616(i) and 10-617(f). (Petitioner’s Brief at 8).

With respect to the former, they reason: when § 10 — 616(i) and § 10-617(f)(1) are read together, it is clear that § 10-617(f)(1) “does not trump the personnel records exemption.” They point out that the latter provision “refers to the ‘subsection,’ meaning § 10-617(f). It does not refer to § 10 — 616(i),” which it easily could have done, had that been what the Legislature intended. The appellants also rely on 83 Op. Att’y Gen. 192 (Md.1998), available at 1998 Md. AG LEXIS 35 (Opinion No. 98-025, December 18, 1998).

In that opinion, the Attorney General, responding to an inquiry from the County Executive for Anne Arundel County concerning “public access to records reflecting individual bonuses or performance awards paid to merit system employees and appointed officials of Anne Arundel County,” concluded that “the public is entitled to inspect records that reflect the earnings of government officers and employees, whether those earnings consist solely of a regular salary or are augmented by a bonus or performance award.” Id. He cautioned, however, that “[t]his conclusion does not imply that the public has an entitlement to the documents establishing the basis for a bonus or performance award[,] for example, performance evaluations. Underlying records of this kind fall within the exemption for personnel records.” Id. at 192 n. 3. The appellants argue that the employment contract the University has with each coach is an underlying record of the kind to which the Attorney General made reference and, ¹⁰¹ therefore, comes within the exemption for personnel records found in § 10 — 616(i).

(Petitioner’s Brief at 11). So viewing the contracts for employment, they disclosed the salary information that the contracts authorized, but refused to disclose the contracts themselves. The appellants’ argument with respect to § 10 — 617(f) is premised on the financial information concerning the coaches’ contractual and financial arrangements with, and thus payments from, third parties, being personal financial information and not a part of the salary the coaches receive from the State. They note, in this regard, that, while “public record” is