Vagnoni v. Shenkle

Powers, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. A family cookout, interrupted by a sudden shower, was a cause (not proximate) of serious injuries sus ⁵⁷⁷ tained by Luigi Vagnoni on the afternoon of Labor Day, 1968. He and his family had joined a group of relatives at the home of his brother on West Park Drive, near University Boulevard, in Prince George’s County. A cookout was in progress in the back yard when a sudden storm came up.

Some of the participants took care of the cooking equipment, and others, including Mr. Vagnoni and his son, ran to close the windows on several cars parked on both sides of the street. Mr. Vagnoni directed his son to his own car, on the near side of the street, and he headed for his brother-in-law’s car, parked at the curb on the opposite side. While in the street, he was hit and injured by a car driven by Donald Larry Shenkle. 1 The trial court ruled, and we agree, that his own negligence was a proximate cause of his injury. Luigi Vagnoni and his wife Donatina sued Shenkle in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County.

The case was tried before a jury, with Judge William B. Bowie presiding. At the close of the plaintiffs’ evidence, Judge Bowie granted a directed verdict for the defendant. In this appeal from the judgment entered on that verdict, appellants ask us to consider five questions: 1. Whether appellant was contribu tor ily negligent as a matter of law. 2.

Whether the facts presented a jury question as to whether appellee’s car was operated on the wrong side of the road. 3. Whether operating a motor vehicle on the wrong side of the road can constitute negligence. 4. Whether the crosswalk statute applies where there are no crosswalks in the neighborhood. 5. Whether a pedestrian crossing between crosswalks is contributorily negligent as a matter of law.

Questions 2 and 3 are not before us. Judge Bowie found it unnecessary to decide whether there was evidence of ⁵⁷⁸ primary negligence by the appellee, and we think his conclusion was correct. Questions 4 and 5 merely present aspects of whether appellant was contributorily negligent as a matter of law, and we shall consider that single question. The area was not an incorporated town, but was “a development, a subdivision”.

Houses were located on one side of West Park Drive; on the other side was Northwest Branch Park. About 200 feet north of the scene was University Boulevard. Chapman Road was the next street to the south, at a little greater distance. West Park Drive was 35 feet wide, from curb to curb, and cars were parked on both sides.

There was room for traffic in both directions, but it would be a “fairly tight squeeze”. Appellant and others hurried toward the street. Appellant said he was running. He also described his gait as not running a race, but loping, or trotting — a 40 or 45 year old man’s run.

Without stopping, he changed direction to head for a car across the street. He testified that while he was on the grass strip between the sidewalk and the curb on the near side he looked in both directions, could see to the corner at University Boulevard and saw no cars coming. He made this observation while in motion. He continued across the rest of the grass strip, off the curb, between two parked cars, and into the travelled portion of the street, and had progressed two-thirds of the way across when he heard a skidding noise.

He then looked to his left for the second time and saw the appellee’s car bearing down on him. He had not looked in that direction since he was on the grass plot. He did not see appellee’s car until he looked up after hearing the skidding noise. He tried to get out of the way by trying to proceed across the street.

Appellant introduced evidence that the damage to appellee’s car was to the left headlight