Vance v. Vance

Gilbert, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The facts of this case would appear to be more at home in a plot of a “soap opera” than in a court of law because a recitation of them should begin with “Once upon a time____” Yet, there is evidence demonstrating that they are true, and truth, as Lord Byron said, “is always strange; Stranger than fiction.” 1 We are here concerned with a civil suit by a woman against a man for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, assault and battery, and the intentional infliction of emotional distress, 2 grounded on their ostensible relationship as husband and wife and growing out of a petition by the man to set aside an alimony and support decree because it was based on a “marriage” that never was. The petition was later withdrawn but by that time the fact that the “marriage” was invalid had been clearly established. Before embarking on a discussion of the legal issues involved in this appeal, we shall endeavor to unravel the mare’s nest in which the parties, Muriel Gwendolyn Vance, appellant, and Arnold Leonard Vance, appellee, find themselves entangled.

To so do we shall attack the problem sequentially. The appellee, during his residency at University Hospital in Baltimore City, separated from his then wife, Elizabeth Vance in “July or August” of 1954. In “September or October” of that same year, Dr. Vance met the appellant who was a registered nurse “working in OB at the time.” The relationship between the parties intensified to the point where marriage was discussed. Dr. Vance reached an agreement with Elizabeth Vance.

A hearing on the bill of divorce and ¹³² cross-bill was held before an examiner 3 bn September 12, 1956. Additional testimony was taken on October 3, 1956. While Dr. Vance attended the September hearing, he was not present for the presentation of the additional testimony. According to the appellant and her mother, the doctor appeared at their residence in “maybe the middle of September” 1956 and told appellant and her parents “that he had finally gotten his divorce from ... [Elizabeth], and that he was free, and that we [appellant and Dr. Vance] could plan our marriage at the end of the month.” Arrangements were made for the couple to be wedded in Arlington, Virginia.

Just who arranged for the “marriage” to take place in Virginia was disputed. Appellant testified that the doctor made the arrangements through a lawyer friend of his from Washington, D.C. Dr. Vance presented an entirely different version. He said all the arrangements were made by appellant. In any event, the parties went through a religious ceremony before a Methodist minister on September 29,1956.

They had previously applied for and received a marriage license. The information on the application for the license was written by appellant who testified that she wrote “Divorced” “under the groom’s information” because that is what Dr. Vance told her. The decree of divorce was signed by a judge of the Circuit Court of Baltimore City on October 16, 1956 and sent to Dr. Vance by his then lawyer on November 6,1956. It was mailed to the doctor’s address at the hospital.

Patently, Dr. Vance was not divorced from Elizabeth Vance at the time he entered into a “marriage” with the appellant. The impediment of a prior, valid, existing marriage blocked a valid marriage to appellant. 4 Dr. Vance stated that the appellant knew that his ¹³³ divorce from Elizabeth Vance was not final, but she, nevertheless, insisted upon going through with the ceremony. Appellant steadfastly denied knowing that the doctor was legally incapable of entering into a valid marriage when the two were supposedly wed. Appellant learned that they were not in fact and in law married 5 when the doctor’s petition to set aside the alimony and support decree was filed. 6 Muriel Vance’s reaction to the news of the invalidity of her marriage is the foundation of the matter before us.

This litigation began in the Circuit Court for Howard County, Maryland, on August 2, 1976, when appellant filed a four-count declaration against Dr. Arnold Vance, alleging, as we have previously stated, fraud, negligent misrepresentation^ assault and battery,, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Upon the close of evidence, but prior to submitting the case to the jury, Judge James Macgill granted Dr. Vance’s motion for a directed verdict on the count alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress. The remaining counts were submitted to the jury which returned a verdict for appellant on the negligent misrepresentation, awarding her fifty-thousand dollars ($50,000) in compensatory damages. The trial judge thereafter granted Dr. Vance’s motion for a judgment N.O.V. Subsequently, the court stayed its action and granted a rehearing, after which the judgment N.O.V. was reinstated.

In her appeal to this Court, the appellant does not contest the jury’s verdict on the fraud and assault and battery counts, thus abandoning those claims. The appellant does, however, level a barrage against the trial judge’s granting of the motion non obstante veredicto as well as the directed verdict on her allegation of the intentional infliction of emotional distress. We conclude that the appellant is justified in asserting that the rulings call for reversal and remand for a new trial. We shall now explain why we so believe. ¹³⁴ THE JUDGMENT N O. V. It is settled law that in reviewing a trial court’s grant of a motion for a judgment N.O.V., the evidence and all reasonable inferences which can be drawn from it must be considered in the manner most favorable to the party against whom the ruling was made.

Menish v. Polinger Co., 277 Md. 553, 567 , 356 A. 2d 233, 240 (1976); Wesko v. G.E.M., Inc., 272 Md. 192, 200 , 321 A. 2d 529, 534 (1974); Gill v. Computer Equipment Corp., 266 Md. 170, 173 , 292 A. 2d 54, 55 (1972); Lusby v. First National Bank, 263 Md. 492, 499 , 283 A. 2d 570, 573 (1971); Wheeler Transportation Co. v. Katzoff, 242 Md. 431, 435 , 219 A. 2d 250, 252-53 (1966); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Bolton, 229 Md. 321, 326 , 182 A. 2d 828, 830 (1962); Smith v. Bernfeld, 226 Md. 400, 405 , 174 A. 2d 53, 55 (1961); Zeamer v. Reeves, 225 Md. 526, 530 , 171 A. 2d 488, 490 (1961); Hess v. Frazier, 27 Md. App. 150, 169 , 340 A. 2d 313, 323 , cert. denied, 276 Md. 745 (1975); Cluster v. Cole, 21 Md. App. 242, 249 , 319 A. 2d 320, 324-25 (1974); Hagen v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission, 20 Md. App. 192, 195 , 314 A. 2d 699, 700 (1974). We view the evidence and all reasonable inferences which can be drawn from it as supporting compensation for the emotional distress suffered by appellant as a result of her belatedly learning that her ostensible marriage to Dr. Vance was a sham. The trial judge, in granting the judgment N.O.V., bottomed his decision on the reasoning “that damages consisting solely of mental distress are not recoverable in an action for negligent misrepresentation.” The underlying determination of negligent misrepresentation was not questioned, with the result that we shall do no more with respect thereto than note that we have reviewed the record and ascertained therefrom that a finding of negligent misrepresentation was supported by the evidence presented. The record reveals the following facts and rational inferences deducible therefrom concerning recovery for mental distress.

Dr. Arnold Vance was not free to marry appellant in September 1956 because his divorce a vinculo matrimonii from Elizabeth Vance was not final until October ¹³⁵ 16,1956. Accounting at a minimum from November 1956, the appellee was aware of the discrepancy in dates among his statements to appellant that he was free to marry, the “marriage” date, and the decree of divorce. Appellant, on the other hand, disavowed all knowledge of the bigamous nature of her “marriage” to Dr. Vance until 1976 when he filed the motion to annul the marriage and strike the decree awarding her alimony and child support. Appellant’s asserted lack of knowledge was supported by evidence that the decree of divorce between Arnold and Elizabeth Vance had been received by the doctor at his place of business, not at the home he shared with the appellant.

It was not likely that appellant would have seen the divorce decree unless Dr. Vance took it home and showed it to her. Although the parties disagree as to whether the doctor ever showed appellant the decree, the testimony of Mitchell Vance, their son, underpinned his mother’s statement that she had not seen the decree before 1976. Furthermore, appellant testified to her emotional reaction to the news of the invalidity of her marriage. She said: “I just — I couldn’t function, I couldn’t sleep, I was totally embarrassed by the fact that he had filed this and it became public knowledge, once it’s filed.

I consider it defamation of my character. I was too embarrassed to go out and socialize with people that tried to be kind to me. And I just couldn’t function. I really thought I was going to have a nervous breakdown.

And I even now have symptoms of an ulcer.” Her testimony was corroborated by that of both her mother, Mrs. Hewell, who stated that after March 26, 1976 her daughter was in a state of emotional collapse, and Walter Hess, appellant’s son by a previous marriage, who testified that his mother was in such a state of emotional depression that it scared him. He specifically related that: “I’ve been told that my mother is an attractive woman, and during this period of time, there was, ¹³⁶ there was absolutely no beauty or life to her. The hair was unkept (sic), the cheeks were sunken, the eyes were dark. She was a wreck____ “...

When my mother needed me, she called me. I either went to her home, or we had long, long discussions on the telephone. And during the periods that, you know, long periods of sobbing and crying and so on and so forth where I felt that I wasn’t even communicating with my mother, I felt that she was totally detached from the situation, and really was unware of, of her own presence.” We think such evidence demonstrated that the appellant suffered from emotional distress as a result of learning that her “marriage” of almost 20 years was no marriage at all. It is well established in Maryland that there is a right of recovery for emotional distress if it results in physical injury.

Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397 , 165 A. 182 (1933); Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Roch, 160 Md. 189 , 153 A. 22 (1931). Bowman permits recovery for emotional distress “resulting in some clearly apparent and substantial physical injury, as manifested by an external condition or by symptoms clearly indicative of a resultant pathological, physiological, or mental state.” The trial judge in the instant case opined that: “[BJefore recovery can be had for nervous shock, it must be shown that such shock caused a physical or mental condition in the nature of an ailment or illness as distinguished from emotional distress or mental anguish in the nature of embarrassment or depression. There was nothing in the evidence in the instant case to indicate that the plaintiff suffered a physical or mental illness or injury as a result of her shock on learning that her marriage was invalid.” We have a different view. As we see it, the evidence, considered in the light most favorable to appellant, was ¹³⁷ sufficient to support a jury’s finding that appellant was “physically injured” as a result of learning that her marriage to Dr. Vance was invalid.

According to Bowman , the physical injury may be manifested either by an “external condition” or “by symptoms clearly indicative of a resultant pathological, physiological or