Vitek v. State

Murphy, C. J., dissenting: Although I do not fully share the majority’s reasoning process, I do concur with the holding that, in the circumstances of this case, the trial judge erred by allowing questioning on Vitek’s need for money. However, since I find the error to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, I respectfully dissent. The authorities and our cases are virtually unanimous in ⁴⁷ allowing evidence of motive to be admitted, e.g., Gross v. State, 235 Md. 429, 445 , 201 A.2d 808, 817 (1964); 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 363 (1967); R. Perkins, Criminal Law Ch. 7, § 9 (2d ed. 1969), including the lack of or need for money as a motive for crimes committed for pecuniary gain.

See Annot., 36 A.L.R.3d 839 , §§ 9, 11 (1971 & Supp. 1982); 1 C. Torcia, Wharton’s Criminal Evidence § 172 (13th ed. 1972). Even those authorities which disapprove of the practice, see 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 392(2)(a), (3rd ed. 1940), do so not because such evidence of motive is irrelevant, but rather because its relevance is outweighed by the prejudicial effect it may have upon impecunious defendants. As the majority makes clear, a desire for pecuniary gain is virtually universal, regardless of financial status, and a general state of impoverishment need not be shown to establish a motive for pecuniary gain crimes. However, the majority concedes that "under special circumstances,” the financial condition of a defendant may be admissible, where, for instance, there is a "desperate” need for money.

I agree that the mere employment or financial status of a person is of such little additional probative value, given the presumption of motive in pecuniary gain crimes, that it should not be admitted in light of the possible prejudice that would attach to those who cannot rebut the inference of