Walker v. State

HOTTEN, J. Appellant, Karl Marshall Walker, Jr., was indicted in the Circuit Court for Howard County for sexual abuse of a minor and attempted sexual abuse of a minor. On September 10, 2010, the circuit court denied appellant’s motion to suppress evidence seized from the desk he used while employed as an assistant to the special education teachers at an elementary school. Following a two day bench trial on September 21 and 22, 2010, the circuit court convicted appellant of both charges and imposed a sentence of thirteen years, with all but seven years suspended and five years of supervised probation. Appellant timely appealed, presenting the following questions: 1.

Was the evidence sufficient to convict Appellant of sexual abuse of a minor where the State showed only that ¹⁸ he exchanged inappropriate letters of a non-sexual nature with the alleged victim? 2. Did the court err in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress evidence seized during a warrantless search of his desk at his place of employment? For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgments of the circuit court. I. MOTION TO SUPPRESS A. Factual Background At the hearing concerning appellant’s motion to suppress, Mr. M., 1 the principal of the elementary school where appellant was employed, testified that appellant served as a “paraeducator,” which is an assistant to the special education teachers, during the 2009-2010 school year.

He stated that on March 17, 2010, a teacher gave him letters written by appellant that were found in the desk of either C.B. or her twin sister, third-grade students who shared a homeroom. Mr. M. testified that he called appellant that evening and left a voicemail message. When appellant returned Mr. M.’s call the following morning, Mr. M. advised that there was an investigation involving inappropriate communications between appellant and a student and that appellant should remain away from the school until further notice. Mr. M. also contacted other administrators, the head of his school’s security, and the police.

He stated that Detective First Class Erika Heavner and another officer arrived at the school on March 18, 2010. The officers asked Mr. M. about appellant and requested that Mr. M. provide consent to search the desk used by appellant. Mr. M. executed a consent form and led the officers to the desk. The officers opened the drawers and examined the contents as Mr. M. stood nearby. ¹⁹ At the hearing, Mr. M. described appellant’s desk, which was owned by the school system, as being located in the “first grade pod,” an area surrounded by three first grade classrooms, a technology classroom, and an alternative education classroom.

This common area also contained two other desks used by two other paraeducators. According to Mr. M., appellant did not share his desk with anyone and, as a returning faculty member, could retain the same desk from year to year. Appellant’s desk could have been locked, but appellant had not requested a key to lock the desk. Mr. M. also indicated that lockers were available for paraeducators to store their personal belongings, but, to his knowledge, appellant had not requested one.

Because appellant’s desk was located in a common area between classrooms, Mr. M. observed that there was a good deal of student traffic passing by appellant’s desk between classrooms and that small groups and after-school programs used the common area. He went on to state that the groups using the common area would not need to access appellant’s desk unless “to borrow a pencil or something like that.” Lastly, Mr. M. testified that appellant’s employment was terminated soon after March 18, 2010. Mr. M. collected some of appellant’s belongings from the desk, storing them in a bin in his office bathroom. Appellant never returned to the school to collect these items, but Mr. M. was uncertain whether appellant was allowed to enter the school.

Next, Detective Heavner, who was assigned to the Sexual Assault and Child Abuse Section of the Criminal Investigations Division, Family Crimes Unit of the Howard County Police Department, testified regarding her investigation on March 18, 2010. She indicated that she received Mr. M.’s permission to search the desk. Detective Heavner described the desk as having a vertical column of three drawers labeled “seminars, research data,” “student data,” and “learning” and a flat drawer in the center of the desk in front of the chair labeled “utensils.” In the drawers, she found greeting cards and assignments from various students, a printed excerpt of a book entitled “Laughter: A Scientific Investigation,” a blank ²⁰ “Paraeducator/Paraprofessional Voluntary Transfer Request Form,” a drawing of a bear, and a small cardboard box. The box contained a number of folded pieces of paper.

She stated that the first piece of paper was addressed to “Raven K,” a nickname for appellant, from “Steeler girl,” a nickname for C.B. Detective Heavner stated that once she saw the first paper on top, she placed all the papers back into the box and seized the box. On March 26, 2010, eight days later, Detective Heavner applied for and executed a search warrant for the box and its contents. The box contained a multitude of notes and cards that appeared to be from C.B. to appellant. Following the receipt of testimony and argument, the circuit court denied appellant’s motion to suppress, finding that appellant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of the desk.

The circuit court ruled as follows: I make my decisions based on the evidence that’s in front of me, this desk was, in fact, assigned to Mr. Walker, that’s without dispute. This desk was capable—he was invited by the school to lock it if he wished, that’s indisputable. This desk, and I’m looking at State’s [Exhibit] J, the photograph of the front of the desk, has a key lock on the drawer underneath where the seat—or right above the seat, the mid-drawer, it has a key lock. There’s no evidence that it’s not capable of locking.

This desk is in an open area where people have ample access to it. Given the nature of the use of the area it’s a type of place where you could reasonably expect people to sit down and use the surface when Mr. Walker wasn’t there. Because of the nature of the uses that the school system put it to there weren’t specific work sites, that I could see in photograph G, that would accommodate these interventions,[ 2 ] so it’s reasonable to think that this desk or any other desk could be used by other persons during these interventions or other uses of this open space and general space. This desk was not locked, it’s clear to me it was not locked. ²¹ And what’s of importance to me is the labels on the drawers.

Just because a person is permitted exclusive use doesn’t mean the person has to agree to permissive use. And look to the facts individually in each case to determine whether or not there’s been demonstrated a subjective expectation that his or her property or possessions will not be searched and whether or not that is an objectively reasonable expectation of the circumstances. All I know is that this was assigned to Mr. Walker, that it could have been locked but it was not, that’s in an open use area. And these labels are very important to me, the labels are as follows; on the general drawer it’s labeled utensil and desk items, then are three other drawers, they’re a tower—they’re stacked one on top of each other type drawers on the right side of the desk, the top drawer is labeled seminars and research data, the middle drawer is labeled student data, the middle drawer[ 3 ] is labeled materials, learning.

Now, if this was Mr. Walker’s personal space that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in then he certainly would not have any need to label the drawers, because he would know what was in the drawers. But, more importantly, the labels on the drawers are for items that cry out for collegial use, for use by other adults involved in the education of the children. There’s no reason to label these things unless the teacher, perhaps, he’s assisting needs to know how to get to student data based on one of the students in Mr. Walker’s absence. There’s no need to put utensils on a drawer except to direct anybody who needs a fork or something where to look.

These labels say to anybody who walks by, these drawers contain items that are generally used in the business of bettering our children. And I think that under the circumstances it has not been demonstrated that there was a reasonable expectation of privacy. So, therefore the police action conduct in this case ²² is not impermissible and I’ll deny the motion for that reason. B. Discussion Appellant contends that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence seized during the warrantless search of the desk.

According to appellant, the court’s findings that (1) the desk was located in a common area rather than a private office; (2) the desk was not locked when the police searched it; and (3) the desk drawers had general, non-personal labels were insufficient to support a finding of no reasonable expectation of privacy. The State counters that the circuit court correctly found that appellant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the desk because its location suggested that other people would use it, it was not locked, and the labels on the drawers suggested it was for “collegial use.” Additionally, the State avers that even if appellant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the desk, the principal’s consent rendered the search valid either under reasonableness or through apparent authority to consent. When reviewing a trial court’s decision on a motion to suppress, “we view the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing, and the inferences fairly deducible therefrom, in the light most favorable to the party that prevailed on the motion.” Williamson v. State, 413 Md. 521, 531-32 , 993 A.2d 626 (2010) (citing Bailey v. State, 412 Md. 349, 362 , 987 A.2d 72 (2010); Crosby v. State, 408 Md. 490, 504 , 970 A.2d 894 (2009); Longshore v. State, 399 Md. 486, 498 , 924 A.2d 1129 (2007); State v. Nieves, 383 Md. 573, 581 , 861 A.2d 62 (2004); Laney v. State, 379 Md. 522, 533 , 842 A.2d 773 (2004)). We will defer to a court’s fact-finding unless those findings are clearly erroneous.

Williamson, 413 Md. at 531 , 993 A.2d 626 ; Bailey, 412 Md. at 362 , 987 A.2d 72 ; Crosby, 408 Md. at 504-05 , 970 A.2d 894 . Still, “we review the ultimate question of constitutionality de novo and must ‘make our own independent constitutional appraisal by reviewing the law and applying it to the facts of ²³ the case.’ ” Williamson, 413 Md. at 532 , 993 A.2d 626 (quoting Bailey, 412 Md. at 362 , 987 A.2d 72 ). The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which is applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.... ” See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961); Williamson, 413 Md. at 534 , 993 A.2d 626 . A defendant who alleges that his or her Fourth Amendment rights have been violated “bears the burden of demonstrating his or her legitimate expectation of privacy in the place searched or items seized.” Williamson, 413 Md. at 534 , 993 A.2d 626 (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 , 99 S.Ct. 2577 , 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979)).

The challenger must establish (1) a subjective expectation that his or her property will not be searched and (2) that the expectation is objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Laney, 379 Md. at 545 , 842 A.2d 773 ; accord Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 , 119 S.Ct. 469 , 142 L.Ed.2d 373 (1998). “A defendant demonstrates a subjective expectation of privacy by showing that he or she sought ‘to preserve something as private.’ ” McFarlin v. State, 409 Md. 391, 404 , 975 A.2d 862 (2009) (quoting Smith, 442 U.S. at 740 , 99 S.Ct. 2577 ). Furthermore, “[t]o establish that the subjective expectation of privacy was objectively reasonable, a defendant must demonstrate that the law is prepared to recognize the expectation as ‘legitimate.’ ” Id. (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148 , 99 S.Ct. 421 , 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978) (noting that an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy is “more than a subjective expectation of not being discovered”)).

Finally, “whether a[] [public sector] employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy must be addressed on a case-by-case basis.” O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 718 , 107 S.Ct. 1492 , 94 L.Ed.2d 714 (1987). The Supreme Court has recognized that an employee may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her workplace. Id. at 716 , 107 S.Ct. 1492 (citing Mancusi v. ²⁴ DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 , 88 S.Ct. 2120 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1154 (1968)). “As with the expectation of privacy in one’s home, such an expectation in one’s place of work is ‘based upon societal expectations that have deep roots in the history of the [Fourth] Amendment.’ ” Id. (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 , 178 n. 8, 104 S.Ct. 1735 , 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984)).

Appellant directs our attention to Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 , 88 S.Ct. 2120 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1154 (1968), and O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 , 107 S.Ct. 1492 , 94 L.Ed.2d 714 (1987). In Mancusi, 4 392 U.S. at 368 , 88 S.Ct. 2120 state officials, without the benefit of a warrant, seized documents from DeForte’s desk, which was located in “one large room, which DeForte shared with several other union officials.” The Court held that DeForte had standing to challenge the admission of the documents at trial based on his Fourth Amendment rights for the following reasons: Since the Court in Jones v. United States,[ 5 ] [ 362 U.S. 257 , 80 S.Ct. 725 , 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960) ], explicitly did away with the requirement that to establish standing one must show legal possession or ownership of the searched premises, see 362 U.S. at 265-267 [ 80 S.Ct. 725 ], it seems clear that if DeForte had occupied a “private” office in the union headquarters, and union records had been seized from a desk or a filing cabinet in that office, he would have had standing. ²⁵ Cf. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 [ 51 S.Ct. 153 , 75 L.Ed. 374 (1931)]; Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 [ 40 S.Ct. 182 , 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920)]. In such a “private” office, DeForte would have been entitled to expect that he would not be disturbed except by personal or business invitees, and that records would not be taken except with his permission or that of his union superiors.

It seems to us that the situation was not fundamentally changed because DeForte shared an office with other union officers. DeForte still could reasonably have expected that only those persons and their personal or business guests would enter the office, and that records would not be touched except with their permission or that of union higher-ups. This expectation was inevitably defeated by the entrance of state officials, their conduct of a general search, and their removal of records which were in DeForte’s custody. It is, of course, irrelevant that the Union or some of its officials might validly have consented to a search of the area where the records were kept, regardless of DeForte’s wishes, for it is not claimed that any such consent was given, either expressly or by implication.

Mancusi, 392 U.S. at 369-70 , 88 S.Ct. 2120 . Therefore, the Supreme Court held that a union employee who shared an office with other union employees had a privacy interest in the office sufficient to challenge successfully the warrantless search of the office. Id. at 369 , 88 S.Ct. 2120 . Justice White dissented from the majority opinion in Mancusi and stated, “[although the Fourth Amendment perhaps protects the individual’s private desk in a union office shared with other officers or employees, I dissent from the Court’s extension of the protected area to the office door.” Id. at 377 , 88 S.Ct. 2120 .

In O’Connor, supra, 480 U.S. at 711 , 107 S.Ct. 1492 a physician filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against officials at the state hospital where he worked, alleging that their search of his office violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment. Based on Mancusi, supra, 392 U.S. 364 , 88 S.Ct. 2120 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1154 , and Oliver, supra, 466 U.S. 170 , ²⁶ 104 S.Ct. 1735 , 80 L.Ed.2d 214 , the Court “rejected] the contention ... that public employees can never have a reasonable expectation in their place of work[,]” holding that the “operational realities of the workplace, however, may make some employee’s expectations of privacy unreasonable when an intrusion is by a supervisor rather than a law enforcement official.” O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 717 , 107 S.Ct. 1492 . Furthermore, “[pjublic employees’ expectations of privacy in their offices, desks, and file cabinets, like similar expectations of employees in the private sector, may be reduced by virtue of actual office practices and procedures, or by legitimate regulation.” Id. The physician did not share his desk or file cabinets with any other employees, had occupied the separate office for seventeen years and kept personal materials in his office, including personal correspondence, medical files, correspondence from patients unconnected to the hospital, personal financial records, teaching materials, and personal gifts.

Id. at 718 , 107 S.Ct. 1492 . The Court also noted that there was no evidence that the hospital had any regulations or policies discouraging doctors from storing personal papers and effects in their desks or file cabinets, though “the absence of such a policy does not create an expectation of privacy where it would not otherwise exist.” Id. at 719 , 107 S.Ct. 1492 . Accordingly, the Court held that there was undisputed evidence that the doctor had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his desk and file cabinets. Id. at 718 , 107 S.Ct. 1492 .

Nevertheless, because the search at issue was conducted by a public employer rather than law enforcement, the Court applied a special needs reasonableness analysis, balancing the invasion of the employee’s “legitimate expectations of privacy against the government’s need for supervision, control, and the efficient operation of the workplace.” Id. at 719-20 , 107 S.Ct. 1492 (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 , 103 S.Ct. 2637 , 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 , 87 S.Ct. 1727 , 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967)). Applying precedent to the case at bar yields the conclusion that appellant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the desk. We recognize that appellant was assigned the ²⁷ desk and that he had used the same desk in prior school years. Yet, the desk was owned by the school system and was located in a large, open, well-traversed room.

This room was referred to as the “first grade pod,” connecting several classrooms, and contained desks for two other paraeducators. Because it was so centrally located, students and faculty routinely passed the desk. Small instructional groups and after-school programs also held meetings and conducted other activities in the large room, which was only secured at night when the custodians locked the doors leading to the outer hallways. Appellant could have taken steps to safeguard what he kept in the desk, but did not.

The principal of appellant’s school indicated that although other people at the school likely would not have reason to open the drawers of the desk, he stated that someone might look in the desk “to borrow a pencil or something like that.” Furthermore, at the time of the search, the drawers read “seminars, research data,” “student data,” and “learning.” Regardless of who originally placed them on the drawers, the labels suggested that the drawers contained school-related materials accessible to a wide range of persons, rather than appellant’s personal, private items. Cf. O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 718 , 107 S.Ct. 1492 (employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in desk and file cabinet in own office not shared with anyone else in which he stored personal documents); Gillard v. Schmidt, 579 F.2d 825, 828 (1978) (guidance counselor who was responsible for maintaining confidential student records and whose desk was in an office secured by a locked door had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his desk). Appellant could have used a private locker provided to him by the school, but he did not.

Appellant had the option of locking the desk, but he did not. The aforementioned facts, taken together, indicate that appellant did not have a subjective expectation of privacy, and even if he did, such an expectation was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances presented. Accordingly, we discern no error in the circuit court’s denial of appellant’s motion to suppress. ²⁸ II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL A. Factual Background At the bench trial, Ms. P. and Ms. C., teachers at appellant’s school, testified that on March 17, 2010, they found a letter in C.B.’s desk and gave it to Mr. M., because they found the contents inappropriate and disturbing.

Appellant, who had assisted in C.B.’s class that year, wrote the letter under the nickname “Raven-K” to “Steelergirl.” 6 The letter stated: U won’t see me after school 2day. I really miss u when we r away I can never get anytime wit u. U look so pretty n gorgeous 2day. Purple is my favorite color and u look so good in it.

I had a dream that we went 2 Las Vegas on a plane. I was screaming loud and you said, “Stop being a bitch and man-up.” I said, “O.K.” I love when u r forceful and mad. We had fun holdin hands and hugging. We watched movies and went to a club to dance.

I loved the bear u made me. I hoped the MSA went well. U r so smart and beautiful. U r right.

I care about u so much. My heart aches when I m away from u. If anyone ANYONE hurts u, I would fuekin kill them. Know that my V will always b-long 2 u.

I do think about kissing u sometimes but I’d never do it if u didn’t want 2. At ²⁹ least I can kiss your picture every night. I know this is a little strong but it[’]s how I feel about you. I hope u miss me as much as I miss u when we r away. [I] [a]m n V with U always.

C.B.’s teacher, Ms. P., testified regarding C.B.’s journal, in which C.B. wrote fictional stories as part of her school assignments. The journal was admitted into evidence, and Ms. P. stated that she had become concerned earlier in the school year when she read a story C.B. wrote detailing a camping trip with appellant. She brought the issue to the attention of the school psychologist because C.B. imagined going camping with an adult. The psychologist, however, found no issues with the journal entry because C.B. did not describe sharing a sleeping bag with an adult.

Both teachers, Ms. C. and Ms. P., described appellant as “friendly” and someone with whom students “were always willing to work.” He would give students “high fives” in the hallways and acted more like a friend than a teacher. Ms. C. stated that several students, including C.B., would hug appellant when he entered the classroom, with C.B. usually initiating the hugs. Ms. C. stated that she also hugged students if the student initiated the hug, but that she would only hold a student’s hand for behavioral purposes. Moreover, Ms. P. testified that she had chastised appellant for giving a student a chocolate bar, which was unfair to other students and contrary to the county school policy, and that appellant was understanding and indicated that he had not realized it was improper.

Ms. P. also articulated that appellant paid more attention to C.B., her sister, and another female student. She witnessed appellant discuss football with C.B. and her sister. She also saw appellant hug C.B., who appeared to have a crush on appellant, but she did not see appellant and C.B. holding hands. Ms. P. stated that she occasionally hugged students when they initiated, but that she did not hold students’ hands, even for disciplinary purposes.

Mr. M. testified and reiterated much of his testimony from the suppression hearing. He elaborated that during the ³⁰ course of appellant’s employment at the school, he had conversations with appellant, especially during appellant’s first year of employment, regarding appellant’s “overly friendly approach.” Specifically, Mr. M. stated that he counseled appellant about hugging students, to minimize the length of a hug, to “hug on the side,” and to extend a hand for a handshake instead. Next, Detective Heavner testified, restating much of her testimony from the suppression hearing. She stated that on March 18, 2010, before going to the school, she responded to a telephone call from C.B.’s mother, advising that she had recovered papers from C.B.’s backpack.

Detective Heavner retrieved the papers, which the State introduced as evidence. The papers included the following: • A heart-shaped piece of paper on which appellant wrote a letter to C.B., stating that he “missed [her] so much,” that he “hate[s] the weekends” because he did not get to see her, expressed sadness that she lost a game, told her that she was “still a winner to [him],” said he “just want[s] to hold, hug, and be with [her],” and wished her well on the Maryland School Assessment. • A letter from appellant to C.B., wishing her a “great weekend” and stating. “[h]ere is something sweet for the sweetest girl I now. Can I ask you to be my girl? I love having you in my life.

I won’t ask you for anything than to just be there for me. I need you in my life and can’t live without you. Just be there for me.... M[y] ¥ B longs 2 U____” • A piece of paper on which Mr. Walker listed “[t]hings” he loved: God, music, family, life, fitness, exercise, the Ravens, football, baseball, basketball, jazz, piano, and “Steeler Girl.” Appellant also wrote “I hope you don’t think I’m weird, but I really do care about you.” • A letter from appellant in which he wrote that he “liked” C.B.’s “outfit” that day, told her that her name meant “ ‘Curly-hair’ and ‘cutey’ ” and that his name meant “strong free man,” called C.B. his “very best friend,” and ³¹ told her that her hug “made [his] day” and that his “heart races a 1,000 beats per minute” when they talk. • A letter in which appellant wrote the following: I really missed you over the weekend.

The whole weekend I kept thinking about you. Wondering what you were doing. Sorry for being in a funky mood 2day. I have to be honest with you.

I am sad because I really love you and I know I’m not supposed to. I’m not some perverted child psycho stalker. I don’t think perverted thoughts of you. I just have a deep love and care for you.

I keep trying to stop feeling this way about you, but I just can’t. I have dreams every night of holding you, you sleeping in my arms. Having belching contests. Arguing over the Ravens and Steelers (they suck suck suck).

Then you get real mad and starting beating me up. Then we apologize, hug, and hold hands. When I see you I get so happy, then I get very sad. I can’t hold your hand.

We can never spend time together. Seeing you go home on the bus is the worst part of my day. I love giving you things because it’s the only way I can show you how much I love you. I feel like I’m going crazy.

I also heard you have a boyfriend. That has me very depressed. Please don’t think of me as some creep or monster. I don’t want to lose your respect.

I feel like Cullen in the Twilight stories and you are the girl.[ 7 ] I have tried to make myself not like you, but too late. I have fallen for you hard. Maybe I do need to go to another school. Just know that I am totally in love with you and will never stop caring for you.

I am sorry for feeling this way about you. Please don’t think bad of me.... P.S. Tear this up after you read. Tear the other notes too. ³² • A letter from appellant, stating: “Your sister told me about you and Randy.

You could have told me. I won’t bother you anymore.” • A letter in which appellant apologized to C.B. for “picking [her] up too high” and told her about a dream as follows: We went to the movies to see Twilight Eclipse. You sat in my lap and put your arms around my neck and kissed me on my cheek. THEN FELL SLEEP!

I tried to wake you but you snored LOUD in my face. So I kissed you 7 times on your for[e]head and once on your lips. You woke up and we watched the rest of the movie with you in my arms and your head on my chest. • A letter in which appellant formed an acrostic from C.B.’s name to give her compliments, including that she was cute, sweet, and the “bomb,” and called her his “soup R ★ 4 ev R.” • A letter in which appellant told C.B. that he “like[d] seeing [her] smile at [him] again,” thanked her “for making [him] smile again,” and told her that she was his “only love.” • Another letter in which appellant used C.B.’s name to give her compliments. • Letters in which appellant wished C.B. well on the Maryland School Assessment. • A letter in which appellant apologized for not coming to a Valentine’s Day party and told C.B. that “[they] have to play basketball so that [he] can see if [he] can beat [her].” • A heart-shaped piece of paper on which appellant wrote that he loved “C.B.” and told her that “[o]nly [her] hugs can melt [his] heart” and that it “makes [his] day” when she holds his hand. • A letter from appellant with the following poem for C.B.: When the weather outside is frightful. Being at home is so delightful.

But it makes me miss you so. When school is closed because of the snow. YOU R SNOW BEAUTIFUL. :) ³³ • A letter in which appellant listed the following “reasons [he] think[s] [C.B.] [is] wonderful and care[s] about [her] so much[:] 1. You are so beautiful. 2.

You are a good person. 3. You have nice curly hair. 4. You are intelligent. 5. You like to crack jokes and have sense of humor. 6.

Even when you are mad I think you are so pretty. 7. You like music. 8. You like being different.” • A letter from appellant, stating: Thank u 4 reading with me. It seems everytime [sic] I wanna spend time with u some 1 interrupts.

I want to kick those kids [i]n their stupid heads. U looked so pretty 2day. [I] [a]m n V with u so much. I wish we could spend more time 2gether. U r so much fun.

Write 2 me when u get a chance. V ed your bear u made 4 me. I hope your sister was not sad 2day. She is a good friend but you r my girl and my love.

Never 4get that. • A letter in which appellant wrote that he “miss[ed]” C.B., was “sad” when he was away, and congratulated C.B. on making honor roll. • A letter in which appellant drew a heart with the words “Olive U” inside the heart. • A note from appellant, stating “Emily asked me if I had six-pack abs, I said yes, but they are for one person to see. That’s Steeler girl.” • Pictures of hearts containing the words “Mr. Steelergirl.” • A letter in which appellant used pictures to tell C.B. that she was talented, gifted, and perfect. • Drawings of cartoon characters, including the Tasmanian Devil, Tweety Bird, Snoopy, Nemo, the Cat in the Hat, Daffy Duck, birds, and a shark. Also during Detective Heavner’s testimony, the State introduced into evidence the items found in the desk, which included: • A blank “Paraedueator/Paraprofessional Voluntary Transfer Request Form.” ³⁴ • A piece of paper on which C.B. used the letters of appellant’s name to give him compliments, including that he was “wonderful,” “amazing,” “kind,” and “rad (cool)” • Drawings of birds, a giraffe, a dinosaur, people, and a seahorse. Some of the drawings were signed by C.B. “With love” or “With all my love.” • A heart with the initials “CW” in it. • A letter from C.B. in which she wrote to appellant: “I don’t think your [sic] weird at all.

When you give me things it makes me fell [sic] special. Thank—you that you care for me.” • A handwritten Valentine’s Day card from C.B. to appellant. • A drawing of a heart in which C.B. wrote the name “Raven K” and the words “awesome,” “great,” “nice,” “cool,” “good,” “sweet,” and “intelligent.” • A drawing of a bear in which C.B. wrote “[her elementary school] Rocks! Go Bears.” • A Christmas card to appellant from a student named Emily. • Papers with pictures of a snowman, a turkey, a gingerbread man, and other things. One piece of paper from a student named Ciara stated “I like WOCR he is [nice] to me.” Other papers contained stamps of bears holding hearts with “I love you” written on them. • A chapter on “ticklish relationships” from a book entitled “Laughter: A Scientific Investigation.” Various portions of the chapter are highlighted, including a statement that “[t]he response to tickle is an innate, socially and behaviorally complex reaction directed toward terminating the stimulus that triggered it” and discussions about the history of tickling, the role of tickling in some sexual fantasies, the reasons a person cannot tickle himself or herself, and whether any non-human animals are ticklish. 8 ³⁵ On the same date as the search of the desk, Detective Heavner and Detective Brandy Kurty interviewed appellant, taping the interview.

The State played the interview for the circuit court. Arriving wearing a Ravens jacket, appellant admitted during the interview that he gave C.B. letters and drawings beginning around Christmas of 2009. He maintained, however, that there was nothing in the letters “about touching [him] inappropriately or anything like that” and that he never attempted to contact C.B. outside of school. He explained: I care for her greatly....

I don’t want to hurt anybody’s kids.... And, I, that’s not what I’m about, and I’m not about ... child grooming.... [M]y intent is not to groom somebody’s child with the purpose of committing any type of lewd act or anything like that, I just, it was just conversations going back and forth.... [N]othing romantic, no I, I wouldn’t say it was romantic at all, it just, I just, I just really care for her because you know, she reminded me a lot of when I was a kid ... and when I was around her age, um, she used to share with me a lot of issues that she had with anger and I used to share with her, well, I had a lot um, then, you know, any, you know, when, when you’re writing back and forth, you know, it just sometimes, it just, you, you’re going back and forth and you’re going back and forth and you know, and I should have cut it off[.] Appellant further stated that “it’s not even a physical connection at all, it’s not, I have no sexual fantasies about [C.B.] whatsoever, or anybody’s children.” 9 Appellant ended the interview by asking whether he could tell C.B.’s parents that he was sorry and stating that he was willing to transfer to a different school to help C.B. and her family. Detective Heavner testified that she received additional papers from C.B.’s mother in the following month, including a ³⁶ letter in which appellant told C.B. that she “can be honest with [him]” and “tell [him] anything” and stated that he would never “hurt [her]” and would “understand” if C.B. “want[ed] a boyfriend or like[d] someone.” Detective Heavner also searched appellant’s apartment pursuant to a warrant, but did not find any child pornography. C.B.’s mother testified that she recalled an afternoon in December 2009 when C.B. got off the school bus in tears.

She explained that C.B. was upset because appellant might be transferring to another school that school year or the next. She stated that C.B. was visibly upset the entire afternoon, which was a Friday, but that it was not “an issue by the time [C.B.] went back to school” the next Monday. C.B.’s mother stated that the school contacted her on March 17, 2010 regarding the letter in C.B.’s desk. She took C.B. and her twin sister to the Child Advocacy Center, where they met with detectives.

She also searched C.B.’s backpack and room, finding the letters she gave to Detective Heavner. She elaborated that soon after finding the letters, C.B. was upset and displayed temper tantrums when they would discuss appellant. According to C.B.’s mother, C.B.’s behavior returned to normal “almost immediately,” but there were two consecutive days in August 2010 when C.B. was upset because she had been thinking of appellant. C.B. testified that she knew appellant as a “friend at school.” She recalled exchanging letters with appellant in which they referred to each other as “Raven K” and “Steeler girl,” but she could not remember when they began exchanging letters.

She stated that she and appellant would hand each other letters at the end of the school day as she headed to her bus. They would hug each other, but only in the presence of other children, with whom appellant also regularly exchanged hugs and “high fives.” Finally, C.B. testified that appellant held her hand and gave her money and candy. At the close of the State’s case, appellant entered stipulations into evidence that C.B.’s two brothers would have testified that they knew appellant from elementary school, that he ³⁷ regularly gave candy to students, and that he was generally a fun and nice guy. Appellant moved for a judgment of acquittal on the grounds that