Ver Brycke v. Ver Brycke

ADKINS, Judge. In 1992, John R. Ver Brycke, III and Barbara Ver Brycke (“the Ver Bryckes”), appellees/cross-appellants, transferred $200,000 to their son, John R. Ver Brycke, IV (“John”), and his then wife, Lisa May Feehley Ver Brycke (“Lisa”), appellant/cross-appellee. In an effort to establish a sort of “family compound,” the Ver Bryckes advanced these funds to help John and Lisa buy a home known as “Rabbit Hill,” which is next door to the Ver Bryckes’ home on the Severn River. John and Lisa ultimately separated five years later, in August 1997.

They divorced in October 2000, never having lived in the Rabbit Hill home. The Ver Bryckes and Lisa dispute the nature and legal effect of this $200,000 transaction. When Lisa and John sold Rabbit Hill, the Ver Bryckes made a demand for the $200,000 ⁶²⁷ plus interest, which Lisa rejected on the ground that the $200,000 was a gift. A jury in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County found by special verdict that the Ver Bryckes had given John and Lisa a conditional gift of $200,000, the condition being that Lisa and John would actually live in the Rabbit Hill home, with their children, and help care for the Ver Bryckes.

The jury also found that Lisa and John were unjustly enriched by the transaction, and that they were equitably estopped from retaining the gift. It awarded the Ver Bryckes $200,000 under these theories of recovery. The jury also found, however, that the Ver Bryckes “were . . . aware that the conditions [of their conditional gift] would not be satisfied on or before January 1, 1995[.]” After the court ordered judgment in favor of the Ver Bryckes for the entire $200,000, Lisa moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, arguing that the Ver Bryckes were barred by the statute of limitations from recovering. The trial court denied this motion without a hearing or a written opinion.

Both parties appeal the resulting judgment. Lisa raises the following questions for our review: I. Did the jury find that the applicable statute of limitations has run, so that the trial court erred in allowing recovery by the Ver Bryckes?

II

Was the jury’s finding that the $200,000 was a conditional gift supported by the evidence? The Ver Biyckes ask us to decide these additional issues: III. Did the trial court err in failing to force Lisa and John to disgorge profits from the sale of Rabbit Hill when the jury found that the “benefit” constituting the unjust enrichment was merely the $200,000 initial amount?

IV

Were the Ver Bryckes entitled to prejudgment interest as a matter of right? Because the Ver Bryckes failed to file suit within three years of knowing that Lisa and John would not satisfy the condition that they live at Rabbit Hill, we hold that their claim was partially barred by the statute of limitations. The bar of ⁶²⁸ the statute is limited, however, to $40,000 of the $200,000 gift, because that amount was unsecured. With respect to the $160,000 balance of the conditional gift that was subject to a deed of trust, the 12 year statute of limitations applied, and the Ver Bryckes’ principal claim in this amount was not time-barred.

We also hold that the jury’s finding that there was a conditional gift is supported by the evidence. Regarding the Ver Bryckes’ cross-appeal, we hold that the Ver Bryckes are not entitled to disgorgement of profits or prejudgment interest as a matter of right. FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS Lisa and John’s Purchase Of Rabbit Hill After meeting while both were in the Navy, Lisa and John married in April 1981. In 1986, they moved to Tennessee.

In the early 1980’s, John noticed the Rabbit Hill property when he made his first visit to his parents’ new Annapolis home, which was next door to Rabbit Hill. The resident of Rabbit Hill was an older woman. When she died in 1992, John asked his father to inquire about what was going to happen to the property. Learning that Rabbit Hill was to be sold, John and Lisa considered buying the property.

Lisa explained that they calculated how much money they would be “comfortable spending on a mortgage and still [be] able to keep our kids in a private school, and we came up with ... $850,000,” $300,000 of which would be financed. The property, however, had a significantly higher value, in the range of $750,000. In order to make the purchase, John and Lisa needed financial help from other members of the Ver Brycke family. The property featured both the main house and a two-bedroom guest house.

According to John, after we figured we knew what the price was going to be then we went into a — I went into a mortgage search mode trying to find the. best financing, and we did____I came up with a figure of 350-for me, 200-for my sister, and 200-for [my parents]. ⁶²⁹ John’s sister, Pamela Ver Brycke, agreed to contribute $200,000 toward the purchase, in exchange for the right to purchase the guest house for rental income. 1 The Ver Bryckes agreed to advance John and Lisa the remaining $200,000. It is the parents’ $200,000 transfer — or more specifically, the nature of that transaction — that eventually resulted in this litigation. After their offer was accepted, the Ver Bryckes proceeded to make the financial arrangements necessary to complete the purchase. The Ver Bryckes took out a mortgage on their own home to finance their $200,000 contribution toward the purchase of Rabbit Hill.

On August 10, 1992, Mr. Ver Brycke signed a “gift letter” stating: I, John R. Ver Brycke III ... will give (or have given) [John Ver Brycke, IV] a gift of $200,000.00 .... and there is no obligation expressed or implied either in the form of cash or future services, to repay this sum at any time. These funds are available and will be given (or have been given) to: John Ver Brycke IV in time to close the mortgage transaction on the purchase of his ... home. Mr. Ver Brycke also consulted his estate planning attorney. In a September 11, 1992 letter, Ronald Holden summarized the proposed transaction. 2 You have asked me to summarize the substance of my recommendations concerning your desire to make a gift of $200,000.00 unto your son and his wife by use of the annual $10,000.00 gifting rule.

As you are aware, each of you as individuals is permitted to give up to $10,000.00 per calendar year unto any number of individuals. Thus, each of you may give $10,000.00 per year unto John and $10,000.00 per year unto his wife, Lisa. This represents a total of $40,000.00 per year. ⁶³⁰ You expressed the desire that in making the proposed gift/loan gift of $200,000.00 you did not want to use up any of your $600,000.00 unified credit (which is available under Federal Gift Tax Laws). During our meeting, I cautioned that if you were to set up a situation whereby John signed a $200,000 note and religiously, each calendar year, you forgave $40,000.00 of such note, there is a risk that the IRS will take the position that the entire gift of $200,000.00 was made in 1992 versus being made in increments of $40,000.00.

I advised that this risk is even greater if your son and his ■wife did not make the customary interest and principal payment expected in [ajrms length mortgage transactions. You stated that notwithstanding the above potential risk, you would like to proceed to attempt to qualify the gifts as being made in $40,000.00 increments. Based upon the above objective I have recommended to-you the following: 1. ) On settlement day, I recommend that each of you write over your separate signatures a $10,000.00 check to John and each of you write over separate signatures a $10,000.00 check to Lisa.... 2. ) On settlement day, instruct [settlement agents] Feldman and Bernstein to prepare for you a $160,000.00 mortgage note to be signed by John and Lisa.... 3. ) In January of 1993 and each subsequent year thereafter, you will plan to forgive $40,000.00 of the debt. 4. ) John and Lisa should make regular mortgage payments to you each month, beginning November 1st. The Rabbit Hill settlement took place on September 30, 1992.

The Ver Bryckes followed many of Holden’s recommendations. Before the- closing date, the Ver Bryckes deposited $160,000 into an escrow account at the title company that was handling the Rabbit Hill transaction. At closing, that money was applied , toward the purchase price. The remaining $40,000 that the Ver Bryckes committed toward settlement was delivered at closing.

Mr. and Mrs. Ver Brycke each wrote separate $10,000 checks to Lisa and John, totaling $40,000. John and Lisa immediately endorsed these four ⁶³¹ checks, and those funds were used to purchase Rabbit Hill. 3 Pamela separately paid for and settled on the guest house. John and Lisa borrowed the remaining $300,000 of the $550,000 purchase price from Norwest Mortgage, Inc. (“Nor-west”). In exchange for the $200,000 funding, the Ver Bryckes received promissory notes and a second deed of trust on Rabbit Hill.

Instead of drawing a single $160,000 promissory note, as Holden contemplated, the Ver Bryckes had Lisa and John sign sixteen individual promissory notes for $10,000, which were easier to individually cancel on an annual basis. John and Lisa also executed in favor of the Ver Bryckes a second deed of trust, which was junior to Norwest’s first deed of trust. 4 Shortly after settlement, Norwest asked for an acknowledgment that there had been a $200,000 gift to Lisa and John. According to the title company agent who handled the Rabbit Hill settlement, “[t]here was a[n] [August 10, 1992] gift letter saying that there would be a gift, and then [Norwest] wanted an acknowledgment that the gift had in fact been given.” Mr. Ver Brycke signed a December 7, 1992 letter to Norwest, in which he “advised that my wife and I have given a gift of $200,000.00 to our son, John R. Verbrycke, IV and daughter-in-law, Lisa May Verbrycke.” Releases, Refinancing, And Renovation After settlement, Mr. Ver Brycke related that “John and Lisa started immediately to working on [Rabbit Hill], ... taking the plaster off the walls and ... gutting the house, and so they started there and they kept on with that work until ⁶³² the spring.” But “no work of any kind” was done to Babbit Hill in terms of actual remodeling. After it was “gutted,” the house was not habitable.

While John and Lisa were working at Rabbit Hill, on January 1, 1993, the Ver Bryckes cancelled four of the $10,000 notes, in accordance with Holden’s advice. On January 1, 1994, they again cancelled four more notes. The cancelled notes were placed back into the Ver Bryckes’ safe deposit box at Farmer’s National Bank with the remaining notes that had not been cancelled. 5 In 1994, John and Lisa refinanced Rabbit Hill. In doing so, they borrowed an additional $100,000 to fix up that property.

Instead, however, they used that money to renovate a summer cottage in Sherwood Forest, which the Ver Bryckes owned, and which Lisa and John had occupied intermittently since their move to Maryland. 6 When January 1995 arrived, Rabbit Hill was still gutted. The Ver Bryckes did not cancel any of the remaining notes. Dissolution, Litigation, And Sale Lisa and John’s marital difficulties eventually led them to separate on August 6, 1997. John initiated divorce proceedings in January 1998.

On March 23, 1999, the Ver Bryckes filed in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County a declaratory judgment complaint, naming both Lisa and John as defendants. In this and subsequent amended complaints, the Ver Bryckes alleged that ⁶³³ they had “advance[d] to Defendants $200,000” at the Rabbit Hill closing, and that there was a dispute regarding the status of the deed of trust and underlying promissory notes executed by Lisa and John at settlement. It was the Ver Bryckes’ position that they “never intended to make a completed gift of $200,000 to [Lisa and John] in 1992[,]” and that Lisa and John understood and accepted that the $200,000 was either a loan or a gift conditioned on fulfillment of their promise to live at Rabbit Hill and to care for them as they aged. The Ver Bryckes asserted alternative claims for breach of the deed of trust and notes, unjust enrichment, and promissory estoppel.

In November 1999, while this litigation was pending, Lisa and John contracted to sell Rabbit Hill to a third party for $980,000. On February 23, 2000, a week before the scheduled closing, the Ver Bryckes sent a payoff statement, indicating that the balance due under their notes and deed of trust was $231,197.81. In response, Lisa moved for emergency ex parte relief, alleging that Rabbit Hill was encumbered by the deed of trust to the Ver Bryckes, that the parties disputed whether the $200,000 secured by the deed of trust was a loan or a gift, and that the Ver Bryckes would not release the lien of the deed of trust to allow the closing to proceed without payment of $231,000. She requested that the net proceeds of the sale “be placed in the register of the Court until a disposition of the property is made by the domestic Court.” The circuit court ordered that all the sale proceeds, other than those necessary to pay off Norwest, be placed into escrow, and that the lien of the deed of trust “be transferred to and be a lien against the Escrow Fund.” Lisa and John settled on March 1, 2000, and $547,224.54 was escrowed pursuant to the court order.

The Ver Bryckes also had their attorney send John and Lisa an acceleration notice, dated November 22, 2000, demanding a payoff of $231,197. John and Lisa made no payments to the Ver Bryckes under the notes, either before or after receiving the acceleration notice. 7 ⁶³⁴ In their second amended complaint, the Ver Bryckes asked the court to “adjudge and declare the respective rights and obligations of the parties” regarding the $200,000 deed of trust and the notes. They prayed judgment that covered not only the $200,000, but also a “pro rata share” of the significant profit from the sale of Rabbit Hill, and requested that they be paid from the escrowed Rabbit Hill funds. John did not contest the positions taken by his parents.

Lisa, however, asserted a number of defenses, including that the $200,000 was an unconditional gift and that the Ver Bryckes were barred from recovering by the statute of limitations. She also counterclaimed against the Ver Bryckes and cross-claimed against John for fraud in the inducement, constructive fraud, unjust enrichment, promissory estoppel, and civil conspiracy. Trial After a trial on the merits, the jury returned special verdicts in favor of the Ver Bryckes. The jury rejected Lisa’s contention that the Ver Bryckes made an unconditional $200,000 gift.

They also rejected the Ver Bryckes’ claim that the $200,000 was a loan. Instead, the jury agreed with the Ver Bryckes that the $200,000 was a conditional gift to Lisa and John. The jury concluded that the elements of unjust enrichment and promissory estoppel were present, and found that the Ver Bryckes were entitled to $200,000 under each theory. The jury also found, however, that the Ver Bryckes were “aware that the conditions would not be satisfied on or before January 1, 1995[.]” Without giving any effect to this “knowledge” finding, the trial court ordered judgment in favor of the Ver Bryckes for the entire $200,000.

Lisa moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), asserting that the jury’s finding that the Ver Bryckes knew by January 1,1995 that the conditions of their conditional gift would not be satisfied barred their entire recovery ⁶³⁵ under the three year statute of limitations governing civil actions at law. The trial court denied Lisa’s motion without a hearing, explanation, or mention of the statute of limitations. It ordered judgment in favor of the Ver Bryckes and directed the escrow agent to pay the Ver Bryckes $200,000, with post-judgment interest of 10 percent per annum. The Ver Bryckes then moved to alter, amend, or revise the judgment, or for JNOV.

They asserted that (a) they were entitled to a percentage of the profits from the sale of Rabbit Hill despite the jury’s finding that the amount of the unjust enrichment was only $200,000, and (b) they were entitled to prejudgment interest. After receiving Lisa’s response, the trial court denied the Ver Bryckes’ motion without a hearing or explanation. Lisa appealed, and the Ver Bryckes cross-appealed. Each side points to aspects of the record and the law as grounds for appellate victory.

Before addressing their arguments, we briefly summarize certain portions of the record relevant to them. The Ver Bryckes’ Claims The Ver Bryckes advanced two alternative theories in support of their claims for relief. They argued that the $200,000 was either a loan or a conditional gift. They offered testimony and documents in support of both theories.

At trial, John testified that he “always considered the money a loan, and I made a verbal agreement with my father that I would pay him back one way or another, if not now then later[.]” At the time Mr. Ver Brycke advised John and Lisa that the Ver Bryckes would advance them the $200,000 they needed to buy Rabbit Hill, John related, with [Lisa! by my side I said, “Daddy, ... I’m going to pay you back one way or another. I don’t like the idea of you having this [$1,200 a month] mortgage payment. And I’m going to try to pay you back that if I can, and if the place is ever sold you will be paid back immediately.” ⁶³⁶ John claimed that Lisa agreed with his statement, saying, “That’s right.”' John denied that the Ver Bryckes used the $200,000 as a gift “enticement on [his parent’s] part,” to persuade him to move to Annapolis from Memphis, “other than just wouldn’t it be great if we were all right here.

But there were no promises made. I don’t recall ever any mention particularly on that house of any financial assistance for that.” John nevertheless confirmed that he and Lisa understood and accepted that the purpose of the $200,000 was to enable them to purchase and live next door to the Ver Bryckes. [T]here was never [anything] ... written down that said, “You must do this and you must help me, and you will help me in my old age and we will watch your children.” The whole thing was just understood.... There was no contract. There was no agreement....

It was a family and a pretty happy family[.] Both Lisa and John desired to live close by because you have all sorts of nice relationships and the things that come out of them to mutually help each other.... And that was the condition for living right next door instead of a community 15 miles away or staying in Memphis, because we would have had all these nice things that ... were conditions. He also testified that his parents did not benefit “one bit” from his renovation of the Sherwood Forest cottage. On the other hand, Mr. Ver Brycke did not view the $200,000 as a loan.

He testified that, from his perspective, the $200,000 was a gift. It was a conditional gift. All of it is, the whole $200,000, and this was understood by us before ... I went to Mr. Holden.

That’s why I always say yes, it is a gift, and to this day it’s been a gift. It’s a conditional gift .... Before we went to Mr. Holden when we were talking about this. We all got together and we decided to pool our resources, and none of us could do this by ourselves.

It was a family understanding. We didn’t have any contract, but ⁶³⁷ none of us would have done anything if it wasn’t understood that they’d come and live there. Lisa and John wouldn’t have. Pam wouldn’t have.

Mr. Ver Brycke also testified that at the September 80,1992 closing, he and his wife “passed the whole $200,000 to ... John and Lisa, by ... making out these checks for $40,000 to take out the first increment of this incremental gift plan. John and Lisa made out these $10,000 notes, and they were given to [the Ver Bryckes] later.” Mr. Ver Brycke also emphasized that there was a mutual understanding that this $200,000 would be used to enable John and Lisa to live next door. “[WJhether you call it a loan or whether you call it a gift, I transferred to them $200,000 in exchange for the understanding that they were going to live there.” Pamela Ver Brycke corroborated Mr. Ver Brycke’s testimony. At trial, she testified that her brother asked for her help in purchasing Rabbit Hill, and that she would not have purchased the guest house otherwise. 8 When asked why her brother wanted to buy Rabbit Hill, she explained that, “[p]artly the advantage was that it was next door to my parents, and one of the reasons was that in their advancing age they would be next door to help take care of them and [the] benefit to my ... parents would [be] ... having the grandchildren next door.” As for the December 1992 gift letter, 9 Mr. Ver Brycke testified that he did not intend to release any of the promissory notes or the deed of trust when he signed that letter.

He explained why he signed the letter. ⁶³⁸ Well, you know, in all these mortgages that I’ve seen there’s a letter from the mortgage company saying that if there are any irregularities or anything like that that you will agree to correct them, and they usually say that they’re going to sell these letters, these mortgages, to another company. They don’t hang onto them very long, and for that reason if the company to who[m] they’re going to sell them has an objection to them you agree to repair them. I thought that’s what it was. I didn’t think very much about this at all, and I figured I had given them a gift, a conditional gift.

The jury also heard testimony from Ronald Holden, the estate planning attorney who advised the Ver Bryckes, and reviewed his notes and September 11, 1992 advice letter regarding the $200,000 transaction. Holden’s notes state: “Son buying new home and parents want to loan $200,000 in gift in $10,000 increments up to $40,000 per year.” At trial, Holden testified that “[t]he nature of my advice was fundamentally they wanted to give this gift of $200,000, this amount [in 1992].... Fundamentally that would have been their objective, but they did not want to do it in a way that used up their unified credit.” According to Holden, the $200,000 was a loan. He testified that there was never any discussion of a conditional gift. [W]hat was being proposed was a loan that may be forgiven.

It wasn’t required that it be forgiven____From an estate planning point of view, from the [Ver Bryckes’] point of view, it was to their advantage to forgive it at a faster pace versus a slower pace, because that would help to save overall federal estate taxes. Holden testified that Mr. Ver Brycke never told him about the August 10, 1992 gift letter. He acknowledged that this letter conveyed an intent contrary to the plan that he set up and laid out in his September 11,1992 advice letter. Lisa’s Defenses Lisa’s primary defense to the Ver Bryckes’ claims was that the $200,000 was an unconditional gift, just as the August and December 1992 gift letters said it was. ⁶³⁹ According to Lisa, in 1992 she and John began looking into buying a home in Annapolis, where the Ver Bryckes lived.

When asked why she agreed to move to Annapolis, Lisa explained that I did eventually agree to move up here. John’s parents are older____My mom had ... passed away.... So it seemed important to have the kids to be able [to] live by grandparents, and John and his family, they were very excited about it. So eventually I acquiesced.

She testified that the Ver Bryckes were “going to make a gift” of $200,000 toward the $750,000 purchase price of the home. After an offer was made on Rabbit Hill, Mr. Ver Brycke said he was going to see an estate attorney ... in order to figure out the best way to avoid paying taxes.... [T]he gift was just a gift. He was meeting with an attorney to figure out some plan for their records to establish some way to ... make a paper trail for the IRS.... It didn’t affect us at all.

Lisa denied that there were any conditions in connection with the $200,000 gift, either before or after settlement. 10 She testified, however, that her understanding was that she could not have used the money to build a house in Tennessee, or for anything other than the purchase of Rabbit Hill. According to Lisa, the Ver Bryckes never demanded or suggested that Lisa and John repay them, even after they renovated the Sherwood Forest cottage instead of Rabbit Hill. She claimed that the Ver Bryckes knew about the cottage renovations, and eventually approved of them. 11 ⁶⁴⁰ In support of her unconditional gift defense, Lisa also points to the testimony of Jerome Feldman, an attorney for Mid-Maryland Title Company, Inc., who did the Rabbit Hill settlement. At trial, Feldman testified that, to his understanding, the $200,000 “was a gift. [The Ver Bryckes] were going to give a gift of $200,000 to John and Lisa.” Feldman admitted, however, that in his deposition, he testified that he did not know if it was a gift or a loan.

Feldman also testified that he was never shown the August 10, 1992 “gift letter.” According to Feldman, this letter indicated] that [Mr. Ver Brycke] was giving John and Lisa $200,000 for the purchase of [Rabbit Hill], and that there was no obligation expressed or implied to repay that sum at any time.... [T]his document is relied upon by the lender to verify that John and Lisa would have $200,000 unconditionally to close on the purchase of the property. When asked by Lisa’s attorney whether he would have completed the settlement if he had known that the $200,000 was a conditional gift, Feldman replied, “Absolutely not. We gave the documents to [Mr.] VerBrycke. We never recorded the deed of trust between John and Lisa and [Mr.] Ver Brycke, nor would we have.” DISCUSSION Lisa’s Appeal I. and II.

Statute Of Limitations And Conditional Gift Lisa asserts that, if in fact , the Ver Bryckes made a conditional gift to her and John, their recovery of that gift is barred by the general three year statute of limitations in Md.Code (1974, 2002 RepLVol.), section 5-101 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJ”), applying to civil actions at law. She contends that the longer, 12 year statute of limitations for á “promissory note or other instrument under seal,” set forth in CJ section 5-102, does not apply because the jury found that the $200,000 payment was a conditional gift and not a ⁶⁴¹ loan. According to Lisa, because the jury found that the Ver Bryckes had made a conditional gift of $200,000 to Lisa, and the jury “[cjlearly ... found that the [sjtatute of limitations began to run in January 1995 on the entire amount claimed by [the Ver Bryckes],” their recovery of that $200,000 is barred because they filed suit in 1999, more that three years after the statute of limitations began to run. The Ver Bryckes respond with three contentions.

First, 12 they argue that the interrogatory on the verdict sheet asking when the Ver Bryckes knew that John and Lisa would never live at Rabbit Hill was not framed in a way that invoked the bar of the statute of limitations. Second, they contend that “the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the sale of the house made the performance of the condition impossible.” Third, they claim that, “in the case of unjust enrichment, the cause of action cannot be asserted until the retention of the benefit becomes unjust, and the statute of limitations does not begin to run until that point in time.” Before addressing these contentions, a brief review of Maryland decisional law on the statute of limitations is helpful. Maryland has adopted the so-called “discovery rule” as a means for determining the “trigger date” for the statute of limitations. Recognizing the unfairness inherent in charging a plaintiff with slumbering on his rights where it was not reasonably possible to have obtained notice of the nature and cause of an injury, [the Court of Appeals] has adopted the discovery rule to determine the date of accrual.

The discovery rule tolls the accrual of the limitations period until the time the plaintiff discovers, or through the exercise of due diligence, should have discovered, the injury. Thus, before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury. ⁶⁴² Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship v. Brown & Sturm, 360 Md. 76, 95-96 , 756 A.2d 963 (2000) (citation omitted). In Pennwalt Corp. v. Nasios, 314 Md. 433 , 550 A.2d 1155 (1988), the Court of Appeals explained the policy bases for statutes of limitation.

According to the Court, statutes of limitation were enacted in an effort to balance the competing interests of potential plaintiffs, potential defendants, and the public. The statutory period provided by a statute of limitations represents a compromise of these interests and “reflects a policy decision regarding what constitutes an adequate period of time for a person of ordinary diligence to pursue his claim.” By creating a limitations period, the legislature determined that a plaintiff should have only so long to bring his action before he is deemed to have waived his right to sue and to have acquiesced in the defendant’s wrongdoing. Limitations statutes therefore are designed to (1) provide adequate time for diligent plaintiffs to file suit, (2) grant repose to defendants when plaintiffs have tarried for an unreasonable period of time, and (3) serve society by promoting judicial economy. Id. at 437-38 , 550 A.2d 1155 (citations omitted).

The Court of Appeals has held that “ ‘[i]t is the discovery of the injury, and not the discovery of all of the elements of a cause of action that starts the running of the clock for limitations purposes.’ ” Lumsden v. Design Tech Builders, Inc., 358 Md. 435, 450 , 749 A.2d 796 (2000) (citation omitted). Similarly, we have explained that [t]he statute of limitations begins to run when the potential plaintiff is on “inquiry notice” of such facts and circumstances that would “prompt a reasonable person to inquire further.” Once on notice of one cause of action, a potential plaintiff is charged with responsibility for investigating, within the limitations period, all potential claims and all potential defendants with regard to the injury. Doe v. Archdiocese of Washington, 114 Md.App. 169, 188-89 , 689 A.2d 634 (1997) (citation omitted). ⁶⁴³ To evaluate the Ver Bryckes’ first argument against the bar of limitations, we need to examine the exact question posed to the jury. Question 3C asked the jury: “If you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the Plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Ver Brycke, III, made a conditional gift, were Plaintiffs aware that the conditions would not be satisfied on or before January 1, 1995?” The Ver Bryckes explain their argument: The question does not establish when the Plaintiffs became “aware that the conditions would not be satisfied on or before January 1, 1995.” The date in issue 3c is meaningless.

Although [Lisa] would like to read the question as if it were worded differently (such as, “Were the Plaintiffs aware on or before January 1, 1995, that the condition would never be satisfied?”), the jury’s response gives no clue as to whether the Plaintiffs were aware in 1995, or 1992, or 1999, that the condition would never be satisfied. We find this interrogatory ambiguous. The words “on or before January 1, 1995” could modify the word “satisfied,” rather than the word “aware.” If the date modifies the word “satisfied,” the interrogatory would not resolve the statute of limitations issue, which turned on whether the Ver Bryckes were aware before January 1, 1995 that the condition of their gift would not be met. The question would only resolve the statute of limitations issue if “on or before January 1, 1995” is interpreted to modify the word “aware.” During closing argument, however, the Ver Bryckes’ attorney interpreted the question just as Lisa now does.

In explaining to the jurors how his client would like them to answer Question 3C, the Ver Bryckes’ attorney argued: I think the testimony of both Mr. VerBrycke senior ... and Barbara Ver Brycke was that they didn’t know until the divorce had gone through and the house was sold that there was a certainty that this condition[] was never going to be met. So certainly that was after January 1 of '95 and you answer that question “no.” (Emphasis added.) Moreover, counsel candidly conceded at oral argument that he knew that the interrogatory was ambiguous before it went ⁶⁴⁴ to the jury. Knowing that this question could be misinterpreted by the jury, but also knowing that its intended purpose was to resolve the statute of limitations issue raised by Lisa, the Ver Bryckes had the burden to object to its inclusion, and point out its ambiguity. See Md. Rule 2-522(c)(“No party-may assign as error the submission of issues to the jury ... unless the party objects on the record before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which the party objects and the grounds of the objection”).

They chose not to do so, and must live with the consequences of that decision. These consequences are not as far-reaching as Lisa would urge, however, because we shall hold that limitations only barred $40,000 of the $200,000 judgment. Before we explain our reasons for this limited application of the limitations defense, we return to the Ver Bryckes’ second and third arguments against the statute of limitations. When Limitations Began To Run As we indicated above, the Ver Bryckes argue that the statute of limitations