Walker v. Grow

ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION KENNEY, J. Appellant, Elinor Walker, appeals the modification of the child support obligation of appellee, Ronald Grow, and the denial of attorney’s fees by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. She presents four questions, which we have reordered as follows: 1. Was the trial court’s decision to disregard aspects of appellee[’]s income for the purposes of calculating child support, including funds distributed to appellee through his corporation, error and an abuse of discretion? 2. Did the trial court err or abuse its discretion in failing to include work-related child care expenses and extraordinary monthly medical expenses when modifying child support in this matter?

Was it [an] abuse of discretion to order child support at an amount insufficient to provide the minor children with the material advantages enjoyed by appellee? Did the trial court err in failing to grant appellant’s request for attorney fees? For the following reasons, we shall vacate the circuit court’s judgment. 1 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY The parties, who have never been married, have two minor children together — fifteen year old Noah and twelve year old ²⁶⁴ Hope. They have engaged in several child support disputes over the years, the last of which resulted in a consent order dated November 14,1995.

According to the order, the parties agreed to child support payments by Grow in “the sum of $925 per month, plus 75% of the cost of the minor children’s day care.” On May 7, 2004, Walker moved for a modification of child support, alleging that the children’s expenses had increased, and that Grow’s income had increased. Walker requested that the court “recalculate child support on the basis of an ‘above Guidelines’ analysis of the joint income of the parties, the minor children’s expenses and other related factors.” Additionally, Walker requested attorney’s fees. The court held a hearing on December 7-8, 2004. Grow is the chief operating officer of Aliron International, Inc. (“Aliron”), and a shareholder in the company.

According to Grow’s 2003 federal income tax return, his adjusted gross income was $272,835. In his financial statement to the court, Grow listed his gross monthly wages at $12,499.06 ($149,988.72 per year). At trial, he was examined and cross-examined extensively on his expenditures, investments, and the perquisites of his employment. Grow testified that he has vacationed abroad in the last five years, pays a housekeeper, has had cosmetic surgery, makes $5,000 monthly payments on “a piece of artwork,” has a gym membership, and drives a Mercedes Benz.

He has provided financial assistance to his mother in dealing with her ownership of real property, and was paid a fee for management of his mother’s property. He owns various mutual funds, stocks, and real property in Maryland, Florida, and Costa Rica, including a 30 percent ownership interest in Aliron’s office building. His company provides his health insurance, pays for his cellular phone, and pays his expenses for overseas business trips. Gabrielle Kaufman, the accountant for Aliron and Grow, testified that Aliron is a Subchapter S corporation.

Grow is the minority shareholder, owning thirty percent, and Cora Alisuag, the president and chief executive officer, is the major ²⁶⁵ ity shareholder, owning the remaining seventy percent. Alisuag has the “ultimate authority” as to all business decisions, including “total discretion” with regard to distributions. Kaufman described Aliron’s financial structure, and testified to Growls income from the business. Walker testified that she is employed as an attorney for the County in the “Pro Se Project.” On her financial statement, she listed her gross monthly wages as $4,162.

She testified to various expenses associated with her home, and the costs of raising the children. The court found Walker’s monthly actual income to be $4,165, and Crow’s to be $12,442, for a combined adjusted actual income of $16,607. That amount exceeds the highest figure in the statutory schedule of basic child support obligations. In such a case, the court has discretion in setting the amount of child support.

The court reasoned: “After listening to all the testimony and arguments of counsel I view this as, really, a guidelines case.... I think this case, actually, in my view, proves the wisdom of using the guidelines in most circumstances.” Extrapolating from the statutory schedule, the court determined that Grow’s support obligation would be $1,609 per month, and denied Walker’s request for counsel fees. The court issued an order to that effect on December 21, 2004, which was entered on the docket on December 28, 2004. On January 7, 2004, Walker moved to vacate or, alternatively, to alter, amend, or revise the order.

On January 25, 2005, she noted this timely appeal. The circuit court denied Walker’s motion on February 14, 2005. DISCUSSION “The parents of a child are his natural guardians and, quite apart from the moral obligations of parenthood, owe the child a legal, statutory obligation of support.” Lacy v. Arvin, 140 Md.App. 412, 422 , 780 A.2d 1180 (2001). “A parent owes this obligation ... to the child regardless of whether the child was the product of a marriage.” Id. “The court may modify a child support award subsequent to the filing of a ²⁶⁶ motion for modification and upon a showing of a material change of circumstance.” Md.Code (1984, 2004 Repl.Vol.), § 12-104(a) of the Family Law Article (“Fam.Law”). If the combined adjusted actual income of the parents is $10,000 per month or less, the court must calculate the proper amount of child support using the statutory child support guidelines.

Fam. Law § 12-202; Johnson v. Johnson, 152 Md.App. 609, 614 , 833 A.2d 46 (2003). When the combined adjusted actual monthly income is over $10,000, “the court may use its discretion in setting the amount of child support.” Fam. Law § 12-204(d).

See also Johnson, 152 Md.App. at 614 , 833 A.2d 46 . “Several factors are relevant in setting child support in an above Guidelines case. They include the parties’ financial circumstances, the ‘reasonable expenses of the child,’ and the parties’ ‘station in life, their age and physical condition, and expenses in educating the child[ ].’ ” Freeman, 149 Md.App. at 20, 814 A.2d 65 (quoting Voishan v. Palma, 327 Md. 318, 329, 332 , 609 A.2d 319 (1992)). “Nevertheless, in above Guidelines cases, calling for the exercise of discretion, the rationale of the Guidelines still applies.” Malin v. Mininberg, 153 Md.App. 358, 410-11 , 837 A.2d 178 (2003) . Here, the court calculated the amount of child support by extending the scheduled support to a combined actual income of $16,607 per month. “Child support orders ordinarily are within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Shenk v. Shenk, 159 Md.App. 548, 554 , 860 A.2d 408 (2004). Likewise, “the question of whether to modify an award of child support ‘is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, so long as the discretion was not arbitrarily used or based on incorrect legal principles.’ ” Tucker v. Tucker, 156 Md.App. 484, 492 , 847 A.2d 486 (2004) (quoting Smith v. Freeman, 149 Md.App. 1, 21 , 814 A.2d 65 (2002)). “[W]here the order involves an interpretation and application of Maryland statutory and ease law, our Court must determine whether the lower court’s conclusions are ‘legally correct’ under a de novo standard of review.” Child Support ²⁶⁷ Enforcement Admin, v. Shehan, 148 Md.App. 550, 556 , 813 A.2d 334 (2002).

I. Grow’s Actual Income Walker argues first that the circuit court erred in computing Grow’s actual income by failing to include in the computation “pass-through” corporate income appearing on Grow’s income tax return. She also argues that the court erred in failing to include other income in its calculation. “When the chancellor exercises discretion with respect to child support in an above Guidelines case, he or she ‘must balance the best interests and needs of the child with the parents’ financial ability to meet those needs.’ ” Freeman, 149 Md.App. at 20 , 814 A.2d 65 (quoting Unkle v. Unkle, 305 Md. 587, 597 , 505 A.2d 849 (1986)). “[T]he parties’ financial circumstances” is among the relevant factors the trial court must consider. Freeman, 149 Md.App. at 20 , 814 A.2d 65 . Indeed, “ ‘the central factual issue is the “actual adjusted income” of each party.’” Johnson, 152 Md.App. at 615 , 833 A.2d 46 (quoting Reuter v. Reuter, 102 Md.App. 212, 221 , 649 A.2d 24 (1994)).

Accordingly, even in a case in which the statutory schedule of basic child support obligations does not apply, the trial court must ascertain each parent’s “actual income.” Fam. Law § 12-204(d) (providing for the court’s use of “discretion in setting the amount of child support” when the “combined adjusted actual income exceeds the highest level specified in the schedule”); Johnson, 152 Md.App. at 615-22 , 833 A.2d 46 (using the statutory definition of “actual income” to determine that a “bonus” received by the obligor should be included in the calculation, which caused the combined income to exceed $10,000). “ ‘Actual income’ means income from any source.” Fam. Law § 12-201(b)(l). “For income from self-employment, rent, royalties, proprietorship of a business, or joint ownership of a partnership or closely held corporation, ‘actual income’ means gross receipts minus ordinary and necessary expenses re ²⁶⁸ quired to produce income.” Fam. Law § 12-201(b)(2).

According to the statute: (3) “Actual income” includes: (i) salaries; (ii) wages; (iii) commissions; (iv) bonuses; (v) dividend income; (vi) pension income; (vii) interest income; (viii) trust income; (ix) annuity income; (x) Social Security benefits; (xi) workers’ compensation benefits; (xii) unemployment insurance benefits; (xiii) disability insurance benefits; (xiv) for the obligor, any third party payment paid to or for a minor child as a result of the obligor’s disability, retirement, or other compensable claim; (xv) alimony or maintenance received; and (xvi) expense reimbursements or in-kind payments received by a parent in the course of employment, self-employment, or operation of a business to the extent the reimbursements or payments reduce the parent’s personal living expenses. (4) Based on the circumstances of the case, the court may consider the following items as actual income: (i) severance pay; (ii) capital gains; (iii) gifts; or (iv) prizes. (5) “Actual income” does not include benefits received from means-tested public assistance programs, including temporary cash assistance, Supplemental Security Income, food ²⁶⁹ stamps, and transitional emergency, medical, and housing assistance. Fam.

Law § 12-201(b)(3)-(5). The court must verify the parents’ income statements “with documentation of both current and past actual income.” Fam. Law § 12 — 203(b)(1). “[S]uitable documentation of actual income includes pay stubs, employer statements otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence, or receipts and expenses if self-employed, and copies of each parent’s 3 most recent federal tax returns.” Fam. Law § 12 — 203(b)(2)(i).

In the case of a parent who is self-employed, “the court may require that parent to provide copies of federal tax returns for the 5 most recent years.” Fam. Law § 12 — 203(b)(2)(ii). A. S Corporation Pass-Through Income and Distributions According to Grow’s federal income tax return for 2003, his taxable income was $277,175. His 2002 and 2001 returns show taxable incomes of $174,751 and $249,148 respectively.

In the financial statement presented to the court, however, Grow indicated that his “gross monthly wages” were $12,360.25, or $148,323 per year. Gabriele Kaufman, Grow’s and Aliron’s accountant, testified that, because Aliron is a Subchapter S corporation, Grow’s federal income tax returns do not reflect his actual income. Rather, “[the] income of the business is flowed through to the shareholders and reported on the shareholder’s personal tax returns, and the taxes associated with that income [are] paid by the shareholders.” She testified that the income shown on the shareholders’ tax returns “doesn’t necessarily at all mean that they receive any of that income.” Kaufman explained that Grow did not “technically receive the income that was reported” on his tax returns: He doesn’t receive that income because first and foremost Mr. Grow is a minority shareholder of Aliron, and he has no, he has no rights to force the corporation to make distribu ²⁷⁰ tions. The majority shareholder has full discretion as to when and if distributions will be made.

And the second reason, which is another kind of major reason, is that the business needs to retain cash in the company in order for it to fund its ordinary and necessary expenses of the business, its operations, pay its payroll, pay its bills. Grow entered into evidence a 1040 tax return on which Kaufman had calculated his income without the pass-through income that was retained by Aliron, used to pay the company’s taxes, or distributed for business purposes, in addition to his 2003 schedule K-l, which shows his “Shareholder’s Share of Income, Credits, Deductions, etc.” Kaufman testified that, in calculating Crow's income without the corporate pass-through income, she subtracted the amount that appeared on the K-l as “Ordinary income (loss) from trade or business activities” and on line 17 of Crow's 1040, “Rental real estate, royalties, partnerships, S corporations, trusts, etc.” Kaufman also subtracted the amount that was reported on the K-l as “Investment income,” “Tax-exempt interest income,” “Charitable contributions,” and “Section 179 expense deduction.” She also subtracted the amount listed on the K-l under “Property distributions (including cash).” According to Kaufman, “most of [the distributions] relate to quarterly estimated tax payments that have to be made on the profits of this year’s income,” and “it might also be some distributions relating to some business investments that they made for the business.” Kaufman calculated Growls income as $149,359. Asked by counsel whether, “within a reasonable degree of accuracy,” that figure represents the actual amount of Crow's income, Kaufman responded in the affirmative. At the conclusion of her testimony, the court asked Kaufman to make the calculation on the stand: THE COURT: Ordinarily [if] somebody else, whether a private individual or a corporate individual pays your taxes, that’s income to you, isn’t it? ²⁷¹ [KAUFMAN]: In a general sense when another party pays for your expenses, yes.

THE COURT: Well, it could be a gift but I mean in a business situation. [KAUFMAN]: But with an S Corporation, it’s different. THE COURT: Why? [KAUFMAN]: Because the whole purpose of being an S Corporation is to avoid double taxation.... And the reason is because S Corporations have special rules with double taxation, and they don’t, it’s a vehicle, it’s an entity choice that allows you not to pay tax twice on the same income. It’s more tax efficient than a regular corporation.

THE COURT: Could you look at [Grow’s 2003 tax return] please? Looking at that return, which you prepared from information given to you by Mr. Grow, correct? [KAUFMAN]: Yes. THE COURT: Tell me, and if you need a calculator, I have one here.... What’s this man’s income for 2003, actual income?

What do we look at as his income for 2003 based upon that return? Because at one point as you can see [his] adjusted gross income is 272. And when you came up with his [income] without Aliron it’s 149. And what he told me was it’s 148.

So what’s his actual income? THE COURT: [Based on the tax return] he filed with the feds after you prepared it. Just looking at that, what should I regard as this man’s income for 2003? [KAUFMAN]: It should be, well, I need a calculator. THE COURT: I’m pleased to see you need one. [KAUFMAN]: It’s really to be, to be really straight with you, that’s why we use computers.

It’s not really possible for me on a calculator to come [to] exactly what his taxable income but— THE COURT: Well, is it 148 or is [it] 272? ²⁷² [KAUFMAN]: If we just go by, I’ll make it easy. We’ll go by adjusted gross income. Let me do it that way. It should come out to about 149,359 that I’ve come up with.

THE COURT: It should. [KAUFMAN]: Yeah. THE COURT: Does it? [KAUFMAN]: Yeah. Let me do it again because I messed up on your calculator. I’m a few hundred dollars off but— THE COURT: How much? [KAUFMAN]: A few hundred dollars off.

THE COURT: So it’s— [KAUFMAN]: But that’s because I’m not spending, I feel pressured with the time to not look for what my difference is. Oh, I know, I know what it might be. I see it. It’s going to come out exact.

It’s the state refunds. THE COURT: So how much is it? What’s your number? [KAUFMAN]: Okay. Let me just.

I just keep adding wrong numbers but it’s, it’s about 150,000,149,000. THE COURT: Now, you’re an accountant— [KAUFMAN]: I’m feeling pressure on a calculator here. If you would let me, if you want to wait a few minutes, I’ll do it. THE COURT: I’d like to know since you did the return, I’d like to take that few minutes— [KAUFMAN]: All right, good.

THE COURT: — and have you give me a definitive number and not a range, please. [KAUFMAN]: 149,359. Asked on cross-examination how she arrived at the figure, Kaufman explained: What I did was I took the adjusted gross income of 272,835 that was on his actual tax return. I subtracted out the 120,896 which was one component of the K-l which was on line 17. I subtracted the interest income related to the ²⁷³ business of 1,760.

That gave me 150,179. I subtracted out the difference in line 10, which is the state income tax refunds because some of that relates to the business and some of that is his personal tax refund. So I subtracted out that difference of $606. And because his income without Aliron is a little bit, slightly less than $150,000, he gets a small $214 loss from his rental property.

So to add that back, that gives me the 149,359. The court ultimately found that Grow’s income was slightly less than the amount testified to by Kaufman: ... I’m looking at [Walker’s] income on a monthly basis of being 4165, and [Grow’s] being 12442[,] which is a little different from what Ms. Kauffman [sic] said. She told me yesterday his income was, for 2003, was 149,359.

That’s about 12446 a month. In fact, in his financial statement he says 12499. But after — not that I don’t believe any other witness, but I, after I sort of pressed her and sort of made her do what I thought an accountant could do, not that she was unwilling, just felt uncomfortable, that the 4165 for the mom, 12442 for him seems accurate. After the court announced its findings, Walker’s counsel argued that the court should have included, among other things, a distribution from Aliron and interest on investments in its calculation of Grow’s actual income.

The court responded: “See, that doesn’t get me anywhere____ That’s business .... I don’t see that as being something I can turn into income.... ” The court based its child support award on its determination that Grow’s actual income is $12,442 per month, or $149,304 per year. 1. The Court’s Reliance on Expert Testimony Walker contends that the circuit court erred in accepting the testimony of Kaufman in determining Grow’s income. She argues that Kaufman acknowledged her lack of familiarity with the statutory definition of “actual income,” and that the court relied too heavily on her calculation. ²⁷⁴ A court may admit expert testimony, “in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if the court determines that the testimony will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Md. Rule 5-702.

In Gallagher v. Gallagher, 118 Md.App. 567 , 703 A.2d 850 (1997), a divorce and alimony case, we indicated that admitting the expert testimony of a certified public accountant to assist in determining the husband’s income was appropriate. The expert testified that the husband, who was a professional gambler, received more income than he had reported. Although the husband had failed to preserve the issue for appeal, we noted: The numerous, complex, financial transactions in which appellant was involved required that an expert, such as a Certified Public Accountant, be consulted in order to determine the nature and extent of appellant’s income and expenditures. It is clear that [the CPA] testified as to appellant’s income and expenditures and traced certain assets held in various bank accounts.

He also took certain statements and income tax records and drew from them conclusions. This is precisely what experts do.... Accordingly, we believe [the CPA] properly testified as an expert. Id. at 578-79 , 703 A.2d 850 .

In this case, the court was presented with a somewhat complex business and personal financial picture. The court found that Kaufman was qualified as a certified public accountant and an expert on tax planning and consulting for closely held corporations. Moreover, although an expert need not testify from personal knowledge, Kaufman did, in fact, prepare the tax returns that were the subject of her testimony. Moreover, Walker did not attempt voir dire prior to Kaufman’s testimony or object to her admission as an expert witness.

Walker cites Ley v. Forman, 144 Md.App. 658, 670 , 800 A.2d 1 (2002), for this Court’s statement: “The clear intention of the legislature requires the trial court to consider actual income and expenses based on the evidence. The court must rely on the verifiable incomes of the parties, and failure to do ²⁷⁵ so results in an inaccurate financial picture.” Kaufman did not testify as to Grow’s “actual income” under Fam. Law § 12 — 201(b). Indeed, she acknowledged that she was unfamiliar with the statutory definition of “actual income.” Rather, she explained that the income shown on Grow’s tax return is greater than the amount he actually received, and gave her opinion as to what that amount was.

In other words, she “assisted] the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Md. Rule 5-702. The court did not err in admitting her as an expert witness. Even if a witness is qualified as an expert, the fact finder need not accept the expert’s opinion. To the contrary, “ ‘an expert’s opinion is of no greater probative value than the soundness of his [or her] reasons given therefor will warrant.’ ” Surkovich v. Doub, 258 Md. 263, 272 , 265 A.2d 447 (1970) (quoting Miller v. Abrahams, 239 Md. 263, 273 , 211 A.2d 309 (1965)).

The weight to be given the expert’s testimony is a question for the fact finder. “The trier of fact may believe or disbelieve, accredit or disregard, any evidence introduced. We may not — and obviously could not — decide upon an appeal how much weight must be given, as a minimum to each item of evidence.” Great Coastal Express, Inc. v. Schruefer, 34 Md.App. 706, 725 , 369 A.2d 118 (1977) (citations omitted). Accord Edsall v. Huffaker, 159 Md.App. 337, 342 , 859 A.2d 274 (2004). Walker refers to Maranto v. Maranto, 192 Md. 214, 218 , 64 A.2d 144 (1949), in which the Court of Appeals said that “an expert witness cannot usurp the function of the courts to determine the legal sufficiency of evidence of mental incapacity.” In Maranto, an appeal from a divorce, the husband argued that the wife’s allegations demanded greater corroboration because a psychiatrist had testified that she was “a paranoiac, and it is usual for a paranoiac to exaggerate.” Id. at 217 , 64 A.2d 144 .

The Court noted that the psychiatrist, after having interviewed the wife, testified to his “general impression,” but could not recount any specific information about her. Id. at 217-18 , 64 A.2d 144 . Nevertheless, he ²⁷⁶ testified that she had a propensity to exaggerate and that she had exaggerated on the witness stand. The Court stated that, “[i]f a psychiatrist is to take over the function of courts and juries to pass upon the credibility of witnesses, he must furnish some basis for so doing more substantial than a general impression from forgotten facts.” Id. at 218 , 64 A.2d 144 .

Walker also directs us to Montgomery County Dept. of Social Servs. v. Sanders, 38 Md.App. 406, 423 , 381 A.2d 1154 (1977) (citations omitted), a child custody case in which we stated: Evidence offered by social workers, psychologists and psychiatrists may be necessary in custody cases. The equity court, however, is entitled to weigh that evidence along with contradictory testimony and its own observations. Reliance upon “the auxiliary services of psychiatrists, psychologists, and trained social workers ... should not be too obsequious or routine or the experts too casual.” Such reliance could lead the courts, in acts of misapplied psychology, to separate unjustly family members. “Particularly important is this caution where one or both parties may not have the means to retain their own experts and where publicly compensated experts or experts compensated by only one side have uncurbed leave to express opinions which may be subjective or are not narrowly controlled by the underlying facts.” We held that the trial court had not abused its discretion in returning the child to his mother’s custody despite the testimony of the Department’s expert that he should remain in foster care because of his age and the amount of time he had been away from his mother. We rejected the Department’s contention that the trial court should have accepted the expert’s opinion and ruled accordingly.

In our view, those cases are not controlling. Kaufman did not opine on the credibility of a witness or the legal significance of the evidence before the court. Because the ²⁷⁷ evidence included Grow’s financial statement and his tax returns, it was certainly appropriate for the court to consider Kaufman’s testimony on the issue in verifying Grow’s income. As the trier of fact, the court was free to “believe or disbelieve, accredit or disregard” any or all of Kaufman’s testimony, and we will not second-guess the weight it gave her testimony, or any other evidence.

Great Coastal Express, 34 Md.App. at 725 , 369 A.2d 118 . 2. Pass-Through Income and Distributions According to Walker, “it is obviously unjust to allow a parent to reap the many tax benefits of small business ownership while apparently minimizing his or her personal income and the support obligations that flow from it by leaving income in a privately held business.” Presumably, she is referring to Aliron’s retained earnings, and arguing that some portion of it should have been attributed to Grow as income. More directly, she contends that “Appellee’s most recent tax returns made it clear that he had received a sizeable distribution from his company, that he did so on a regular basis,” and that “these distributions should properly have been included by the chancellor in calculating Appellee’s income.” A “Subchapter S corporation” or “S corporation” is a company that is able, under federal tax law, to “enjoy the benefits of incorporation but avoid the taxation of both the corporate entity and its shareholders.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. O’Toole, 379 Md. 595, 605 , 843 A.2d 50 (2004) (citing 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 1361-1379 (2003)). “ ‘[The] corporation and its shareholders [are able] to avoid the double tax normally paid when a corporation distributes its earnings and profits as dividends.’ ” O’Toole, 379 Md. at 605 , 843 A.2d 50 (quoting Byrne v. Comm’r, 361 F.2d 939, 942 (7th Cir.1966)). “Thus, with few exceptions, the corporation does not pay tax at the corporate level, but its earnings ‘pass through’ to the shareholders who must report profits or losses on their federal and ²⁷⁸ state individual income tax returns.” O’Toole, 379 Md. at 605 , 843 A.2d 50 . Although the corporation may make actual distributions to its shareholders, the income reported on the shareholders’ tax returns does not necessarily reflect what the individual actually receives.

Rather, portions of the income are often retained by the corporation to pay taxes, operating expenses, and employee’s salaries. “Actual income,” for the purposes of determining child support, is “income from any source.” Fam. Law § 12-201(b)(1). “For income from self-employment, rent, royalties, proprietorship of a business, or joint ownership of a partnership or closely held corporation, ‘actual income’ means gross receipts minus ordinary and necessary expenses required to produce income.” Fam. Law § 12-201(b)(2). “ ‘Ordinary and necessary expenses’ does not include amounts allowable by the Internal Revenue Service for the accelerated component of depreciation expenses or investment tax credits or any other business expenses determined by the court to be inappropriate for determining actual income for purposes of calculating child support.” Fam. Law § 12-201 (i). “ ‘Actual income’ includes: (i) salaries; (ii) wages;” and “(v) dividend income.” Fam.

Law § 12-201(b)(3). We have found no Maryland cases, and have been directed to none by counsel, addressing the extent to which pass-through income or distributions from a Subchapter S corporation should be considered the actual income of a parent for child support awards. Several courts in sister states have considered the issue. In interpreting their own child