Vaise v. State

MATTHEW VAISE V. STATE OF MARYLAND, Case No. 2205, Sept. 2018 SPEEDY TRIAL – SIXTH AMENDMENT – EFFECT OF NCR PLEA CHANGE DURING TRIAL PREPARATION ON BARKER ANALYSIS. In a complex murder case involving a defendant whose criminal responsibility was in question after he entered an NCR plea sixteen months into the parties’ trial preparation, when the State was prepared to proceed to trial, the focus of speedy trial analysis under Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), is on the NCR-related delay that occurred after the change in plea paused and then re-set the proverbial clock on trial preparation. SPEEDY TRIAL – SIXTH AMENDMENT – EFFECT OF NCR EVALUATION ON TRIAL PREPARATION. When a dispute arose about the defendant’s criminal responsibility following an NCR diagnosis by psychiatrists at Clifton T. Perkins Hospital, a single NCR-related postponement taken by the State to conduct an independent evaluation of the defendant’s criminal responsibility did not carry dispositive weight in the Barker analysis.

Although further delay raised constitutional concern, the State was entitled to a reasonable opportunity for its expert to evaluate appellant. See Carey v, State, 299 Md. 17, 22 (1984); Goins v. State, 293 Md. 97 , 107 n.7, 111 (1982). SPEEDY TRIAL – SIXTH AMENDMENT – WEIGHT OF NCR-RELATED DELAY – LENGTH AND REASONS FACTORS UNDER BARKER. NCR-related postponements were neutral in the Barker analysis because they afforded both parties a reasonable period to evaluate appellant’s criminal responsibility.

Alternatively, given the parties’ mutual agreement to these evaluations, and that the State’s sole NCR- related postponement did not cause as much trial delay as the NCR-related postponements requested by appellant, the length and reasons for NCR-related postponements requested by the defendant and the State offset each other. SPEEDY TRIAL – SIXTH AMENDMENT – WEIGHT OF NCR-RELATED DELAY – ASSERTION OF RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL AND PREJUDICE FACTORS UNDER BARKER. Appellant’s belated assertion of his right to a speedy trial and his failure to show prejudice weigh against him in the Barker analysis, where the State was prepared to proceed to trial when appellant changed his plea, defense counsel waited two years after his boilerplate request for a speedy trial to object and another four months to move for dismissal, the State’s NCR evaluation triggered less trial delay than the NCR evaluation requested by appellant, there was no actual prejudice to appellant’s case, and appellant’s complaints about pretrial incarceration were undercut by the record. Circuit Court for Baltimore City Case No. 115072020 REPORTED IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 2205 September Term, 2018 ______________________________________ MATTHEW STEPHEN VAISE v. STATE OF MARYLAND ______________________________________ Reed, Shaw Geter, Raker, Irma S.

(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Shaw Geter, J. ______________________________________ Filed: May 4, 2020 Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. Suzanne Johnson 2020-10-23 14:20-04:00 Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk On January 29, 2015, the body of Stephen Vaise was discovered in his Baltimore home, lying in a pool of blood. After his death was ruled a homicide by gunshot, the State charged Stephen’s son, appellant Matthew Stephen Vaise, with first-degree murder and use of a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence. Following a mistrial, appellant was re-tried over twelve days before a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, which convicted him of second-degree murder and use of a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence, and in a bifurcated proceeding, found him criminally responsible.

Appellant was sentenced to thirty years for the murder, consecutive to twenty years for the firearm offense, without the possibility of parole during the first five years. Appellant presents the following questions for our review: 1. Did the trial court err in allowing the State to introduce irrelevant and prejudicial other crimes evidence? 2. Did the trial court err in denying Appellant’s motion to dismiss for violation of his right to a speedy trial? 3.

Did the trial court err in refusing to grant Appellant’s motion for mistrial when the State allowed a portion of Appellant’s statement, which was supposed to have been redacted, to be played for the jury? Concluding there was no error or abuse of discretion, we shall affirm appellant’s convictions. In doing so, we shall examine the effect of appellant’s change in plea to “not criminally responsible” on his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. BACKGROUND Thomas Vaise (“Thomas”),1 who lived at 203 Riverview Road, Brooklyn Park, in Anne Arundel County, was close to his brother Stephen, whose only child was appellant.

According to Thomas, approximately three weeks before January 29, 2015, Stephen brought appellant to Thomas’ house. Stephen was upset and asked Thomas to let his son stay there overnight while Stephen was at work. Stephen explained that he was worried about appellant, who lived with him, because there were “some people” who were “after” appellant. While Stephen and Thomas were talking, appellant went into the basement and got a beer from the supply Stephen left at his brother’s house.

Thomas, who does not drink, refused to let appellant stay because he was already drinking alcohol. At 3:33 p.m. on January 29, Baltimore City Police Officer Anthony Hargrove went to 4403 Prudence Street, in Baltimore, to conduct a well-being check for Stephen. This visit was prompted by a call from Stephen’s employer, who reported that, uncharacteristically, he had not been to work for two days. The doors of the house were locked, and nothing looked abnormal about the residence.

A short time later that day, around 4:30 p.m., Thomas returned to his house from work, to find his front door open. When he entered, appellant was sitting in a chair, drinking a beer. Appellant wondered where his father was, saying he had not seen him for the past three days. When Thomas asked how appellant, who had not been given a key, got into his house, appellant answered that he came in through the open cellar door.

After 1 Because of their shared family name, we shall refer to Thomas and Stephen Vaise by their first names. We shall refer to Matthew Vaise as appellant. 2 Thomas found the molding along that door broken, he called the Anne Arundel County Police. At 5:40 p.m., Corporal Brian Daughters2 arrived at Thomas’ home to investigate a possible burglary. Thomas showed him the cellar door and explained the circumstances in which he found appellant.3 Appellant told Daughters that he came to his uncle’s house looking for his father, whom he had been unable to contact.

Appellant explained that he last saw his father around 9:00 p.m. on Monday, January 26, when he left his house following an argument between the two. When asked whether he contacted Baltimore City police, appellant claimed he did, but he was treated like he was crazy. Appellant did not trust the Baltimore City Police, and believed federal authorities should investigate. Thomas then reported that he had just received two voice-mail messages from Stephen’s employer stating that Stephen had not shown up for work, which was inconsistent with Stephen’s record.

Daughters requested an evidence collection unit at Thomas’ residence to process the scene at Thomas’ house while he drove appellant to Stephen’s house in an effort to contact him. While driving to Stephen’s residence, appellant told the officer that he had left his house key inside. Appellant claimed that when 2 Daughters was a corporal at the time, but by the time he testified at trial, he was a sergeant. 3 Appellant was later charged with burglary of Thomas’ residence. 3 he returned to the house at 9:00 a.m. the morning after he and his father argued, he saw Stephen’s car, but no one answered the door. Stephen’s red sedan was still parked at the house, covered in snow.

While appellant waited in the police vehicle, Daughters checked outside the residence. Both front and back doors were locked, and there were no indications of a break-in. When Daughters asked appellant whether someone else had a key, appellant suggested that his father’s friend might have one. Around 6:40 p.m., they retrieved a key from that individual.

During that encounter, appellant told his father’s friend that he spent the last two evenings at Bloody Pond4, an undeveloped area popular for recreational off- roading vehicles. Returning to Stephen and appellant’s residence at 7:06 p.m., Corporal Daughters opened the back door and saw Stephen Vaise’s body lying on the floor in the doorway between the kitchen and living room. A large pool of blood under his head had begun to coagulate, and the body was cold. He suffered seven gunshot wounds to his head and chest.

In the living room were eight cartridge casings and one metal fragment. The victim had bags of groceries in his hands and was surrounded by a lot of things, including a machete, a hammer, and five bullet shell casings. Police concluded that the machete, hammer, and casings were placed at the scene by the killer. 4 “Bloody Pond” is sometimes referred to as plural, Bloody Ponds. For consistency, in this opinion we will refer to it as Bloody Pond. 4 Police also found a note signed by appellant, dated January 26, 2015, stating: “This man is a crook who steals people’s identities and murders people.

He has associations with various LEAs and RICO with mafia ties.” With the note was a business card for a private detective named Roland Miller. In addition, the electrical power for the house was turned off. The State later argued to the jury that “the crime scene’s manipulated” and that appellant was the person who “would do that[.]” At 12:34 a.m. on January 30, 2015, Detective Martin Young interviewed appellant following his waiver of rights. Over the course of seven hours, appellant stated he had valuable information for police but needed assurances of protection before disclosing it.

According to appellant, he expected hundreds of people to be arrested and convicted based on what he knew. Appellant had not seen his father in three or four days, since Monday, January 26th, around 9:00 or 10:00 p.m., when Stephen locked the door behind him. Since then, appellant had been spending his nights at Bloody Pond. After calling his father’s work and learning that he did not show up, appellant believed his father was murdered.

Appellant called the Anne Arundel County Police to make a report and made inquiries about where his father could be on Tuesday and Wednesday; he also made a couple of trips to the house, but no one answered the door. Appellant told the detective that at the time his father was killed, he had been researching Roland Miller, who appellant initially described as a person who stole identities and murdered people. Later, appellant claimed that Miller was an investigator for the Office of the Public Defender who kept contacting him to get people “off the hook.” 5 According to appellant, he believed his father was safe from the consequences of the research appellant was doing as long as he stayed away. Appellant also identified James Lee Reid5 as a person who raped him, falsely accused him of being a federal agent, stole identities, ripped off credit cards, and was involved with drug dealers.

Appellant accused Reid or his associates of killing his father to steal his credit information. Appellant related that on January 3, 2015, he and his father bought a rifle from Christopher Penvose because they were scared and wanted the weapon for their personal safety.6 Appellant admitted that he and his father had frequent arguments, explaining that they “scream and yell at each other . . . a couple times a week[.]” Although his father had been calling the police a lot lately because he had been cranky, appellant claimed that they never had a physical altercation. Yet, he also stated that Stephen had him “locked up” for assault in December, then bailed him out of jail the next day. According to appellant, his father did not want appellant to be locked up, just to leave the house for the night.

Detective Kimberly Starr testified that on December 9, 2014, she responded to the Vaise residence at 4403 Prudence Street, in reference to a 911 call by a father complaining 5 Although Reid’s last name is spelled differently elsewhere in the trial transcripts, we shall use this spelling for consistency. 6 Penvose later testified that on January 3, 2015, he sold a Hi-Point rifle to Stephen and appellant for $350, after Stephen told him he wanted the weapon for home protection. As part of the sale, Penvose gave them Hornady “ammo.” Because Stephen had to straighten out a DUI, appellant took possession of the weapon. When Penvose learned that Stephen was killed, he called police to tell them about the rifle. 6 that his son was blaring music and would not turn it down, followed by a “911 hangup.” When Starr knocked on the door, appellant answered and calmly said everything was fine, but Stephen yelled that his son “had come in his room and jumped on him” and “was shaking him.” Appellant began yelling, saying that he “couldn’t get his father to wake up” and that he was worried he had taken too much medication. After another officer arrived, Stephen showed the detective his broken glasses and where he was sleeping when appellant jumped on him.

He said, “he tried to call [police] but his son broke his cell phone.” He also showed the detective “where the alarm system was pulled off the wall” by appellant and told her he could not “find his house phone.” After calming down outside the presence of his son, Stephen “said that he was afraid” of appellant. As Detective Starr explained the procedures for charging documents and protective orders, Stephen asked her to “do [her] job” and make his son leave the house, but she replied that she “could not just put someone out of their home.” The detective decided to arrest appellant for assault because Stephen and appellant “were screaming at each other,” and Stephen “was afraid” after appellant had broken Stephen’s glasses and cell phone, removed the landline, and disabled the alarm system, leaving Stephen without any way to call for help. When the transport vehicle arrived, appellant yelled that he was going to be killed in jail. Stephen then said he did not want his son arrested.

The detective responded: “no disrespect to you, I really don’t care what you want, because when he kills you, it’s not going to be my fault.” 7 On February 11, 2015, Randolph Turner, a crime lab technician executing a search warrant at Stephen and appellant’s residence, took photos and recovered another cartridge casing in the basement. Upstairs in the front bedroom, sitting out on the bed, he collected a Hornady 9mm box of ammunition and other ammunition, as well as a soft case for a rifle. In the middle bedroom, he recovered a “bill of sale for the” Hi-Point rifle and an unfired 9 mm cartridge. On the way back to Baltimore City Headquarters, Turner realized that he inadvertently left his departmental camera and a brown paper bag in the middle bedroom.

When he and other officers returned for these items, appellant refused to let them in, even after Detective Hunter “begged” him to let him “get the property back.” In the room where Turner left the camera, the light “kept switching . . . on and off, on and off, on and off.” The detective then got an arrest warrant charging appellant “for the stolen property[.]” On February 16, Tasha Aytes Rogers, a member of the police department’s latent print unit, returned with detectives. When Turner’s camera was recovered in the second floor middle bedroom, it was broken into pieces. Spotting a rifle barrel between the mattress and the box spring, against the wall, Rogers and a detective recovered the barrel of the Hi-Point rifle that Penvose sold to appellant, partially disassembled and missing its stock. A firearms examiner tested the weapon and determined that the nine cartridge cases recovered by police near the body and in the basement were fired with that rifle.

Appellant was arrested on February 20, 2015, “for the trespass at his uncle’s house.” Appellant’s friend Charles Granger bailed him out and, the next day, took him back to his residence on Prudence Street. They entered through a basement window, gathered things 8 for appellant to stay with him, and looked throughout the house for clues about who killed Stephen. Appellant had expressed fear that people were looking for him and told Granger that his father bought a rifle for him because of that. They did not find the rifle but two or three boxes of ammunition and the case for the rifle in Stephen’s room.

After appellant found his key to the house, they returned to Granger’s home, but went back to appellant’s house “two or three times.” Appellant and Granger later went to the police station to tell them what they had found in the house. Granger also knew James Reid, describing his own relationship with him as “[r]ocky” but appellant’s relationship with him as “best friends.” Granger testified that Reid was “just a liar” and “a con artist” who “was in bad shape” from drug use. Reid and appellant “were always getting into trouble.” On February 23, 2015, appellant made another recorded statement to police, denying that he killed his father. During that interview, Detective Raymond Hunter informed appellant that police had recovered the camera, the Hi-Point rifle, and cartridge casings fired from that rifle.

In addition, he told the detective that he had “pointed the gun at the ground and go bang, bang, bang the bullets go right into the ground[.]” He denied that his father hid the rifle from him, noting that he “bought me that gun because he was afraid for my safety.” Appellant insisted that someone who knew James Reid was the killer, because although Reid “was incarcerated before this happened[,]” he “has been extorted in some 9 very serious drug dealing.” Appellant also admitted smashing the camera, saying “no one told me that was a police camera.” Appellant testified on his own behalf that on January 26, 2015, he had “printed out a lot of information” about people who were “after” him. When he talked to his father about providing that information to the FBI office in Baltimore, Stephen “thought it was a real bad idea.” Appellant was “really scared” and left the house without his key. He stayed at a vacant house that night, then stayed the next two nights at Bloody Pond in a tent. Between January 26 and January 29, 2015, appellant returned to the house he shared with his father “more than once[.]” Although his father’s car was there, no one answered when he knocked, so he figured his father was not home each time.

He did not break inside because when he had “on two other occasions,” his father “got really mad at him.” By January 29, 2015, appellant was cold and tired, so he went to his uncle Thomas’ house. Appellant entered through the basement door, as he did while he was in school. He “sat on the couch, drinking beer” and waited a couple hours until Thomas got home and called police. Appellant could not remember everything he told police over the course of multiple interviews.

He was paranoid because he had not slept and was having problems with several people who were after him due to money he owed for drugs. Appellant believed that his father was killed by people who were after him for taking their drugs. While appellant was incarcerated, he gave James Reid permission to cash a $34,000 life insurance check, mistakenly thinking it was not real. After Reid used one or two 10 thousand dollars toward commissary orders for appellant, he disappeared with the rest.

Appellant received collection notices forwarded to him in jail from Reid’s address. After the jury convicted appellant of second-degree murder and use of a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence, a bifurcated proceeding was held to determine whether appellant was criminally responsible. Appellant presented expert testimony by Dr. Amanda Square, a forensic psychiatrist who, at the time she evaluated appellant, was employed by the State at Clifton T. Perkins Hospital Center. She testified that around Stephen’s murder, appellant reported being “extraordinarily paranoid,” “extremely fearful for his life,” “unable to sleep,” and that he had reduced his substance abuse so he could be vigilant lest someone try to kill him.

Dr. Square interviewed Thomas Vaise, Roland Miller, James Reid, and other family and friends. She also considered detention records from 2013, documenting that appellant “was overtly psychotic” and treated with antipsychotic medication. Dr. Square initially diagnosed appellant as a schizophrenic with multiple substance abuse disorders and an antisocial personality disorder. Based on that evaluation, she concluded that at the time of his father’s murder, appellant was not criminally responsible.

When the State later requested that she consider additional information in her diagnoses and conduct another evaluation, she reviewed recorded calls that appellant made while incarcerated and information about an incident when appellant called his father’s workplace, saying that there was going to be a murder/suicide. Dr. Square did not change her opinion as to criminal responsibility. 11 The State presented testimony by Dr. Richard A. Ratner, another expert in forensic psychiatry. Dr. Ratner agreed with Dr. Square’s diagnoses of antisocial personality disorder and a variety of substance abuse disorders, but he disputed the diagnosis of schizophrenia. Dr. Ratner testified that, instead, appellant “is a manipulative psychopath[.]” As a substance abuser with considerable experience in the criminal justice system, “he lies with impunity and without shame, only changing the story when the lie has been conclusively proved.” Dr. Ratner concluded that appellant’s claims of amnesia about the shooting were not consistent with schizophrenia or the staged crime scene, but rather “linked to his wishes to avoid the consequences of his acts.” The psychiatrist opined that even though appellant reported psychotic states that cleared up with antipsychotic medicines, he was not previously diagnosed or medicated for schizophrenia.

In Ratner’s view, appellant’s “poly drug abuse[,]” working both individually and in combination, “is the most likely explanation” for any psychosis. The psychiatrist concluded that appellant was criminally responsible at the time of the murder. In rebuttal, the defense called Dr. Annette Hanson, a forensic psychiatrist who, as director at Perkins and the University of Maryland program in which Dr. Square was a fellow, supervised Dr. Square’s evaluation of appellant. After participating in two of the three interviews of appellant and reviewing Dr. Ratner’s report, Dr. Hanson agreed with Dr. Square’s diagnosis and observed that Dr. Ratner’s report inappropriately reflected “personal antipathy or animosity towards” appellant.

Yet Dr. Hanson acknowledged that “this is a difficult case” in which “reasonable clinicians really could disagree.” 12 The jury found appellant criminally responsible. We shall add material from the record in our discussion of the issues raised by appellant. DISCUSSION I. Evidence of the December 9, 2014 Altercation After prevailing on a pretrial motion in limine, the State presented evidence at trial that on December 9, 2014, appellant had an altercation with his father, resulting in a call to 911, police intervention, and appellant’s arrest for assault. Appellant, invoking the prohibition against evidence of “other crimes, wrongs, and acts” under Md. Rule 5-404(b), contends that the motion court and the trial court erred in ruling that such evidence was admissible.

Applying established standards and precedent governing evidence of other crimes, we hold that the court did not err in admitting the challenged evidence. A. Standards Governing Admission of “Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts” Evidence Maryland Rule 5-404(b) governs admissibility of evidence concerning culpable conduct other than that for which a defendant is on trial. In pertinent part, the rule provides: (b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts . . . is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.

Such evidence, however, may be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, common scheme or plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Md. Rule 5-404(b) (emphasis added). 13 The rule “is designed to protect the person who committed the ‘other crimes, wrongs, or acts’ from an unfair inference that he or she is guilty not because of the evidence in the case, but because of a propensity for wrongful conduct.” Winston v. State, 235 Md. App. 540, 563 , cert. denied sub nom. Mayhew v. State, 458 Md. 593 (2018). “The primary concern underlying the Rule is a ‘fear that jurors will conclude from evidence of other bad acts that the defendant is a ‘bad person’ and should therefore be convicted, or deserves punishment for other bad conduct and so may be convicted even though the evidence is lacking.’” Hurst v. State, 400 Md. 397, 407 (2007) (quoting Harris v. State, 324 Md. 490, 496 (1991)). This Court has summarized the restrictions on admitting “other crimes” evidence under Rule 5-404(b), as follows: It is well-settled that subject to several exceptions, evidence of other crimes is not admissible in Maryland.

It may be admissible, however, if the “evidence is substantially relevant to some contested issue in the case and is not offered to prove guilt based on propensity to commit crimes.” A three-part analysis is required before other crimes evidence is admitted. First, the court must determine whether the evidence fits into one or more of the exceptions [in Rule 5-404(b)]. This is a legal determination. Second, it must be shown by “clear and convincing” evidence that the defendant engaged in the alleged criminal acts.

In this regard, “[w]e review the trial court’s decision to determine if there is sufficient evidence to support” its finding. Third, the court must find that the probative value of the evidence outweighs any unfair prejudice. “This determination involves the exercise of discretion by the trial court.” Darling v. State, 232 Md. App. 430 , 462–63 (2017) (quoting from Hurst, 400 Md. at 406 ; Sifrit v. State, 383 Md. 116, 133 (2004); and State v. Faulkner, 314 Md. 630, 634 (1989)). B. The Record 14 Before trial, the State moved to admit evidence that on December 9, 2014, appellant assaulted his father Stephen, whose 911 call summoned police to intervene in their dispute. At the hearing on that motion, the State proffered that Detective Kimberly Starr responded to the house after Stephen called 911 but the “call got cut off.” Appellant was “screaming” at his father, who reported that appellant had “jumped” him while he was sleeping, ripped the alarm off the wall, and broken his cell phone and glasses.

Appellant was arrested and charged with assault, but when he “was brought into court in early January of 2015,” Stephen declined to press charges. The prosecutor argued that evidence regarding the December 9 incident should be admitted under Rule 5-404(b). The State’s theory as to special relevance was that these events showing a history of physical and verbal assaults against Stephen demonstrated a continuously “building anger” by appellant toward his father, that Stephen’s fear of appellant “speaks to identity in the context of who would have done this[,]” and that appellant’s familiarity with the electrical system in the house during that altercation was relevant because the power was cut off when police discovered Stephen’s body. Defense counsel conceded that “it may fall under motive” but challenged whether there was sufficient evidence.

In support, counsel pointed out that Stephen called 911 merely to complain that appellant refused to turn down his music volume, that Stephen never wanted appellant to be arrested, and that Stephen told the prosecutor that the police report was not correct. Although Stephen reported that appellant jumped on him while he was in bed, appellant claimed he merely shook his father because Stephen was not waking up after taking a “heavy cocktail of Ambien.” When the criminal case went to court in 15 January of 2015, Stephen indicated that he did not want to proceed with the charges against his son. The motion court ruled that the December 9 incident was admissible under Rule 5- 404(b), as evidence with special relevance in establishing motive, intent, identity, and consciousness of guilt. The court concluded that the State had established clear and convincing evidence of the incident and that its probative value outweighed any unfair prejudice.

At trial, the court granted appellant a continuing objection “to the admission of anything having to do with” that incident. C. Appellant’s Challenge Invoking all three prongs of the test for admitting “other crimes” evidence under Rule 5-404(b), appellant contends that the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce evidence about the December 9 incident, because it lacked special relevance, was not proved to a clear and convincing evidence standard, and was unfairly prejudicial. We address these contentions in turn, explaining why neither the record nor the law supports them. 1. Special Relevance Appellant first disputes the motion court’s ruling that evidence of the December 9 incident had special relevance in establishing motive, intent, identity, and consciousness of guilt.

Acknowledging that “[e]vidence of other crimes introduced to establish a defendant’s identity may be generally admissible under certain proscribed and sharply limited circumstances[,]” he argues that “the identity exception . . . has become somewhat amorphous and confusing” because, as the Court of Appeals has recognized, “many courts 16 appear to have used the identity exception as a sort of catch-all clause which is mixed into other exceptions or delineated separately depending on the needs of that court in a given case.” Cross v. State, 282 Md. 468, 477 (1978). In appellant’s view, “[t]he fact that Stephen and his son had a dispute in which there were no physical injuries and only yelling was witnessed did not establish that appellant was the person who committed the murder of Stephen at the end of January of 2015.” The State counters that “[t]he trial court properly admitted this evidence as it was relevant to show a pattern of abuse and difficulties, which in turn demonstrated appellant’s motive and intent in killing his father.” In turn, because “motive is the ‘catalyst that provides the reasons for a person to engage in criminal activity[,]’ Snyder v. State, 361 Md. 580, 604 (2000)[,] . . . the presence of a motive can make the existence of ultimate facts, like identity and intent, more likely.” We agree that evidence of this prior verbal and physical altercation had special relevance in establishing appellant’s motive, intent, and derivatively, his identity. Bryant v. State, 207 Md. 565, 586 (1955), and its progeny are instructive here. In Bryant, the State presented evidence that one month before the victim was murdered, the defendant was convicted of twice assaulting her.

See id. at 572, 586 . The Court of Appeals held that evidence of prior assaults of the victim by the accused was “admissible . . . to prove the intent” to kill. Id. at 586 . Similarly, the Court recognized in Snyder, 361 Md. at 605 , that “[e]vidence of previous quarrels and difficulties between a victim and a defendant is generally admissible to show motive.” “To be admissible as evidence of motive, however, the prior conduct 17 must be committed within such time, or show such relationship to the main charge, as to make connection obvious, . . . that is to say they are so linked in point of time or circumstances as to show intent or motive.” Id.

(quotation marks and citation omitted). The evidence in that case had special relevance because it showed “a long course of ill treatment of the deceased by the accused; that they frequently quarreled and, although they renewed relationships at various times, there was almost a continuous state of hostility between them.” Id. at 605-06 . Relying on Bryant, the Court in Snyder held that evidence of prior altercations between the victim and the defendant “were so closely connected to the offense charged as to be evidence as to the intent and motive of the accused in [that] case.’” Id. at 604–05. This Court has applied these principles in affirming admission of other crimes evidence under comparable circumstances.

See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 230 Md. App. 450, 461 (2016) (holding evidence of prior incidents of domestic violence had special relevance to show “the exertion of control over the victim through the perpetration of a cycle of violence” that established a motive for murder); Stevenson v. State, 222 Md. App. 118, 150 (2015) (evidence of recent “physically abusive acts” against victim had special relevance in showing motive because such evidence “‘was probative of a continuing hostility and animosity’” toward victim, “not simply the propensity to commit murder”) (quoting Snyder, 361 Md. at 608–09). In turn, we have recognized that evidence showing “that a particular person has a motive to commit an act also tends to identify that person as the perpetrator.” 5 Lynn McLain, Maryland Evidence, State & Fed., § 404:11 (Sept. 2019 update available on Westlaw). See, e.g., Wilder v. State, 191 Md. App. 319, 344 (2010) 18 (in prosecution for first-degree assault, “[t]estimony that Wilder had earlier threatened to come to the house with a weapon ha[d] special relevance to establishing the identity of the shooter in this case, and it is also relevant to Wilder’s motive for revenge against” the victims). The State argues that, as in Snyder and Jackson, “evidence that appellant had previously assaulted his father was relevant to show motive, i.e., that there was an acrimonious relationship or a prior history of abuse between appellant and his father.” We agree that evidence of the recent altercation between father and son, involving animosity boiling over into verbal and physical assault, requiring police intervention during which Stephen reported that he was afraid of appellant, was relevant as evidence of motive, intent, and identity.

The evidence had special relevance in establishing “a continuing hostility and animosity toward” Stephen, when viewed in light of appellant’s own statements to police that he and his father had a contentious relationship, that they argued on the night Stephen was last known to be alive, and that appellant left the house immediately after that argument. See Stevenson, 222 Md. App. at 150 .7 2. Clear and Convincing Evidence Appellant next argues that the court erred in finding that there was clear and convincing evidence of the December 9 incident because there was “a dispute as to the actual facts of what happened[.]” The State, pointing to appellant’s admissions to police 7 We need not and do not address consciousness of guilt as grounds for the finding of special relevance. See generally State v. Phillips, 210 Md. App. 239, 270 (2013) (appellate court may affirm on any ground presented to motion court). 19 and in jail calls, counters that “[t]here was ample evidence from which the circuit court could conclude by clear and convincing evidence that [appellant] assaulted his father on December 9.” The record supports the motion court’s determination that the proffered evidence about the December 9 altercation was clear and convincing.

Police responded to Stephen Vaise’s “cut off” call for assistance. Stephen reported to Detective Starr that while he was sleeping, appellant came into his bedroom and jumped on top of him, triggering an intense argument during which appellant attempted to silence his father, by ending the 911 call and disabling his cell phone, landline, and alarm system. According to the detective’s proffered testimony, the 911 was a “hang-up,” Stephen’s cell phone and eyeglasses were broken, the alarm panel was ripped off the wall, and the landline phone was missing. In addition, Starr allegedly witnessed appellant “screaming at both the victim and officers” and becoming so agitated that he was “getting [in] the face of” the detective.

Stephen appeared frightened and expressly confirmed to the officer that he was afraid of his son. The detective arrested appellant to ensure Stephen’s safety.8 Moreover, appellant admitted physical contact with his father, in statements to police and recorded calls from jail, but attempted to downplay it as merely shaking his father to wake him up. We conclude there is substantial evidence to support the court’s determination that there was clear and convincing evidence regarding the December 9 altercation. The fact 8 As detailed in our background section, Detective Starr’s trial testimony was consistent with this proffer. 20 that after the assault occurred, Stephen elected not to pursue changes against his son did not preclude that determination. 3.

Unfair Prejudice With respect to the final Rule 5-404(b) factor, appellant contends that “any probative value” of the evidence regarding the December 9 altercation “was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Given that he “was on trial for a violent crime” that occurred in late January 2015, and that “[t]he State’s case was entirely circumstantial[,]” appellant maintains the “evidence that [he] had possibly assaulted Stephen” on December 9, 2014, did nothing to establish the identity of Stephen’s killer, but instead, “suggested that he was a violent person, and created the danger that the jury would view this as evidence of a propensity to commit acts of violence.” In light of this risk, he argues, the challenged evidence “was highly prejudicial,” with “no legitimate probative value.” The State responds that “[t]he motions court was well within its discretion in determining that the probative value of the bad acts evidence was not substantially outweighed by any unfair prejudice.” “Moreover,” the State argues, “the trial court reduced the risk that the jury might engage in bad character reasoning by giving a proper limiting instruction to the jury.” We are not persuaded by appellant’s contention that the December 9 incident was so remote in time or circumstances that the jury could not fairly rely on it as evidence of motive, intent, and identity in the January 26 shooting of Stephen Vaise. As discussed, the jury could reasonably infer, from appellant’s own statements regarding his combative 21 relationship with his father, including that they fought when appellant last saw him alive on January 26, that appellant’s hostility and violence toward his father during the December 9 altercation continued after the assault charges were dismissed in January, erupting during their January 26 altercation. Cf. Snyder, 361 Md. at 657 (affirming admission of evidence showing “a long course of ill treatment of the deceased by the accused; that they frequently quarreled and, although they renewed relationship at various times, there was almost a continuous state of hostility between them”).

Because other crimes evidence is quintessentially prejudicial, the court correctly required a showing of “undue prejudice likely to result from its admission.” See Faulkner, 314 Md. at 635 (emphasis added). By giving the following limiting instruction, moreover, the court expressly prohibited the jury from drawing an impermissible propensity inference: You have . . . heard evidence that the Defendant was arrested for assault in the second degree of his father on December 9, 2014, which is not a charge in this case. You may consider this evidence only on the question of motive, intent, opportunity or knowledge. However, you may not consider this evidence for any other purpose.

Specifically, you may not consider it as evidence that the Defendant is a bad character or has a tendency to commit crime. Though prejudicial, evidence of the December 9 altercation was not unfairly so, because of its special relevance in showing motive, intent, and identity in Stephen’s murder. In these circumstances, the motion court did not err or abuse its discretion in admitting such “other crimes” evidence.

II

Speedy Trial 22 Appellant contends that he was denied his right to a speedy trial by a series of eleven postponements that delayed his trial for thirty-one months after his arrest. Based on our independent examination of the record, we hold that, although the delay clearly was of constitutional dimension, appellant was not denied his right to a speedy trial, given the nature and circumstances surrounding the postponements, particularly the delay attributable to his belated NCR plea, and the lack of prejudice to appellant’s defense. A. Standards Governing Review of Speedy Trial Challenge Maryland courts have consistently applied the four factor balancing test announced by the U.S. Supreme Court in Barker [v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S. Ct. 2182 (1972)] to address allegations that a defendant’s right to a speedy trial, as provided by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, has been violated. In Barker, the Supreme Court rejected a bright-line rule to determine whether a defendant’s right to a speedy trial had been violated, and instead adopted “a balancing test, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 , 92 S. Ct. at 2191–92.

The Court identified four factors to be used in determining whether a defendant’s right to a speedy trial has been violated: “Length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.” Id. at 530 , 92 S. Ct. at 2192 . None of these factors are “either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial. Rather, they are related factors and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant.” State v. Kanneh, 403 Md. 678 , 687–88 (2008) (some citations omitted). See also Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81 , 89–90, 129 S. Ct. 1283, 1290 (2009) (reaffirming the analytical framework established by Barker).

In reviewing the denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial, “we make our own independent constitutional analysis.” Glover v. State, 368 Md. 211, 220 (2002). 23 In other words, “[w]e perform a de novo constitutional appraisal in light of the particular facts of the case at hand; in so doing, we accept a lower court’s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous.” Id. at 221 . “Appellate review should be practical, not illusionary, realistic, not theoretical, and tightly prescribed, not reaching beyond the peculiar facts of the particular case.” Peters v. State, 224 Md. App. 306, 359 (2015) (quoting Brown v. State, 153 Md. App. 544, 556 (2003), and State v. Bailey, 319 Md. 392, 415 (1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted). B. The Record The record pertinent to this speedy trial challenge is set forth in the following time line, with postponements shown in bold type. February 20, 2015 ARREST March 30, 2015 DEFENSE COUNSEL’S ENTRY OF APPEARANCE + SPEEDY TRIAL DEMAND April 16, 2015 DEFENDANT’S FIRST APPEARANCE Appellant’s trial was scheduled for June 16, 2015. June 16, 2015 FIRST POSTPONEMENT – 55 DAYS – JOINT Hearing at which postponement request by “all” was granted.

New trial date: August 10, 2015, before the Hicks deadline of September 26, 2015. Reasons: “Def needs further investigation,” “Defense attorney unavailable,” “New State’s evidence,” “Discovery just provided by State.” August 7, 2015 SECOND POSTPONEMENT – 93 DAYS – DEFENSE Hearing at which defense counsel’s advance request to postpone was granted. New trial date: November 11, 2015. Reason: Per defense counsel, “it’s not ready to be tried yet.

There’s a lot of complicating factors, including I’m having him properly evaluated by a private psychiatrist[.]” No opposition by State. 24 September 26, 2015 HICKS DATE.9 October 22, 2015 THIRD POSTPONEMENT – 26 DAYS – JOINT Hearing at which joint request to postpone for “further investigation” was granted. New trial date: December 7, 2015. Reasons: Newly assigned prosecutor and defense attorney scheduling conflict. December 7, 2015 FOURTH POSTPONEMENT – 57 DAYS – STATE – NO DEFENSE OBJECTION Hearing at which the State’s request to postpone was granted.

New trial date: February 2, 2016. Reasons: The prosecutor cited “an outstanding forensic biology report” regarding blood evidence and the existence of “a potential witness” “who is presently incarcerated” that the State was “trying to set up a proffer session with.” Defense counsel stated, “we are actually not objecting. We just ask that the . . . postponement be charged to the State.” January 28, 2016 FIFTH POSTPONEMENT – 58 DAYS – JOINT Hearing at which the State’s advance request to postpone was joined by defense counsel, then granted. New trial date: March 31, 2016.

Reasons: The prosecutor cited a material police witness who was on family medical leave, and the need to interview an inmate witness. Defense counsel joined the request, stating “Mr. Vaise has some pretty pervasive mental health issues. I retained a private expert to evaluate him, and through no fault of our own, we’ve had to reschedule several times.” Defense counsel asked for a date “as far in advance as we can because of the nature of the case.” March 24, 2016 SIXTH POSTPONEMENT – 81 DAYS – STATE – NO DEFENSE OBJECTION Hearing at which the State’s advance request to postpone was granted. New trial date: June 20, 2016, specially set.

Reason: Prosecutor unavailable. The court noted that both the defendant and the State 9 Md. Code, § 6-103(a)(2) of the Criminal Procedure Article and Maryland Rule 4- 271(a) both require a criminal defendant to be brought to trial within 180 days after the earlier of the defendant’s first appearance in circuit court or the appearance of defense counsel, unless the administrative judge finds “good cause” for a postponement. In State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 318 (1979), the Court of Appeals held that charges must be dismissed if the State fails to establish good cause for trying the defendant after this 180- day deadline, which has become known as the “Hicks date.” See State v. Huntley, 411 Md. 288, 298 (2009); Peters v. State, 224 Md. App. 306, 356 (2015). 25 requested a specially set trial date because trial could not be completed within the allotted dates calendared by the court and the prosecutor was not available beyond those dates. The court noted “No opp” from the defendant.

May 19, 2016 PLEA CHANGE, TO “NOT COMPETENT TO STAND TRIAL” AND “NOT CRIMINALLY RESPONSIBLE BY REASON OF INSANITY” Notice filed that appellant was committed to the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene for evaluation of his competency and criminal responsibility. June 14, 2016 SEVENTH POSTPONEMENT – 106 DAYS – DEFENSE Hearing at which defense request for postponement was granted. New trial date: October 4, 2016. Reasons: “Due to new developments in the case, Defense counsel felt it imperative to file an NCR motion.

Defense requesting this matter be removed from specially set docket.” Defense counsel proffered to the court that “some issues arose that caused me to reconsider filing an NCR” and after doing so, “Court Medical contacted [counsel] last night via E-mail indicating that Mr. Vaise needed further inpatient evaluation for criminal responsibility. He was transported yesterday to Perkins Hospital and they’re asking for at least 60 more days.” The prosecutor stated that “[t]he State would not object” but “was intending and ready to go forward on Monday, the 20th.” June 22, 2016 ORDER FOR EXTENDED COMMITMENT TO THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND MENTAL HYGIENE FOR EXAMINATION AS TO CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY, extending appellant’s commitment for 60 days. August 22, 2016 ORDER FOR EXTENDED COMMITMENT AND SCHEDULING ORDER SPECIALLY SETTING TRIAL DATE FOR OCTOBER 4, 2016. Sept. 14, 2016 EIGHTH POSTPONEMENT – 97 DAYS – DEFENSE Hearing at which defense request for postponement granted.

New trial date: January 9, 2017. Reasons: NCR evaluation and competency evaluation were not complete. The court noted the State was not objecting. 26 October 12, 2016 REPORT ISSUED BY DR. SQUARE CONCLUDING APPELLANT WAS NOT CRIMINALLY RESPONSIBLE AT THE TIME OF THE CRIME.

October 19, 2016 STATUS HEARING ON NCR EVALUATION The prosecutor advised that “we