Wagner v. State

WATTS, J. This case arises from the circumstance that a father and daughter were parties to a multiple-party bank account, and, without the father’s permission, the daughter removed funds from the account to use for her own benefit, allegedly pursuant to Md.Code Ann., Fin. Inst. (1980, 2011 RepLVol.) (“FI”) l^lMffi. 1 We decide: (I) whether the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for theft, and whether an individual can commit theft from a joint or multiple-party bank account to which the individual is a party; and (II) whether the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for embezzlement (fraudulent misappropriation by fiduciary). We hold that: (I) the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for theft where the individual willfully or knowingly obtained or exerted unauthorized control over funds—belonging to another—contained in a joint bank account without the other’s knowledge or consent and with the intent to deprive the other of those funds; statutorily granted authority permitting a party to a joint or multiple-party account to access and withdraw funds in the account does not confer ownership of the funds in the account to that party such that, as a matter of ⁴¹⁰ law, the party cannot be guilty of theft; and (II) the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for embezzlement (fraudulent misappropriation by fiduciary).

BACKGROUND On February 14, 2013, the State, Respondent, charged Jacqueline Wagner (‘Wagner”), Petitioner, with theft of property with a value of at least $500 2 and embezzlement (fraudulent misappropriation by fiduciary). On October 17 and 18, 2013, the Circuit Court for Baltimore County (“the circuit court”) conducted a bench trial, at which the following evidence was adduced. As a witness for the State, Marion Wagner (“Father”), who was eighty-four years old at the time of trial, testified as follows. Father had three daughters, including Wagner.

For most of his life, Father lived in a row house on South Curley Street in Baltimore City with his wife, Jean, who died in 2005. While Jean was alive, she handled the family finances because “[s]he was very good with figures[.]” After Jean’s death, Father handled his own finances for a short period of time before asking Wagner to assist him. At that time, Father had an individual retirement account (“the IRA”) with American Century Investments containing nearly $200,000, and a checking account and a savings account (collectively, “the Account”) with Provident Bank containing “a few thousand” dollars. 3 ⁴¹¹ Father also received a monthly pension check in the amount of $88 and income from the Social Security Administration. On July 29, 2005, Father added Wagner to the Account as a “joint owner.” At trial, as to that event, the following exchange occurred: [PROSECUTOR]: Okay.

Now, 2005, you indicated that you put [] Wagner on your account. Why did that happen? [FATHER]: That happened because I had my bank account with my wife’s name on it[,] but[,] since she passed away, I wanted somebody else to be able to get the money if I couldn’t get it myself. So I asked [Wagner] if I could put her name on the account[,] and this is my money in there, but not hers, and she agreed to do that. [PROSECUTOR]: Well, what specific instructions did you give her about putting your, her name on your account? [FATHER]: The only reason I did that was in order for me to get my money out if I couldn’t go get it, would she be able to get it for me. [PROSECUTOR]: Okay. [FATHER]: That was my money. Father retained the checkbook for the Account, and “never knew [that he] had” an ATM card.

Father did not let anybody else have the checkbook for the Account except when he gave it to Wagner on one occasion. In 2006, Father mortgaged his house for $87,000, 4 and loaned the proceeds to Wagner to help with Wagner’s business of transporting people to and from bingo halls. 5 Father expected Wagner to “pay [the loan] back completely.” ⁴¹² In January 2007, after his house was damaged by a fire, Father moved into Wagner’s home in Baltimore County. Father received $40,000 from his insurance company to pay for the cost of repairs to his house. 6 Father put Wagner in charge of the repairs and instructed “her to do whatever she want[ed] to get the house in shape” and “to pay the contractor whatever [s]he ha[d] to pay.” In 2009, the repairs to Father’s house were finished. Wagner “talked [Father] into letting [his] granddaughter and her boyfriend [ ] move into [Father’s] house”; as a result, Father kept living with Wagner.

In late 2009, Wagner told Father that he needed to move out, so he moved out of Wagner’s house and moved in with one of his other daughters. 7 Before moving out of Wagner’s house, Father received a statement from his bank informing him that the mortgage on his house had not been paid; the bank threatened to initiate foreclosure proceedings. After receiving the statement, Father telephoned his bank and discovered that the mortgage had not been paid and that he owed his bank $60,000. 8 When he asked the bank about the amount of funds in the Account, Father “was astonished to find out that it was nothing.” The money in the IRA and the Account was missing. For several months thereafter, Father requested and reviewed copies of his bank records to find out what had happened to the funds in the Account and the IRA. In 2010, Father went to a Commissioner Station of the District Court of Maryland and filed a complaint against Wagner.

Father had not authorized Wagner to transfer funds from the IRA to the Account, make numerous ATM and cash ⁴¹³ withdrawals from the Account, or transfer funds from the Account to Wagner’s personal checking account 9 or the bank accounts of companies (KLMJ Inc. and Smythe Transportation) that Wagner owned. 10 Father did not know the full extent of the withdrawals and transfers until he started reviewing his bank records. As a witness for the State, Detective Deborah Chenoweth (“Detective Chenoweth”) of the Baltimore County Police Department testified that she was assigned to investigate the matter, and that her investigation revealed that, from December 9, 2005, to October 13, 2009, $181,670.09 was transferred from the IRA to the Account, 11 and $251,645.83 was taken from the Account through ATM withdrawals, cash withdrawals, and wire transfers to Wagner’s personal checking account and the bank accounts of companies that Wagner owned. In other words, funds would be transferred from the IRA to the Account, and thereafter would be withdrawn by ATM or cash or transferred by wire from the Account to Wagner’s personal checking account or the bank accounts of companies that Wagner owned. The circuit court admitted into evidence a Provident Bank signature card, which was dated July 29, 2005, identified the Account, and listed Father as the “Primary Owner.” The signature card’s middle section contains Father’s and Wagner’s signatures and Social Security numbers, and labels each of Father and Wagner as a “Joint Owner.” ⁴¹⁴ On her own behalf, Wagner testified as follows.

Wagner was “put on [the A]ccount in ease anything happened to” Father. Wagner put money into the Account, but she had “[n]o idea” how much. Wagner sometimes gave Father money out of her personal checking account (which was a joint account with Father) and sometimes transferred money between the Account and her personal checking account. Father received his bank statement every month and balanced his checkbook, so Father knew exactly “what he had” and “what he was using and spending.” As to the IRA, originally, Father withdrew funds from the IRA by mailing a form; Father would then receive in the mail a check, which he would deposit.

After Father began living with Wagner, Father informed her that he did not want to deal with “everyday things,” including money, so he authorized her to handle telephonic withdrawals from the IRA. Wagner was required to fax a form confirming any telephonic withdrawal; after the form was processed, money from the IRA was deposited into the Account. Wagner did not take any money out of the IRA without Father’s authorization because it was “his money.” Wagner did not sign Father’s name on the requests for withdrawals from the IRA. All of the money taken out of the Account was at Father’s request.

Father always used cash and never had a credit card or a debit card. Wagner never took money from the Account or the IRA for her own benefit or without Father’s authorization. Wagner acknowledged that the money deposited into the Account was Father’s money, and that her “money was kept separate from [Father’s] money.” Father gave Wagner the proceeds of the $87,000 mortgage “as a gift[,]” but Wagner paid the mortgage when she had “extra money[.]” Wagner failed to pay the general contractor for the work on Father’s house. When asked whether she gave Father $200,000 over the course of three years to “lose at the casinos[,]” Wagner testified “[p]ossibly” and explained: “It’s [Father’s] money.

He wanted it, he got it, he did what he wanted with it.” ⁴¹⁵ At the conclusion of the bench trial, the circuit court found that Wagner took funds from the Account, finding as follows: I have absolutely no question in my mind, none, that [Wagner] took and used the money in [the A]ccount ... for her own purposes. I am truly well beyond hav[ing] a reasonable doubt. I have no doubt. I reject factually as strongly as I can that [Wagner] withdrew funds at [Father’s request and that that money was lost gambling.

After issuing its factual findings, the circuit court observed that the case presented a legal, not factual, question. Specifically, the circuit court stated: “I really think factually there’s no question about what happened. I think it’s much more of a legal question----I have, frankly, spent the majority of my time[ ] trying to figure out what is, what are the consequences or ramifications of a joint account.” As to legal conclusions, the circuit court stated: [T]here is, in fact, a rebuttable presumption. There’s a difference between ownership and ability to withdraw[,] and one starts with the presumption that[,] in a case where there’s joint ownership with a right of survivorship, which is created by the titling of the account, that it’s joint owners.

But it can be rebutted and the burden is on the person who wants to rebut it.... I’m reading to you from Haller v. White, [ 228 Md. 505, 510 , 180 A.2d 689, 692 (1962), superseded by, Md.Code Ann., Fin. Inst. (1980, 2011 Repl.Vol.) § 1-204] it says we think the most significant fact is the form of the account, which on its faces creates a joint tenancy.

It is true that this raises only a rebuttable presumption[,] but the burden is upon the party seeking to rebut it. In [ ] Stanley [v. Stanley, 175 Md.App. 246, 262 , 927 A.2d 40, 50 , cert. dismissed, 402 Md. 36 , 935 A.2d 406 (2007) ], the common law presumption of joint ownership with the right of survivorship created by the titling of the bank account as joint can be overcome by evidence that the owner’s intent was not to create such rights in the titleholder. I have really struggled, I make no bones about it, over this issue of [“]ean you actually have a situation where there’s theft when the titling is joint owners[?”,] and I come down on the side that you ⁴¹⁶ can[,] and that is because I am persuaded that[,] even if one starts with this presumption that it’s joint owners, it can be rebutted[,] and I have found in this case, as I said, ... it’s not beyond a reasonable doubt, it is beyond all doubt. The circuit court found Wagner guilty of both theft of property with a value of at least $500 and embezzlement (fraudulent misappropriation by fiduciary).

On October 21, 2013, the circuit court sentenced Wagner to eight years’ imprisonment, with all but eighteen months suspended, for theft of property with a value of at least $500, followed by five years’ supervised probation; the circuit court also ordered Wagner to pay $122,355 in restitution to Father. 12 For sentencing purposes, the conviction for embezzlement (fraudulent misappropriation by fiduciary) merged with the conviction for theft of property with a value of at least $500. Wagner appealed, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed. See Wagner v. State, 220 Md.App. 174, 194 , 102 A.3d 900, 912 (2014). Wagner filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which this Court granted.

See Wagner v. State, 441 Md. 666 , 109 A.3d 665 (2015). STANDARD OF REVIEW Maryland Rule 8-131(c) provides: When an action has been tried without a jury, the appellate court will review the case on both the law and the evidence. It will not set aside the judgment of the trial court on the evidence unless clearly erroneous, and will give due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. ⁴¹⁷ In Goff v. State, 387 Md. 327, 338 , 875 A.2d 132, 138-39 (2005), we further explained the standard of review under Maryland Rule 8-131(c), stating: The deference shown to the trial court’s factual findings under the clearly erroneous standard does not, of course, apply to legal conclusions. When the trial court’s decision involves an interpretation and application of Maryland statutory and case law, [this] Court must determine whether the lower court’s conclusions are legally correct under a de novo standard of review.

We will not disturb the judgment on the facts, however, unless the trial court’s findings are clearly erroneous. If there is any competent evidence to support the factual findings of the trial court, those findings cannot be held to be clearly erroneous. (Citations, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted). As to sufficiency of the evidence, “[t]he standard for appellate review of evidentiary sufficiency is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the [State], any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Smith, 374 Md. 527, 533 , 823 A.2d 664, 668 (2003) (citations omitted).

In so evaluating, “[w]e do not re-weigh the evidence, but we do determine whether the verdict was supported by sufficient evidence, direct or circumstantial, which could convince a rational trier of fact of the defendant’s guilt of the offenses charged beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 534 , 823 A.2d at 668 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Because the issue in this case involves statutory interpretation, we set forth the pertinent rules of statutory construction: The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the [General Assembly]. As this Court has explained, [t]o determine that purpose or policy, we look first to the language of the statute, giving it its natural and ordinary meaning. We do so on the tacit ⁴¹⁸ theory that the [General Assembly] is presumed to have meant what it said and said what it meant.

When the statutory language is clear, we need not look beyond the statutory language to determine the [General Assembly]’s intent. If the words of the statute, construed according to their common and everyday meaning, are clear and unambiguous and express a plain meaning, we will give effect to the statute as it is written. In addition, [w]e neither add nor delete words to a clear and unambiguous statute to give it a meaning not reflected by the words [that] the [General Assembly] used or engage in forced or subtle interpretation in an attempt to extend or limit the statute’s meaning. If there is no ambiguity in th[e] language, either inherently or by reference to other relevant laws or circumstances, the inquiry as to legislative intent ends[.] If the language of the statute is ambiguous, however, then courts consider not only the literal or usual meaning of the words, but their meaning and effect in light of the setting, the objectives[,] and [the] purpose of [the] enactment [under consideration].

We have said that there is an ambiguity within [a] statute when there exist[ ] two or more reasonable alternative interpretations of the statute. When a statute can be interpreted in more than one way, the job of this Court is to resolve that ambiguity in light of the legislative intent, using all the resources and tools of statutory construction at our disposal. If the true legislative intent cannot be readily determined from the statutory language alone, however, we may, and often must, resort to other recognized indicia—among other things, the structure of the statute, including its title; how the statute relates to other laws; the legislative history, including the derivation of the statute, comments and explanations regarding it by authoritative sources during the legislative process, and amendments proposed or added to it; the general purpose behind the statute; and the relative rationality and legal effect of various competing constructions. ⁴¹⁹ In construing a statute, [w]e avoid a construction of the statute that is unreasonable, illogical, or inconsistent with common sense. In addition, the meaning of the plainest language is controlled by the context in which is appears.

As this Court has stated, [bjecause it is part of the context, related statutes or a statutory scheme that fairly bears on the fundamental issue of legislative purpose or goal must also be considered. Thus, not only are we required to interpret the statute as a whole, but, if appropriate, in the context of the entire statutory scheme of which it is a part. Stoddard v. State, 395 Md. 653, 661-63 , 911 A.2d 1245, 1249-50 (2006) (citations, internal quotation marks, and paragraph break omitted) (some alterations in original). DISCUSSION I. Wagner contends that, as a matter of law, absent language in an account agreement restricting a person’s use of funds, a person cannot be guilty of theft from a joint or multiple-party bank account if the person is a party to the bank account.

Wagner argues that, because she was a party to the Account, she was an owner of the funds in the Account and had the right to withdraw funds from the Account, and accordingly could not be guilty of stealing her own property. Indeed, Wagner asserts that, under FI § l-204(f), she had full authority to exert control over the funds in the Account as a party to the Account, and her ability to legally withdraw funds from the Account constituted an ownership interest in those funds. Wagner maintains that because she was a party to the Account, “[tjhere was no restriction on her withdrawal of funds.” The State responds that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the conviction for theft because Wagner withdrew funds from the Account without Father’s authorization and used them for her benefit, not Father’s. Indeed, the State contends that Wagner “plainly committed theft” because she took funds from the Account for her own use and without Father’s ⁴²⁰ authorization.

The State argues that FI § 1-204 does not shield Wagner from criminal liability for her unauthorized taking and use of Father’s funds because FI § 1-204 concerns account access, not account ownership. The State asserts that FI § l-204(f) does not confer ownership of an account, but instead provides authorization to withdraw funds from an account absent some other agreement between the financial institution and the parties to the account. Md.Code Ann., Crim. Law (2002, 2012 Repl.Vol.) (“CR”) § 7-104(a) 13 provides: A person may not willfully or knowingly obtain or exert unauthorized control over property, if the person: (1) intends to deprive the owner of the property; (2) willfully or knowingly uses, conceals, or abandons the property in a manner that deprives the owner of the property; or (3) uses, conceals, or abandons the property knowing the use, concealment, or abandonment probably will deprive the owner of the property.

For purposes of the theft statute, CR § 7-101 (h) defines “owner” as “a person, other than the offender: (1) who has an interest in or possession of property regardless of whether the person’s interest or possession is unlawful; and (2) without whose consent the offender has no authority to exert control over the property.” (Paragraph breaks omitted). CR § 7-101(j) defines “property of another” as “property in which a person other than the offender has an interest that the offender does not have the authority to defeat or impair, even though the offender also may have an interest in the property.” Here, we hold that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence was sufficient to support ⁴²¹ the conviction for theft. As of 2005, the IRA contained nearly $200,000, and the Account contained “a few thousand” dollars. On July 29, 2005, Father added Wagner to the Account as a “joint owner.” Between December 2005 and October 2009, $181,670.09 was transferred from the IRA to the Account.

During that same time, $251,645.83 was taken from the Account through ATM withdrawals, cash withdrawals, and wire transfers to Wagner’s personal checking account and the bank accounts of companies that Wagner owned. 14 Father testified that he did not authorize Wagner to transfer funds from the IRA to the Account, make numerous ATM and cash withdrawals, or transfer funds from the Account to Wagner’s personal checking account or the bank accounts of companies that Wagner owned. Indeed, Father testified that he did not know the full extent of the withdrawals and transfers until he started reviewing his bank records after moving out of Wagner’s house. Put simply, the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to support the circuit court’s finding that Wagner “took and used the money in [the Account] for her own purposes” and did so without Father’s knowledge or authorization. In other words, Wagner willfully or knowingly obtained or exerted unauthorized control over the funds in the IRA and the Account with the intent to deprive the owner (Father) of those funds in violation of CR § 7-104(a).

Significantly, Wagner does not dispute in any meaningful way the circuit court’s factual findings that: (1) Father added Wagner to the Account to allow Wagner to access the funds in the Account if something happened to Father or for Father’s benefit; (2) Wagner understood that the money in the Account belonged to Father; and (3) Wagner withdrew funds from the Account and used them for her own purposes. Indeed, rather than attacking the evidentiary basis for the conviction for theft of property with a value of at least $500, Wagner relies ⁴²² exclusively on FI § 1—204(f) to contend that, as a party to the Account, she was an owner of the funds in the Account and had the legal authority to access the Account and exercise control over the funds, such that she could not be convicted of stealing her own property. We disagree. Stated simply, FI § 1—204(f) does not mention, let alone implicate, the ownership rights among living parties to a joint or multiple-party account; instead, FI § l-204(f) provides that a party to a joint or multiple-party account may access and withdraw funds in the account.

We explain. FI § l-204(f) provides, in its entirety: “Unless the account agreement expressly provides otherwise, the funds in a multiple-party account may be withdrawn by any party or by a convenience person for any party or parties, whether or not any other party to the account is incapacitated or deceased.” FI § l-204(b)(5) defines a “convenience person” as: [A]ny person who is authorized to draw upon funds in an account: (i) Under a power of attorney given by 1 or more parties to the account; or (ii) By virtue of a designation in the account agreement appointing that person as agent of a party or the parties to the account for the convenience of the party or parties. (Paragraph breaks omitted). By its plain language, FI § 1-204(f) simply grants a party or a convenience person to a joint or multiple-party account the authority to access the account and withdraw funds, absent language in the account agreement expressly providing otherwise; FI § l-204(f) does not confer ownership of the funds in the account to the party or the convenience person.

Indeed, FI § 1—204(f) does not delineate or detail the relationship among the parties to a multiple-party account; instead, FI § 1-204(0 concerns the relationship between the parties to a multiple-party account and the financial institution where the account is held, as memorialized in an account agreement between the financial institution and the parties to the multiple-party account. In short, the issue is whether a party authorized to withdraw under FI § 1—204(f) is an “owner” of the property as ⁴²³ defined by CR § Y—101(h)(1) and (2). In other words, does having the ability to withdraw funds pursuant to FI § 1—204(f) create an interest in or give ownership of the property to a party to the account? We conclude that FI § 1—204(f) does not create an interest in property or give ownership of property to the party authorized to withdraw.

See Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (“Interest” is defined, in pertinent part, as “[a] legal share in something; all or part of a legal or equitable claim to or right in property!)]”). By its plain language, FI § 1—204(f) authorizes only the act of withdrawal from a multiple-party account, nothing more and nothing less. The ordinary meaning of the term “withdrawal” (the noun form of the verb “withdrawn” in FI § l-204(f)) does not convey or suggest that an individual who engages in a withdrawal expressly or impliedly becomes an owner of the withdrawn funds. See Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (“Withdrawal” is defined, in pertinent part, as “[t]he removal of money from a depository!!,]” e.g., “withdrawal of funds from the checking account!)]”); Withdrawal, Merriam-Webster (2015), http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/withdrawal [https://perma.cc//YLU4-CGNJ] (“Withdrawal” is defined, in pertinent part, as “removal from a place of deposit or investment^]”).

Nothing in FI § l-204(f) uses the term “ownership” or a synonym; nor does FI § l-204(f) contain any terms concerning ownership of the funds that may be withdrawn from a multiple-party account. In short, FI § l-204(f)’s plain language says nothing about the ownership interests, or lack thereof, of those individuals who are authorized to make withdrawals from a multiple-party account. As such, equating the authority to withdraw with ownership strains the clear language of FI § 1—204(f) beyond recognition. 15 ⁴²⁴ A review of FI § 1-204’s legislative history does not change the result or alter the plain meaning of FI § 1—204(f). Indeed, FI § 1-204’s legislative history demonstrates that the General Assembly enacted FI § 1-204 to repeal the rules as to gift and trust that formerly governed the joint or multiple-party accounts of deceased individuals.

In 1992, the General Assembly passed House Bill 956 (which became, among other statutes, FI § 1-204), for the purpose of, among other things, “authorizing certain persons to withdraw funds in a multiple-party account under certain circumstances[,]” “providing that financial institutions may make payments from multiple-party accounts to certain persons without liability under certain circumstances[,]” and “providing for the effect of [FI § 1-204] on common law[.]” 1992 Md. Laws 3498 (Ch. 578, H.B. 956). Indeed, in an uncodified section of FI § 1-204, the General Assembly stated: [FI § 1-204] is intended to alter the common law, including Whalen v. Milholland, 89 Md. 199 , 43 A. 45 (1899), Milholland v. Whalen, 89 Md. 212 , 43 A. 43 (1899) and their progeny, as it applies to all deposit accounts in financial institutions that are established in the name of one or more parties, whether or not in trust, or with survivorship rights, or with payable on death rights. 1992 Md. Laws 3498 , 3507 (Ch. 578, H.B.956). Before continuing with our review of FI § 1-204’s legislative history and, specifically, House Bill 956’s file, we pause to provide context concerning the common law that was intended to be altered by FI § 1-204. The common law at issue developed through cases concerning “contests] between those claiming as co-owners or as surviving owner of a bank or building association account[.]” Jones v. Hamilton, 211 Md. 371, 380 , 127 A.2d 519, 526 (1956).

The first of these cases were Whalen v. Milholland, 89 Md. 199, 200 , 43 A. 45, 46 (1899) (“Milholland I”) and Milholland v. Whalen, 89 Md. 212, 212-13 , 43 A. 43, 43 (1899) (‘Milholland II”), both of which involved bank accounts opened by Elizabeth O’Neill (“O’Neill”) and the contest between O’Neill’s sister, Mary Whalen (“Whalen”), and the executor of O’Neill’s estate, Ar ⁴²⁵ thur V. Milholland (“Milholland”), as to who was entitled to the funds in the accounts after O’Neill died. In Milholland I, 89 Md. at 200, 43 A. at 46, O’Neill opened a bank account at the Savings Bank of Baltimore titled as follows: “Elizabeth O’Neill and Mary Whalen. Joint owners. Payable to the order of either, or the survivor”; the words “joint owners” were not originally on the form, but were stamped on later.

In Milholland II, 89 Md. at 212-13, 43 A. at 43, O’Neill opened a bank account at Metropolitan Savings Bank titled as follows: “Metropolitan Savings Bank, in account with Miss Elizabeth O’Neill. In trust for herself and Mrs. Mary Whalen, widow, joint owners, subject to the order of either; the balance at the death of either to belong to the survivor.” The titling of the account at Metropolitan Savings Bank “was made at the instance and upon the request of [] O’Neill” and embodied the instructions that O’Neill gave Metropolitan Savings Bank when she opened the account. Milholland II, 89 Md. at 213, 43 A. at 43. O’Neill funded the bank accounts and held the accounts’ pass books, which were required to withdraw funds.

Milholland I, 89 Md. at 200, 203, 43 A. at 46, 47; Milholland II, 89 Md. at 213, 43 A. at 43. After O’Neill died, both Whalen and Milholland claimed the funds in the accounts. Milholland I, 89 Md. at 200-01, 43 A. at 46; Milholland II, 89 Md. at 213, 43 A. at 43. In Milholland I, 89 Md. at 202, 43 A. at 46, this Court held that the funds in the account at the Savings Bank of Baltimore belonged to O’Neill’s estate because Whalen failed to demonstrate that O’Neill had validly gifted her the funds in the account before O’Neill’s death.

We explained that the words “joint owners” in the title of the account, standing alone, were “not sufficient” to transfer title to the funds to Whalen or to establish a gift, particularly because O’Neill “retain[ed] possession of the pass book, and ... the book must be produced before the deposit can be withdrawn.” Milholland I, 89 Md. at 202-03, 43 A. at 47. We noted that the later addition of the words “joint owners” to the title of the account was of no significance, explaining: ⁴²⁶ Those words were placed on the [pass] book, not because [ ] O’Neill requested the bank officers to do so, and not because she thought they would, or designed they should!,] vest an indefeasible interest in [Whalen], but merely because the bank had adopted that form, as testified by the assistant treasurer, “to make it uniform!,]”—though uniform with what[,] he did not say. The words were put there[,] not as expressing [ ] O’Neill’s intentions!,] or as limiting her control over the funds, but manifestly to carry out some policy or theory of the Savings Bank [of Baltimore]. They represent and stand for no voluntary, deliberate act of hers at all.

In the face of these facts, whatever the import of the words might be, had they been consciously and purposely used by [ ] O’Neill, they certainly can be given no weight or potency. Milholland I, 89 Md. at 203-04, 43 A. at 47 (emphasis in original). By contrast, in Milholland II, 89 Md. at 215, 43 A. at 45, this Court held that the language used by O’Neill in opening the account at Metropolitan Savings Bank demonstrated O’Neill’s intent to grant an ownership interest in the funds of the account to Whalen; i.e., the funds in the account belonged to Whalen, as the beneficiary of the trust, and not to O’Neill’s estate. We stated that “a deposit [such] as we [we]re [then] dealing with[ ] constitute^] a valid declaration of trust, in the absence of contravening proof, and [ ] when a trust [was] thus created!,] the rights of the beneficiary become fixed, even though the settlor retains the [pass ]book in his [or her] possession.” Milholland II, 89 Md. at 218, 43 A. at 45.

We explained: [O’Neill] was seized of the money for the use of herself and her sister, as joint owners of the equitable interest; and both were authorized to draw the funds upon producing the [pass ]book. This is not all.... By the terms of the declaration of trust, upon the death of [] O’Neill!,] the balance on deposit became [ ] Whalen’s property, not by a gift and delivery of the [pass ]book, nor by the right of survivorship as one of two joint owners, nor by a gift of the ⁴²⁷ funds inter vivos, but purely and exclusively because the trust ... stripped [ ] O’Neill of her individual ownership of the money, and vested the money in her in trust, as to this balance, for [ ] Whalen, if the latter happened to outlive [ ] O’Neill. Milholland II, 89 Md. at 218, 43 A. at 45.

Milholland I, Milholland II, and their offspring established in the common law the general principle that “the usual entry ‘A in trust for A and B, joint owners, balance at the death of either to belong to the survivor’ is, unexplained, a sufficient declaration of trust, since it indicates an intention to establish the trust[.]” Bierau v. Bohemian Bldg., Loan & Sav. Ass’n, “Slavie” of Balt. City, 205 Md. 456, 461 , 109 A.2d 120, 123 (1954). Also established in the common law was the corresponding general principle that, “[i]f there was no intention to create a trust, none will be held to exist[,] no matter what words are used.” Id. at 461 , 109 A.2d at 123 (footnote omitted).

In other words, cases following Milholland I and Milholland II involving claims of ownership of a joint or multiple-party account focused on the intention of the creator of the joint or multiple-party account. Indeed, following Milholland I and Milholland II, “[i]n every case, the real purpose and intention of the donor, and not the [] use of one particular term or another, w[ould] decide the question of whether there was a trust.” Bierau, 205 Md. at 462 , 109 A.2d at 123 (footnote omitted); see also Jones, 211 Md. at 380 , 127 A.2d at 526 (“The distillation of the Maryland cases is that[,] in a contest between those claiming as co-owners or as surviving owner of a bank or building association account, th[is] Court has sought to find who was the original owner of the money on deposit, the intention of the owner as to the fund, the mechanics employed to effectuate that intent, and their effectiveness.”). Nevertheless, over time, this Court’s “decisions decided subsequent to Milholland I and Milholland II [ ] substantially ‘blended’ the distinction between the types of accounts discussed in those cases[, i.e., blurred the distinction between gift ⁴²⁸ and trust,] and suggested] that the surviving owner of a joint account may have survivorship rights upon the death of the depositor, even in the absence of ‘trust’ language on the titling document.” Hartlove v. Md. Sch. for the Blind, 111 Md.App. 310, 344 , 681 A.2d 584, 600 (1996), vacated on other grounds, 344 Md. 720 , 690 A.2d 526 (1997) (per curiam) (citations omitted). Indeed, Milholland I, Milholland II, and then-progeny “precipitated some uncertainty concerning ownership of multiple-party bank accounts following the death of the account holder.” Stanley v. Stanley, 175 Md.App. 246, 262 , 927 A.2d 40, 50 , cert. dismissed, 402 Md. 36 , 935 A.2d 406 (2007).

In response, the General Assembly enacted FI § 1-204. See Stanley, 175 Md.App. at 262 , 927 A.2d at 50 (The Court of Special Appeals stated that “the General Assembly enacted ... FI § 1-204” “[t]o resolve th[e] uncertainty” “concerning ownership of multiple-party bank accounts following the death of the account holder.”); Hartlove, 111 Md.App. at 343 n. 16, 681 A.2d at 600 n. 16 (The Court of Special Appeals noted that the General Assembly enacted FI § 1-204 “to alter the common law” and to “ ‘release[ ] courts from the gift and trust tests for determining where funds should go’ ” following the death of a party to a multiple-party account. (Citation omitted)).

That FI § 1-204 was intended to change the common law principles applicable to multiple-party accounts following the death of an individual is evident throughout House Bill 956’s file. For example, House Bill 956’s “Bill Analysis,” prepared by the House Economic Matters Committee, stated that House Bill 956 was intended to alter the common law and provided the following information as background: Currently, common law and case law govern the rights of parties with regard to multiple party accounts. There are two basic forms of multiple party accounts, the Trust Form and the Joint Form. The Trust Form reads “A in trust for A and B, subject to the order of either, balance on the death of either to the survivor”; the Joint Form reads “A and B as joint owners, subject to the order of either, balance on the death of either to the survivor”. ⁴²⁹ Under the Milholland cases (decided in 1899), on the death of one of the depositors, the assets in a joint account belong to the survivor if the account was in a Trust Form for the benefit of the survivor; conversely, if the Joint Form was used instead of the Trust Form, the assets in the account belong to the estate of the deceased depositor regardless of any other language in the contract creating the account.

House Bill 956’s “Bill Analysis” explained, to that end, that one of the changes or effects on current and future accounts would be that “[e]ach account agreement for a multiple-party account opened on or after January 1, 1992, must contain a clear and conspicuous written statement specifying that, unless contrary direction is given in the account agreement, upon the death of a party, the funds in the multiple-party account shall belong to the surviving party or parties.” Indeed, House Bill 956’s “Bill Analysis” emphasized survivorship rights, stating as follows: RIGHTS OF PARTIES Death of a Party The bill sets out the rights of parties in multi-party accounts. The basic rule is that, upon the death of a party to a multiple-party account, the right to any funds in the account is determined under the express terms of the account agreement. If the account agreement does not expressly establish the right to funds in the account upon the death of a party, or if there is no account agreement, any funds in the account upon the death of a party belongs [sic] to the surviving party or parties. (Emphasis omitted).

Language identical to that contained in House Bill 956’s “Bill analysis” is contained in House Bill 956’s “Floor Report.” Concerns about survivorship rights, or what occurred after the death of an individual who was party to a multiple-party account, were also expressed elsewhere in House Bill 956’s ⁴³⁰ file. According to a document submitted by the Maryland Bankers Association, 16 House Bill 956’s purpose was to “establish[] a statutory framework for the creation of ‘multiple-party’ deposit accounts and for the determination of the rights of persons who claim to have an interest in multiple-party deposit accounts.” The Maryland Bankers Association explained why House Bill 956 was needed, stating: Currently!,] there is no comprehensive Maryland law governing how to establish deposit accounts with multiple parties or how to determine who has rights in deposit account funds when more than one person is named on the account. Instead, deposit accounts are governed by various contradictory statutes scattered throughout the Maryland Code and by a series of cases first decided at the turn of the century. Current Maryland law often leads to uncertainty as to who has rights to funds in an account both during the life of[,] and after the death of[,] one or more persons named on an account.

This uncertainty leads to disputes between a deceased account holder’s estate and other persons who assert ownership of account funds. Moreover, current Maryland law is in conflict with the law applied by the [Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation] to establish ownership interests in jointly held accounts. (Emphasis added). The Maryland Bankers Association observed that, “[i]f the account agreement is silent as to the rights of the[] various individuals, then House Bill No. 956 [would] provide! that] an account party w[ould] have a right to funds in the account (i.e., w[ould] have survivorship rights) upon the death of another account party[.]” Jeffrey J. Radowich, the Chair-Elect of the Section of the Estate and Trust Law of the Maryland State Bar Association, testified in support of House Bill 956’s substantially identical counterpart, Senate Bill 756, explaining the problem posed by the then-existing common law as follows: ⁴³¹ The current state of the law is confusing[,] leads to uncertain results, and frustrates the intent[ ] of Maryland citizens.

A person thinks [that] he or she has established an account at a financial institution [that] will pass on that person’s death to another surviving person, but[,] after death[,] it turns out that the form of the account does not bring about that result. Instead, the property gets paid to the probate estate, and often ends up in the hands of an entirely different person. Testimony of Jeffrey J. Radowich, Chair-Elect, Section of Estate and Trust Law, Maryland State Bar Association, in Support of S.B. 756 (Feb. 28, 1991). Radowich testified that the problem was aggravated because “[d]ifferent financial institutions use various forms of language to describe the different kinds of multiple[-]party deposit accounts, compounding the confusion” and because “[c]urrent Maryland statutes have different provisions regarding certain types of multiple[-]party deposit accounts for savings and loan associations, on the one hand, and banking institutions, on the other hand.” Id.

Radowich posited that Senate Bill 756 provided a solution by setting forth “[c]lear and practical rules” establishing “four types of accounts, and stipulating the legal rights of the parties to the account.” Id. In sum, FI § 1-204’s legislative history demonstrates that the General Assembly’s intent was to abrogate common law distinctions between gift and trust established in Milholland I and Milholland II, and to erase the uncertainty that often accompanied the death of a party to a multiple-party account as to who was entitled to funds in the account. Our reading of FI § 1-204’s legislative history is consistent with Stanley, 175 Md.App. at 264 , 927 A.2d at 51 , in which the Court of Special Appeals stated: The history of [FI § 1-204] and its declared purpose make plain that the overriding intent of the [General Assembly] was to abrogate the common law rules concerning donative intent established by Milholland I and II, and to provide unequivocally that, in the absence of an account agreement that states otherwise, upon the death of one of the parties to ⁴³² a multiple-party account[,] the survivors own the funds in the account. At bottom, the General Assembly enacted FI § 1-204 to extinguish confusion regarding ownership rights of the funds in a multiple-party account following the death of one of the parties—as is evidenced by the concerns about survivorship rights expressed in House Bill 956’s file.

In enacting FI § 1-204, the General Assembly eliminated the need to resort to extrinsic evidence to establish the donative intent of the deceased. Upon our review of FI § 1-204’s legislative history, including a review of Milholland I, Milholland II, and subsequent case law, it is clear that the context of the common law and resulting enactment of FI § 1-204 concerned the ownership interest in funds contained in a joint or multiple-party account following the death of one of the parties, and not the ownership interests among living parties to a joint or multiple-party account. Stated otherwise, neither the common law as developed through Milholland I, Milholland II, and their .progeny, nor FI § 1-204 or its legislative history, demonstrates an intent to implicate the ownership interests among living parties to a joint or multiple-party account or to otherwise affect any agreement that may exist among living parties concerning the ownership interest in funds in the account. Instead, FI § 1—204(f) simply grants a party or a convenience person to a joint or multiple-party account the authority to access the account and withdraw funds, absent language in the account agreement expressly providing otherwise.

Because we hold that FI § l-204(f) does not confer ownership rights to the funds in a joint or multiple-party account—i.e., a party to a joint or multiple-party account is not an “owner” of the funds in the account by virtue of the circumstance that he or she has the authority to withdraw funds from the account—we perceive no merit in Wagner’s reliance on CR § 7-110(a) 17 for the contention that Wagner, ⁴³³ as an alleged “joint owner” of the Account, cannot be convicted of theft. As Chief Judge Barbera pointed out during oral argument, such a position presupposes that Wagner was a joint owner of the funds in the Account