W.R. Grace & Co. v. Swedo

ADKINS, J. In each of these three cases we are tasked with determining the appropriate method for crediting payments made under a workers’ compensation award when that award is increased on appeal. The question is whether the credits are computed on the basis of the number of weeks paid or the amount of money expended. The answer can make a substantial difference in the bottom line paid and received. In resolving the issue in favor of the claimants in each of these cases, we rely on legislation passed specifically to supersede earlier decisions of this Court.

FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS Because there are no disputed facts in these cases, and the questions presented are identical in each case, we will only briefly touch on the facts of each case. The different procedural posture of each case results in the employers sometimes being petitioners and sometimes respondents, and vice versa ⁴⁴⁶ for the injured workers. Thus, we will dispense with our traditional Petitioner/Respondent designation of parties and instead collectively refer to the Employer/Insurers 1 (“Employers”) and Workers when discussing the relevant cases and statutes. No. 82, W.R. Grace and Co. v. Swedo Andrew P. Swedo, Jr. (“Swedo”) was injured on November 3, 2002 while working for W.R. Grace & Co. (“Grace”).

Swedo filed a claim with the Workers’ Compensation Commission (the “Commission”) seeking permanent total disability benefits, or, in the alternative, permanent partial disability benefits. After a hearing, the Commission found that Swedo had sustained a 70% permanent partial disability and awarded him $234 per week for 200 weeks. The disability was apportioned as follows: 40% permanent disability due to the workplace accident, and 30% permanent disability due to preexisting conditions. Swedo appealed this decision to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.

The jury agreed that Swedo suffered a 70% permanent partial disability, but found that he was 50% disabled due to the accident, and 20% disabled due to preexisting conditions. The Circuit Court subsequently vacated and remanded the award on appeal. The Commission then amended its order to $525 per week for 333 weeks. At the time of this amended award, Grace had already paid under the initial award for 148 weeks.

Swedo filed Issues with the Commission requesting clarification as to whether Grace was entitled to a credit based on the total number of weeks it had paid under the initial award, or total dollars paid. The Commission ordered that Grace be credited for the weeks paid. Swedo appealed this determination to the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, which affirmed the Commission. Swedo then appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, which reversed the Circuit Court, holding that em ⁴⁴⁷ ployers should receive credit based on the total dollars.paid.

Grace petitioned this Court for certiorari, which we granted. No. 91, Florida Rock Industries v. Owens In May 2005, Jeffrey P. Owens (“Owens”) sustained an accidental lower back injury while working for Florida Rock Industries, Inc. (“Florida Rock”). On February 26, 2010, the Commission issued an order finding that Owens had sustained a permanent partial disability resulting in a 30% industrial loss of the use of his body as a result of the accident, and ordered Florida Rock to make weekly payments of $257 for 150 weeks, retroactive to July 15, 2008. On judicial review in the Circuit Court for Saint Mary’s County, a jury reversed the Commission’s decision, finding that Owens had suffered a permanent partial disability amounting to a 50% industrial loss of the use of his body.

On remand from the Circuit Court, the Commission amended its order to an award of $401 per week for 333 weeks. This order did not credit Florida Rock for the weeks of benefits already paid. Florida Rock petitioned the Circuit Court for judicial review of the Commission’s order, and filed a motion for summary judgment requesting credit for the 150 weeks of benefits already paid. Owens conceded that a credit was proper, but argued that the credit should be based on the “monetary benefits paid” rather than the number of weeks paid.

The court agreed with Owens, and found that Florida Rock was entitled to a credit for the dollar amount of benefits already paid to Owens under the Commission’s February 26, 2010 award. Florida Rock appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed the Circuit Court in an unreported opinion. We granted Florida Rock’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari. No. 92, Coffee v. Rent-A-Center, Inc. Robert W. Coffee (“Coffee”) was injured while working as an account manager for Rent-A-Center in December of 2007.

After filing a workers’ compensation claim, the Commission determined that he sustained a permanent partial disability equating to a 12% industrial loss of the use of his back, and ⁴⁴⁸ awarded Coffee 60 payments of $114 retroactive to March 21, 2009. Coffee petitioned the Circuit Court for Baltimore City for review of this award. The jury found that Coffee’s permanent partial disability amounted to a 16% industrial loss, and consequently, the Commission’s award was reversed in part. The Commission issued an amended award on January 18, 2012, granting Coffee an award of $283 per week for 80 weeks, retroactive to March 21, 2009.

During the pendency of this appeal, Rent-A-Center paid Coffee all 60 installments of his weekly award. As a result, the initial award of $6,840 was paid in full by the time the Commission issued its amended award. Rent-A-Center did not appeal the amended award or request an accounting as to its prior payments. Yet Rent-A-Center did not pay the amended award in full.

Rather, Rent-A-Center deducted the 60 weeks already paid from the award, and sent Coffee a check for $5,660, representing the 20 week increase at $283 per week. Coffee filed Issues with the Commission to compel payment of the difference between the total awards computed according to the total dollars paid, rather than according to the total weeks paid. The Commission determined that a weeks-paid standard was the appropriate standard, pursuant to this Court’s holding in Ametek, Inc. v. O’Connor, 364 Md. 143 , 771 A.2d 1072 (2001). 2 Coffee sought judicial review of this decision in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. The court affirmed the Commission.

Coffee then appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, but before the intermediate appellate court could rule, we granted Rent-A-Center’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari. Although each petitioner phrases the question differently, each case asks us to decide the following question: When crediting an Employer/Insurer for payments made under a workers’ compensation award that is subsequently amended, should credit be given for the number of weeks ⁴⁴⁹ paid under the initial award, or should credit be given for the total dollar amount paid under the initial award? For the following reasons, we hold that in such situations, credit should be given for the total amount of dollars paid under the initial award. DISCUSSION The Employers make two primary arguments regarding their assertion that they should be credited on a weeks-paid basis.

First, they claim that the broad purpose and language of the Workers’ Compensation Act (the “Act”) supports a weeks-paid crediting regime. Second, the Employers argue that our previous case law explicitly and consistently upholds a crediting for the number of weeks paid when considering changes in workers’ compensation awards. The Workers counter with two primary arguments. First, they argue that Md.Code (1991, 2008 RepLVol.), § 9-683 of the Labor and Employment Article (“LE”) unambiguously requires that credit for payments made be calculated in terms of the total dollar amount paid.

Second, they argue that the legislative history supports a clear legislative intent that the crediting be done in terms of the total dollar amount paid. We address these arguments in turn. The Employers argue that LE § 9-633 3 must be interpreted consistently with the Act as a whole. They reason that because the provisions that set out the payment schedule for permanent partial disability, LE §§ 9-626 through 9-630, ⁴⁵⁰ express payment schedules in terms of weeks payable, the units of compensation contemplated by the Act are weekly in nature.

The Employers point to the title of LE § 9-627— “Duration of compensation” — for further proof that the payment of benefits under the Act is fundamentally computed in terms of weeks. As Rent-A-Center explains, The Legislature intended tha[t] an injured employee receive benefits for his injury for a duration that is proportionate to his injury. The dollar amounts of those benefits are calculated pursuant to the duration of weeks and are based on factors including the date of the injury and how much the employee was making at the time of his injury. Thus, the Employers explain, the Act is primarily about the number of weeks an injured employee is paid, rather than the total amount of money the employee is paid.

The Employers remind us that when tasked with interpreting a statute, we have routinely explained that we must avoid illogical or unreasonable results. They argue that it would be illogical to interpret the Act such that in all other provisions, it structures benefits around a weekly approach, but when calculating the credit for benefits already paid, it switches up to base benefits on total dollars paid. Thus, they say, the clear language of the Act as a whole, and specifically LE § 9-633, supports a weeks-paid credit calculation. The Employers also explain that our longstanding precedent — as embodied in Philip Electronics North America v. Wright, 348 Md. 209 , 703 A.2d 150 (1997), superseded by statute as stated in Plein v. Department of Labor, 369 Md. 421 , 800 A.2d 757 (2002), Ametek, Inc. v. O’Connor, 364 Md. 143 , 771 A.2d 1072 (2001), and Del Marr v. Montgomery County, 397 Md. 308 , 916 A.2d 1002 (2007) — is that employers should be credited for the weeks they have paid under previous awards.

As they explain, even after the enactment of LE § 9-633, this Court held in Del Marr that credits should be calculated in terms of weeks. The Employers point to our holding in Del Marr in which we stated that “a modification that serves to increase or decrease compensation, whether ⁴⁵¹ occasioned by ... judicial review ... or a reopening, may have prospective effect only, achieved by allowing a credit for compensation previously paid calculated on a weekly basis.” 397 Md. at 320 , 916 A.2d at 1008 . Additionally, the Employers explain that Del Marr rejected the argument that the enactment of LE § 9-633 overturns Philip Electronics and Ametek. Id. at 317-18, 916 A.2d at 1007 .

The Employers urge us to follow this line of precedent. The Workers argue that LE § 9-633 is clear and unambiguous in providing that credit for payments made under an amended award should be done in reference to total dollars paid. They explain that LE § 9 — 101(e)(1) defines “compensation” as “the money payable under this title to a covered employee or the dependents of a covered employee.” Furthermore, the Workers argue that the “ordinary, popular understanding” of the word “compensation” refers to money. Because it is this Court’s role to use the “[ojrdinary, popular understanding of the English language ... [when] interpreting] ... the plain language of the text of a statute[,]” the Workers urge us to hold that compensation refers to money in LE § 9-633.

See Stachowski v. Sysco Food Servs. of Baltimore, Inc., 402 Md. 506, 516 , 937 A.2d 195, 200 (2007). The Workers remind us that we have held that “[i]f the language of the statute is unambiguous and clearly consistent with the statute’s apparent purpose, our inquiry as to legislative intent ends ordinarily and we apply the statute as written, without resort to other rules of construction.” See Lockshin v. Semsker, 412 Md. 257, 275 , 987 A.2d 18, 28-29 (2010) (citations omitted). Because LE § 9-633 is unambiguous, argue the Workers, we need not engage in any statutory construction. Rather, we should follow the clear and unambiguous meaning of the statute and hold that credits should be applied in terms of total dollars paid.

The Workers also argue that because the legislative history clearly demonstrates the intent to enact a dollars-crediting regime, we should conform our holding to that intent. They present three sources of legislative intent meant to buttress their position. First, they present the Senate Finance Com ⁴⁵² mittee’s report on House Bill 1278 (“HB 1278”) — the Bill that would become LE § 9-683. This report construed HB 1278 as providing that “if an award of permanent partial disability under the State’s workers’ compensation laws is reversed or modified by a court on appeal, the payment of any new compensation awarded will be subject to a credit for compensation previously awarded and paid.” The Workers argue that because this Senate Finance Committee report summarizes HB 1278 as putting forth “a dollar credit, as opposed to a number of weeks paid credit,” it is clear that the Legislature meant this bill to enact a dollars-paid crediting regime.

The Workers then refer us to the Maryland Chamber of Commerce legislative position memo on the subject, which issued a favorable report on HB 1278. This memo summarized HB 1278 as requiring “employers to be credited for the amount of workers’ compensation dollars previously paid, rather than the number of weeks paid, in those instances where a permanent partial disability award is reversed or modified[.]” After summarizing this Court’s holdings in Philip Electronics and Ametek, the Maryland Chamber of Commerce explained that “HB 1278 imposes a consistent method for crediting the employer for benefits previously paid; that method is to credit dollars and not weeks.” Finally, the Workers direct us to the legislative testimony of William Kress, who spoke on behalf of The Alliance of American Insurers. Kress’s testimony explains that “House Bill 1278 will require all credits to be calculated based upon the actual dollar amount of benefits paid out to the Claimant.” The Workers argue that these three pieces of legislative history demonstrate that it was the intent of the Legislature, and the understanding of all the parties who commented on the bill, that LE § 9-633 was intended to create a dollars-paid crediting system. Analysis The Commission is an adjudicatory administrative agency.

See W.M. Schlosser Co. v. Uninsured Employers’ Fund, 414 Md. 195, 204 , 994 A.2d 956, 961 (2010). Thus, in our review we look through the decisions of the circuit courts ⁴⁵³ and intermediate appellate court, and evaluate the agency decision directly. See Frey v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 422 Md. 111, 136-37 , 29 A.3d 475, 489-90 (2011). As we explained in Board of Physician Quality Assurance v. Banks, “[a] court’s role in reviewing an administrative agency adjudicatory decision is narrow[;] it ‘is limited to determining if there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the agency’s findings and