Vargas-Aguila v. State

ZARNOCH, J. After obtaining a stay in the District Court for Montgomery County of his trial for certain drunk driving offenses, appellant/cross-appellee Jose D. Vargas-Aguila (“Vargas-Aguila”) in October 2009 brought a declaratory judgment action in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County against appellee/cross appellant, State of Maryland, Office of the Chief Medical Examiner (“the State”). Specifically, he sought a declaration that the “Regulations of the Toxicologist, Post Mortem Examiners Commission, State of Maryland, Regarding Tests of Breath and Blood for Alcohol” (“toxicologist standards”) 1 were invalid because they had not been adopted in accordance with the rulemaking requirements of the State Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Md.Code (1984, 2009 Repl.Vol.) State Government Article (SG), §§ 10-101 et seq. On appeal, Vargas-Aguila challenges the correctness of the circuit court’s declaration that the toxicologist standards were not required to be promulgated under the APA. On cross-appeal, the State argues that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to issue a declaratory judgment in light of the pending criminal trial in the district court.

We agree with the State ³⁷⁸ and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand with directions to dismiss the declaratory judgment action. FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS On April 10, 2008, Vargas-Aguila was stopped by the Montgomery County Police while operating a motor vehicle. Based on the odor of alcohol on Vargas-Aguila’s breath and the presence of an open beer bottle in the front center console of his vehicle, Vargas-Aguila was arrested on suspicion of driving under the influence of alcohol. Upon his arrival at the police station, Vargas-Aguila took a breath test to determine his blood-alcohol content (“BAC”).

According to appellant’s brief, the test determined that Vargas-Aguila had a BAC of 0.30 grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath, above the legal limit to drive. 2 Vargas-Aguila was charged with numerous traffic offenses, including driving under the influence of alcohol, a violation of Md.Code (1977, 2009 Repl.Vol.), Transportation Article §§ 21-902(a)-(b). Trial of Vargas-Aguila’s charges began on May 5, 2009 in the district court. When the State introduced the results of Vargas-Aguila’s breath test from the evening of his arrest, Vargas-Aguila objected to the test’s admission, citing Md. Code (1973, 2006 Repl.Vol.), Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJP”) § 10-304. Under this provision, when a breath test is used by the police as evidence in a prosecution for driving under the influence of alcohol or while intoxicated, “[t]he test of breath shall be administered by a qualified person with equipment approved by the toxicologist under the Postmortem Examiners Commission at the direction of a police officer.” 3 Vargas-Aguila alleged that the equipment ³⁷⁹ used to calculate BAC was not properly administered by a qualified person as required by § 10-304 because the State toxicologist, who is responsible for setting standards for alcohol readings, had not validly adopted them.

Specifically, Vargas-Aguila claimed that the toxicologist standards, which were apparently first issued April 1, 1983, see Krauss v. State, 322 Md. 376, 381 , 587 A.2d 1102 (1991), constituted a “regulation” under the APA. 4 Because these toxicologist standards were not promulgated in accordance with the APA, Vargas-Aguila claimed they were invalid and therefore inadmissible in his criminal case. 5 In response to Vargas-Aguila’s objection to the admission of his breath test results, the district court judge did not make a legal ruling on the validity of the toxicologist standards, but rather, stayed the criminal case and allowed Vargas-Aguila to ³⁸⁰ file a declaratory action in circuit court. 6 On October 13, 2009, Vargas-Aguila filed a complaint seeking declaratory relief in the circuit court. His complaint asked that the circuit court declare the toxicologist’s standards invalid and award him “such other and further relief as in law and justice he may be entitled to receive.” 7 The State moved to dismiss the declaratory judgment action on the grounds that it sought an improper exercise of the circuit court’s jurisdiction and intruded on the pending criminal trial in the district court. The court denied the objection. 8 Following a hearing on the merits, the circuit court denied the State’s request that it reconsider the rejection of the motion to dismiss and issued the following declaratory judgment: DECLARED, that in Md.Code Ann. Courts & Judicial Proceedings Art., §§ 10-302 through 10-309, and in Md. Code Ann. Transportation Art., § 21-902, the Maryland General Assembly has, since 1962, granted the State [t]oxicologist express authority to exercise professional judgment in the certification and approval of equipment used for ³⁸¹ testing blood and breath alcohol levels and in the provision of training standards for staff who are authorized to operate the equipment; and it is further DECLARED, that the General Assembly has neither required, nor prohibited, the State [t]oxieologist at the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner from promulgating regulations, pursuant to the Maryland Administrative Procedure[ ] Act, Md.Code Ann. State Gov’t. Art. §§ 10-101, et seq.

(APA) and Md.Code Ann. Health-Gen. Art. §§ 2-104 and 5-307, to facilitate the legislative deference to the exercise of professional judgment by the State Toxicologist; and it is further DECLARED, that as of the date of the July 14, 2010 hearing on this matter, the State Toxicologist had not promulgated any such regulations in conformity with the APA. 9 This appeal followed. QUESTIONS PRESENTED Appellant has presented the following questions for review: 1. Do the contents of the document, “Regulations of the Toxicologist, Post Mortem Exa,miner[s] Commission, State of Maryland, Regarding 'Tests of Breath and Blood for Alcohol ” constitute regulations of the State Ltjoxicologist that must be adopted in conformance "with the State Administrative Procedure Act? 2.

Is the evidence of test of breath and blood for alcohol obtained pursuant to invalid regulations of the State [tjoxicologist inadmissible under Section 10-304 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article? 3. Are convictions and sanctions imposed under §§ 16-205.1 and 21-902 of the Transportation Article invalid if ³⁸² predicated upon evidence of tests of breath and blood for alcohol obtained pursuant to invalid regulations of the State [t]oxicologist? The State has framed the issues in the following fashion: 1. Did the circuit court correctly declare that the State [tjoxicologist, when adopting procedures for the use, maintenance and calibration of equipment for testing the alcohol content of breath and blood, and for the training of personnel who administer such tests, need not promulgate formal regulations pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act? 2.

Should the circuit court have denied a request for a declaratory judgment addressing an issue that the plaintiff had raised in a pending criminal proceeding? DISCUSSION Maryland’s Declaratory Judgment Act, CJP §§ 3-401 through 3-415, is to be “liberally constructed,” but “there are certain restrictions in its application.” Sprenger v. PSC, 400 Md. 1, 24 , 926 A.2d 238 (2007). “[T]he court will refuse a declaration where another court has jurisdiction of the issue, where a proceeding involving identical issues is already pending in another tribunal, where a special statutory remedy has been provided, or where another remedy will be more effective or appropriate under the circumstances. In these cases it is neither useful nor proper to issue the declaration.” Haynie v. Gold Bond Bldg. Products, 306 Md. 644, 651 , 511 A.2d 40 (1986).

See also CJP § 3-409(b) (“If a statute provides a special form of remedy for a specific type of case, that statutory remedy shall be followed in lieu of a proceeding under this subtitle.”). Ordering declaratory relief “to decide an issue, even though the issue is presented in another pending case between the parties” is reserved for “very unusual and compelling circumstances.” Id. at 652, 511 A.2d 40 . These principles are applicable regardless of whether the pending case is a civil or criminal action, id.; or whether the pending action is in the ³⁸³ district court and the declaration is sought in the circuit court. A.S. Abell Co. v. Sweeney, 274 Md. 715, 719-21 , 337 A.2d 77 (1975).

In Haynie , the Court of Appeals found “no very-unusual and compelling circumstances” when the circuit court could have simply decided the issue in the pending tort case. 306 Md. at 652 , 511 A.2d 40 . In Grimm v. Co. Comr’s for Washington Co., 252 Md. 626 , 250 A.2d 866 (1969), the Court of Appeals held that a declaratory judgment action was properly dismissed where the plaintiff sought to adjudicate issues presented for resolution in a pending criminal case. The Court in Grimm said that to rule otherwise “would be unfortunate as it would unduly burden the courts.” Id. at 640-41 , 250 A.2d 866 . 10 Vargas-Aguila’s criminal trial in district court presented the same issues as the declaratory relief he sought in the circuit court. In fact, Vargas-Aguila’s action in circuit court was a direct challenge to the evidence proposed by the State in the district court prosecution.

Although the district court lacks the power to issue a declaratory judgment, it certainly would have been within its authority to determine the legal ³⁸⁴ question of the validity of the toxicologist standards. 11 See Howard v. State, 76 Md.App. 447, 450-51 , 545 A.2d 705 (1988) (The district court in a criminal case possessed “fundamental jurisdiction” to decide whether the adoption of an agency regulation violated the Maryland Constitution.) Thus, there was no reason for Vargas-Aguila to seek declaratory relief in the circuit court. Vargas-Aguila points us to no “compelling or unusual circumstances” which justify the use of a declaratory judgment action in this case. See Grimm, 252 Md. at 639 , 250 A.2d 866 (noting examples of exceptional circumstances to be “where the plaintiff alleges that he is subjected to a threat of continuing prosecution which will not be abated by the criminal proceeding or where there is a substantial threat of irreparable harm, or where for other reasons, the criminal