Verzi v. Goldburn

Sweeney, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case we are concerned with a dispute over certain monies contained in two joint tenancy bank accounts in the Riggs National Bank of Washington, D. C. On March 15, 1965, Olga M. MacMillan and her daughter, Helen M. Verzi, the Appellant herein, opened a joint checking account at the Riggs National Bank and a week later, on March 22nd, they opened a joint savings account at that same institution. In each case both women signed an agreement provided by the bank which stated that “all sums now on deposit or hereafter deposited in our account with the said bank, shall be owned by us jointly with the right of survivorship and not as tenants in common.” Mrs. MacMillan died on May 1, 1972. After her death, her personal representative, Glenn J. Goldburn, filed a petition to have the funds in the two joint accounts declared part of the decedent’s estate.

Mrs. Verzi resisted that petition, claiming the money as her own, and in due course the matter came on before the Circuit Court for Montgomery ⁴¹¹ County, sitting as a court of equity, with the Honorable Plummer M. Shearin presiding. Judge Shearin found in favor of the personal representative, and from that judgment Mrs. Verzi has taken this appeal. Because the accounts were opened in a banking institution located in the District of Columbia, all parties in interest agree that the question of the ownership of the disputed funds must be decided according to the substantive law of the District of Columbia. In addition to the Appellant, the decedent was survived by a son, John MacMillan, and those siblings were Mrs. MacMillan’s only heirs.

It appears that Mrs. MacMillan was the owner of a substantial apartment complex and was actively engaged in the management of that business, with some assistance from her son. At some time prior to the day on which the first of these accounts was opened, Mrs. MacMillan had suffered a heart attack and evidently became apprehensive about her continuing ability to manage her business enterprise. It is undisputed that one of the reasons which led her to open the joint accounts was her desire to have her daughter assist her in the management of her business properties. With the passage of time, Mrs. MacMillan became increasingly ill, and at some time in the year 1970 she abandoned her own residence in Montgomery County and went to live with the Appellant in a residence purchased specifically for that purpose, and towards the purchase price of which Mrs. MacMillan made a contribution in excess of $15,000.00.

At least some of the balance of the purchase price was financed by two deeds of trust, and there is evidence in the record that monthly payments on one of the trust accounts were made by Mrs. MacMillan. The record also clearly shows that at no time during the period from which the accounts were opened until Mrs. MacMillan’s death did Mrs. Verzi draw on the funds in either account for her own purposes, although there were numerous occasions on which she signed checks in connection with her mother’s business enterprises, or for payment of nursing or other personal expenses for her mother. ⁴¹² For several years immediately prior to her death, the decedent, having suffered a stroke, was in need of intensive nursing care. For some period of time after her stroke, she was served by nurses on a 24 hour a day basis, but eventually the nursing duties were performed by one nurse, who worked 32 hours a week during the daytime hours, with Mrs. Verzi supplying such other nursing care as might be required at all other times. It is conceded that Mrs. Verzi received no compensation from her mother, either for assistance to Mrs. MacMillan in conducting her business affairs, or for her nursing services, with the exception of the trust payments to which reference is made hereinabove.

It is the position of the Appellee, the personal representative, that the accounts at Riggs were opened by the decedent for her own convenience, and that they were never intended by her to be for the benefit of the Appellant. Mrs. Verzi, on the other hand, contends that her mother, with full knowledge of the consequences, opened the accounts with the intention that any balance in them at the time of her death be paid over to and become the property of Mrs. Verzi. The Appellee, in support of his position, offers very little evidence. The Appellant, in support of her claim to the monies, presents a far more compelling case and we believe that under the facts of this case and under what we deem to be the controlling law, the court below erred in finding for the Appellee.

Although it is, of course,true that the law of the place of deposit should control, Imirie v. Imirie, 246 F. 2d 652 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Seng v. Corns, 58 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 1952); Barstow v. Tetlow, 97 A. 829 (Me. 1916); In re Damato, 206 A. 2d 171 (N.J. Super. Ct., App. Div. 1965); Wyatt v. Fulrath, 239 N.Y.S.2d 486 (Sup. Ct. 1963); see Annot. 25 A.L.R.2d 1240 (1952) and 10 Am.Jur.2d Banks [Sec.] 376 (1963), it is our duty to interpret the laws of the District of Columbia in this case in the same manner as that law has been interpreted by the Court of Appeals of Maryland. In Tyler v. Suburban Trust Co., 247 Md. 461 , 231 A. 2d 678 (1967), the Court of Appeals construed the law of the District of Columbia in a case of great similarity and said, at 470: ⁴¹³ “[I]n applying the law of the District of Columbia .... we believe that the core of the matter with regard to joint accounts with right of survivorship is whether sufficient evidence exists to prove the intent on the part of the donor of the joint bank account to establish survivorship to the account in the donee.

Horowitz v. Fainberg, 374 F. 2d 336 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Donoughe v. Morgan, 298 F. 2d 329 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Imirie v. Imirie, supra; Matthew v. Moncrief, 135 F. 2d 645 (D.C. Cir. 1943). “If the intention of the donor of the joint account to create the right of survivorship is clear, it is our belief that the courts of the District of Columbia will effect the implementation of such an intent, unless by so doing a violation of public policy results.” and again at 472, the Court said: “[I]n the cases of Horowitz v. Fainberg, supra, and Donoughe v. Morgan, supra, there was no effort made to correct the impression that the intent to create the survivorship is the important factor in such cases, and indeed if anything, we must assume that Horowitz and Donoughe hold that where the facts show that the joint and survivorship account expressly provides for survivorship, that this intent will prevail unless evidence to the contra,ry is produced. ” (Emphasis supplied). In the instant case, as in Tyler , there is no evidence of fraud or coercion. The accounts in question were opened more than seven years before the death of the decedent, and there is no evidence that the accounts were established either to thwart the laws governing testamentary dispositions or to circumvent creditors; nor was there any other indication of an actual or intended violation of public policy. In the case at hand, again as in Tyler , the document signed by the decedent when